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Abstract
This project seeks to explain what happens to armed organizations after they sign peace
accords. Why do they dissolve, return to war, or form non-violent socio-political entities
(political parties or civic associations)? To explain variation in post-war outcomes, my argument
centers on the human geography of armed groups. Recruitment, deployment, and post-war
migration patterns generate distinct configurations of a) collective capacity, b) relations with
civilians, and c) inter-armed group dynamics. I propose that, if a rebel or paramilitary unit
recruits in a geographically concentrated area and deploys its fighters in their home communities,
the organization will persist and transform into a socio-political entity after disarming. If instead
the organization recruits in a dispersed manner, deploys its soldiers away from their towns of
origin, and the soldiers either return home or displace to a third locale, the group will
disintegrate; it will lose its capacity for collective action. By bankrupting some organizations and
preserving others, demobilization has differential effects on armed group capacity. Where it
weakens a group, it destabilizes the territorial bargains between the ex-armed group and state and
between the group and its contiguous, non-state armed actors. As a result, resumed war becomes
likely. If instead, the distribution of power within the system is maintained, the groups will, over
time, fully demilitarize and be brought into the state's legal framework. This dissertation is based
on rich data collected during fourteen months of fieldwork in Colombia from 2006 to the present
during which time I went inside each demobilizing organization to reconstruct and map its post-
war trajectory. Exploiting Colombia's unparalleled comparative laboratory for this research, I
test the effect of recruitment, deployment, and post-war migration patterns on organizational
outcomes using two strategies. First, I conduct a detailed, controlled comparison of armed groups
in three regions of Colombia based on interviews of over 200 ex-combatants, civilians, and
victims. The second strategy combines these qualitative sources with quantitative ones to
evaluate the proposed hypotheses on the entire universe of municipality-armed group dyads in
Colombia (n=1040). For this analysis, I rely on municipal-level violent event data, interviews of
nearly 100 Colombian experts on the armed conflict, a database of seven years of news articles,
and statistical evidence from a series of surveys of former paramilitaries (n=31,472). The
empirics provide strong support for the proposed model. The project has significant implications
for debates on reintegration, state-building, consolidating peace, reconciliation,
decriminalization, and transitions to democracy.
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Part I.
Chapter 1
Introduction
I. The Puzzle: Three Divergent Outcomes
Juan Pinilla, Camilo Ospino L6pez, and Felipe Villegasi all fought in the Colombian
paramilitaries and disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated during the peace process of 2003-
2006. Their trajectories diverged, offering insights into the varying outcomes of demilitarizing
groups during war to peace transitions.
Campaigns
Juan Pinilla surrendered his gun and demobilized with the Bloque Cacique Nutibara
(BCN) on the November 25th, 2003. Juan had done the things that most in his Medellin
shantytown did. He joined a neighborhood posse at age 10, a gang at age 12 and an armed
faction, either rebel or paramilitary, at age 14. On his way home one night, he witnessed the rape
of his neighbor, Ana Maria. He was powerless to stop it. After the rapists stormed his home and
threatened him with torture and execution if he opened his mouth, Juan created a rival gang
(combo) with his childhood companions. He had observed that the most popular and feared kids
in the city were those with motorcycles, arms, and money - those that belonged to the gangs.
With his combo, he rid the area of the rapists' group and cleansed the thieves, drug addicts and
petty criminals from his beloved neighborhood. Several years later, his gang joined the ranks of
the Bloque Cacique Nutibara paramilitaries who promised them protection and pay. As a
paramilitary, Juan operated as a hitman, assassinating everyone on his lengthy to-do list:
1 A majority of my interviews were conducted in confidentiality and the names of interviewees are withheld by
mutual agreement and changed in the text in order to protect my respondents and to adhere to the Human Subjects
Protocol. I therefore do not cite my interviewees' names unless they granted me permission to do so. These names
have been altered (Ex-paramilitaries, interviews by author, Medellin, Bogotd, and Apartad6, January - July, 2008).
guerrilla militiamen, rival paramilitary fighters, leftist sympathizers, and unauthorized drug
dealers.
When Don Berna ordered Juan to disarm as part of a peace process, he obeyed. After
relinquishing his gun, he and his BCN comrades returned home to live amidst the communities
they had abused, patrolled, extorted, and governed; the communities they had never left. Their
former armed employer, the BCN, endured, transforming into a powerful, non-violent, proto-
state organization with a monopoly of 'social work' in Medellin's poor neighborhoods and
possession of several local government posts. All 4,000 of his fellow ex-combatants joined. The
organization laundered its extensive, illicitly accrued resources and financed its continued reign
over Medellin. Its now 'licit' domination remained unchallenged for several years.
Bankruptcy
On December 10th of the following year, Camilo Ospino L6pez, disarmed with 1,434
fighters from another paramilitary group, the Bloque Catatumbo, on the Venezuelan border.
Camilo was from the far off coastal region of Sucre. Before joining the autodefensas, he had
completed his mandatory military service and returned home to find his parents massacred by the
guerrillas for not complying with their extortion dues. Driven by a desire for revenge, Camilo
tried to rejoin the Colombian armed forces. He also craved the respect, status, and adventure he
had reveled in with a gun. He was turned away. The local mayor recommended him instead to a
paramilitary commander in the region who had a reputation for paying his foot soldiers well.
Soon after joining the paramilitaries, he was deployed to the drug and rebel producing
Catatumbo region near the Venezuelan border, some 800 kilometers from his home. For three
years, he trudged through jungles and mountains, embattling the guerrillas and civilian
communities.
After surrendering their guns, he and his ex-combatant colleagues and leaders dispersed
back to their homes in the coastal regions of Urabi, Cordoba, Sucre, and Atlantico and his
paramilitary brigade dissolved. Already uprooted by the war, Camilo chose not to return home as
there was little left for him there. With no ties to the Catatumbo region, he decided to migrate
instead to Bogoti which promised anonymity and work in the capital's shantytowns. He
evaporated into civilian life and maintained no ties to his former comrades. Camilo's expired
Bloque Catatumbo left a power vacuum on the Venezuelan border that quickly filled with a
miscellany of actors from the underworld: rearmed paramilitary factions, pre-existing criminal
mafias and narco-trafficking cartels who became embroiled in persistent fighting.
Guns
Two years later, a third soldier, Felipe Villegas, disarmed with the last of the 34
paramilitary factions - Bloque Elmer Cardenas (BEC) and its 1,536 fighters on the Panamanian
frontier. Felipe had joined the paramilitaries fifteen years prior after demobilizing with the EPL
guerrillas. The EPL's political party - Hope, Peace and Liberty - was massacred by the FARC
who accused it of betraying the revolution. 2 Fearing for his life, he joined his former enemy's
ranks - the paramilitaries - who promised him protection in exchange for his military savvy,
penetrating intelligence and widespread social web. His years in the BEC were spent managing
the paramilitary group's extortion and trafficking activities and recruiting fighters native to the
region.
After disarming, Felipe and his local, ex-combatant comrades continued to live where
they had patrolled and joined the BEC's civilian reincarnation, 'Constructors of Peace.' Felipe
worked on one of Constructors of Peace's palm plantations and spent all of his free time with his
former paramilitary companions. He kept his radio and resumed his daily reports to his battalion
2 EPL stands for Popular Liberation Army; the FARC are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.
ex-commander, alias, 'El Gato.' 'El Gato' was his source of guidance, employment, and security.
He was not alone in turning to 'El Gato' for assistance. When members of the community
wanted to build a school, punish a thief, find work, or collect a debt, they went to see 'El Gato.'
Two years after disarming, rumors circulated of the 'Paisas,' a remilitarized faction comprised of
BEC's neighboring Bloque Heroes de Tolovi. Threatening pamphlets, a series of assassinations,
and civilian protests announced its emergence and encroachment of BEC territory. Felipe was
called back to full-scale war by 'El Gato' who remilitarized his battalion in the form of the
Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia.
11. Introduction
Bankruptcy, Guns, or Campaigns. These are the puzzling, divergent trajectories of
demilitarizing groups, which my project seeks to explain. Militia, paramilitary, and rebel groups
disarm across the globe and yet we have a surprisingly weak understanding of why they dissolve,
endure, and redeploy for war or peaceful politics. In Nepal, the Maoists crowned their transition
from underground insurgency to open politics with a victory in the 2008 elections while in
Guatemala, the URNG could not muster sufficient support to succeed as a legitimate political
actor. In Afghanistan "militia leaders in the north still command the loyalty of thousands of
fighters who can be mobilized quickly" (RFE 2007) while in Sierra Leone, the RUF "is obsolete"
(UN 2003). This variation remains underexplored and poorly theorized. And yet, the war
termination literature points to the centrality of disbanding armed groups and turning them into
political entities and the UN considers "demobilizing combatants [to be] the single most
important factor determining the success of peace operations. Without demobilization, civil wars
cannot be brought to an end and other critical goals - such as democratization, justice and
development - have little change for success" (UN 2004). A better understanding of the
mechanisms that generate distinct post-war outcomes is a prerequisite for productive theory-
building on post-conflict state-building, consolidated peace, reconciliation, and transitions to
democracy.
This project seeks to fill this gap and explain what happens to armed organizations after
they sign peace agreements and disarm. Why do they dissolve, return to war or transform into
non-violent socio-political entities such as political parties or civic associations? To do so, it
adopts an organizational approach that impacts how we think about many important questions in
social science and challenges the micro and macro level analyses that dominate the civil war
research agenda. This project emphasizes the explanatory leverage of human and social
geography, contesting the causal priority afforded physical terrain and natural resources in the
peace scholarship. Methodologically, the analysis assumes a multi-method, sub-national
approach and disaggregates organizations to their most critical units.
To explain variation in armed groups' post-war trajectories, my argument identifies two
key factors. First, I find that where armed groups recruit and deploy their fighters determines the
combatants' network structures and post-war migration and thus, whether the organization
survives or disintegrates. It also determines the group's embeddedness in the civilian population
and its ability to maintain political influence without arms. I conclude that non-local rebel and
paramilitary groups, which recruited their fighters from dispersed regions, are prone to
disintegration. In contrast, local militarized groups, which drew a majority of their recruits from
the communities in which they fought, are comprised of combatants who are strongly linked to
each other, remain concentrated in the zone of deployment post-war, and are entrenched in their
communities. These local groups thus face a high probability of persisting and forming
legitimate political entities after disarming.
Second, by bankrupting some organizations and preserving others, demobilization has
differential effects on armed groups' collective capacities. Where it weakens a group, it
destabilizes the territorial bargains between the group and state and between the group and its
contiguous, non-state armed actors. It also creates high levels of noise and optimism around the
extent to which it has done so. As a result, renegotiating bargains becomes difficult and resumed
war likely. If instead, the distribution of power within the system maintains, the militarized
groups will, over time, fully disarm and be brought into the state's legal framework.
This Introduction advances in two sections. It specifies how the project contributes to key
questions in Political Science and challenges existing theoretical explanations of post-war
outcomes. The chapter concludes with a road map for what lies ahead.
III. Micro and Macro Approaches
Scholars who write about peace analyze either the individual or country units of analysis.
The micro approach seeks to explain variation in individual ex-combatants' reintegration
success. It studies why former fighters vote, find jobs, avoid psychological trauma, and behave
as normal civilians and points to characteristics of the ex-combatants such as their age,
education, and exposure to violence during the war.3
Despite a recent push to the micro level, the majority of civil war research remains at the
country level. The macro approach seeks to explain why countries experience recurrent war or
3 Humphreys and Weinstein 2007 finds that former soldiers who experienced greater violence in Sierra Leone prove
less likely to reintegrate successfully. Blattman and Annan Forthcoming concludes that soldiering has detrimental
effects on economic, but not psychological, reintegration and Blattman 2009 argues that abduction leads to increases
in political participation in Uganda. An ongoing study by Mvukiyehe, Samii, and Taylor investigates the micro-
dimension of peacekeeping in Burundi. Several policy-oriented works evaluate UN and World Bank DDR program
designs (Colletta et al. 2006; Pugel 2006 (Liberia); CHF International 2007 (Liberia)).
peace and focuses on the role of security guarantees and addressing the grievances that lead to
war in the first place.4
Missing is a literature on the organizational dynamics of conflict resolution and peace
building. How can we study the peace process in El Salvador without knowledge of the FMLN
and ORDEN? How can we research reintegration in Sierra Leone without exploring the
trajectories of the RUF and Civil Defense Forces? Organizations are critical actors in the post-
war environment and can enable us to understand why organized violence reappears and why
peace consolidates and what that peace looks like. Accordingly, this project places the
organization at the center of its causal story of war to peace transition.
While an exciting, new literature has emerged on organizations during war, studying their
onset, recruitment, repertoires of violence, and governance strategies, this literature has not
broadened the analysis to armed organizations after a peace is signed.5 For this reason, I have
devoted several years to extending this research agenda to the post-war period, getting inside the
opaque, secretive, armed structures, and understanding how individual fighters live within their
constraints. I have collected original, fine-grained data on demilitarizing groups that enable me
to build theory and test hypotheses at this level of analysis at which little work has been done.
IV. An Organizational Approach
'Organizational weapons' are "a source of power [which when] tapped ... may be ...
diverted to other, more far-reaching aims." - Philip Selznick 6
By placing the organization at the center of the analysis, this project generates theory on
several critical spheres of conflict studies: a) the inner workings of rebel and paramilitary groups;
4 Walter 1997, 2004; Toft Forthcoming.
5 Kalyvas 2006; Wood 2003, 2006; Petersen 2002; Kasfir 2009; Weinstein 2006; Lichbach 1995.
6 Selznick 1952.
b) the alliances and disputes between these groups; c) their dynamics with the state; and d) the
interactions between them and civilian communities (Figure 1). The project then synthesizes
these usually separately analyzed spheres to gain traction on the macro post-war landscape.
Figure 1. Inputs into the Analysis 7
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I will briefly break down the project's contribution in each of these spheres and then suggest
how, combined, the project refines our existing thinking on civil war and peace.
First, the project offers a lens into the opaque interior of armed structures. It demonstrates
how strategic decisions at the upper rungs of leadership, such as those of soldier deployment,
interact with micro decisions at the lower tiers of command, such as those of migration, to
generate distinct organizational outcomes: survival or bankruptcy. The project further explores
where institutional stickiness and lock-in dominate, rendering group trajectories path-dependent,
and where instead there exists maneuverability for policy to impact outcomes.
7 In turning this dissertation project into a book manuscript, I plan to also consider the dynamics between the armed
organization and external states and the international community.
8 For path dependency theory, see North 1990; Pierson 2004; Mahoney 2000.
Second, by examining the dynamics between former armed entities and between these
entities and the state, the project facilitates revisions to interstate conflict theories of intrastate
war.9 Using micro, field-based data,10 it indicates the conditions under which illegal non-state
actors can be treated justifiably as states and when this analogy with the international system
reaches its limits.
Finally, the project enhances our process-oriented understanding of the relationship
between ex-combatants and their communities and generates new insights into civilians'
rejection, tolerance and even endorsement of coercive rule and its legacies. The project confers
agency upon non-combatants rather than treating them as passive by-standers to the fate of their
communities' governance.
Weaving together these pieces, the project finds the common, critical thread to be human
geography; where individuals are, and who they are tied to, matter immensely in explaining inter
and intra group dynamics. Mapping this geography yields interesting refinements of our
conventional wisdoms of war and peace.
V. Divergence from Conventional Wisdoms of Post-War Outcomes
This study questions the deterministic role afforded resources in explaining post-war
outcomes. The political economy of war theories predict that resource-rich groups are more
likely to remilitarize and splinter, and are less likely to form socio-political entities than are
resource-poor units." While focusing on processes during war, resource determinism offers four
9 Interstate theories applied to intrastate realm include Walter 1997; Fortna 2004.
10 This sub-national data contrasts with most existing studies of intrastate violent outcomes which use national-level
data: democracy scores, natural resources, life expectancy, GDP, etc. See, for example, Walter 2004; Collier and
Hoeffler 2004; Collier et al. 2003; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2001, 2002; Hegre et al.
2001; Reynal-Querol 2002; Gleditsch et al. 2002; Murdoch and Sandler 2002; Reynal-Querol 2002; Ron 2005;
Sambanis 2002; Fearon 2004.
" This scholarship has three variants: 1) 'greed' (Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Grossman 1999);
implications for the post-war environment: a) armed units endowed with natural resource wealth,
criminal opportunities or external support attract opportunistic joiners and thus suffer greater
principal-agent problems and vulnerability to organizational fragmentation; b) resource-rich
groups commit greater and more arbitrary violence against the non-combatant populations 2 and,
as a result, are less likely to muster the civilian backing necessary to be able to form legitimate
political organizations; c) these groups are driven by material motivations and are thus unlikely
to want to form socio-political organizations; and d) loot-based groups, in stark contrast to
socially-endowed, ideological armed units, are fundamentally greedy and thus lack incentives to
commit to peace; war constitutes a more efficient means to their desired end: supra-profits.
These claims have been heralded by scholars, journalists, and practitioners alike. A majority of
leading academic articles on civil war focus exclusively on the presence of natural resources and
their link to conflict outcomes.' 4 References to thugs, warlords, and narco-terrorists abound in
journalistic accounts and imply that these labels have explanatory value.'5 And practitioners
aiming to separate allies from enemies, hang tightly to these motivational labels.
In resource determinism's critical case of cocaine-saturated Colombia, the geographic
distributions of drugs, trafficking routes, gems, oil, and extortion opportunities provide a
surprisingly weak guide to organizational outcomes: war recurrence, bankruptcy, or campaigns. I
find that resources can explain military strength and expansion, international legitimacy, and
corruptive capacity, but cannot account for variation in the inner workings of armed groups, their
2) 'organizational economics' (Weinstein 2002, 2006); and 3) capacity (Seymour 2008; Johnston 2008). I group the
first two strands together. The only difference in their predictions is that the greed theory assumes organizational
endurance while the organizational economics variant asserts that resource-rich groups suffer principal-agent
problems and splinter.
12 Weinstein 2006; Weinstein and Humphreys 2008.
13 De Zeeuw 2008.
14 Humphreys 2005; Lujala 2003; Ross 2006; Ostby, Hegre and Raighleigh 2008; Skaperdas 2002; Keen 2000;
Auty 2004; de Soysa 2000; Bellows and Miguel 2008.
" Several examples of journalistic references include New York Times 2009, 2010.
relations with civilian populations, their interactions with the state, or their inter-illegal armed
faction dynamics. A quick look at armed groups' trajectories around the world provides credence
to this finding. There are cases of resource-rich groups that disappeared (Sierra Leone's RUF),
remilitarized (Angola's UNITA, Peru's Sendero Luminoso), and became political parties
(Mozambique's RENAMO, Sudan's SPLA/M, Lebanon's Hezbollah). Similarly, there are
examples of resource-poor groups that disintegrated (Colombia's EPL), returned to fighting
(Nicaragua's Contras), and formed peaceful socio-political organizations (Nepal's Maoists, El
Salvador's FMLN). Important variation exists within similarly resource-endowed groups.
The study also disputes the explanatory hegemony currently held by credible
commitment problems in accounting for patterns of resumed war. This theory asserts that the
post-civil war environment is anarchical, and thus ex-adversaries cannot credibly commit to
disarmament.16 Specifically, ex-combatants cannot trust that the government will keep its peace
promises after they surrender their weapons (Walter 1997; Fearon 2004). Accordingly, absent
security guarantees, ex-combatants opt for rearmament while wars, which end with peace terms
that reduce the security dilemma, are more likely to avert renewed violence. These peace terms
include external guarantees by credible and committed third-parties and internal guarantees of
security sector reform, power-sharing arrangements, and de facto partitions.'7
This project undermines the explanatory power of commitment problems by
demonstrating that there are shocks to the system that cannot be predicted or prevented. In these
cases, 'credible commitment' is not the dominant mechanism. Demobilization can constitute one
such shock. It can suddenly alter organizational capacity, bankrupting some ex-armed groups
16 See Posen 1993; Snyder and Jervis 1999 for the civil war onset corollary of this thesis.
17 On external guarantees, see Walter 1997, 1999; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004. On security sector
reform, see Toft forthcoming; Call 2007; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Licklider 2009. For key works on power-
sharing, see Lijphart 1977; Horowitz 1991; Roeder and Rothchild 2005. Kaufmann 1996 champions the partition
solution.
while preserving others, but then its effect ends. It follows that the anticipated distribution of
power in the next period mirrors that immediately following demobilization. There is no
expectation of afuture shift in strength and thus the parties should be able to reach a bargain
(Powell 2006). Additionally, the effect of demobilization on relative power is notforeseen.1 8
Armed groups would not have demobilized had they predicted they would be bankrupted or
weakened by doing so. The credible commitment argument purports to explain the post-conflict
environment and yet, it cannot offer analytic leverage on the success and subsequent failure of
bargaining. While certain interstate logics have been applied indiscriminately to domestic
contexts, those of informational problems and mutual optimism have received scant attention in
the intrastate domain.19 This project constitutes a first attempt to incorporate information
asymmetries within organizations into our models of war to peace transitions.
This project also questions pure, agency-based causality and confers support to
institutional approaches. While leaders' decisions and strategies are key to explaining the
organizational forms that emerge, this project finds high levels of path-dependency. Leaders'
future decisions are constrained by how they have engineered the organizational 'machine,' 20
specifically, where they recruited and deployed their soldiers. These variables therefore gain
causal priority.
An additional divergence from dominant accounts lies in the study's shift away from the
'popular support' approach. The conventional view holds that civilians will support ex-
combatants if they endorsed the armed group's platform or if the combatants used 'less' violence
18 There is little work on the effects of unforeseen shocks on bargaining. Muhammet Bas and Andrew Coe are
working on modeling this phenomenon.
19 For these theories application to the interstate arena, see Fearon 1995 for information problems. For mutual
optimism theory, see Blainey 1988.
20 Miller 1992, p. 2.
21
while at war. Implicit is an assumption that there are acceptable levels of violence and that,
irrespective of the use of massacres, kidnappings, homicide, and coerced taxation, ideological
affinity will translate into civilian endorsement. Against these common claims, this project finds
so-called popular support puzzling. Why would a family, victimized by years of extortion, their
son 'disappeared' by the actions of a rebel group, 'support' the group? Because the family shared
its Marxist ideology? Because its combatants did not exterminate the entire village, only their
son? I find that civilians rarely 'support' violence and ideological affinity does not generate non-
combatant tolerance for ex-combatants' influence over civilian affairs; rather human ties, sticky
social institutions, and retrospective voting do. The term 'popular support' needs to be explained
and imbued with meaning before it can be claimed to be a cause.
Finally, by focusing on armed organizational legacies, this project challenges the
common assumption of a semblance between the variables that lead to war in the first place and
those that lead to its recurrence. It also questions the academic standard operating procedure of
treating war as a two-party game between the state and rebel group23 and demonstrates the
importance of looking at the multitude of actors in civil wars, especially at the prevalent and
entirely understudied paramilitary structures.2 4 Finally, it highlights the analytic efficiency of
disaggregating these structures to their most causally relevant units of analysis.
21 Manning 2004, 2007; de Zeeuw 2008; Siderberg 2007.
22 All of our datasets and even our theories lump together war onset and war recurrence. Both are coded '1' and
explained using the same logic.
23 See, for example, Mason and Fett 1996.
24 An exception is a new project on pro-state militias: http://www.abdn.ac.uk/militias/. See Carey, Mitchell, and
Lowe 2009.
VI. Road Map
The project divides into three sections.
Part ]
Part I, comprising Chapters 2-4, introduces the dissertation's theory, research design and
empirical data. Chapter 2 outlines the schematics of the argument and locates the project's focus
on the organization in contrast to previous studies, which have examined the post-war landscape
at either the macro or micro units of analysis. Chapter 3 specifies how I test the proposed logic
against the strongest alternatives. It introduces the chapter's multi-method approach, which nests
detailed process tracing of battalions in three regions within a quantitative analysis of all
battalion-community dyads in Colombia. It further justifies the sub-national research design,
which facilitates the collection of detailed information about where armed organizations recruit
and deploy, their relative power, and their post-war trajectories. This chapter further presents the
rich sources from which the project draws including survey, interview, violent event, and
ethnographic data. Chapter 4 introduces the comparative laboratory for this research: the
Colombian paramilitaries. Thirty-six paramilitary organizations, comprising 31,671 fighters
signed peace accords with the government and disarmed between 2003 and 2006. They exhibited
significant divergence in their post-war paths, allowing me to exploit within country variation to
maximize my number of cases while holding many confounding factors constant. This fourth
chapter provides the historical background on the Colombian paramilitaries in general and on the
three regions that feature prominently in the project's empirical analyses.
Part II
Part II - Chapters 5-7 - disentangles the determinants of armed organizations' post-war
trajectories. Chapter 5 - Bankruptcy - explores the challenges of war to peace transitions for
organizational survival. It shows how armed groups' recruitment and post-war migration
strategies account for some groups going bankrupt after disarming while others retain a capacity
for collective action through the two mechanisms of multifaceted networks and physical
clustering of former combatants. It therefore highlights the inner workings of armed
organizations in the aftermath of a peace accord. Chapter 6 - Campaigns - focuses on variation
in former armed groups' leverage over social and political civilian affairs and on why non-
combatants endorse or reject ex-combatants' influence. The model centers on deployment
strategies and their effects on a) the social networks between combatants and civilians, b)
victims' levels of anger at their perpetrators, c) the perceived shadow of the future of ex-fighter-
civilian interactions, and d) the stickiness of institutions of authority. This chapter shows how
configurations of deployment and migration produce varying levels of embeddedness, which in
turn translates into differing abilities to rule without opposition. The chapter maps the dynamics
between formerly militarized actors and non-combatants communities. Chapter 7 - Guns - turns
to the inter-armed group processes to understand divergence in remilitarization and
demilitarization. It shows how demobilization may prompt changes in the distribution of power
and thereby destabilize the system of mutually-dependent bargains between non-state actors and
between the state and each rebel or paramilitary faction. It explores how the bankruptcy of some
organizations and survival of others, as documented in Chapter 5, alters the parameters
underpinning the formal and informal peace bargains and, in so doing, fractures the delicate
peace architecture. Remilitarization is the result. It contrasts this trajectory with that of dyads
whose power differential withstands the upheaval of demobilization and thereby cements the
demilitarization regime.
Part II draws on evidence from the three comparative case studies to qualitatively
evaluate the logic and from extensive survey data to quantitatively assess the model. Each of
these chapters presents in greater detail the schematics of the argument and takes a different slice
of the organizational evolution of the armed group: its survival, its involvement in society's civil
and political life, and its return to violence. Each sets the argument against the alternatives and
provides rigorous tests of the observable implications. Part II thus tests the validity of the theory
as applied separately to each of the post-war trajectories.
Part IHI
Part III, comprising Chapters 8 and 9 takes the theory beyond the Colombian
paramilitaries to assess its explanatory weight in other contexts. Chapter 8 uses sub-national data
on the emergence of rebellion in Colombia to evaluate the project's logic against the dominant
accounts of civil war recurrence. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, it does not find
mountainous, impoverished areas, saturated with lootable resources to be most prone to
insurgency. Instead, the conditions able to account for the geographic variation in rebellions'
emergence are the organizational legacies of war: dense social capital and networks for violence
and reservoirs of insufficiently demobilized and reintegrated ex-combatants. The project's final
chapter skims the world for evidence of the theory's generalizability and specifies the impact of
the project on the study of war to peace transitions and the study of violence more generally. It
concludes with the policy implications for practitioners aiming to dismantle rebel and
paramilitary structures, harness their collective capacities, neutralize their coercive logics, and
redeploy them for peaceful politics.
Chapter 2
Theory of Post-War Trajectories of Armed Organizations
I. A Theory of Post-War Trajectories
What happens to armed organizations after they sign peace accords and disarm? Why do
they disappear, remilitarize or become non-violent socio-political entities (political parties or
civic associations)? This chapter outlines the broad brushstrokes of the project's theory while
Chapters 5-7 fill in the fine-grained details of the three outcomes: bankruptcy, campaigns, and
guns.
In this project, I argue that rebel and paramilitary groups' recruitment, deployment, and
post-war migration patterns interact to generate distinct post-demobilization trajectories (Figure
2). Concurring with Hunter 1997's critique of modes of transition theory, I opt for a dynamic
approach that explains variation in ex-armed groups' paths over time.2 5
Figure 2. Variation in Post-Demobilization Trajectories26
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25 Stepan 1988 offers a path dependent explanation for states' divergent civil-military relations post-dictatorship.
Hunter 1997 critiques Stepan's approach arguing that it is necessary to look not only at continuity in military
prerogatives but also at change. I concur and therefore aim to explain both the ex-armed organizations' initial post-
demobilization trajectories and their evolution over time.
26 In Colombia, in the aftermath of demobilization, we observe 40% of the paramilitary structures going bankrupt,
33% forming demilitarized socio-political entities, and 27% returning to guns.
Organizational Challenges of War to Peace Transitions
In order to secure a peace accord, an armed group must pose a sufficient threat to the
state such that the state prefers to bargain than continue fighting. To pose a sufficient threat, the
armed group must overcome the key organizational challenges of asymmetric information,
externalities,2 8 and adverse selection.2 9 During an armed group's transition from war to peace,
these challenges resurface. Specifically, uncertainty and misinformation are pervasive. While at
war, combatants live according to orders. They awake, eat, walk, steal, torture, kill when ordered
to; they act as part of a collective, not as individuals. Then, one day they are ordered to disarm
and, from night to day, they become civilians again. In the aftermath of demobilization, the
group's organizational mission and goals also become in flux and its regime of cooperation is
disrupted. Ex-fighters do not know if their former group will transmute, what it will become, if
they will be called back to fight, and if they will face judicial ramifications for their participation.
It follows that the common knowledge, shared perceptions of trustworthiness, and informal
norms that maintained cooperation during combat are destabilized, requiring a recalibration of
the entire network of mutually reinforcing expectations and programmed responses (Miller 1992;
March and Simon 1958). At the same time, combatants may recognize that their competency in
the use of violence (extreme asset specificity) will render them redundant in a demobilized
organization or in civilian society (Chai 1993). The organization's fighters also often come to
27 Asymmetric information exists in organizations because "the knowledge of which we must make use never exists
in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory
knowledge which all the separate individuals possess" (Hayek 1948, p. 78).
28 Externalities result because each member's productivity is a function of others' efforts; the benefits of the labor
are divided equally, but the costs of the work effort are individual thus creating opportunities for individual shirking.
Team production (producing violence, community work, political campaigns, etc.) is especially prone to
externalities.
29 Adverse selection arises because potential recruits' skills and commitment are often unobservable, proxied only
by rough indicators. Moreover, information is asymmetric; only the potential recruits know their true value. Given
these conditions, organizations end up with lower quality hires (Coase 1960; Moe 2001; Miller 1992). Weinstein
2006 applies the key findings and logic of organizational economics to the study of armed organizations.
believe that, by signing a peace accord, their commanders are shirking. 30 Commanders rarely
consult their subordinates before agreeing to demobilize and thus, the rank and file and mid-
ranking leaders are transformed from combatants to non-combatants without anyone seeking
their consent.3 ' Moreover, commanders often negotiate peace terms that serve their individual
self-interests rather than those of their subordinates. Incentives to desert escalate and sustaining
the group's capacity for organized collective action becomes difficult.
Organizational Survival vs. Bankruptcy
I argue that one type of organization finds itself well-positioned to overcome these
challenges: an organization whose combatants enjoy multifaceted networks and remain
physically concentrated after disarming, enabling the organizations to retain a structure and
disciplined collective action.
Multifaceted bonds are pre-war networks that foster trust, deepen 'identity-movement'
linkage, guarantee repeated interactions, and thus produce norms of reciprocity that keep
individuals linked to and cooperating with the organization. The dense social ties further confer
to the organization an endowment of institutionalized normative authority, information about
members' reputations, and a rich array of positive and negative sanctions that enable ex-armed
groups to continue policing contributions and effectively monitoring participants even after they
have demobilized (Ghosh and Ray 1996). Finally, recruitment through multifaceted networks
mitigates the adverse selection problem by providing more accurate information as to the
30 See North and Weingast 1989 for a discussion of the conditions under which employees trust their managers.
During war-to-peace transitions, armed leadership rarely complies with these conditions. For example, UNITA
leaders left their men to go to Luanda where they were rewarded with houses and cars (Africa Confidential 2002).
3 In a survey conducted of 120 former fighters who returned to arms post-demobilization, 54% responded 'No' to
the question, "If you had not received the order to demobilize, would you have demobilized?" (Zukerman and
Gonzalez 2008).
32 See McAdam 2003; Kenny 2009.
recruits' 'true selves' (degree of honesty, commitment to the cause, and competence ).33 Thus,
organizations characterized by these multidimensional bonds are more likely to be staffed with
employees that will act in the organization's interest even after the fighting has ended.
Combined, these assets render densely networked organizations more likely to survive the
challenging conditions of war to peace transitions. 34
Physical Clustering, meanwhile, protects and strengthens the social capital between
comrades 35 and, by facilitating continued face-to-face interactions, lowers information
asymmetries, reduces transaction costs of monitoring, and renders sanctioning of misbehavior
credible. It thus reduces incentives for subordinates and commanders to defect. To police,
punish, and reward, one must possess information on the subject's whereabouts. Networks and
physical clustering provide this. Additionally, geographical concentration of former fighters
generates a longer shadow of the future; these ex-comrades will continue to interact into the
indefinite future as displacement is highly costly. Last, former commanders and foot soldiers'
close personalized exchange creates a host of side-payments to influence each other's behavior
including "social acceptance, personal services, or other motivating factors" (Miller 1992).36 By
defecting, former combatants lose their friends and, in some cases, their families. They also
signal untrustworthiness. Their former comrades cannot tell if their decision not to participate in
the organization implies that they wish to remain neutral (stay home) or to instead defect to the
3 For adverse selection theory, see Simon 1957; Williamson 1975, Alchian and Demsetz 1972. Networks also
socialize people to specific sets of values, ideologies and worldviews.
34 The role of community ties in achieving collective action has also been emphasized in the study of mobilization
and cooperation within ethnic groups (Fearon and Laitin 1996).
* I treat social capital as a neutral category and "political multiplier" in line with Berman 1997 and Putnam 2000.
Berman 1997 shows that when we define robust civil society neutrally as high levels of associationalism, it is
equally likely to strengthen bad equilibrium points such as fascism, terrorism, authoritarianism, or remilitarization as
it is good ones such as democracy (or socio-political entities). See also Popkin 1979; Coleman 1988; Tarrow 1998
for how social capital can act as receptacles of collective action to be appropriated for future forms of cooperation.
36 Other authors writing on the effect of interpersonal ties on cohesion include Laumann 1973; Gross and Martin
1952; Friedkin 2006.
other side (provide information to the government or enemy force). Even though disarmed, it can
be suicidal for ex-fighters to desert as they possess valuable information, which can jeopardize
their comrades' amnesty, extradition rulings, illicit earnings, or civilian political futures. Their
comrades may choose to silence them through assassination rather than risk this information's
revelation. Thus, physically clustered groups' intimate knowledge about their participants deters
defection; ex-combatants must continue to signal loyalty and remaining part of the organization
is the best way to do so (Gould 1995). In sum, iterated interactions through physical
concentration and multifaceted bonds linking combatants to their formerly armed organization
enable the local group to sustain disciplined collective action. These networks and geographical
clustering, as will be elaborated upon in Chapter 5, are a function of armed organizations'
recruitment, deployment and post-war migration patterns.
Mechanism #1: Recruitment Patterns & Post War Migration
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Where these bonds and physical clustering are lacking, organizations are prone to
disintegration. Without dense ties, these organizations' fighters have more diffuse trust and
weaker norms of reciprocity. Geographically dispersed, expectations of future interactions
diminish and ex-combatants face little incentive to cooperate; defection snowballs. Isolated,
superiors do not know where to find their subordinates so monitoring costs escalate. Lacking
social solidarity and face-to-face interactions, "each [ex-]soldier is theoretically freed from
constraint and may pursue individual rather than group ends;" organizational bankruptcy
becomes likely (Bearman 1991).
Campaigns
If its networks and geographic distribution favor organizational survival, the resultant
structure may reinvent itself as a socio-political organization with leverage over civilian affairs.
Its ability to do so depends on its embeddedness in the communities, which is a function of its
deployment strategy. Groups, which station their fighters in their home communities, comprise
combatants who are tied to the civilian population through familial, friendship, neighborhood,
and other networks. Evidence suggests that these networks reduce victims' levels of anger and
facilitate reconciliation. Moreover, given the high cost of displacement, the community members
recognize that the combatants will continue to reside in their neighborhoods for at least the
medium term, thereby extending the shadow of the future and encouraging cooperation. I
propose that this embeddedness allows local demilitarizing organizations to exercise influence
over civilian affairs without the manifest use of arms. It affords the former combatants the
authority and endorsement to potentially gain votes, regulate economic activities, dictate social
norms, and administer local justice without community resistance.
If deployed far from their homes, combatants lack these ties to the civilian communities
and the prospect of enduring future interactions. Accordingly, non-combatants resist and reject
the non-local groups' presence and governance and denounce their 'silent guns.' Not embedded
in the communities, these non-local armed groups prove unable to form legitimate socio-political
entities after disarming.
Mechanism #2: Deployment Patterns
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In sum, recruitment, deployment, and post-war migration patterns determine if a former
rebel or paramilitary group disappears or not and, if it survives, if it is able to form a legal socio-
political organization. The distribution of power determines if the group returns to violence or
not.
Guns
Altered Distribution of Power
At time= 1, militarized entities (state and non-state) broker formal and informal deals,
which result in cooperation and the successful demobilization of the non-state armed groups.
Demobilization shocks the capacity of some groups - thinly networked and dispersed ones -
while preserving others. It thereby upsets the distribution of power between certain dyads and
changes the parameters underwriting the interdependent bargains. The bargains' terms therefore
require renegotiation. However, due to organizational pathologies and information short-
circuiting within organizations, there is wide variance surrounding and thus disagreement about
the estimates of relative power, complicating the bargaining process. Mutual optimism and
remilitarization result. This is not a story about bargaining indivisibilities or commitment
problems, but a story about the difficulty of determining an organization's relative power after it
has demobilized and when there are private information and incentives to misrepresent within an
organization. Thus, if the demobilized group's power shifts relative to its neighboring armed
actors (either it is weakened or strengthened by demobilization), a return to violence is likely. Its
altered strength is not commensurate to that prevailing when it negotiated the terms of its peace
accord.
It should be noted that local groups' organizational assets - multifaceted networks and
physical clustering - are critical to the group sustaining the collective action required for
remilitarization. Specifically, these assets constrain the individual former fighters in the
following ways: 1) they link the ex-fighters' status to the network; 2) they apply social pressure
to cooperate with their former comrades to whom they are densely connected; 3) they afford the
leadership the credible sanctions necessary to re-recruit; and 4) they provide reassurance that, if a
faction of the web remobilizes, others will follow and that it will be safe to follow (Petersen
2001).
Mechanism #3: Distribution of Power
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I assume in this analysis that the state seeks the Weberian goal of a monopoly of the use
of violence within its borders. Thus, following a peace negotiation, it seeks to act as a revisionist
actor, expanding its power and reasserting its authority in regions under illegal armed group
control. However, it can do so either through contestation or through co-optation. Drawing on
Stepan 1988's conception of civil-military relations during democratic transitions, I treat the ex-
paramilitary organization as a military exiting from power with its prerogatives and power to a
greater or lesser extent intact. I propose that the state chooses a level of 'articulated military
contention" - the extent to which it will challenge these prerogatives - based on the extent of the
demobilized group's bankruptcy. If the demobilized group is weakened relative to the state, the
state will be emboldened by its superior force and the power void left by the decaying army.
Accordingly, it will not respect the group's territorial sovereignty and will seek to circumvent the
group's authority in its zone of control. The government will do so (often with international
community backing) by building schools, infrastructure, police stations, health clinics etc.
(reconstruction) or by engaging in more direct forms of contestation. Its actions will be perceived
as offensive and can spark defensive, if feeble, redeployment by the weakened ex-rebel or
paramilitary unit.
Preserved Distribution of Power
Where demobilization does not shock the distribution of power, but instead leaves the
(usually networked, clustered) group's relative power unchanged, the state will ally with it and
assert its presence in the former armed group's zones of operation by cooperating with the group
and recognizing its sovereignty. Additionally, the bargains will hold between the ex-rebel or
paramilitary group and its contiguous non-state armed actors. 37
It should be noted that, under the following, empirically rare set of circumstances, the
bargains will also hold in the case of a weakly networked, physically dispersed organization: a)
the unit's contiguous factions weaken to commensurate degrees; and b) the state, due to its
resource constraints and state-building priorities, lacks the capacity or will to deploy its
37 Provided they are similarly networked and clustered and thus survive demobilization intact.
institutions to the group's territory; either the areas are non-strategic or deployment is too
expensive.
Where the distribution of power is preserved, the groups will initially exist with what I
call 'silent guns.' They have disarmed, but remain in an unstable state of latent coercive capacity
from which they can easily remilitarize. Their combatants maintain arms in caches or under
mattresses and their elite regiments remain on alert. Over time, if the power differentials
maintain, the bargains will crystallize and the groups will be brought fully into legality, passing
from 'passive guns' to no guns. The ex-armed groups' prerogatives will decrease as will the
likelihood of conflict in later periods.
Remilitarization at this point proves difficult, costly, and slow and is thus unlikely; the
organization's ex-combatants have been socialized back into civilian life. The mechanisms that
sustain the local group's organizational collective action - dense bonds and physical
concentration - are subject to decay, decreasing over time. 38 This creates a dynamic element to
the organizational capacity. Specifically, over time, former combatants' civilian networks
strengthen and pose what McAdam 2001 calls "negative influence attempts" to remobilizing.
Moreover, the ex-soldiers' self-concepts become less closely correlated with the group and their
dependence on the group diminishes. It follows that the collective structure weakens and
ultimately becomes co-opted, contributing to state capacity. Figure 3 illustrates these proposed
post-war trajectories of demilitarizing organizations.
38 This is similar to what happens during military transitions. Hard-liners may wish to instigate a coup, but may no
longer be able to; cohesion and collective action within the military erodes.
Figure 3. Post-Demobilization Trajectories
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*Note: It is beyond the scope of the project to explain the success or failure of the socio-political organization over
time.
II. Assumptions and Scope Conditions
Armed Organization & War Outcomes.
This study examines paramilitaries, militias, warlords, and rebels that are territorial in
nature, fought asymmetric wars,39 and have signed peace accords with the government. I focus
only on groups that end their fighting through negotiated settlements. I do not include militarily
defeated groups because their post-war trajectories - extinction - are over-determined. However,
I do analyze weakened organizations many of which, despite being coded 'defeated' by the war
39 Kalyvas 2005. Military asymmetry between armed actors contrasts with 'symmetric nonconventional warfare,'
which can be observed in civil wars that accompany processes of state collapse. According to Kalyvas, these latter
wars [entail] the disintegration of the state army and its replacement by rival militias."
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outcome literature's dichotomous scale,40 proved sufficiently strong to be party to a peace treaty
and to form socio-political entities and/or remilitarize. Chapter 5 explores the 'military defeat'
hypothesis explicitly. I use the word 'post-conflict' or 'post-war' at the organizational not the
country level to refer to the fact that the groups under investigation have signed a peace accord
and are thus in a post-conflict stage. The country, however, may still be at war with other armed
factions.
Unit ofAnalysis.
I examine several units of analysis. First, I look at the armed organization, which signs a
separate peace accord with the government. In the empirical cases explored in this project, these
organizations comprise approximately 1500-3000 combatants and divide into territorial units
(battalions) that usually span several communities. I then break these organization into each of
the places in which they operated, generating battalion-community dyads. This enables me to
explain local, regional, and national dynamics and to account for factions of an organization
taking divergent trajectories. I also evaluate the argument on the individual ex-combatant unit of
analysis. The data determines which level of analysis I use. Wherever possible, I use the
battalion-community dyadic level as this is where the exciting causal processes are taking place.
Remilitarization
While I speak to the peace literature on "rearming," I do not use the term 'rearm' because
post-conflict environments and their formerly armed organizations swim in weapons.
Organizations, which are not truly disarmed, cannot rearm. However, they can remilitarize. I
should emphasize that remilitarization refers to the same armed group returning to fighting
4 0 Fortna 2005; Toft Forthcoming; Mason and Fett 1996.
and/or illegal activity withinfive years of the peace accord.4 1 The distinction between new and
renewed groups is important because new groups, at least initially, lack capacity and confront
Olson's collective action problem. Thus the policy implications for how to fight these groups is
distinct from those for a remilitarized insurgent or counterinsurgent group. The project's focus
on groups that return to war rather than new armed actors also stems from the fieldwork-based
conviction that organizational legacies are important and thus the causes of remilitarizing are not
the same as those of militarizing for the first time.42
Non- Violent Socio-Political Organizations: Political Parties or Civic Associations.
Socio-political influence may take a variety of organizational forms ranging from a
formal political party to a co-opted existing party or a civic association. Existing studies focus
exclusively on power-sharing arrangements. I assert that post-war groups may form political
parties, but are also likely to continue to buy off parties, form NGOs, or hire lobbyists that
defend their interests without directly competing in the electoral process. Accordingly, I extend
the analysis of armed groups' transitions into non-violent socio-political entities beyond the
formal political arena.
Path Dependence
While process and path dependency play an important role in my argument, the path is
not deterministic; rather commanders choose their recruitment and deployment strategies during
the war and ex-combatants choose where to migrate post-war. Agents make these strategic
decisions. However, they are subject to a strong lock-in effect at which point the process gains
41 The five-year period has become standard in the quantitative literature on civil war. I employ it as a result of my
observation of a decaying function to organizational legacies and because it is practically infeasible to follow the ex-
combatants throughout their lives and account for their individual trajectories. Most peace studies only study the
first months or year after demobilization. Thus, this study extends the time horizon. Nonetheless, the longer term
post-conflict dynamics are poorly understood and merit greater study.
42 This finding contrasts with Walter 2004.
causal dominance and determines the trajectories of the organizations and, partially, of their
individual members. The strategic decisions are endogenous to the conflict, but they exert
exogenous influence over what happens after they are executed and path dependency assumes
the reigns.
III. Conclusion
On balance, how does my theory measure up? It has the attributes of good theory. In
addition to having theoretical importance, the theory has wide explanatory range and predictive
richness. It explains an array of important outcomes (recurrent war; reintegration of former
combatants; post-war state-building; consolidated peace; and armed group-to-socio-political
party transitions). Moreover, the variables can be shaped by human action; hence the theory
offers prescriptions for controlling the outcomes it frames.
The following chapter outlines how I go about testing this theory. It presents the research
design, methods and data I employ to evaluate if the empirical reality and order of events are
congruent with the predictions and if the human subjects spoke and acted as the model would
forecast.
Chapter 3
Research Design & Methods
I. Introduction
This project employs a multi-method,4 3 sub-national approach and uses original data
collected over 14 months of fieldwork in Colombia. I engage in several tests of the predictions of
the theory. The first three evaluate the theory's internal validity using micro and intermediate-
level data on the Colombian conflict. The fourth test, only partially completed, assesses its
external validity on a set of cases worldwide. I build on Lieberman 2005 and nest a 'thick,' in-
depth investigation of a few cases within a statistical analysis of 1040 observations. The
empirical chapters of the project substantiate the claim that the variables of recruitment,
deployment, and post-war migration patterns have the greatest explanatory power over the
observed variation in armed groups' post-demobilization trajectories.
II. Case Selection
My unit of analysis is the armed organization. Therefore a sub-national research design is
appropriate. Additionally, to evaluate my argument requires detailed information about where
armed organizations recruit and deploy, their relative power and their post-war trajectories.
Collecting this information from extremely secretive organizations, as a practical matter, can
proceed only one country at a time. Additionally, war zones require the triangulation of
information and multi-method research designs because the data is imperfect, confidential,
guarded, and subject to manipulation and the strength of each method can compensate for the
weakness of the others.
43 I adopt the logic that variable-oriented large-n work and case-oriented small-n work should operate in cyclical and
iterative dialogue to generate logically coherent, empirically probable, accurately causal theories. See Ragin 1987.
I thus chose an extraordinary comparative laboratory for this research: the Colombian
paramilitaries. Thirty-six paramilitary organizations, comprising 31,671 fighters signed peace
accords with the government and disarmed between 2003 and 2006. They exhibited significant
variation in their post-disarmament trajectories while operating in a single country. I analyze
these outcomes both cross-sectionally and diachronically.
This case selection has several advantages. First, as recommended by King et al. 1994
and Lijphart 1971, it maximizes cases and controls by exploiting within-country variation.
Second, it facilitates tightly controlled sub-national comparisons while ensuring a high degree of
unit homogeneity, limiting unobserved sources of variation between units, and holding broadly
constant development levels, historical legacies, state military strength, political regime type,
social cleavages, and political economy (Snyder 2001). Third, these cases exhibit variation on
the key alternative explanatory factors enabling an assessment of the relative merit of rival
hypotheses. Finally, the reintegration of the paramilitaries was underway during my fieldwork,
providing the rare opportunity to conduct extensive interviews and surveys and observe the
transition to peace while minimizing chronic problems of recall. Of course, my aim is to
determine if the proposed logic also operates in other contexts around the world. I return to the
question of the model's generalizability in the Conclusion.
III. Empirical Tests of Internal Validity
The first test of the theory is a detailed controlled comparison of armed organizations in
three regions of Colombia. The universe of potential cases for this test includes all armed
organizations that have signed a peace accord and demobilized. Within this population, I select
units that hold the greatest number of fixed-effects constant while providing variation on group
recruitment and deployment strategies and post-war migration patterns. I engage in comparisons
both cross-sectionally across organizations and their sub-units and longitudinally to test the
dynamic, time-specific elements of the model. My cases include Medellin's Bloque Cacique
Nutibara (BCN), a paramilitary organization that, after disarming, formed a socio-political
organization. It sustained disciplined collective action, but did not remilitarize. My other cases
are the Norte de Santander's Bloque Catatumbo (BC), which dissolved post-demobilization, and
Urabi's Bloque Elmer Cardenas (BEC) and Heroes de Tolovi (BHT), which at the time of
demobilization formed NGOs that were later used as the basis for armed redeployment.
Case studies facilitate the richly detailed accounts necessary to evaluate the proposed
explanatory factors, intervening factors and complex causal processes. Using these qualitative
methods, however, requires intimate familiarity with and nuanced understanding of the cases. I
thus went inside each organization and reconstructed and mapped its post-demobilization
trajectory. To analyze these three case studies, I engage in within-case congruence tests as well
as process tracing to see how the predictions generated by the model and rival theories fare
against the empirical record (George and Mckeown 1985).
I first employ congruence procedures: a within case method of causal interpretation
which compares the predicted values of the explanatory and outcome variables with their
observed values in actual post-war environments. I track the extent to which changes in the
outcomes of interest co-vary with changes in the factors provided by the model. Then, using the
process tracing method, I trace the mechanisms by which the causal variables translate into
outcomes.
I look for evidence about how pre-war network configurations and migration patterns of
local versus 'returnee,' 'squatter' or 'displaced' groups affect demilitarizing organizations'
ability to sustain collective action. I also trace the decay functions of these variables. For each
case, I map the armed group's deployment decisions and explore this factor's effect on the
group's relationship with the non-combatant communities. Next, I examine the interactions of
geographically contiguous organizations to understand the mechanisms that prompt some groups
to return to fighting. Finally, I probe the impacts of divergent state-building strategies on
demilitarizing organizations both across time and space. Throughout the analysis, I check for
omitted variables that may account for both armed groups' recruitment, deployment, and
migration patterns and their post-war outcomes.
I seek to exploit the case studies for several other purposes, namely, to assess if the causal
mechanisms are homogenous across cases, to develop improved measurement of the concepts for
large-n testing, to identify additional relevant variables, and to assess the role played by rival
hypotheses.44
For the case studies, I rely on qualitative evidence and survey material to reconstruct the
divergent paths of these armed structures from 1990-2009. I collected chronologically unbroken
accounts of the unique histories of each region and armed organization over the course of one-
three months of fieldwork in each research site during which time I conducted interviews of over
200 ex-combatants (including demobilized fighters who had remobilized and those who had run
for office) and a large number of victims, community members, military personnel, and civil
society leaders. I also engaged in extensive participant observation. Wherever possible, I aimed
to crosscheck the information gathered and to reconstruct social histories from all different
perspectives.
The other tests of the theory combine these qualitative methods with quantitative analysis
to evaluate the plausibility and generalizability of the hypotheses on the entire universe of armed
44 For discussions of case study methods, see Munck 2004, Ragin 2004; and Skocpol and Somers 1980.
organizations and ex-combatants. Doing so ensures against selection bias, internal
inconsistencies, and incorrect probabilistic claims. I use a large-n approach, first employing the
bloque (paramilitary brigade) as the unit of analysis (n=36), then exploiting the frente
(counterinsurgent battalion) (n=128) and armed group-municipality dyads (n=1040), and finally
disaggregating to the individual unit of analysis (n=3 1,671). For this analysis, I measure these
groups' recruitment strategies, pre-war networks, deployment decisions, post-demobilization
migration, embeddedness, physical clustering, relative power and post-disarmament outcomes.
IV. Data Sources
To map these variables, I conducted semi-structured interviews of over 150 Colombian
experts on the armed conflict including professors, think tank researchers, international
organization personnel, government officials, journalists, and clergy. To complement these
interviews, I engaged in content analysis of the armed organizations' records and gathered the
academic, think tank, and government data and research conducted on my topic. Additionally, I
compiled articles from ten national and regional newspapers from 2002 to the present that
document the peace negotiations, demobilization process, and rearming phenomenon and coded
the stories about the war and peace phases of the armed groups (See Appendix B). I further
interviewed several of the top paramilitary commanders and gained access to their confidential
testimonies under the Justice and Peace Law. I engaged in participant observation in 21 of the 36
paramilitary brigade's zones of operation. Last, I collaborated on the construction of a
municipal-level violent event database of paramilitary, guerrilla and state violence 1960-2007
that includes 29,000 events. In addition to these diverse data, I incorporated the results of a
4 My original database covers the period 1960-1984. I then gained access to the CEDE data, which includes all
violent events 1984-2007. See Chapter 8 for a detailed discussion of this database.
series of nine surveys, which included a nationally-representative survey of 28,23546 ex-
paramilitaries and guerrillas, a survey of 2,245 of the demobilized soldiers' nuclear families, and
a survey of the 226 psychologists4 7 who treated the ex-combatant population and thus had an
intimate understanding of their reintegration. These surveys of former combatants were
administered by the Colombian High Council on Reintegration (ACR)'s psychologists with my
supervision. I also analyzed the results of Organization of International Migration (OIM) surveys
of 31,472 ex-paramilitaries" and 5,004 civilians living in communities with a significant
demobilized presence. Finally, with the help of the Organization of American States' Peace
Mission (OAS-MAPP), I conducted a survey of 120 ex-combatants who remilitarized post-
demobilization, were captured and then imprisoned. I personally interviewed 40 of these former
combatants in the prisons of Bogoti', Medellin, and Cncuta (See Appendix C).
From these materials, I am able to derive various measures of where former combatants
originated, fought, demobilized, and migrated, facilitating composite measures of social ties and
physical clustering. The data also provides detailed information on the communities' perceptions
of the armed groups' embeddedness both pre- and post-demobilization. Using information on the
ex-combatants' networks and associations I can further estimate the extent to which the
organizations remained intact and the ex-combatants participated collectively in social and
political activities. Additionally, I derive measures of armed factions' relative power and assess
if sub-units returned to commit acts of violence. Last, from these data, I gain proxies of control
factors such as natural resources, leadership, abuse, military strength, terrain, state presence, and
local political-economy.
46 A more comprehensive ex-combatant survey has 15,540 respondents. See Appendix C.
47 The psychologists were also asked questions about specific ex-combatants in a survey corresponding to 2,817
demobilized fighters.
48 I also gained access to two more comprehensive OIM surveys of 11,703 ex-combatants nation-wide and 3,207
former fighters in Medellin.
V. External Validity Test
Finally, several shadow cases from around the world will test the theory's external
validity. Specifically, I evaluate the generalizability of different parts of the argument on cases
including the Sierra Leonean Kamajors, Filipino militias, Iraqi Awakening Groups, Aceh
counterinsurgents, Afghan militias, and Guatemalan Civil Defense Forces. For these shadow
cases, I conducted interviews of peace negotiators and former combatants from each of the
countries and complement the primary materials with secondary literature and expert interviews.
This test is currently underway. Its very preliminary findings are discussed in the Conclusion.
VI. Conclusion
Qualitative and quantitative fieldwork produces a rich fabric of data and facilitates the
analysis of multiple perspectives and voices. The stories are painful and their protagonists have
trusted me to weave them into a narrative that will shine light on a tangled, complex war and to
generate improvements, however small they may be, in the reintegration and peace processes. I
turn now to a historical narrative of this tangled violence, its paramilitary protagonists, and the
peace accords that are the jumping off point for this study.
Chapter 4
Historical Narrative of Colombia's Violence
This chapter introduces the paramilitary organizations that emerged across Colombia. It
describes the social and human terrain in which they formed, the dynamics of their violent
expansion, and the puzzle of their disarmament. It then describes the historical landscapes of the
three in-depth case studies, which feature prominently in the project's empirical material. With a
clearer understanding of the conditions that gave rise to effective paramilitarism in these three
regions, we can turn in subsequent chapters to discussions of how and why they diverged post-
war.
I. Rise of the Paramilitaries
The contemporary Colombian conflict has roots in La Violencia, the civil war that raged
from 1949-1958 between the Liberal and Conservative Parties.49 At its conclusion, an inadequate
demobilization and reintegration process and altered power distribution spawned the reactivation
of conservative, liberal and communist guerrillas in arms, initially in the form of bandoleros and
'independent republics,' but over time as organized guerrilla structures (FARC, ELN, EPL) and
private security forces.50 With the introduction of the drug economy to Colombia in the late
1970s and the adoption of kidnapping and extortionary financing tactics, the guerrillas began to
pose a serious threat to the military, landowning elite, drug barons and political class.
49 This conflict killed between two and three hundred thousand civilians over its course (see Guzmdn et al. 1962, pp.
287-93).
50 FARC stands for Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia; EPL is the acronym of the People's Liberation Army
and ELN stands for the National Liberation Army. See SAnchez and Meertens 2001 and Pizarro Leong6mez 1991
for the historical context in which these three armed organizations emerged. Villamarin 1995; De La Torre 1980;
and Aguilera Pefia 2006 offer accounts of the ELN; Arango 1984, Arenas 1985, and Alape 1989, 1994 provide
narratives of the FARC's origins. On the EPL, see Villarraga and Nifno 1994 and Calvo 1987.
Accordingly, these diverse sectors of society began to form regional 'self-defense' units. Unlike
typical insurgent forces, these militarized units did not begin as a single, cohesive, politically-
driven organization; rather the paramilitary phenomenon was highly regionalized with small
groups, of usually no more than 100 combatants, forming in different parts of the country to
repel guerrilla thefts, extortions and intimidation. These units included rural armies and death
squads (resembling autodefensas in Peru and peasant patrols in Guatemala), urban vigilante units
and gangs, hit men and drug-cartel franchises. Some were sponsored by landowners and cattle-
ranchers who equated the guerrillas' peace negotiations in the 1980s and 90s with surrender of
the country to the leftist rebels, an outcome that threatened their control, status, and livelihoods.5 1
They thus supported the rise of the paramilitaries to derail the peace process and protect their
interests.5 2 Other paramilitary factions enjoyed the patronage of drug-traffickers,5 3 who needed
security for their illegal businesses and extensive lands bought with laundered monies.14 And still
others were facilitated by state corruption and the Colombian security forces."
In the early 1990s, the smaller guerrilla groups (M19, EPL, CRS, PRT, QL 56) opted for
peace with the government, disarming in exchange for amnesty and political aperture.5 7 The
51 Romero 2003; Fundaci6n Ideas para la Paz 2007.
52 The Patriotic Union, FARC's political arm, was already gaining impressive electoral results as was EPL's Party:
Hope, Peace, and Liberty.
53 For example, in 1981, the Medellin cartel created a militant group, 'Death to Kidnappers' (MAS), aimed at
executing anyone connected to kidnapping.
54 See Reyes Posada 2009 for an excellent account of this 'counter agrarian reform' whereby drug traffickers and
paramilitaries acquired vast expanses of land through illicit deeds, forced displacement of peasants, and laundered
money.
s Law No. 48 of 1968 provided legal grounds for the creation of paramilitary forces until 1989 when it was
overturned. In 1994 and 1995, Decrees 356 and 368 then served as the basis for Convivir. See Gallego 1990; El
Tiempo 2010a.
56 Castro, Arenas, and Bateman 1980 and Villamizar Herrera 1995 provide histories of the M19. For details of this
reintegration process, see Dirrecci6n General para la Reinserci6n 2000; Turriago and Mora 2003. Over 7.300 former
guerrillas disarmed between 1990 and 2002 (Small Arms Survey 2006).
" This peace process brought a new constitution, which significantly altered Colombia's political landscape. After
the EPL's demobilization in 1990 in Urabd/C6rdoba, the paramilitaries also 'disarmed' briefly by the logic, "We
were fighting the guerrillas, but if the guerrillas demobilize, our raison d'etre no longer holds" (Beatrice (Sister of
Top Former Paramilitary Commander), interview by author, Apartad6, June 2008). After disarming, the
FARC and ELN remained in arms. The expansion of these two latter guerrilla armies and their
decisions to fund themselves through drug trafficking and indiscriminate kidnappings and
extortion justified the paramilitaries' growth throughout the 1990s. At this point, FARC
battalions reached the outer limits of Bogota and, to the majority urban population, it seemed that
the 'revolution' might succeed. Accordingly, the paramilitaries found their ranks filling, their
coffers overflowing, and their ability to operate with a carte blanche from the government
increasingly limitless.
II. Paramilitary Expansion
In 1997, attempts to unify the autonomous self-defense factions under a sole command
with a political identity bore fruit in the creation of the paramilitary confederation: the
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC).58 While ostensibly operating under an umbrella
organization, the paramilitary brigades (and, in some cases, battalions) retained a high degree of
sovereignty and self-sufficiency, to the point that they often fought amongst themselves more
than they battled the guerrillas. 59 The confederation had two objectives: political
legitimatization6 0 and expansion. As to the first, it sought political status for the paramilitaries
paramilitaries formed an NGO: Fundazcord. However, the paras' territorial disputes with the FARC prompted their
remilitarization. See Corporaci6n Observatorio para la Paz 2002.
58 The AUC was created and led by Carlos Castafno of the Self-Defense Forces of C6rdoba and Urabi, a long-
standing and powerful paramilitary group on the Caribbean coast.
59Fredy Rend6n Herrera, alias 'El Alemdn,' Testimony under the Justice and Peace Law, Medellin, 5 June 2007.
During his free version, 'El Alemdn' admitted that "Castafio was the head of the paramilitaries, but that they did not
receive direct orders from him ... The AUC was organized as a confederation ... While in Castainto's statements, it
appeared to be an organized structure, that was not the case in practice. Each block was autonomous in its
decisions."
60 In 1990, the paramilitaries began to signal that they were politically-oriented organizations as opposed to profit-
seeking gangs. To do so, they made public statements and adopted 'statutes' that referred to their "ideological
platform" based on "fundamental principals" such as the "natural right of legitimate self-defense," the state's duty to
defend its citizens and the right to private property. Among the key political objectives cited were politically and
militarily opposing guerrilla organizations, filling the vacuums left by the state in terms of security, social order and
justice, and participating actively in local political life. The paramilitaries also drafted a historical narrative of their
that would pave the way for an eventual negotiation with the government to gain amnesty and
guarantees of no extradition to the US. At the same time, drug trafficking blurred with the
counterinsurgent platform and the paramilitary groups became motivated not only by cleansing
territories of the guerrillas, but also by controlling strategic regions of coca cultivation,
trafficking routes, drug laboratories and shipment locations run by the rebels. The paramilitaries
expanded through three means: 1) they deployed their forces to other regions; 2) they co-opted
existing self-defense groups in other zones of the country; 61 3) they 'sold' the paramilitary
'brand' as a franchise to those able to recruit, combat, raise funds and control territories
(Guiqueta and Arias 2008). Over the course of the 1990s, the resultant, disparate
counterinsurgent groups expanded their power over the entire country. They achieved significant
military successes against the FARC and ELN, extracting the guerrillas from expansive
territories first in the Atlantic Coast (Urabi, C6rdoba) and middle Magdalena Medio
(Barrancabermeja), and then slowly extending to the Venezuelan border (Catatumbo region),
eastern plains (los Llanos) and southern departments. 62 Between 1997-2005, the paramilitaries
killed at least 9,354 individuals, tortured 990, disappeared 1,694 and displaced a large fraction of
the more than 3.5 million internally displaced persons.63 The testimonies of former combatants
have uncovered over 40,400 crimes.64 The paramilitaries' 31,671 fighters attacked not only the
insurgents, but also the society they believed to be harboring the insurgents - leftist social
movements, political parties, civil society, and unions. 281,661 victims have registered with the
Attorney General.s The paramilitary brigades further managed to permeate all facets of
origins, which portrayed them as victims of the state's inability to provide security against guerrilla hostility.
Guiqueta and Arias 2008. See also El Colombiano 1997.
61 There were over 400 Convivir Organizations operating across Colombia. Revista Alternativa 1997.
62 Echandia Castilla 1999.
63 CINEP 2004a and CINEP 2004b, 2005. Global IDP Project 2005; Amnesty International 2005.
64 El Tiempo 2010a.
65 El Tiempo 2010a.
Colombia's society, politics, and economy.
Between 1999 and 2003, they significantly modified the political geography of 12
departments, partially transformed others, won substantial parliamentary support (controlling
35% of Congress), influenced presidential elections, and captured local governance.6 6 They
exerted influence in nearly half of Colombia's municipalities. Politicians saw the paramilitaries
as advocates in their electoral competitions. The paramilitaries had the ability to render a
politician's term successful by restoring order and 'peace' and affording him/her retrospective
votes. They also had the capacity to intimidate and buy off voters, 'eliminate' political rivals,
coerce voter abstention, and transport voters between districts.67 In addition to their influence
over formal politics, the 'warlords' also managed to exert control over informal political and
social transactions in their bastions and gain "immense spaces of legitimacy." 68 For example,
they mediated disputes among inhabitants over land boundaries, old debts, and marriage,
regulated and extracted tributes from the economy, engaged in 'social cleansing,' and
constructed an alternative order in many localities where they came to be recognized as the
'state.' This was exaggerated by the fact that Colombia has traditionally suffered institutional
absence in much of its national territory and a weak military incapable of effectively combating
the FARC and ELN guerrillas. Following the logic 'an enemy of an enemy is a friend,' the
armed forces saw an ally in the autodefensas; both sought to cleanse the country of rebels.69
66 Romero 2008. See also Rangel 2005.
67 Defensorfa del Pueblo Reports 2002, 2004.
68 Duncan 2006.
69 Former military officers also joined the paramilitaries, specifically those facing severe sentences for human rights
abuses committed while in the Colombian armed forces. These officers faced the choice of going to prison more or
less for life or fleeing justice and joining an illegal armed group. Many opted for the latter. They could join the
FARC, ELN or paramilitaries. They had no affinity with the first two and thus chose to join the paras. The marriage
of convenience was the following. The paramilitaries offered the ex-military personnel security and protection from
the law and, in exchange, the ex-military officers provided the paramilitaries training and organizational
management. Many of these ex-military officers are quite well known such as alias '101' and 'Camilo.' (Former
Military Officer, interview by author, BogotA, February 2008).
Over time, the paramilitary phenomena developed into a multi-faceted army with regional
alliances with the military, police, businessmen, judges, social elite, narcos, campesinos, and
politicians.
III. Timing Ripe for Peace Negotiations
In May 2002, Alvaro Uribe won the Colombian presidency and commenced a process of
negotiation with the paramilitary jefes. The timing was ripe for this process. The failure of the
government's peace talks with the FARC in 2000-2001 meant that public opinion had turned
against the guerrillas and began to favor a military strategy to deal with the insurgents.7' The
FARC had taken advantage of the Caguin demilitarized zone during the peace talks, using it as a
safe-heaven for drug trafficking and preparation for further war. As a result, the guerrillas'
prospects of regaining a future seat at the negotiating table diminished and the paramilitaries
became redundant; they were no longer needed as a safeguard against peace deals with the
FARC. Additionally, the paramilitaries perceived themselves to be at their best moment
militarily and politically, and only likely to decline in the future.72 Colombian society was taken
with a strong desire for peace and a growing intolerance for violence and human rights abuses.
Under pressure from the terms of Plan Colombia,73 the Colombian military and establishment
began to distance themselves from the paramilitaries.74 The paras thus saw their ideological
support eroding. According to one commander, "I demobilized [when I did] because it would be
70 Despite tacit links with the political and military establishments, the Colombian paramilitaries do not resemble
those of other countries (such as those of Central America) because they were autonomous from the state and were
neither created by nor under the control of the state (Camilo Echandia, interview by author, Bogoth, July 2006).
71 Andrds Pastrana Arango (Former President of Colombia), interview by author, Washington DC, June 2006.
72 Andrds Restrepo (Professor, Universidad Nacional), interview by author, BogotA, August 2006.
73 Plan Colombia is the US military/anti-narcotics aid package for Colombia aimed at combating drug cultivation
and trafficking and strengthening the Colombian armed forces. Since 1996, Colombia has received $6,477,606,292
in U.S. Aid. See http://justf org.
74 Guiqueta 2007.
very sad to demobilize when I was losing and had my head down."75 Meanwhile, the large flows
of US military aid strengthened the Colombian armed forces and enabled them to finally take
over the paramilitaries' work of battling the FARC and ELN and providing 'security' to the
country's regions. Uribe's lynchpin policy, "Democratic Security," aimed to achieve precisely
this.76 Through a bolstering of the armed forces, creation of a network of civilian informants and
peasant soldiers, and a strong offensive against the guerrillas, Uribe sought not only to militarily
recapture territories from the rebels, but also to reestablish state presence, rule of law, and
institutions in these territories. Thus, the paramilitaries had achieved their ideological
counterinsurgent goals. The strengthening of the security forces further meant that the military
would keep the guerrillas "at bay and away from the [paramilitaries'] various strategic
interests." 77 Importantly, the paramilitaries also saw an ally in President Uribe and trusted him on
a personal level. While governor of the state of Antioquia in the 1990s, he showed himself to be
very sympathetic to the paramilitary cause. One ex-combatant told me, "We turned ourselves
into Uribe, not the state, not the Attorney General, to Uribe."78 The paramilitaries' allies in
Congress, motivated by their "skeletons in the closet," also proved willing to advocate on the
paras' behalf.79
Finally, the paramilitaries greatly valued the offer of no extradition to the US on drug-
trafficking and money-laundering related charges.80 They found the terms of demobilization very
7 Manuel de Jesfis Piraban (Ex-Paramilitary Commander), interview by author, Bogota, 15 September 2008.
76 This is part of the 'National Consolidation Plan' (PCN), which is sometimes also referred to as 'Integrated
Action.' See Center for International Policy 2009.
77 Gudqueta and Arias 2008.
78 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Santa Marta, 13 April, 2008.
79 See Nalepa 2010. Nalepa finds that the threat of revealing the 'skeletons in the closet' of anti-communist
politicians helped ex-communist parties transfer power without violence. Similarly, fear of disclosure of the para-
politica scandal rendered many congressmen and senators willing to acquiesce to the paramilitaries' demands.
Knowledge of the politicians' skeletons facilitated a deal.
80 The extradition issue has remained highly contentious since the late 1980s when Pablo Escobar and the "No-
Extraditables" carried out their campaign of violence. Escobar claimed that "he would prefer a Colombian grave to
generous, affording them the much needed and desired amnesty and the ability to preserve and
launder their illicitly earned goods.8 ' The paramilitary commanders were "walking a tightrope
and realized that if they didn't comply with this peace process, they could say goodbye to a
political process. The US would enter and grab them for drug trafficking. They would lose their
legitimacy." 82 It should be emphasized that these illegal non-state armies did not face defeat or
stalemate, conditions which generally precede peace negotiations. It was thus despite
extraordinary military, economic, and political power and exorbitant rents from drug-trafficking
that the top-tier paramilitary leadership proved willing to pursue a demobilization process. The
mid-ranking paramilitary leaders and foot soldiers then followed suit principally because "they
received the order to surrender their arms."8 3 The minority that "would have disarmed even if
they had not received the order," pointed principally to their exhaustion with the war, with doing
'bad things,' and with illegality, and to their desire to dedicate themselves to their families.84
Most, however, entered the ceasefire and subsequent peace process only out of loyalty and
submission to and fear of their superiors.
In November 2002, the paramilitaries issued the Declaration for the Peace of Colombia,
in which they formally announced a ceasefire effective January 1 't 2003 and initiated peace
talks. 5 At this juncture, a rift between the paramilitary commanders emerged over the
an American prison" (William Quintero, interview by author, Bogotd, February 2010). The top paramilitary
commanders demonstrated similar preferences despite the new dynamic of the International Criminal Court. Now,
the US judicial process, under which the commanders are tried for drug-trafficking charges, should be preferable to
that of the ICC under which they would be charged with crimes against humanity. The US system also grants them
judicial certainty - the court system will uphold the sentences - and the possibility to negotiate the court's verdict in
exchange for intelligence on trafficking. In contrast, the Colombian law is much less reliable, creating high levels of
judicial insecurity (Conflict analyst, interview by author, Bogoti, January 2008). Nonetheless, the 'top jefes' tended
to strongly oppose extradition and, if extradited, begged the Colombian government to allow their return.
81 Bruce Bagley, interview by author, Bogoti, 10 July 2006.
82 Hernando Corral, interview by author, Bogotd, 20 July 2006.
83 Many of my rank and file ex-paramilitary interviewees repeated this statement.
84 Recidivist Ex-paramilitaries, interviews by author, Bellavista Prison, Medellin, May 2008.
1 From 2002-2006, certain paramilitary brigades, which had not yet demobilized, continued to grow, expand and
carry out violent attacks despite ostensibly being in the full swing of a peace process.
autodefensas financing themselves through drug trafficking and the increasing power of narcos
within the self-defense structures. On one side of the debate was Carlos Castafno, 'El Alemin,'
'Doble Cero,' and to a lesser extent 'Jorge 40' and Mancuso. They believed that the paras'
participation in the illegal coca industry had become an important indicator as to whether they
were criminals or politically-driven organizations with whom peace negotiations would be
legitimate. Accordingly, they envisioned the paramilitaries limiting if not ceasing their drug
trafficking activities, kidnappings and massacres.86 On the other side of the rift were Vicente
Castaho, 'Don Berna,' Macaco, 'Los Mellizos' and 'Gordo Lindo,' among others, who were
deeply entrenched in the drug business and would not agree to reduce their trafficking and
extortions.8 7 Dissent triggered public finger-pointing between self proclaimed, 'legitimate' self-
defense forces and those accused of being 'opportunistic criminals.' 8 8 This debate led first to
Vicente Castafno's April 2004 order to torture and execute his own brother, Carlos, and then, in
May 2004, to the assassination of 'Doble Cero.' 89 These murders diffused the power of the anti-
narco lobby within the paramilitaries.
IV. Peace Accords: A Process with a Life of its Own
The Santa Fe de Ralito Agreement of July 2003 resulted in peace accords between the
government and each of the 34 paramilitary blocs and the subsequent, staggered disarming of
their 31,671 combatants between 2003 and 2006. Concurrently, Uribe initiated an individual
demobilization process whereby paramilitary and guerrilla combatants could desert their armed
86 These leaders feared the U.S. Justice Department's requests to extradite them and the State Department's inclusion
of the paramilitaries on its list of international terrorist groups. See Osorio 2004; Castailo 2001; Civico 2009.
87 Cambio 2004.
88 Gudqueta and Arias 2008. See also El Tiempo 2002a; El Tiempo 2002b; El Espectador 2002.
89Rumors indicated that Carlos Castahfo intended to strike a deal with the DEA to provide information about
Colombia's drug trafficking mafias in exchange for judicial benefits.
groups and receive amnesty and reintegration benefits. 18,781 paramilitaries and guerrillas have
disarmed under this latter process. 90
In order to set the stage for the project's analysis of the post-demobilization trajectories of
the paramilitaries, it is worthwhile to get inside the heads of the para commanders and the
government negotiators to understand how they weighed the pros and cons of cooperation at
different stages of the process.
In 2002, all of the commanders arrived at the negotiation table in Santa Fe de Ralito with
the firm intention not to go to jail as, in their words, they had come to the table voluntarily, as an
undefeated army, and at the peak of their military expansion and power. They further envisioned
the peace process preserving their economic fortunes and legalizing their power. Commanders
Jorge 40, Mancuso, El Alemain and others imagined themselves making the leap from a
privileged position in the criminal underworld to a commensurate one within the law's bounds.
Specifically, they intended to become high profile elected officials (governors or senators).
These men possessed the robust social bases, bank accounts, and political recognition necessary
to do so. When they rode through coastal Colombia, crowds of civilians cheered them on. When
they looked in the mirror, they saw heroes basking in the gratitude of their countrymen for
"saving Colombia" from the insurgents. 91 Millions of dollars hid in coffers under their
floorboards. And they had embroiled civil servants from all walks of political life from state
health workers to congressmen in the far-reaching para-politica scandal. Accordingly, these
paramilitary leaders assumed that, with the peace process, they would simply transform their
90 Data as of July 2010 (Alta Consejeria para la Reintegraci6n 2010).
91 At first, the paramilitary commanders envisioned involvement with local and regional politics, but over time, they
believed they would gain positions of national stature. Their formation of the Politico del Movimiento Nacional de
Autodefensas Desmovilizadas speaks to this fact (Colombian Journalist, interview by author, Cambridge, MA, 11
April 2007).
entire organizational machine into a politically legitimate one.92 At the core, the commanders
were convinced that they would win a favorable deal and that, were the deal to be derailed, they
could return to war.
These expectations were shared by external observers. Analysts of the process had no
doubt that "in the future, it will be very difficult to apply a canon of justice or lessen the
influence the [paramilitaries] have conquered in the regions." 93 They believed the para forces
and power to be shielded, elusive, and untouchable. They did not anticipate any paramilitary
group disintegrating or losing its extensive social, political, economic or military leverage.
This trajectory envisioned by the paramilitaries and outside observers did not play out as
planned. It is critical to understand that, once underway, processes exert their own causalforce.
The demobilization of the autodefensas was not the result of a strategic plan designed in advance
and executed by the paramilitaries or the government; rather, it resulted from a series of
junctures and crises, which were only resolvable through further demobilization. At each of these
critical moments, powerful paramilitary leaders, already seated at the negotiating table and
facing situations each day more adverse and contrary to their original beliefs about the process,
evaluated that it was more costly to leave the peace process than to remain within its bounds. 94
These moments recurred until some of the commanders no longer had the option to withdraw
from the table, until they found themselves in a maximum-security prison with no alternative
courses of action, until some of their structures went bankrupt. In this sense, the demobilization
92 Macaco was an exception. "He had little interest in politics though his right hand man, Ernesto Baez did. During
the war, Macaco would merely buy off the political bureaucracy and judiciaries without promoting a 'political
project"' (Conflict Analyst, interview by author, Bogoti, January 2008). Rodrigo Tovar Pupo ('Jorge 40'), in
contrast, assessed that the "best way to gain political power was not to buy off the existing political class, which
would only serve to corrupt them, but rather to finance simple people with perhaps no political experience and to get
them into power.... For this reason, you see many new parties and politicians coming to power on the coast."
(Conflict Analyst, interview by author, Bogoti, October 2007).
93 Valencia 2005.
94 I am very grateful to Daniel Acosta for his excellent insights into this process and for sharing with me his working
paper on the subject.
of the paramilitaries should not be interpreted as a leap into the abyss from which the
commanders surrendered every possibility of remaining armed. At every step, they firmly
believed that they could still opt out until suddenly they could not. I will briefly tell this
unwritten story. In many respects it resembles democratic transitions; dictators would never have
allowed aperture if they had known what it would lead to: their demise.
In 2003, the government said to the paramilitaries: "All the judicial rights of the process
will be decided by Congress." In so doing, the government told them, "You have to convince the
country, the people, that you deserve more lenient sentences and protection and whatever else it
is you want." 95 Even the 35% of Congress, which the paras 'controlled,' could not guarantee
their proposed peace terms. Suddenly, flexing their muscles proved counterproductive and only
provided fodder for those who accused the paramilitaries of systematically violating the ceasefire
and being unworthy of political status and lenient judicial terms.96 In 2003, a hurricane of
national and international criticisms of the Government's 'Alternate Judicial' bill hit.97 To
counter the critiques, build credibility, and sway local and foreign opinion in their favor, the
paramilitaries agreed to demobilize one brigade as an act of good will. This first demobilization
occurred in the absence of any effective government guarantees that the Santa Fe de Ralito
informal pacts would be honored. With their finances, arms, and recruiting capacities still intact,
this first demobilization did not constitute a point of no return for the paramilitaries.
95 Acosta 2008.
96 Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, FIDH, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights were
especially vocal critics of the bill.
9 The government submitted a bill to Congress proposing an "alternate judicial" regime that would permit the
paramilitaries to forgo standard sentences for a variety of crimes, including human rights abuses, crimes against
humanity, and drug trafficking.
V. Popular in the Shadows; Scorned in the Light
It should be noted that these waves of criticism came as a rude awakening to the
paramilitary commanders. They were shocked to learn that their societal support had limits. They
went from being anti-subversive heroes in their regions to being portrayed as villains, common
criminals, narco-traffickers, and heinous human rights abusers in the national media. Even their
political allies in Bogoti' began to betray them. The paramilitarization of Colombian politics
went from being the norm to a scandal (para-politica).98 "We are like prostitutes, by night [while
in clandestinity] we are the most sought after whereas by day [when we come out into
legality]," 99 many politicians, business elite and citizens "[feel] the need to dissociate publicly
from [our] 'contamination' or hush about existing contacts." 00 Meanwhile, the government took
an extra step and declared that paramilitaries guilty of crimes against humanity would not be
allowed to participate in elections or form political parties. This was not the political power and
process the paramilitary commanders had envisioned.
Despite the unanticipated and adverse turns the process was taking, most of the
commanders believed it a better bet to remain in the process and watch it unfold than to
withdraw and lose the benefits that they had achieved thus far. After all, they retained the option
of pulling out at a later date if necessary (or so they thought). This logic triggered a second phase
of demobilizations to quiet further critiques and as an "apology for the excesses committed
during the cessation of hostilities." 101 With each paramilitary brigade demobilized, however, the
paramilitaries' bargaining power eroded and the process tied their hands tighter. The frontiers of
98 A 2007 survey showed that politicians, in certain regions, would be punished electorally for links with the
paramilitaries. Responding to the question, "Would you vote for at least one of the politicians accused of
paramilitary connections?" only 3% said yes in Barranquilla, 12% in Bogoti and 42% in Valledupar. In another
question, 78% responded that it is unforgivable for politicians to have formed pacts with paramilitaries. Regional
variation was high. Revista Semana 2007.
99 Baez 2006.
100 Guiqueta 2007
101 Acosta 2008.
their possibilities closed in as their expectations of what was feasible became deflated. The final
law met with the commanders' approval despite it being significantly less attractive than what
they had imagined when they came to the table several years prior.
In the calculations of the paras, what was seemingly not contemplated was that once
demobilized, the government would defect. The first assault on their promised benefits was the
government's unilateral decision in August 2006 to terminate the commanders' special permits
that allowed them to move freely around the country and to instead concentrate them in the
detention center in La Ceja, Antioquia. Sixty commanders complied but several escaped,
including Vicente Castaiio and the Mellizos brothers. Next, in December, the government
transferred the paramilitary leaders to the maximum security prison in Itagii.102 The
commanders acquiesced; at this point, fleeing would elicit the whole power of the state against
them. Moreover, they remained committed to allaying the government's fears about their
intentions and demonstrating their dedication to the process. Recall that, at the beginning of the
process, serving jail time was inconceivable for the commanders. Now, several years later, they
accepted this decision with little resistance. In this sense, it is critical to examine the timing of
the events and circumstances that led to the paramilitaries' demobilization. "A comparative
analysis of only two time cuts - before demobilization, and post-demobilization - would miss a
whole chain of events and contexts that were crucial in driving the leaders of these powerful
armies to demobilize."103
102 Rubini 2008.
103 Acosta 2008.
Justice.
The final version of the peace bill, the Justice and Peace Law (Law 975),104 was approved
on June 21, 2005. It dictated that individuals guilty of crimes against humanity (mostly the
commanders and mid-tier leaders) would receive reduced punishments of five to eight years in
prison and would not be extradited to the US. In exchange, they had to make full and honest
confessions of their actions and engage in monetary and symbolic reparations.1 0 5 These lenient
judicial benefits would be lost if the paramilitaries failed to confess to the whole truth or broke
their promise of 'no repetition' by committing criminal, illegal and/or violent acts. It was on this
basis that 14 paramilitary commanders were extradited to the US in May 2008. Meanwhile, the
members of the irregular armed groups with no pending charges of crimes against humanity
(mostly foot soldiers) who were guilty only of "political crimes" (rebellion, sedition, treason,
rioting) fell under Law 782 of 2002 (revised as 1106 of 2006), which granted them full pardons
and reinsertion assistance. 106 It should be noted that the peace negotiation did not involve
significant government concessions. It did not introduce security sector reform or enact policies
designed to facilitate paramilitaries' political reintegration: favorable electoral conditions,
guaranteed congressional seats, or power-sharing arrangements.
While the accords did not afford the paramilitary commanders what they had envisioned,
they also did not dismantle or neutralize the paramilitaries' political, economic, or social
structures of influence, just their military ones. Many brigades, for reasons posited in Chapters 2
104 See the English translation of the Justice and Peace Law: http://www.coijuristas.org/justicia/Law
percent20975.pdf. The purpose of the law is "to facilitate the processes of peace and individual or collective
reincorporation into civilian life of the members of illegal armed groups, guaranteeing the victims' rights to truth,
justice, and reparation." See also Kalmanovitz 2009. 2,700 paramilitaries have registered under the Justice and
Peace process.
105 See Justice and Peace Law, Article 8, which stipulates that reparations take the form of restitution of assets,
payment of compensation, access to rehabilitation procedures, and guarantees of no-repetition.
106 These exclude atrocious acts and barbarism, terrorism, kidnapping, genocide, homicide outside combat and
civilian victimization. See Law 782, 2002.
and 5, proved able to shield their structures from dissolution. In addition, the peace agreement
developed a comprehensive disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program to
transition the ex-combatants back into civilian life.
VI. DDR Program
The disarmament procedures were the following: each paramilitary organization
concentrated its members in a specific site for approximately three weeks, during which time the
combatants and their weapons were registered and basic medical and psychological assistance
was provided. Thereafter, the combatants could migrate to the towns of their choosing and enroll
in the Ministry of Interior's reintegration program.107 In August 2006, the government replaced
this program with the High Commission for Reintegration (ACR),108 which significantly revised
and improved the regime. 109 Taking into account 'lessons-learned' from DDR programs
worldwide, the Colombian program quickly became a model for other countries embarking on
war to peace transitions." 0 The ACR shifted the program's focus from short-term 'reinsertion' to
long-term and sustainable 'reintegration.' Rather than having the transition from militarized to
civilian life be time constrained, the new program dictated that the ex-combatants would
'graduate' from the program only when they were deemed 'reintegrated.' For some, this could
take a year; for others, a decade. Additionally, rather than assume reintegration to be a uniform
process, the ACR plotted each individual ex-combatant's trajectory over time, registering his/her
107 Andres Davila (Director, Ministry of Interior's Reintegration Program), interview by author, BogotA, August
2006; Jaime Polanco (Ministry of Defense's Disarmament and Demobilization Program), interview by author,
BogotA, July 2006.
108 Presidencia de la Repiblica, Alta Consejeria para la Reintegraci6n Social y Econ6mica de Personas y Grupos
Alzados en Armas
109 The collectively demobilized paramilitaries, who are the focus of this project, benefitted less from these changes
in the reintegration program as they had already been in the program for as many as two years. The chief
beneficiaries were ex-combatants who entered the program post-2006 (mostly individual guerrilla defectors).
"0 The international conference on DDR held in Cartagena in May 2009 speaks to this fact. It gathered DDR
specialists and practitioners from countries around the world.
psychological, social, vocational, educational, and civic attributes and tailoring his/her program
accordingly. 1"' The benefits were also broadened to include not only those conferred to all
Colombian citizens (health, education, and security), but also services specific to the
beneficiaries' needs as ex-combatants (psychological counseling and monitoring, legal guidance
on Laws 975 and 728, and citizenship education).' 1 2 The former combatants, for example, were
obligated to attend weekly workshops in which they learned 'how to be civilians.' These sessions
aimed to undo the moral codes learned within the illegal armed factions and to instill Colombian
Law's norms of justice. According to several psychologists who intimately monitored the ex-
combatants' psychological, economic, and social reintegration:
Many ex-combatants are proud of their crimes when they demobilize. They do not
feel guilty about them at all because they have not been taught normal values. But
as they engage in the social-psychological workshops, they begin to feel more
guilt. So the emotional trauma that ex-combatants experience is at times low
when they demobilize, but may increase over time ...because the reintegration
and reconciliation programs teach the former combatants what emotions they are
supposed to feel."
In addition to psychological services, the ex-combatants also received monthly stipends and
economic reintegration assistance. The program assisted them in finding jobs, offered them
vocational training, and created macro agro-industrial projects to employ them. Third, the ACR's
customized reintegration programs shifted from a benefits-only approach to a benefits-in-
exchange-for-responsibilities one. No longer did the ex-combatants receive subsidies with no
strings attached; instead, the economic support became conditioned on and varied according to
"' ACR 2008.
112 Frank Pearl (High Commissioner for Reintegration), interviews by author, Bogoti, August 2007 - May 2009.
13 ACR Psychologist, interview by author, Bogoti, 2007. This concurs with the findings of Blattman and Annan
2009.
the individuals' commitment to and performance in the DDR Program (i.e. number of workshops
and courses attended).11 4
This was an important change in a regime populated by ex-paramilitaries who believed
they deserved gratitude for their patriotic service (fighting the guerrillas) and for agreeing to
demobilize when they did not have to (they were not defeated). In many ex-combatant and
community workshops I attended, the former paramilitaries exhibited a strong sense of
entitlement. They argued that, because they demobilized and thus did the country a favor, they
deserved a wide range of benefits including homes, permanent jobs, televisions, etc. This
'benefits-oriented' approach generated resentment among the victims who did not receive
commensurate assistance or services from the state. Many of the conflicts that arose between
victimizers and victims post-war appeared to be less about past crimes and more about the post-
demobilization benefit scheme. 1 5
Last, the reintegration program became community oriented. The definition of program
'beneficiaries' was extended to include not only ex-combatants, but also their families and the
'recipient' communities in which they lived. These populations became eligible for reintegration
program services and assistance.ii 6 Thus, in one of the only cases worldwide, DDR and
transitional justice merged and the reintegration program became involved with reparations and
reconciliation.
Despite the sound design and execution of the ACR process, it proved unable to compete
with the forces set in motion during the war, namely the combatants' recruitment and
deployment patterns. I return to a discussion of the implications of the study's findings for
reintegration policy in the Conclusion. I turn now to the historical backdrop of the paramilitary
"4 Frank Pearl (High Commissioner for Reintegration), interviews with author, BogotA, August 2007 - May 2009.
115 Santiago Jaramillo, (Medellin's Victim Program), interview by author, Medellin, February 2008.
116 High Commission for Reintegration, Community Division Director, interview by author, Bogoti, August 2007.
case studies.
VII. Case Studies: Three Paramilitary Regions
This dissertation analyzes all of the paramilitary structures that emerged from the mid-
1980s through the end of the 20th century across Colombia, but focuses particularly on armed
organizations in three regions: Urabi, Medellin, and Norte de Santander. The paramilitaries' war
in Urabi began in the mid 1980s when, tired of kidnappings and extortion, landowners, cattle-
ranchers and banana plantation owners formed self-defense forces. The paramilitaries came to
Medellin in the mid 1990s when the mafias became politicized. And the paras emerged on the
violence scene of the Venezuelan border at the end of the 1990s as part of a campaign to root out
the guerrillas from Norte de Santander. These case studies constitute a tightly-controlled, sub-
national comparison across paramilitary groups within a single war over time that holds broadly
constant development levels, colonial legacies, state military strength, political regime type,
social cleavages, and political economy.
Map 1. Controlled Comparison: Three Regions of Colombia
Urabi's Norte de
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Campaigns: Medellin's Bloque Cacique Nutibara (BCN)
Any paisa can tell you that Medellin's Valley of Aburrd has suffered four wars over
the past thirty years. First, beginning in the 1980s, the rural guerrilla organizations (FARC, ELN,
EPL) sought to create urban militias in Medellin." 8 The militia groups' "armed proselytizing"
and authoritarian presence brought a first wave of violence to the Antioqueo capital"19 and
engendered local gangs. 2 0 One ex-rebel explained to me, "The militias killed the thieves and
then became the thieves. They killed the rapists and then became the rapists. I hated this so I left
the militias and formed a gang to resist their presence."' 2' Thus, by the late 80s, Medellin had
militias and gangs.
During this period, Pablo Escobar also rendered Medellin synonymous with the cocaine
trade. 2 2 The Medellin cartel, which at its height enjoyed profits of $60 million per day, launched
a campaign of violence to pressure the Colombian government to outlaw extradition to the US
for drug offenses. 2 3 Thus, added to the mix of gang and militia specialists in violence, were the
mafia's terrorists, private security, and paid assassins (sicarios). Eventually, in 1993, a rogue
faction of Medellin's mafia, PEPES ('Persecuted by Pablo Escobar'), in collaboration with US
Special Operation Forces, DEA, CIA, and Colombia forces captured and killed Escobar.
1 17 Paisa is the slang term for the local population of Medellin, Colombia's second largest city, and the surrounding
areas. Colombia has very strong regional identities and the paisa one is among the strongest.
118 See Medina Franco 2006; Jaramillo Arbeliez 1994.
119 These groups were urban self-defense gangs infused with revolutionary political ideology. They were highly
fragmented with 10 separate groups operating by 1993. The government of President Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994)
demobilized 800 of their members, in the aftermath of which, the militia forces linked directly to the FARC and
ELN consolidated their presence.
120 Gustavo Villegas, (Ex-director of Medellin's Reintegration Program), interview by author, Medellin, 4 March
2008. According to Villegas, the militias applied strict rules to the barrios such as prohibiting girls from wearing
low-riding jeans or short skirts. The gangs resisted these rules. See also Ceballos Melguizo and Cronshaw 2001, pp.
110-131.
121 Former BCN Commander of Comuna 6, interview by author, Medellin, 26 February 2008.
122 See Salazar 2001.
123 In 1991, Medellin had the highest per capita murder rate in the world with a monthly average of 529 homicides.
Garcia et al. 2005.
After Pablo's death, his gangs remained active but without the cartel's disciplining
structure. According to a mid-ranking paramilitary commander who formerly worked for
Escobar, "There were many pelaos, 'sons' of the boss [Pablo], who were left abandoned. This is
when the third war began between the remaining criminal groups to gain control of the city,"124
its drug sale points and extortion and selective assassination markets. Diego Fernando Murillo
Bejarano, alias 'Don Berna,' a former member and founder of PEPES, inherited Escobar's
principal narco-trafficking structure - the Office of Envigado - and won this war, becoming the
most powerful chief of Medellin's underworld.125
Don Berna transformed his criminal apparatus in Medellin into a paramilitary
organization with hegemonic control of the region.126 To do so, he built upon the well-developed
industry of violence staffed with the diverse actors who had starred in the city's earlier wars and
co-opted the gangs, hitmen, offices, and powerful gangs. 2 7 In the metropolitan area, Don
Bema's structure became the Bloque Cacique Nutibara (BCN) while in the rural areas,
specifically eastern Antioquia, it became the Bloque Hiroes de Granada (BHG).
On November 25, 2003, the Bloque Cacique Nutibara signed a peace agreement with the
Colombian government and demobilized 868 combatants and 497 weapons.128 However, because
the BCN's disarmament was the first of the paramilitary processes, its outcome remained
uncertain and many of the BCN combatants preferred to remain outside of the process. 129 As a
124 Ex-BCN Commander of Comuna 4, interview by author, Medellin, 25 February 2008.
125 See www.verdadabierta.com, which is an effort by the think-tank, Fundaci6n Ideas para la Paz (FIP), and the
magazine Semana to reconstruct a collective memory of the armed conflict.
126 In the mid-1990s, faced with security problems, Don Berna fled Medellin and sought refuge with his former
PEPES' comrades, the Castafio brothers who, after the fall of Escobar, had formed the paramilitary structure,
Peasant Self-Defense Forces of C6rdoba and Urab6 (ACCU) in Colombia's northwest frontier. With the Castafnos'
backing, 'Don Berna,' adopted a new alias 'Adolfo Paz' and transformed his structure into a powerful, paramilitary
organization in Medellin.
127 Diego Murrillo, alias 'Don Bema,' Testimony under the Justice and Peace Law, Medellin, 16-17 July 2007.
128 Alto Comisionado para la Paz 2006.
129 Piedad Moreno (OAS - MAPP), interview by author, Medellin, 21 February 2008.
result, the bulk of the BCN's military structure joined the Bloque Heroes de Granada (BHG),130
demobilizing with this group on the 1" of August 2005 in San Roque, Antioquia. In total, 2,033
BHG combatants relinquished 1,120 arms.131 Due to the almost indistinguishable nature of the
BCN and BHG, I will herein consider them as one case, calling them the BCN or Bloque
Cacique Nutibara.
In the chapters that follow, I consider how the Bloque Cacique Nutibara's social history
made it a local group, comprising paisa recruits that were deeply embedded in their
communities. As a result, this paramilitary organization survived after surrendering its arms. It
overcame the challenging conditions of war to peace transitions and retained the loyalty of its
staff, the hierarchy of its structure, and the support of its non-combatant base. It formed a large-
scale, socio-political NGO that transformed from a manifestly coercive entity to a latent, and
eventually, demilitarized one. Comprising roughly 4,000 ex-combatant members, the NGO,
Corporaci6n Democracia, engaged in extensive 'community activities' and ran its members in
local elections. Ultimately, the networks and physical clustering of the Bloque began to erode
such that the organization lost its ability to remilitarize. Given this weakened organizational
capacity, the state gradually enhanced its presence and authority in the marginal neighborhoods
long under illegal armed control and co-opted the BCN's ex-combatants back into civilian life.
Guns: Urabd's Paramilitary Factions (BEC & BHT)
Urabai is the heart of Colombia's agricultural riches: bananas, African palm, wood, and
130 While the organization demobilized in two stages, this did not imply a split in the brigade; rather it was a
strategic decision as a kind of insurance policy. The demobilized members of the BCN and the still active BHG
combatants remained close friends and the active BHG paras never threatened or assassinated the demobilized as
has occurred in other processes where demobilization was deemed betrayal. (For example, in the aftermath of the
EPL's demobilization in 1991, the FARC and a spoiler faction of the EPL killed off many of the demobilized.)
131 Alto Comisionado para la Paz 2006.
cattle. Additionally, it boasts an extensive natural port, the international border with Panama,
mountainous terrain, and dense jungle. Accordingly, for four decades, it constituted a "territory
of war," attracting all of the country's diverse armed actors. They aimed to gain access to the
region's recruits, sanctuaries, taxes from agricultural plantations, and trafficking routes to
Central America for illicit arms imports and drug exports.' 32 The persistent presence of armed
actors in Urabi and their willingness to fight bitter wars over the region for nearly half a century
suggest that it was a critical breeding ground for criminal and political experts in violence. 33
In the 1960s and 70s, Urabi became an epicenter of Colombian labor activism, unionism,
and guerrilla activity. Each guerrilla group infiltrated a union, formed a political party, and
fought a fierce war for the 'hearts and minds' of the 'radical' banana laborers. The FARC
controlled the union Sintrabananeros; Sintagro belonged to the EPL; and the ELN directed
Sindejornarelos. 3 4 The FARC commanded the communist party and the Patriotic Union (UP),
which won several municipal governments and the EPL enjoyed significant electoral success
through its political branch, Esperanza, Paz, and Libertad. In the late 1980s, the fighting
between the guerrilla armies experienced a brief reprieve, only to end tragically when, in 1991,
the EPL signed a peace accord with President Cesar Gaviria, demobilized its army, and
transformed into a legal political party.13 5 To prevent the EPL from dominating the elections and
gaining popularity in the unions and to punish it for disarming, the FARC began an
extermination campaign against the civilian constituency of the EPL and its demobilized
132 Secretariado Nacional de Pastoral Social 2001.
133 It should be noted that Colombians tend to term anywhere there are militarized actors a "geo-strategic region"
and do so only in a post-facto fashion. As a result, most of the country has been deemed strategically important and
the term's significance has been diluted. Despite this problematic and over-inclusive coding of 'strategic zones,'
Urabi proved an incessant war zone.
134 The ELN had a more minor presence in the region.
135 Ramirez Tob6n 1997.
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combatants.136 A bloodbath ensued. As a result, a dissident group of the EPL, the Bernardo
Franco front, joined the FARC's side to assassinate the EPL ex-combatants who, in self-defense,
formed the militias: Comandos Populares. 137 The conflict degenerated; each armed coalition
indiscriminately attacked the social base of the other.138 The Comandos Populares allied with the
paramilitaries and, together, they rid the banana and cattle areas of the FARC guerrillas and
established military, social, and political hegemony. The FARC were forced to withdraw to the
jungles of Choc6 and Mutati.139
These paramilitaries emerged on Urabi's violence scene first in the 1980s as los
Huelengues, then as 'Las 70,' and then as the Autodefensas Campesinas de C6rdoba y Urabi.140
They operated in association with banana planters, cattle ranchers, merchants, and other
members of the business community.141 The Urab6/Cordoba self-defense forces divided into five
sovereign groups: the Bloque Elmer Cirdenas, under the command of Freddy Rend6n Herrera,
alias 'El Alemin,' who controlled the north of Urabi Antioquefuo and Uraba Chocoano;142 the
Frente Turbo, led by Ever Veloza Garcia, alias 'HH,' who patrolled Turbo; and the Frente
Bananero, commanded by Ra6il Hasbdin, alias 'Pedro Bonito,' who held Apartad6, Carepa, and
Chigorod6.' 43 In the zones to the east of Urabi operated two other armed actors, the Bloque
136 Duncan 2007.
137 See Ortiz Sarmiento 2007.
138 Sandoval 1997.
139 Garcia 1996; Madariaga 2006.
140 Dairon Mendoza Caraballo, Testimony under the Justice and Peace Law, Medellin, 16 September 2008.
141 Corporaci6n Observatorio para la Paz 2002; Molina 2001.
142 The original self-defense forces in Necocli were formed by the family of Necocli mayor, Carlos Correa
(Alejandro Toro (Director of Construpaz), interview by author, Necocli, 3 July 2008). The Bloque Elmer Cdrdenas
also ran a website: http://www.acbec.org/ which is now archived.
143 Eleuterio (OAS-MAPP Peace Monitor), interview by author, April 2008. The Frente Bananero was also referred
to as the Frente Alex Hurtado (Revista Semana 2008).
Heroes de Tolovi, under the command of Diego Murillo, and the Bloque C6rdoba, under the
leadership of Salvatore Mancuso.14 4
On 25 November 2004, the Bloque Bananero (the combined Frentes Turbo and
Bananero) demobilized 451 fighters and surrendered 351 arms in Turbo's El Dos. The Bloque
C6rdoba then disbanded its 925 combatants on 18 January 2005 in Tierralta, followed by the
Bloque Heroes de Tolovi's 464 soldiers on the 15 June 2005 in Valencia. A year later, Uribe's
High Commissioner for Peace reached a peace accord with the Bloque Elmer Cirdenas to
dismantle the BEC's five battalions in three stages. On 12 April 2006, the BEC's Frente
Costanero surrendered 220 arms and 309 fighters in Necocli, followed by the Frentes Dabeiba
and Pavarand6 on 30 April 2006 with their 484 soldiers and 360 weapons in Turbo, and the
Frentes Norte Medio Salaqui and Choc6's 743 combatants and 488 arms on 15 August 2006 in
Unguia.145
These brigades embarked on the demobilization journey from a position similar to
Medellin's BCN. They were, for the most part, staffed with local recruits with strong ties to the
non-combatant communities they had patrolled during the war. However, unlike the BCN, the
Heroes de Tolovi (BHT) disarmed in close proximity to an armed faction, Bloque C6rdoba
(BC), which experienced a downgrade in its capacity. This relative weakening of the Bloque
C6rdoba undermined the equilibrium of the peace regime. The BHT and BC could not agree on
the new transfers necessary to avert war and thus, after a period of quiet, they returned to
violence. Already remilitarized, the BHT then challenged the Bloque Elmer Cardenas' battalions,
sparking their redeployment. In the chapters that follow, I seek to understand the timing and
pattern of this remilitarization in Urabi.
144 See Martinez 2004.
45 Alto Comisionado para la Paz 2006.
Bankruptcy: Norte de Santander's Bloque Catatumbo
Until the late 1990s, Norte de Santander was a bastion of the guerrilla armies, principally
that of the ELN with the FARC and EPL enjoying a more minor presence. These armies were
deeply entrenched in the petroleum unions of Tibu and campesino villages of Catatumbo. After
instigating mass mobilizations in the 1980s without success, the ELN began bombing campaigns
against the oil pipelines, kidnappings of prominent figures, and terrorist attacks on infrastructure
to pressure the government to afford the population greater social services. The FARC and ELN
also became heavily involved in the cultivation of coca. The guerrillas had 'taken' most of the
rural, jungle region in the north and west of the state and had a strong urban militia presence in
Norte de Santander's cities. The rebels permeated all aspects of life and the Colombian military
and police presence remained extremely limited. In La Gabarra, for example, when the army
patrolled the five blocks from its base to the park, the entire brigade would have to go because
"if only five soldiers went, they would certainly be killed." 46
In 1998, a group of 200 paramilitaries from C6rdoba, Urabi, and other parts of the coast
set out on an 'expedition' to conquer the Venezuelan border area motivated both by a desire to
rid the area of the insurgents operating in the Catatumbo region and to access the expansive and
lucrative coca crops and border smuggling opportunities. After a brutal campaign against the
rebels and civilians, the paramilitaries managed to gain control of the flat region along
Colombia's most important border, the urban centers including the department's capital city of
Cucuta, the roads and bridges, and much of the economically strategic petroleum and drug
producing zones.147 The jungle remained the guerrillas'.
On December 10th 2004, the Bloque Catatumbo demobilized 1,434 soldiers and
146 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Cicuta, April 2008.
147 See Fundaci6n Progresar 2004.
decommissioned 1,114 weapons in Campo Dos. The BC also surrendered 11 vehicles, 2 boats, 8
canoes, 15 engines, 45 mules, and 161 rural properties they had taken and used for logistical
support.
Unlike the Urabi and Medellin paramilitary brigades, the BC had engaged in dispersed
recruitment and was thus characterized by thin social networks. Additionally, its fighters spread
out throughout Colombia after demobilizing. Without the multifaceted ties or physical clustering,
the BC went out of business post-demobilization. In so doing, it left a power void, which
contiguous paramilitary forces remilitarized to seize, narco-trafficking cartels struggled to
capture, and the state sought to fill. As a result, no coercive entity gained hegemonic control and
levels of violence and criminality remained high.
The three paramilitary organizations considered in depth in this study (BCN, BEC, and
BC) launched their campaigns in roughly similar contexts of state capacity, corruption, insurgent
threat, and ideological struggle. Their fighters joined for the same mixture of security, emotional,
and economic reasons. They committed similarly heinous crimes against humanity and were
relatively strong upon disarming; none faced military defeat. In fact, Bloque Catatumbo was one
of the most militarily effective paramilitary brigades in Colombia and yet, it went bankrupt. All
three were active in illicit economies with the BCN - the organization, which demilitarized and
remained intact - the most deeply entrenched. 148 The three structures demobilized under the
148 Medellin was an epicenter of the drug trade. In 2008, there were 762 sell-points for drugs and cocaine-dealers
earned a monthly profit of five million dollars. "While Medellin is not where the crops are grown and most of the
drugs do not physically pass through Medellin; it is the center for the business, administration and contacts for
narco-trafficking." Additionally, it was one of the places of highest domestic drug sales and consumption in
Colombia. (Medellin Government Official, interview by author, Medellin, February 2008); One Ex-BCN
Commander described his barrio, "There are 38 drug points for marihuana and 25 for crack and other kind of drugs.
The location of these points is plainly known by the community." Interview by author, Medellin, 25 February 2008).
The paramilitary commanders' testimonies under the Justice and Peace Law further spoke to the extent of the BCN's
narco-trafficking (Juan Carlos Sierra Ramirez, alias 'El Tuso,' Testimony under the Justice and Peace Law,
Medellin, 28 June 2007). Similarly, situated on the Panamanian and Venezuelan borders, the BEC and BC operated
same peace terms with the same guarantees of their security and power. The only key ways in
which they differed fundamentally was in their recruitment, deployment, and migration.
VIII. Road Ahead
The remainder of this dissertation explores how these differences in recruitment,
deployment, and post-war migration patterns shape the post-war trajectories of armed
organizations. Specifically, it analyzes the effects of these patterns on the ability of the
organization to retain a collective capacity to mobilize for future activities, to preserve influence
over civilian affairs to transition into a legitimate socio-political actor, and to remain
demilitarized, surrendering the opportunity to return to war. It addresses these questions by
examining the BCN, BEC, and BC case studies in qualitative depth and all paramilitary-
community dyads in statistical breath. I begin by considering how and why armed groups vary in
their ability to avert organizational bankruptcy in the aftermath of war. Chapter 6 explores the
'campaigns' outcome and Chapter 7 takes on the 'guns' trajectory.
in resource-rich terrain with coca cultivation, laboratories and opportunities for cross-border smuggling. The
resource-endowment argument actually predicts the exact opposite of that which occurred in these cases.
Part H.
Chapter 5
Bankruptcy
I. Introduction
During war-to-peace transitions, some armed groups retain an organizational structure
capable of collective action while others disintegrate. In Liberia, "the capability of ex-
combatants to mobilize themselves for any purpose remains strong" (Littman 2009).149
Meanwhile, in Sierra Leone, the RUF "has poor prospects for survival.. .None [of the leaders]
commands much rank and file loyalty, and even if they wanted to, it is extremely unlikely they
could rally ex-combatants" (ICG 2004). In Colombia, the Bloque Catatumbo went bankrupt
while the Bloque Cacique Nutibara and Bloque Elmer Cirdenas survived as powerful, cohesive
organizations.
This chapter asks why we observe variation in the ability of a former armed organization
to remain collective-action capable. It presents a theory of post-war cohesion and its observable
implications and then discusses the three paramilitary case studies. It concludes with a statistical
analysis of post-war bankruptcy, which evaluates the proposed model against the strongest
alternatives.
II. Alternative Explanations
The question of what happens to armed organizations' collective capacity after they
demobilize is understudied. Theories that study war recurrence or rebel-to-party transitions
assume organizational endurance1 50 while those that study demobilization and reintegration
149 See also Utas 2008, p. 4.
150 See Walter 2004 for a study of war recurrence and de Zeeuw 2008 for a project on rebel-to-party transitions.
assume organizational bankruptcy and individual combatant atomization. No one has studied
variation in the ability to collectively act after the organization has demobilized and the necessity
of waging war has been removed. Armed groups achieve some level of structured action with
disciplining control and a command structure. What happens to this? Why does it endure in some
cases and dissipate in others? Several answers emerge implicitly from the literature on collective
action.
Participation in high-risk collective action has occupied scholars of political violence for
decades. Theories of recruitment have focused on what fighters want, a motivational approach to
participation. Some of these theories focus on selective, material incentives, using the terms
'greed,' 'consumers,' and 'criminally-driven'; 152 others emphasize collective and non-material
incentives, employing the labels 'grievances,' 'investors, 'ideologically-driven,' and 'pleasure of
agency." 53 The post-war corollaries include the following:
Resources. One answer derives from Weinstein 2002 and predicts that resource-poor
groups recruit through nonmaterial interests whereas resource-rich groups attract opportunistic,
salaried joiners and suffer greater principal agent problems and vulnerability to organizational
fragmentation. Accordingly, we should expect economically-endowed organizations to go
bankrupt post-war.154
Ideology. An alternative means of maintaining collective action, which may also serve to
sustain collective action after war, is through ideology and collective benefits. Existing accounts
propose that strong ideology, appeal to ethnic, religious, and cultural identities, and commitment
151 See Humphreys and Weinstein 2007.
152 On material motivations, see Grossman 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Weinstein 2006.
153 On non-material incentives, see Wood 2003; Petersen 2001.
154 See Weinstein 2002, 2006.
to a long-term organizational goal should strengthen individuals' identification with the
movement and thus the movement's ability to survive post-demobilization. 55
In contrast to these two models, I focus not on what fighters want, but where they are and
whom they are connected to. This can be called the human geography of organizations. I
evaluate the explanatory power of motivational approaches to post-war collective action
(resources and ideology) and find them unable to explain the observed variation.
Leadership The scholarly literature and anecdotal evidence highlight another possible
answer: leadership. It is posited that certain leaders, by nature of their commanding power, aura,
and charisma, prove better able to retain the loyalty of their subordinates and keep their
organization united (after a demobilization process). Names of especially charismatic military
leaders abound. While plausible, it is difficult, if not impossible, to assess a leader's 'cohesive'
capacity independent from the outcome.
The presence or absence of leaders at the high rungs of the command chain may also
determine post-war organizational endurance. The US Army Counterinsurgency Handbook
adheres to this logic. It maps different configurations of insurgent networks based on the
existence of their commanders and then directs soldiers to behead the organizations in order to
reduce their collective capacity. Post-peace agreement, many leaders are subject to
imprisonment, assassination, or extradition. Evidence from cases such as Peru's Sendero
Luminoso and Angola's UNITA suggests that 'decapitating' the top leadership of an armed
group may cause its bankruptcy. We should thus expect organizations whose top leaders are
isolated from their subordinates to be less likely to survive.
155 Wolf 1969; Scott 1976; Calhoun 1991; McAdam 1999; Varshney 2002; Wood 2003.
I1. Recruitment, Deployment, and Post-war Migration Patterns
Organizations vary in where they recruit and deploy their soldiers, and soldiers vary in
where they decide to migrate after they have demobilized. Recruitment, deployment, and post-
war migration patterns generate distinct configurations of collective capacity. This project does
not aim to propose a comprehensive theory of recruitment, deployment, or migration; rather
these are inputs into the analysis. However, a brief discussion of these concepts is necessary to
ensure against omitted variable bias: that these factors are caused by some underlying
phenomenon that also explains variation in post-war bankruptcy.
The Logic of Recruitment & Deployment
At their outset, armed organizations rarely span the state's entire territory; rather, they
concentrate in very specific geographic locations. These first cells of the organization are
generally composed of recruits native to the regions. While some organizations remain extremely
limited in scope, most seek to strengthen militarily and expand territorially. Organizations face
several strategic options to expand to another region. They can send a sole commander from the
home region (HR) and raise an army in the non-home region (NHR) either through new
recruitment or by co-opting an existing armed actor in the region if one exists (deployment from
HR=O%). They can instead send a battalion and supplement it with recruits from the non-home
region (deployment from HR=50%). Or they can rely only on fighters from the home region and
incorporate no soldiers native to the NHR (deployment from HR=100%). These constitute the
recruitment and deployment strategies of an armed organization and they vary across
organizations and within a single organization over time. I argue that which specific individuals
are deployed is usually random.
How can we explain variation in these strategies? There are several reasons why a
minimal threshold (few combatants from the HR) is not an optimal approach. First, the
organization may wish to station its recruits away from their 'home regions' in order to make
them 'soldiers first;' to maximize loyalty to the mission and army over loyalty to family and
community. 156 Second, even if the militarized unit plans to co-opt an armed group in the NHR,
no commander wishes to go into combat without his trusted 'buddies' by his side. As one ex-
combatant explained to me, "There were no commanders local to the zone, they were all from
elsewhere because of social networks." He gave me the following example: "You are American
and so if you had to choose people to help you with an operation or something, you would
choose your best friends from America. If you were doing a very risky attack, you would want to
be surrounded by 'your people' because you trust them and because you also want them to have
privileges, you want the best for them, and so the commanders from [HR] brought their best
friends and their best friends got the best positions in the organization [in NHR] . The third
reason for not recruiting in the NHR is related to the first: the expanding unit cannot trust that
members of the native population are not loyal informants of their enemy because only the
potential recruits have accurate information about their 'true types.' Given this private and thus
asymmetric information, the armed group is wary of integrating native soldiers into its ranks.
These conditions, of course, may change over time if the organization improves the lives
of the inhabitants in the NHR and thus, the population associates these improvements with the
156 In the Soviet and Yugoslav armies, for example, soldiers were not allowed to operate where they were from.
Similarly, Sim6n Bolivar's army in Peru was comprised of all Venezuelan recruits. The logic behind this
deployment is that "homogeneity is induced by decoupling civil and military society; company solidarity is a by-
product of this separation" (Bearman 1991). Other armies, however, such as those of the Confederacy and, in many
cases, the Colombian self-defense forces, tried to induce social solidarity by the tight coupling of military and civil
society. "Thus, each company was organized within one county, and soldiers volunteered to serve with other men
from their local area - many of them neighbors and kin...The model army was an aggregation of separate local
militias." (Bearman 1991).
157 Mid-ranking Commander (Bloque Catatumbo), interview by author, C6cuta, April 2008.
armed group's rule and confers them trustworthy recruits. Drawing soldiers then enables the
militarized organization to recruit additional members of the native population through these
soldiers' social ties. Doing so reduces the adverse selection problem by providing accurate
information about different individuals' values and loyalty. Thus, we should anticipate that, in
zones of expansion, an armed group is initially composed of 100% soldiers from HR, but that
over time, this number decreases.
There are, however, additional military considerations besides unit cohesion that will
reduce even the initial endowment below 100%. One of these is intelligence. The 'invading'
troops require some local information from the beginning. Thus, we should expect the initial
composition of the group to immediately drop to say 90%.158 Additionally, these are illegal
armed forces that must maintain covert supply chains. For this reason, the units may transport
their combatants to the NHR, but then rely on the local population for non-strategically vital
inputs such as food, transportation, and medicine. Thus, the non-local armed unit will begin to
contract local cooks, drivers, doctors, navigators, and mechanics. Given the high cost, time, and
risk of transporting men from other regions, if the unit requires additional military manpower
quickly, it may also recruit some local foot soldiers (though usually no high ranking officers).
Finally, the marginal cost of recruitment is not equal across all sub-sections of the native
population in the NHR. Thus, there may be certain groups from which the non-local armed group
can easily draw committed recruits even in the absence of territorial control or strong ties to the
community. These sub-groups arise because of the multitude of reasons why individuals
participate in high-risk collective action. They include a) those especially sensitive to material
incentives (the poorest or greediest); b) those affected adversely by the incumbent armed group's
158 How foreign occupations manage intelligence and ally with local collaborators may provide interesting insights
into these dynamics.
strategy of violence and governance (extortion, kidnapping, violent death, and social norms); c)
those with personal security problems in need of protection; d) those driven by resentment or
anger whose status has been reversed or whose family members have been murdered; e) veterans
who return from military service with no other marketable skills besides their expertise in
violence; f) youth hoping for adventure ... the list goes on. Therefore, ease of recruitment does
not correlate with territory. Commanders recruit for unit cohesion, but also for intelligence,
commitment to the 'cause' and ability to provide certain inputs. Thus, group composition will
usually prove less than 100% from the home region (HR).
These patterns complicate when we consider more than two locations - HR and NHR -
and consider instead HR, NHR1, NHR2, NHR3, NHR4.... Say, following the logic above, that the
commander chooses a level of 70% to deploy from the HR to NHR1. This means that 70% of the
force that operates in NHR1 is from the HR and 30% is from NHR1 . Next, the organization
decides to expand further to NHR2 and chooses the same deployment threshold of 70%. This
means that the composition of the army that operates in NHR2 is 49% from HR, 21% from NHR1
and 30% from NHR2. Taking it one region further, the force in NHR3 will be 34.3% from HR,
14.7% from NHR1, 21% from NHR2 and 30% from NHR3. What we see is that, given a constant
rule and deployment according to quotas, the dispersion of the soldiers' towns of origins
increases as the organization expands.
Thus, we get variation in the dispersion of the soldiers' towns of origins. This has two
implications for organizational capacity. One, it signals the density of pre-existing ties between
combatants. Two, it partially contributes to variation in post-war migration patterns and thus,
physical clustering or dispersion of combatants after demobilization. Before exploring the causal
weight of pre-existing ties and post-war physical clustering and delineating the observable
implications of the model, I will briefly touch on the concept of post-war migration patterns.
The Logic of Post- War Migration
Individuals surrender their arms and then choose to 'go home' to their towns of origin,
remain in the zone of operation, or displace to another region, which is neither their home nor
their war theater.
"Returning home, where this is possible for individuals, is often a key step in
reintegration programmes." 59 The concept of relocating combatants back to their towns of origin
constitutes a central tenet of the international community's (UN, World Bank, OIM)
demobilization and reintegration doctrine.160 Those who operated where they are from thus have
a very strong tendency to remain in their war zone after disarming; they are already home, often
still living with their families. This tendency, while still strong, is less marked among combatants
who operated away from their towns of origin.
Combatants deployed to regions far from home are 'displaced' by the war. They may not
return to their communities for the following reasons: their towns of origin may not be safe; they
may fear rejection by their families and neighbors; or their lands may have been occupied, their
communities destroyed, or their families forcibly uprooted by the war.
Additionally, relative to local combatants, these ex-combatants face significantly reduced
costs of displacement as they are already far from their homes. Some remain in the region in
which they fought16 1 because they a) may have found a partner and built a family while fighting;
159 UNDDR http://www.unddr.org/.
160 See Stockholm Report; World Bank: http://www.ndrp.org/.
161 Governments may also influence these 'displaced' combatants' migration. States often do so temporarily by
gathering former combatants in cantonments or concentration areas in their war theaters. However, given
international ideology and the potential that these non-embedded groups would redeploy, this is an empirically rare
strategy. In Sierra Leone, the state pursued occupational relocation whereby combatants were located to zones with
b) may benefit from a vested economic interest in their former zone of operation; c) may enjoy
the power they exercise in the zone, or d) may be ordered by their superiors to retain a foothold
in the theater.162 However, because these combatants are not embedded in the communities in
which they operated (as documented in Chapter 6), they prove more likely to displace to another
zone, which is neither their town of origin nor their sphere of operation. They choose this place
according to a standard migration logic: wherever provides the best economic, security, and
network package. Each combatant may have a different optimal location based on this logic.
Very often, the non-locally deployed former fighters migrate to large urban centers where
employment opportunities are perceived to be high, they enjoy contacts from their home
communities, and they can disappear in anonymity and reduce their security risks.
Combining recruitment and post-war migration patterns, I find that if an armed
organization recruited from disperse geographic locations and its combatants either return home
or displace to third zones after disarming, the organization will experience a low level of
physical concentration of its members.163 Only if a majority of its soldiers remain in the battle
zone after surrendering their arms will the group face a high degree of clustering of its ex-
combatants. 164 If the organization instead recruited in a concentrated area, its fighters have a
high likelihood of remaining in a delimited territory if they migrate home or continue to reside in
the war theater (these are the same in the case of local combatants). Only if the fighters displace
employment opportunities. In some cases, this can facilitate physical clustering (Megan MacKenzie (Belfer Fellow,
Harvard University), interview by author, Cambridge, MA, 10 December 2008).
162 It should be noted that these zones generally hold strategic value; the groups identified them as regions to which
they wished to expand. Thus, the commander may assign a unit of combatants the task of keeping a foothold in the
zone or opportunistic mid-ranking leaders, seeking to take advantage of their superiors' disarmament, may act
autonomously. In countries with a well-developed criminal industry, the commander may also sell off factions of the
organization and their respective territories to criminal mafias.
163 Strong indoctrination programs during the war could potentially offset this tendency by rendering non-local
fighters' migration decisions interdependent. Ex-combatants would settle together in geographically demarcated
zones rather than returning to their families or pursuing separate economic opportunities. Socialization likely proves
influential only in organizations that displace combatants from their civilian lives, engage in infrequent
reassignment, and retain recruits for very long periods of time (Griffin 1988).
164 UN 2006.
to third locations - neither their homes nor battle zones - are the soldiers unlikely to cluster (See
Figure 4).
Figure 4. Post-War Physical Clustering of Ex-Combatants
Dispersion of Recruitment
Post-War Migration
Before turning to the model's predictions about bankruptcy, let me continue the discussion begun
in Chapter 2 of what multifaceted ties and post-war concentration buy an organization.
Multifaceted Ties
Multifaceted ties are pre-war networks that produce social bonds and norms of
reciprocity that keep fighters linked to the organization even after disarming. These ties are
strong when combatants share their towns of origin which afford them denser interpersonal
bonds (family, friendship, community, school, and employment links) but also shared world
views, preferences and knowledge; common culture, slang and food tastes; perceptions of
trustworthiness; mutually reinforcing expectations and programmed responses; and a sense of
their personal interests and identities merging with those of the community. Thus, in the project's
model, geographic dispersion of recruitment determines strength of ties.
To understand the density of ties produced by sharing a town of origin, it is important to
outline the Colombian concept of the vereda. Such a concept likely exists in most societies, but
Dispersed Concentrated
Go Home Low Clustering High Clustering
Squat in War Theater High Clustering High Clustering
Displace: Neither Home nor Low Clustering Low Clustering
in War Theater
especially in ones that are not fully modernized or in which internal migration levels are low.
Veredas are rural neighborhoods or hamlets though the concept has some salience in the urban
barrios. According to Fals Borda's ethnographic accounts, veredas create "distinct locality
groups" whose inhabitants form strong "ties among themselves as well as with the land on which
they live" and this gives them their identity. "Kinship ties are extremely significant." The
neighborhoods are like "extended families." They are "endogamous - most people are familially
connected in one way or another... endogamy is so generalized that an attempt to trace those
lines in a sociogram result[s] in a great accumulation of lines." Families live in the same vereda
for many generations and "there is a strong tendency for heads of households to settle in [the
neighborhood] with their families for their entire lifetime." Additionally, the use of a toponym is
widespread. When asked their identities, "the local people refer to themselves as 'from [X
vereda]" as this says it all. The name of the neighborhood tells any Colombian (especially those
from the broader region) the individuals' political affiliation, their friends, what places they
frequent, and what families they are from. As these family names have been handed down in the
locality for generations, it is relatively simple to know who is local and who is not (1962, 40-41).
Thus, 'shared town of origin' produces a sound proxy for multifaceted networks.
Of course, Colombia has experienced high levels of forced displacement. However, much
of this displacement has been of a collective nature in which the populations recreate their
veredas in the regions to which they are displaced. According to Fernin Gonzilez, "Neighbors,
families, friends, towns all moved together, they transplanted themselves. They had very, very
strong ties and so they reproduced their original campesino societies and norms in their new
zones."165
165 Ferndn Gonzdlez, interview by author, Bogotd, July 2006. Abbey Steele finds this form of displacement to be
especially prevalent in cases of collective targeting by armed groups (Steele 2009).
There are other ties, some real and others 'imagined,'1 66 which might spark these same
cohesion-sustaining mechanisms though most are of a one-dimensional nature. As we will see
below, military service is one of them. Shared ethnicity and political affiliation may be others.
Additionally, socialization during war is possible especially in certain types of organizations
(where transfer between brigades is low, decoupling of civil and military life high, and tours of
service long). For parsimony, I limit the formal analysis to ties based on locality, which my
fieldwork suggested are the strongest, most durable, and most complex ones. I will touch on
other kinds of ties while discussing the qualitative evidence.
Geographic Clustering
Physical concentration, meanwhile, as outlined in Chapter 2, serves to protect and
strengthen the social capital between comrades and, by facilitating continued face-to-face
interactions, lowers information asymmetries and reduces incentives for subordinates and
commanders to defect. It also extends the 'shadow of the future' for interaction, enhancing the
cooperation regime. 167
IV. A Theory of Post-War Collective Capacity
Divergent Configurations
To predict the extent of bankruptcy of an ex-armed organization, my model stipulates that
it is necessary to combine these recruitment, deployment, and post-war migration patterns (See
Figure 5). Different configurations generate distinct social networks and physical clustering and
thus divergent probabilities of organizational survival.
166 See Anderson 1983.
167 See Axelrod 1984 and Fearon 1998 for discussions of the role of shadows of the future in facilitating
cooperation.
Figure 5. Post-War Organizational Bankruptcy versus Survival
Multifaceted Networks
Weak StrongPost-War Physical (Dispersed Recruitment) (Concentrated Recruitment)
Clustering_______________
Intermediate Case*Low Bankrupt (High decay rate)
High Intermediate Case Strongly Intact
*Note: If dispersed, social capital between combatants erodes rapidly.
Observable Implications
HI: Organizations characterized by low recruitment dispersion, and thus dense ties, and
high post-war clustering should preserve a strong capacity for collective action.
H2: We should observe armed groups whose social bonds are instead thin, and whose
fighters disperse to different places, to go bankrupt.
There are two intermediate cases:
H3 : Armed groups which recruited in a concentrated fashion, but whose combatants
dispersed after demobilizing will retain an initial intermediate capacity for collective action, but
this capacity will dissolve quickly.
H4: Finally, we should expect armed groups with weak pre-war networks and high post-
war clustering to constitute an intermediate case of post-war organizational survival. These
groups' fighters originate from multiple regions, but do not return home after disarming; rather,
they concentrate in their combat zones as 'squatters.'
V. Post-War Collective Capacity in Practice
Having set forth the parameters of a model of post-war organizational survival, I turn to
evaluating the model's analytic value in the three case studies. I explore how armed groups
navigate the path from war to peace. I look at the inner workings of the organizations, at the
dynamics between the leaders and followers and between the combatant colleagues. I seek to
understand how and why commanders vary in their recruitment decisions and former fighters in
their migration choices and ask whether these strategies can account for variation in group
bankruptcy and individual defection in the aftermath of peace accords. The chapter concludes
with a quantitative analysis of the model.
Medellin's Bloque Cacique Nutibara (BCN): Bankruptcy Averted
Local Recruits
The BCN was comprised of armed elements that were local and linked to the
neighborhoods in which they operated. The BCN commanders all hailed from Medellin. To fill
the ranks of their organization, they built upon the region's well-developed industry of
violence. 168 Through a complex process of annihilation, negotiation, absorption, and
domination,169 they co-opted and recruited the 'primary' elements of the conflict - the
neighborhood gangs (parches and combos). Parches were adolescents' first encounter with
violence, their 'kindergartens in criminality.' A parche consisted of a small group of friends who
'hung out' and became involved with minor criminal and violent activities in their
neighborhoods. The BCN also came to reign over all of Medellin's combos, the next tier in the
hierarchy of violence. Combos were criminal organizations composed of between five and
twenty members, which were very territorial and local in nature, but sold their services to more
sophisticated armed groups. Combo members were stationed on the street corners of their
communities and patrolled several-block radiuses. They constituted the link between the
neighborhood populations and the macro armed groups. In 2000, Medellin had 221 combos,
comprising 6,991 men. 7 0 37% of the BCN fighters claimed to have belonged to a gang prior to
joining the paramilitaries. 17 To recruit these micro gangs, the BCN adopted the following
methods as described by a BCN commander: "My work was to ... conduct a study neighborhood
168 Diego Murrillo, alias 'Don Berna,' Testimony under the Justice and Peace Law, Medellin, 16-17 July 2007.
169 Instituto de Estudios Politicos de la Universidad de Antioquia 2007.
170 Alonso Jaramillo (Ex-Militia, Scholar of the Conflict, and Director of the Security Branch of the Reintegration
Program), interview by author, Medellin, 27 February 2008.
171 This data was provided by the Programa Paz y Reconciliaci6n. This figure is, however, an underestimation for
two reasons. One, a majority of the BCN former members joined the BHG and demobilized with this latter group.
The ex-BHG fighters were not asked this question. Two, many non-combatants demobilized with the paramilitaries
in order to gain access to the economic, educational, and psychological benefits of the reintegration program (See
Appendix C). These individuals are unlikely to have belonged previously to a gang.
by neighborhood; to do a census of how many boys were in each combo ... We completed this
work in the neighborhoods, contracting all of Medellin's combos to be part of our ranks." 7 2 In
addition to the primary violent actors, the BCN also commissioned the 'secondary' elements of
organized crime - the hitmen-for-hire (sicarios), offices,173 and powerful gangs (bandas).174
These bandas (Terraza, Triana, Frank) were the most organized and powerful of the criminal
entities. Less territorial, but strongly hierarchical, each banda specialized in a certain type of
criminal activity: bank robbery, kidnapping, extortion, narcotrafficking, etc. Finally, the BCN
recruited the 'tertiary' elements of the war - the 'traditional armed actors:' insurgents and
counterinsurgents.' 7 5
Multifaceted Networks
The Bloque Cacique Nutibara (BCN) was thus composed almost entirely of local fighters
from the 'HR (Home Region)'. 75% of the BCN combatants were born in the city of Medellin
and its surrounding area.176 Moreover, a majority of the BCN combatants had strong ties prior to
joining the paramilitaries. During my conversations with ex-combatants in Medellin, many
reported having friends (from elementary school and their neighborhoods) or family members
72 Revista Semana 2005.
73 1t is important to note that the Oficina (Office) should not be understood as a physical space; rather it was an
association of distinct criminal structures to coordinate assassinations, robberies, kidnappings, extortions, and drug
trafficking. See Instituto de Estudios Politicos de la Universidad de Antioquia 2007, p. 54. Former paramilitary
commander, Doble Cero, described the oficina as the "office of complaints and claims, or the Attorney General of
the narco-traffickers, which by following certain existing norms among the mafias, repair[ed] 'inconveniences'
generated by the narco business in exchange for a 30% cut on the profits at stake."
174 These structures enjoyed sophisticated arms, equipment and personnel and tended to sell their services to the
highest bidder. Jorge Gaviria (Director Medellin's Reintegration Program), interview by author, Medellin, 19
January 2008. See also Marin and Adarve 2001.
175 Ex-BHG Combatants, interview by author, Comuna 4, Medellin, 18 February 2008. To subjugate the tertiary
elements, Don Berna's army had to wage war against the other paramilitary structure with a presence in Medellin:
the Bloque Metro. Metro's commander, alias 'Doble Cero,' was opposed to the ascendance of narco-traffickers
within the paramilitary organizations. He consequently defected from the Self-Defense Groups' federation (AUC),
causing its remaining members to declare war on him. After vicious fighting with Metro, Don Berna prevailed,
killing Doble Cero and "absorbing" Metro's structure and members. See Espinal, Ramirez, and Sierra 2007; Civico
2009.
176 These figures come from the nine surveys described in Appendix C. 67% of BHG were born in this zone.
(siblings, cousins, partners) already in the BCN structure prior to joining. My interviewees who
had previously belonged to a criminal group (parche, combo, or banda) attested to having a
"very strong sense of belonging" to these groups. When the paramilitaries summoned the leaders
of their gangs and offered: "join us or face the consequences," they opted to join in a collective
fashion (those that did not were killed). Most of these ex-combatants reported that they also
came to strongly identify with the Bloque Cacique Nutibara, suggesting that their loyalty to their
combos transferred to the BCN. One former fighter described to me, "In the criminal world, I
was a rogue, a scoundrel (pillo), then when I entered the Bloque Cacique Nutibara, I was a
paramilitary (paraco). It was a very big responsibility. Before, I made money myself. In the
BCN, I was paid to do things." Ex-combatants I interviewed felt part of a larger mission, of a
movement that afforded them a status upgrade. "I felt much more respect from the community
when I joined the paramilitaries, it collaborated with me much more." 77 Cacique Nutibara
members who had not belonged to a criminal gang also testified to joining collectively with their
groups of friends. In the context of few economic opportunities and excessive abuses by the
guerrillas' militias, when their friends said, "let's go join the autodefensas, it will be cool," they
went. Sergio Mauricio specified his ties with other combatants: "They were the boys with whom
we had always done everything together, with whom we had studied together." As a result of
these long-standing relationships and friendships, the BCN comrades' ties tended to run deep.
The co-optation of these preexisting, micro, armed groups with intimate knowledge of their
community members' reputations also conferred to the BCN the block-by-block reconnaissance
necessary to staff itself with the most trustworthy members whose loyalty would persist beyond a
ceasefire.
177 Recidivist Ex-combatants, interviews by author, Bellavista Prison, Medellin, April-May 2008.
The BCN linked the small neighborhood-level armed units into a disciplined, hierarchical
organization. Former combatants describe the changes they experienced as they graduated from
their combos and joined the paramilitaries. "In the paras, it was more tense, you had to ask
permission for absolutely everything. You had to report everything. Criminals don't have to ask
permission for anything; you are your own boss." Another explained how, "In the BCN, it was
much more rigorous, I had more responsibility." "It was more repressed because I didn't have
the liberty that I had when I was in the parche," added his friend. In a final interview, a former
Cacique militant captured the essence of BCN membership: "I became less rational in that I
stopped measuring the consequences of my actions because I had to obey orders, period."178 The
BCN commanders appointed neighborhood level mid-ranking officers, which exploited the deep
local knowledge of the combos to target defectors. The neighborhood gangs possessed an
elaborate informant network, which enabled the BCN commanders to credibly threaten
punishment for disobedience and reward good performance.
Physical Clustering of Combatants After Disarmament
On November 25th at dawn, the BCN soldiers left their homes to disarm. They went
downtown to the Palace of Expositions where the formal disarmament ceremony took place.
They were then transferred to a 'concentration area' in a nearby town, La Ceja, to be registered
and "re-educated" in civilian affairs. Three weeks later, they boarded 32 buses, which returned
them to their homes.'7 9 They "arrived back to the neighborhoods in which they had combated,
street by street, with the militias, guerrillas, and Bloque Metro paramilitaries... now, they arrived
as civilians, hoping to redo their lives." 80 Thus, 98% of the BCN paramilitaries remained in
178 Ex-combatants (BCN), interviews by author, Medellin, March-April 2008.
179 See High Commissioner for Peace, Luis Carlos Restrepo's statements prior to the BCN's disarmament, "All
members of the BCN will go to their homes" (Yarce 2003d).180 Yarce 2003e.
Medellin post-demobilization.181 Contrast this with the non-local Vencedores de Arauca of
which only 6% remained in this bloc's zone of operation or the Frente Vichada of which 0%
opted to continue living where it had fought.18 2
The simple facts that the BCN combatants had multifaceted networks, and were
geographically concentrated post-demobilization, facilitated collective action and enabled the
structure to endure. It did so in the form of the Democracy Corporation (Corporaci6n
Democracia (CD)), which was founded on December 10, 2003 as a result of the peace
agreement. All of the 868 members of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara and the 2,033 Bloque
Heroes de Granada combatants automatically joined the Corporation; it was part of the terms of
their demobilization. Thus, according to most members, the decision to join the Corporation was
voluntary, but automatic.' 83 CD President Acedevo outlined how the "bloc did not lose its
structure; organizationally nothing changed. It maintained the same pyramid and hierarchy as it
transformed from illegality to legality." The top commanders became the directors of the
Corporation. The second and third-tier leaders became official CD members of the board. They
carried out the Corporation's operations and activities through the mid-ranking commanders who
became the 'coordinators.' As in the former military structure, these 'coordinators' were each
charged with a territorial zone (usually several neighborhoods) and a group of 37 demobilized
combatants.184 They received direction and funding from the headquarters of the CD.185 Finally,
"the paramilitary rank and file became the Corporation's assembly (member base)."186
181 85% of the BHG soldiers remained in Medellin and the surrounding area in which they had operated.
182 These figures derive from the nine surveys described in Appendix C.
183 Ex-BCN Commander and President of the Corporaci6n Democracia, interview by author, Medellin, 22 February
2008. See also the Corporaci6n's website: www.corporaci6ndemocracia.org and the peace accord: Alto
Comisionado para la Paz 2003.
184 Alcaldia de Medellin 2007.
185 Gustavo Villegas (Former Director of Medellin's Reintegration Program and Former Secretary of Government),
interview by author, Medellin, 4 March 2008.
186 Acevedo (President of the CD), interview by author, Medellin, 2008.
According to the Corporation's former legal representative: "In the CD, everything works by
orders. The boys never attend a meeting or participate in a project of their own volition. They do
so only if the coordinators give them the order. The demobilized are very loyal to their jefes."' 8 7
The Corporation operated as a mechanism of control for the commanders to keep tabs on their
rank and file and maintain them in line and loyal. 188 One of the coordinators described his job,
"My principal commitment is to ensure that my men do not violate the parameters of the peace
agreement. 189 Another commented, "I believe that my leadership has increased [since
demobilizing]... if it hadn't then I wouldn't have the moral authority to direct the 100 to 120
boys [ex-combatants] that are here in the neighborhood."' 9 0 The CD structure legitimized the
status of the commanders and mid-ranking officers and perpetuated their often-authoritarian
governing style. As a result, the rank and file was unable to exit the hierarchical structure.
The rank and file and commanders continued to interact face-to-face on a frequent basis
and to maintain their rapports. An interesting comparison can be made between the BCN
combatants who reintegrated where they had operated militarily and the ex-paramilitaries from
other brigades who had operated elsewhere in the country but migrated to Medellin to reintegrate
(heretofore called Returnee and Displaced ex-combatants). In response to the question, "How
would you describe your current relationship with the leaders of your former armed group?," the
demobilized from BCN demonstrated much closer relations with their former superiors,
characterizing these relationships as 'respect,' 'friendship,' 'support,' and 'gratitude.' In contrast,
Returnees and Displaced (non-local combatants) described their relationships with their ex-
commanders as "non-existent" (45%) or "distant" (33%). Only 7% of ex-BCN combatants
187 Former legal representative of the Corporaci6n Democracia, interview by author, Medellin, 3 March 2008.
Former legal representative of the Corporaci6n Democracia, interview by author, Medellin, 3 March 2008.
189Ex-BCN commander, Comuna 4, interview by author, Medellin, 2008.
190 Quoted in Programa de Paz y Reconciliaci6n 2007.
responded this way. The Returnees and Displaced went further to express that what they most
enjoyed about their demobilization was "not being a member of a Bloque with the hierarchy and
restrictions that such membership implies."191 Non-locally deployed groups did not possess the
dense networks and physical concentration necessary to maintain hierarchical bonds.
While non-local armed organizations' leadership was disintegrating, the BCN
commanders, especially Don Berna, continued to enjoy normative authority. According to BCN
ideologue, Fabio Acevedo, "The whole BCN organization rotated around Don Berna - he was
the central axis." Piedad Moreno, an OAS Peace Mission verifier, described the demobilization
ceremony of Heroes de Granada: "On the date of the planned disarmament of the BHG in
Antioquia, Don Berna found himself in the neighboring state of C6rdoba,192 but the muchachos
refused to demobilize until he had arrived. So the government was forced to transport him in a
helicopter to the farm where the demobilization ceremony was occurring." Moreno continued:
It was the most impressive scene: 2,033 men and women of very diverse
backgrounds all over the hills dressed in white, waving white flags, holding
huge signs reading, 'thank you for the peace.' When Don Berna arrived,
symbolically from the sky, everyone cheered. His combatants were awe-struck,
euphoric, deeply moved at his presence. Many shed tears. It was so special for
the combatants to see him. He was their king, their "gangster," a martyr
[especially as he had survived so many attempts against his life and so much
violence]. They were emotional at the sight of him.193
Don Berna continued to exercise normative power both among the mid-ranking commanders and
among the base even once he was behind bars. CD President described to me, "Don Berna
continues to be our leader, very much so. He is so powerful in the organization, not just
191 These data are derived from the Organization of International Migration's survey of reintegration program
beneficiaries (Sistema de Acompaffamiento, Monitoreo, y Evaluaci6n) (See Appendix C). The survey was applied to
1111 of the 1384 'Returnees,' 742 of the local 868 BCN ex-combatants and 1411 of the 1568 ex-BHG; thus, nearly
the entire population of former fighters in Medellin.
192 Don Berna had been accused of the murder of a congressperson during the ceasefire and had turned himself in.
193 Interview by author, Medellin, 21 February 2008.
militarily, but because he is a man of ideas."1 94 While in the Colombian prisons, Berna received
daily visits from his men and continued to run Medellin from his cell (to such an extent that he
was extradited).
The Democracy Corporation maintained its members through credible threats of
coercion, norms of reciprocity, and side-payments that were possible due to their physical
clustering. Combatants' coordinators knew where their 'boys' lived and worked and thus had the
means to discipline them. Additionally, all of the former fighters' friends belonged to the
Corporation and so exit from the group would have risked these relationships. The Corporation
further influenced its members' behavior through the side-payment of social acceptance. As will
be illustrated in Chapter 6, the paramilitaries enjoyed the tolerance of the local population in the
majority of Medellin's neighborhoods. This meant that the ex-BCN members were not ashamed
to be identified as 'demobilized persons' and associated with a network of ex-combatants; rather,
they perceived such membership as affording them higher status and influence. The side-
payments at the commanders' disposal also included economic and legal benefits. The
Corporation helped the ex-combatants find employment, funded their projects, and provided
them legal counsel. In return, it gained their loyalty (at least in the medium run). Former BCN
fighters launched businesses, NGOs, and campaigns together, which further strengthened their
ties and the collective structure. Ex-BCN soldiers in El Pesebre, for example, formed a small
farming cooperative at which all the ex-combatants from the neighborhood worked and Walter,
the former commander of Santa Cruz, created an association, which washed buses and employed
all of his former soldiers. Cooperatives of this sort proliferated all over Medellin with the
exception of several neighborhoods in Comuna 13 discussed below.
194 Interview by author, Medellin, 22 February 2008.
In sum, repeated interactions through physical concentration and multifaceted bonds
linked local combatants to the BCN organization and enabled the local group to sustain
disciplined collective action. The BCN's chain of control survived and the organization stayed
intact post-demobilization as the Democracy Corporation: "the organization which represents the
ex-combatants of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara." 95
The Counterfactual: Comuna 13
Up until now, the analysis of this case has focused on the trajectory of the local BCN
paramilitaries in the majority of Medellin's neighborhoods. However, there were several
neighborhoods of Medellin in which the BCN fighters were non-local: Independencia I, II, III,
El Salado, and 20 de Julio (neighborhoods of Comuna 13). 196 These communities provide an
illuminating counterfactual while maximizing the level of controls. Comuna 13 had a divergent
social history to the rest of the marginal areas of Medellin. The guerrillas' militias were deeply
entrenched in the communities and local family networks. Whereas in the other zones of
Medellin, communities "supported the paramilitaries,"19 7 in Comuna 13, when the paramilitaries
entered in 2002, "90 percent of the population supported the rebel militias."198 Thus, the BCN,
mistrustful of the Comuna 13 population,199 deployed its fighters from other barrios of Medellin
to Comuna 13 in the aftermath of the military Operation Oridn.200 The BCN never recruited in
the neighborhoods of Comuna 13.
195 Alto Comisionado Para la Paz 2003.
196 I use the term Comuna 13 for the purpose of exposition. However, I am referring to the five neighborhoods of
Independencia I, II, III, El Salado, and 20 de Julio. The paramilitaries were local to other neighborhoods in Comuna
13 such as El Pesebre.
197 Recidivist Ex-Combatants, interview by author, Bellavista Prison, April 2008.
198 Ex-BCN Combatant, interview by author, Comuna 13, Medellin, March 2008. See also El Colombiano 2002a
and El Colombiano 2002b.
199 Whereas in other neighborhoods, former paramilitary combatants openly admitted to having previously belonged
to the guerrillas, ex-BCN fighters in San Javier scorned at this idea: "We have only ever fought against the
subversion" (Ex-combatants (BCN), interview by author, El Pesebre, Comuna 13, Medellin, March 2008).
200 Gustavo Villegas, interview with author, Medellin, 4 March 2008. See also Restrepo 2003; Defensoria del Pueblo
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Accordingly, post-demobilization, relatively few ex-BCN fighters remained in Comuna
13; most returned to the neighborhoods in which they had grown up. Additionally, during the
war, the BCN combatants had occupied many homes of victims they had displaced in Comuna
13. The transitional justice process and pressures from the civilian population forced them to
return these homes to their rightful owners and to migrate back to their communities of origin on
the other side of the city. Whereas 182-400 former combatants lived in each of the Comunas ]
(Popular), 8 (Villa Hermosa), 3 (Manrique), (4) Aranjuez, and Bello after the demobilization,
only 79 total lived in Comuna 13 and, of these, only 13 had operated there during the war (See
Map 2). The BCN battalion that had fought in Comuna 13 disappeared and its fighters joined the
intact, former BCN combatant associations proliferating elsewhere in Medellin, in the zones in
which the BCN had deployed locally.
Map 2. Number of Ex-Combatants by Comuna
Post-Demobilization, Medellin
15
*Note: These figures are from the Programa Paz y Reconciliaci6n in 2008. The majority of ex-combatants
were concentrated in and local to Comunas 1, 3, 4, 8 (with 182-413 ex-BCN fighters in each of these
communities). Comunas 2, 6, 7, and 9 each had between 81-181 ex-BCN combatants. The
communities shown in the lightest shades, including Comuna 13, had low ex-combatant
2002; Aricapa 2005. The library in Comuna 13 also collects fascinating social histories of the violence.
populations (the paramilitaries did not recruit in them). Comunas 5, 10, 11, 14, 15, and parts of 16 board
Medellin's river and highways, which run through the city's center. These are wealthier, more developed
neighborhoods, which never fell under armed group control. Comuna 13 is thus an exception and
interesting counter-case. It had a non-local paramilitary forced deployed to it during the war.
Uraba: Organizational Capacity Preserved
"They demobilized, but ... kept the same structure. The paramilitaries are hidden in their
activities... They do it to control territory." - Yimmy, Justice and Peace Inter-Ecclesiastical
Commission, interview by Human Rights Watch, 2010201
Local Recruits
Similar to the majority of the BCN's battalions, the organizations which operated in the
northwest corner of Colombia - Urabit - were composed of local fighters. I focus here on the
trajectory of the Bloque Elmer Cirdenas (BEC) as it is emblematic of that taken by several
armed groups in Urabi, including the Bloque Heroes de Tolovi (BHT) and Frente Bananero
(FB). I highlight the countercase of the Frente Turbo at the chapter's end.
Bloque Elmer Cardenas recruited and deployed its soldiers in Urabai during the war. Its
commanders and foot soldiers were thus densely bonded and stayed physically concentrated after
disarming. As a result, the demobilized BEC enjoyed a collective-action capable structure and a
network of loyal recruits. In contrast to Medellin's BCN, however, it used that structure to
redeploy and that network to lure its former fighters back to war. Chapter 7 explains variation in
remilitarization across time and space. Here I look only at collective capacity, which can be used
for any social, political, or economic action, militarized or not.
Nearly all the BEC recruits were local to the communities in which they had operated.202
In his testimony under the Justice and Peace Law, Commander 'El Alemin' referred to his armed
201 Human Rights Watch 2010. This case is also briefly described in the US Department of State 2009, p. 75.
202 Freddy Rend6n Herrera, Testimony under the Justice and Peace Law, Medellin, 5-6 June 2007.
group's territory as the "communities that we influenced and from which came our men."203 He
went on, "65% of the group's members were afro-descendents, 32% chilapos, and 3%
indigenous because they were inhabitants of the zones of operation." 204 The ex-combatant
surveys indicate that 80% of BEC fighters deployed in their home region. While there was
inevitably some transfer of men between the battalions, former political commander, Alejandro
Toro, confirmed, "Each of the BEC fronts was comprised of people who were native to each
zone. In the northern Urabi, we recruited from Necocli and Arboletes. In Choc6, we recruited
chocoanos, etc. We did not send people from Urabi Antioqueio to fight in Choc6 because it
didn't work. They did not know the zone; they weren't accustomed to the rivers, to the
mosquitoes, etc.... Many of the fighters even lived with their families while they were operating
with our self-defense forces." 205
Multifaceted Networks.
The BEC paramilitaries exploited two social webs to fill their ranks: the network of the
People's Liberation Army (EPL) and that of Urabi's Convivir. These webs afforded the Bloque
Elmer Cardenas multifaceted networks: social links that created trust and social pressures that
bonded combatants to the BEC after surrendering their weapons.
The paramilitaries (re) formed in Urabi in 1991 amidst full-scale war between the FARC
and 'demobilized' EPL rebels and exploited this violence. The deepening of the conflict led
hoards of ex-EPL guerrillas to bandwagon with the paramilitaries and join their ranks for
203Revista Semana, 2004b. Emphasis added.
204 Freddy Rend6n Herrera, Testimony under the Justice and Peace Law, Medellin, 5-6 June 2007.
205 Interview by author, Necocli, June 2008.
security.206 The result was an unexpected alliance between insurgents and counterinsurgents to
defeat the FARC.207 The Bloque Elmer Cardenas thus gained access to and capitalized on the
EPL's wide-reaching social web of militants, a web several decades in the making. These ex-
EPL soldiers (Esperanzados) were densely bonded and possessed the deep local and territorial
knowledge and intelligence to recruit the most loyal members whose commitment to the
movement would endure after the war. For this reason, paramilitary commander, Carlos Castafio,
referred to the FARC's extermination campaign of the Esperanzados as the FARC's "worst error
and the first step to its destruction in the Banana axis of Urabi."208 The paramilitaries married
this strong insurgent network with a strong counterinsurgent one: that of Convivir, the
cooperative neighborhood watch groups.209 It follows that a majority of the BEC combatants
enjoyed strong ties prior to joining the paramilitaries and the paras were able to recruit "the most
committed youth."210
These multifaceted networks survived the DDR process. A former combatant in Caurallo
described to me "the union, unity, and cohesion among the demobilized." 21 1 During community
gatherings, the demobilized sat together in a group; they remained friends; they laughed together;
206 Faber (Director of Superban), interview by author, Apartad6, June 2008. The exact number of Esperanzados that
joined the paramilitaries is a matter of debate. The Left and ex-EPL political party underestimate the numbers.
However, my interviews pointed to the significance of the paramilitaries' recruitment of ex-EPL combatants. For
example, in the early 1990s, Luis Fernando worked with the EPL peace process. He claimed that a huge number of
ex-EPLs entered the autodefensas (Luis Fernando (Director of SENA's Programs for Ex-Combatants in Urabi),
interview by author, Riosucio, Choc6, July 2008). Another ex-combatant confirmed that a majority of the members
of his EPL dissident group joined the autodefensas because "the war was so fierce at this moment in Urab6 and so
many demobilized were being killed by the FARC. Carlos Castafno protected all of us. If it hadn't been for him, we
would have all been killed." My interviewee had been shot twice by the FARC, once in the chest, once in the arm
(Demobilized from Bloque Bananero, interview by author, Apartad6, 26 June 2008). See also Garcia 2001.
207 Romero 2003.
208 Aranguren Molina 2001.
209 The Convivir were private, armed organizations for surveillance and intelligence (Cooperativas de Vigilancia y
Seguridad Privada). They were comprised of civilians organized and trained by government authorities to protect
their neighborhoods against crime and violence. See Duncan 2007; International Crisis Group 2003.2 10 Ex-paramilitary (Former EPL Member), interview by author, Apartad6, May 2008.
211 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Caurallo, UrabA, 3 July 2008.
they continued to parchar (hang out).2 12 In explaining his enduring relationship with the other
ex-combatants, one former BEC member told me how he does everything with the other
demobilized; he works with them, studies with them; "we are all very good friends."2  This
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theme was repeated during my interviews.
Physical Concentration After Disarming
In Urabi post-demobilization, the combatants returned home to their 'regular residences'
(usually where they were already stationed) or collectively relocated for occupational purposes to
one of the BEC's strongholds where the Construpaz projects were to be developed. There, they
stayed in encampments of former fighters.2 15 These two trends in the ex-BEC soldiers' post-war
migration meant that they remained physically clustered. Eighty six percent of the ex-BEC
fighters continued to reside in the zones they had patrolled.2 16
The geographical concentration of the combatants also meant that the strong hierarchical
relationships and command and control structure endured into the reintegration phase. BEC's
leader, El Alemiln's, relationships with some of his subordinates remained so close that they
called him 'papa' (father).2 17 "Whereas in other regions, many of the mid-ranking commanders
were trying to take pieces of the brigades for themselves, grab at the loot of the brigade, position
themselves to have part of the structure, territory, and economic resources after the
demobilization, here in Urabi, that didn't happen." 218 In part, the local nature of the top, mid,
212 These observations partially derive from meetings I attended in Carepa and Chigorod6 of the 'Leadership
Formation Course' run by SENA for ex-combatant and civilian leaders in the communities, 25 June 2008; 26 June
2008.
213 Ex-combatant (BEC, Coordinator of Construpaz in Riosucio), interview by author, Riosucio, 2 July 2008.
214 Ex-combatants (BEC), interviews by author, Apartad6, Necocli, June 2008.
215 Diego Garcia (OAS-MAPP), interview by author, BogotA, 24 January 2008.
216 These figures derive from the surveys discussed in Appendix C. According to reintegration personnel in
Riosucio, the demobilized combatants insist, "I want to be with my family; I want to be in my community"
(Reintegration Personnel, interview by author, Riosucio, Choc6, June 2008).2 17 Revista Semana 2006.
218 Ex-combatant (BEC), interview by author, Necocli, June 2008.
and low-level officers prevented this; remaining in the zone, they left no vacuum to exploit, but
also "the leadership was clear, and the BEC was very unified at the moment of demobilization; it
had a clear command and control structure." 2 19 In the aftermath of disarmament, OAS Peace
Monitor, Helena, reported that "El Alemin still ha[d] total control... The demobilized [were]
always saying, 'We need to ask our jefe's permission.' The hierarchy [was] intact. The
demobilized use[d] the words, 'jefe,' 'patron.'... El Alemitn still enjoy[ed] the solidarity and the
loyalty of his men. He [was] a charismatic leader,"22 0 who also shared multifaceted bonds with
his men. For example, when the authorities ordered El Alemin's transfer to prison, his ex-
combatants (and some civilians) collected signatures to petition the Attorney General to annul
the accusations against him and enable him to return home to Urabi. Similarly, when he gave his
first testimony in Medellin under the Justice and Peace Law, 150 of his ex-combatants arrived in
13 buses from Necocli to show support for their leader. Even once in prison outside of the Urabi
region, he exercised influence over his men, if not directly, then through his brother, Daniel
Rendon ('Don Mario'). The local nature of the commanders and BEC's institutionalized
hierarchy facilitated the BEC's organizational survival.
As a result, the Bloque Elmer Cirdenas' collective action persisted in the form of a civic
association, Construpaz (Constructors of Peace). It retained its social capital, organizational
know-how, war training, territory, command and control, mid-level commanders, recruits,
corruptive ties with the state, and non-denunciation by civilian communities. It was on the basis
of this structure that 'Don Mario,' was able to construct the remilitarized Gaitanista Self-Defense
Forces of Colombia (AGC). Essentially, irrespective of the motivations for remobilization, the
219 Alejandro Toro, interview by author, Necocli, July 2008. "The BEC enjoyed a high level of organization, most of
its members had an identification card, good health, received salaries..." (OAS 2006)
220 Helena (OAS-MAPP Peace Monitor), interview by author, Cali, November 2007.
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Bloque Elmer Cirdenas had the organizational structure to do so. The Frente Turbo, as will be
explored briefly below, did not.
Social and Organizational Capital According to Lieutenant Colonel of the National
Police of Uraba, "It is not difficult for 'Don Mario' to rearm because of his brother, 'El Aleman'
[BEC's top commander] who gave him all the contacts and the military and organizational
structure." 22 1 A senior government official shared this view: the remilitarized BEC "is the
strongest rearmed group in Colombia," he argued, "because it acquired an already existing
organizational structure. It is easy to go from latently to actively armed."2 22
After demobilizing, all 1536 BEC ex-combatants "voluntarily joined" Construpaz.2 23 The
NGO, in turn, preserved the BEC's hierarchical management apparatus; the commanders kept
tabs on the mid-ranking officers who, in turn, monitored the activities of the rank and file.
Construpaz closely replicated the former paramilitary brigade's organizational structure. For
example, it had an 'advisor' stationed in each municipality who patrolled the ex-fighters in
his/her theater and reported regularly to the top command in Necocli. Ex-combatants confided
that, at Construpaz meetings, the leaders would collect their cell phone numbers and
226
addresses. The civic association also provided the former foot soldiers' employment, which
deepened their dependence on their superiors. Specifically, the BEC members were required to
invest 80% of their individual monthly reintegration stipend in the Cooperative, which used the
funds to start 'productive projects' of rubber, yucca, pepper, and wood. These projects then
221 Colombian National Police, interview by author, Carepa, Urabd, July 4, 2008.
222 Interview by author, Bogotd, 24 January 2008.
223 Ex-combatant (BEC), interview by author, Riosucio, 2 June 2008. However, according to an international peace
monitor, "There was no discussion pre-demobilization about the creation of this organization, the demobilized
weren't informed before demobilization, just at the moment of demobilization, they were told to 'sign on the dot'
and then told, 'VoilA you are members of Construpaz"' (Interview by author, Necocli, July 2008).
224 Ex-combatants (BEC), interviews by author, Riosucio, 3 July 2008.
225 Coordinator of BEC Ex-combatants, interview by author, Riosucio, 2 July 2008.
2 26 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Necocli, June 2008.
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provided the ex-fighters jobs and salaries, strengthening their association with and loyalty to the
BEC structure. According to former political leader, Alejandro Toro, the BEC decided it needed
to support the muchachos in their reintegration process so that they would not "flee the
organization."227 Construpaz further ensured that the formerly militarized group outbid the state
for the ex-combatants' loyalty by minimizing the former fighters' interactions with the
government reintegration program. Essentially, the Cooperative "auto-managed" the
demobilization of its soldiers, depending only minimally on the state. 22 8
'Don Mario' exploited this social capital to return to militarized illegality. 229 Specifically,
he drew roughly two-thirds of the structure back into arms while leaving the other third as a
'front organization' staffed with 'civilians' who could serve specific functions. To account for
the large share of the organization lured back into arms, the model would predict that the ex-
militants' strong bonds and negligible post-war emigration from Urabi enabled the commanders
to re-recruit their subordinates on a significant basis.2 31 The vast majority of the Gaitanista Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia were ex-paramilitaries; few were new recruits.232 Conflict analysts
described to me, "It is not a phenomenon like in Norte de Santander where the rearming is crime,
crime mixing with individual ex-combatants. In Urabi, it is only collectively demobilized ex-
combatants."233 The recruitment mechanisms were fivefold.
227 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Necocli, July 2008.
228 Gersen Arias (Analyst, Fundaci6n Ideas para la Paz), interview by author, Bogoti, July 2008, May 2009.
229 Colombian Army Intelligence, Brigade 17, interview by author, Carepa, 4 July 2008; Ex-paramilitary
commander's family member, interview by author, Apartad6, June 2008.
230 Some ex-paramilitaries find themselves "by night, armed with rifles [in the remilitarized units] and by day,
participating in the reintegration program." They negotiated a partial affiliation with the redeployed armies (Ex-
combatants, interviews by author, BogotA, 20 May 2008).
231 National Police, interview by author, Carepa, 4 July 2008.
232 National Police, interview by author, Apartad6, June 2008. BEC Ex-combatants in San Pedro, Riosucio,
Chigorod6, and Carepa all ostensibly joined the remilitarized units.
233 Interview by author, Bogotd, 20 May 2008. Emphasis added.
102
The first was that of social networks. Construpaz' director explained, "Many who have
joined the [renewed] armed groups do so because of their links of friendship, because of the
social webs."234 The BEC combatants' multifaceted networks linked their status and identities to
the organization and applied social pressures to cooperate with their former comrades to whom
they felt strongly linked. These networks also provided each individual ex-soldier reassurance
that, if a part of the BEC network remobilized, others would follow and that it would be safe to
follow; norms of reciprocity were activated (Petersen 2001). An ex-combatant confirmed to me:
"If you are friends with someone [a demobilized] and he rejoins an armed group and you are
talking with him, you are assumed to be an informant of the group and so you are killed or
threatened by the enemy. So basically, you can't even talk with your friends unless you
rejoin."235 A perverse form of social pressure driven by the 'enemy's' collective targeting based
on guilt by association seems to have been operative. Rearming by some ex-paramilitaries had
reverberating negative externalities on the entire reintegration process. The pressures were also
vertical; the mid-level commanders called mostly on the members of their former units to re-join.
They retained the normative authority, respect, and influence to exercise pressure on the
demobilized soldiers previously under their command. The ex-combatants' membership in
Construpaz, meanwhile, kept them "strongly connected and in constant communication" with
their mentors and superiors. 2 36
The second mechanism was coercion. The physical concentration of the former
combatants afforded the leadership the credible sanctions necessary to draw their fighters back to
violent, illegal activity. The mid-level commanders knew where their former subordinates lived,
where they worked, where they hung out, where their families were, rendering punishment
234 Interview by author, Necocli, 3 July 2008.
235 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Caurallo, 3 July 2008.
236 Conflict Analyst, interview by author, Necocli, 27 June 2008.
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feasible and facile. There is evidence that some ex-combatants received death threats for not
joining the remilitarized groups.2 3 7 Others reported being forcibly recruited and given the choice:
join, die, or leave. Many joined. Others displaced, a fact confirmed by the multiple petitions by
ex-combatants to transfer their 'humanitarian aid' to other municipalities. The petitions testified,
"There is no security for us in Urabi."238 The wave of selective homicides of demobilized offers
further evidence of rearmed groups' threats being brought to fruition. This leads to a third
mechanism: safety. Recruiters promised the former combatants their security. In an environment
in which many demobilized were caught in the crossfire between illegal, militarized actors,
former paramilitaries may have preferred to be inside the protective ring of a rearmed group than
outside of it. Fourth, ex-fighters were given economic incentives to join the ranks of the
redeployed armies. It is estimated that recruiters offered ex-paramilitaries 1,000,000-1,200,000
Colombian pesos ($500-$600) in exchange for their renewed, military service. 239 Finally,
Construpaz and its productive projects provided the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
natural venues at which to recruit former combatants. Construpaz kept a detailed database on its
ex-fighters 240 and, according to community member testimonies, its productive projects served as
"guises" for "pseudo-clandestine gatherings of former members of the Bloque Elmer
Cardenas." 24 1 At a Construpaz assembly in Unguia, "it became clear that there were serious
doubts about the projects ... However, it serve[d] as a recruiting ground for the demobilized to
re-enter the armed struggle with Don Mario's armed unit."242
237 Alta Consejeria para la Reintegraci6n, Security Division, interview by author, Bogoti, 20 May 2008.
238 Alta Consejeria para la Reintegraci6n and the Organization of International Migration, interviews by author,
Bogota, 30 January 2008.
239 Ex-combatants, interviews by author, Urabi, June 2008; These figures were confirmed by conflict analysts,
interview by author, Bogoti, 2008.
240 Ex-combatants, interviews by author, Necocli, June 2008.
241 Demobilized paramilitary leaders called meetings under the false pretense of discussing the projects or
reintegration process, but "really they were just recruiting" (Interview by author, Apartad6, July 2008).
242 Community Member, interview by author, Unguia, February 2007.
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Thus 'Don Mario' acquired an intact organizational structure with an ample and ready
pool of roughly 1,000 recruits to lure back into arms.243 It therefore comes as little surprise that,
once remilitarized, 'Don Mario' was observed to have a very developed organizational structure
with mid-ranking commanders in all the principal municipalities. The Reintegration Program's
Urabi director told me that the "Bloque Elmer Cirdenas' command structure [was] intact so the
leaders [could] be called to rearm at anytime, especially in the north of Urabi and in Choc6," the
BEC's traditional zone of territorial influence.244 The Colombian intelligence branch classified
the AGC as having a unified command, intact hierarchy, and the active participation of
commanders, mid-ranking commanders, and rank and file. In one interview with an international
aid worker, I was told that, "El Alemin is directly supporting his brother's recruitment of the
BEC's mid-level leaders." 245 When the army's intelligence unit mapped the Gaitanista Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia organization, it found the top two leaders to be 'El Alemain's'
brother, 'Don Mario' and El Alemin's military commander, Jhon Freddy Manco Torres ('el
Indio' or 'Don Alberto,'). It traced the second and third tier of leaders246 and similarly found
them all to be former paramilitaries: 'Cebecilla,' 'Yiyo' (head of finances), Juan de Dio Usuga
Davia, 'Giovanni' (commander of Turbo), 'Nicolas' (leader of Arboletes and Necocli),
'Guerillo,' 'El Profe,' and 'Flaca.' 247 These were the BEC's 'cadre:' "the permanent staff of
leaders who train recruits and around whom new units may be built ... the corps of professional
soldiers preserved in peacetime as a basis for ... [remilitarization]."248
243 Army intelligence unit, interview by author, Carepa, July 2008. See El Tiempo 2009a.
244 Alta Consejeria Para la Reintegraci6n Regional Director, interview by author, Apartad6, 4 June 2008.
245 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Apartad6, 27 June 2008.
246 It proves difficult to verify some of the commanders' identities because they demobilized under different names
and different ranks within their organizations. This is the case, for example, with 'Mario Alfa 1,' 'Mario Alfa 5,'
'Picua' and 'El Calvo.'
247 Army Intelligence, Brigada 17, interview by author, Carepa, 4 July 2008. See El Tiempo 2009a.
248 Selznick 1952, p. 18. Emphasis added.
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In sum, because of the BEC's local recruitment and deployment and its combatants'
negligible emigration from Urabi, it was able to avert bankruptcy and preserve an organizational
structure in much the same way as Medellin's BCN. However, in contrast to the BCN and as
explored in Chapter 7, this structure remilitarized to maintain influence over the territory of
Urabi'. I turn now to the Bloque Catatumbo and to explaining why its sophisticated coercive
structure went bankrupt.
Norte de Santander's Bloque Catatumbo: Bankruptcy
Logic ofDeployment
The paramilitaries had several reasons to deploy soldiers to the region of Norte de
Santander: 1) to "weed out the guerrillas" and liberate the resources critical to the Colombian
economy (land, urban areas, petroleum, carbon, and gold); 2) gain access to the coca and to deny
the guerrillas this source of funding; and 3) stop cross-border support for the FARC, ELN and
EPL from Venezuela.249 Thus, a random set of 200 paramilitaries were deployed from the coastal
region of Cordoba and Antioquia to the Venezuelan border, some 600 kilometers away, drawing
recruits as they went. One ex-combatant, Jorge Mario Garz6n, explained this process to me. He
joined the Bloque C6rdoba in his home region in San Jorge and operated in a unit comprised of
450 men.
After eight months, the commander of Bloque C6rdoba came to the base and said,
'We're going to Norte de Santander. We are taking 150 men. The whole structure
is going to be transplanted so it will be ready to deploy immediately there.' The
commander said, 'Who wants to go?' but most of us didn't want to go because
[Norte de Santander] was far and because it was a dangerous zone, others because
they had arrest warrants and so they didn't want to travel between states by road
because they were worried they would be stopped. So it became obligatory for
150 of us to go. The commander just chose us randomly. The commander paid for
our passage and told us where we had to report in Norte de Santander. We
249 Fundaci6n Progresar 2004.
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traveled as civilians all separately. If we didn't show up, the commander said,
'We have all your information, we know where your family lives.' I took the bus
first to Cucuta and then to La Gabarra where I located the farm where we were
supposed to meet. There I found a large part of my structure from C6rdoba. We
were told that our goal was to arrive to El Tarra which was completely under
guerrilla control and that our whole unit of 150 would operate together to do so.2 0
Other of my interviewees belonged to Urabi's Frente Bananero and were then "transferred" to
the Bloque Catatumbo in 1999 to "help build the paramilitary base there."25' Still others were
recruited from the Autodefensas in Puerto Berrio, 52 from the Convivir in the south of Cesar and
from the urban, coastal regions of Cartagena, Barranquilla and Santa Marta.m Mapping the
recruitment locations of the Bloque Catatumbo generates the following dispersion index.
Map 3. Bloque Catatumbo: Recruitment and Deployment Patterns
Recruited > 10% of
Force
Recruited< 10% of Force
Logic of Recruitment
The BC demonstrated a strong lack of trust of local Norte Santanderefios due to the fact
that "they were believed to be infiltrators and active collaborators of the guerrilla. Accordingly,
there was a marked resistance to and thus very limited recruitment of locals."25 4 According to
one of the top commander's bodyguards, "The paras of Bloque Catatumbo also called the Norte
250 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Comuna 3, Cdcuta, 28 May 2008.
251 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Urabd, June 2008.25 2 Ex-combatant, interview by author, C(icuta, 29 May 2008.
253 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Comuna 8, Cicuta, 3 June 2008.
254 Defensoria del Pueblo analyst, interview by author, Cficuta, April 2008.
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Santanderef5os slow-witted, so for that reason, they recruited only very few of them." 255 Another
local was turned away when he tried to join the paramilitaries because, according to his
testimony, "They were not accepting people from Norte de Santander." 25 6
Thus the vast majority of the Bloque Catatumbo (BC) combatants were what Carlos
Castafto called "autodefensas nativas" from C6rdoba, Urabi, Sucre, Cesar and other parts of the
coast.257 The different ethnic composition and accents of these regions made it easy to determine
the soldiers' origins. Those from Cdicuta and near the border have a Venezuelan accent, those
from C6rdoba are afro-descendents and those from Uraba are paisa. During a conversation with
one of the commander's bodyguards in Cdcuta's prison, I was told, "All of the members of my
group in Catatumbo were black [from the Costa]. There were only 6 whites." 258 Recurrent in my
interviews was this theme that the majority of the fighters in the respondents' units were from
'outside of Norte de Santander.' A former BC combatant described, "All of the muchachos from
my brigade were from other parts. There was no commander local to the zone because of social
networks. The commanders from Cordoba and Urabi brought their best friends whom they
trusted and so their best friends got the top ranks in the organization." 25 9
However, the Bloque Catatumbo did recruit some locals. At the brigade level, the survey
evidence indicates that 28% of Bloque Catatumbo fighters were local to the region. They were
concentrated principally in Puerto Santander and Ocafia. Anecdotal evidence provides further
support of this recruitment. According to an ex-paramilitary now living in Comuna 3 in Cdicuta,
of his BC company, 32 were from Cordoba and 8 were from Norte de Santander, but the top
255 Camilo's Bodyguard, interview by author, Cicuta Prison, 2008. This was verified in other interviews in which I
was told that 'People from other places [outside of Norte de Santander] are better."' (Ex-BC combatant, interview
by author, Comuna 6, Cficuta, 4 June 2008).256 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Comuna 6, Cicuta, 5 June 2008.
257 Defensoria del Pueblo, interview by author, Cficuta, 2008.
258 Camilo's Bodyguard, interview by author, Cncuta Prison, 2008.
259 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Puerto Santander, 9 June 2008.
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commander was paisa (from the region of Medellin). 260 The BC leaders recruited some locals
partially because they needed intelligence. One ex-combatant from Urabi confirmed, "The
Cordobeses and Urabef5os arrived without any knowledge of the zone of Norte de Santander." 261
Even in the guerrilla dominated communities, the paras sought out sub-groups willing to
defect. Given the private information - that only the potential recruits knew their true level of
commitment to the guerrillas - the paras had to be clever in their strategies for uncovering the
locals' preferences. When the paramilitaries arrived to El Tarra, they sought to target a section
of the population whom they believed would potentially prove willing to collaborate with them -
the merchants - who had "supported the guerrillas out of obligation and were tired of paying
extortion fees." Some of these therefore provided information as to who supported the guerrillas
"out of their hearts," out of conviction. 262 The paras executed these 'irreconcilables' and
protected their informants.263 Another strategy was pure deception. A former BC member told
me how he had been driving taxis between Cn'cuta and Puerto Santander prior to joining the
paras. He narrated:
One day, I got caught in a 'guerrilla' roadblock in Aguaclara. The combatants had
the armbands of the FARC. These men organized a meeting with all the people
they had stopped to ask how the situation was on the road and seek intelligence
about the status of Puerto Santander. The paramilitaries had done a quick
incursion of Puerto the week prior in which they had killed one guerrilla. In the
meeting, a woman spoke up and said, 'The paras are coming, you have to stop
them, they are already trying to enter the town,' demonstrating her support for the
guerrillas. Others were quiet or gave incorrect intelligence. When the meeting was
over, the soldiers took off their FARC armbands and underneath were the
armbands of the paramilitaries. They took the woman outside and shot her. This
was their way of figuring out who were the guerrillas' sympathizers. I was very
collaborative in the meeting and so the paramilitaries asked if I wanted to join
them.264
260 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Comuna 3, Cdcuta, 28 May 2008.
261 Ex-combatant (Bloque Catatumbo), interview by author, Apartad6, 26 June 2008.
262 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Tibu, June 2008.
263 Petreus 2009.
264 Ex-combatant (Bloque Catatumbo), interview by author, Puerto Santander, April 2008.
109
In addition to intelligence, the paramilitaries also needed support and supply networks.
Many of those recruited in Norte de Santander were not part of the military structure; rather they
were taxi drivers, cooks, apartment owners, nurses, financiers, informants, coca pickers, and
logisticians. 265 One ex-combatant described, "When they first arrived, the paramilitaries rented
apartments in the military's barracks. I took them around because they didn't know Cdcuta. I
washed their cars and ran errands for them." Slowly, he was brought formally into their ranks.266
The paramilitaries also needed people to cut the coca leaves. Thus, they had armies of
raspachines (coca pickers) working for them. Some of these ended up joining their military
structures as foot soldiers. "I was a raspachin of coca for three years in La Gabarra. It was the
only job available there. I got tired of it and so I ended up being able to enter the paras who were
there in 1999.",267
Finally, while community-based networks provide multifaceted bonds, there are other
one-dimensional networks, which the paramilitaries exploited in Norte de Santander to overcome
adverse selection problems. One of these was the veteran web. The top commander of the
Bloque Catatumbo was a retired high-ranking military officer. Military service was compulsory
in Colombia. If one dodged it, there was a fine, which only the elite could afford. Convoys
would come through periodically to gather up military-age boys. After the required 18 months of
service, the 'veterans' returned home to their communities. Many enjoyed their time in the
military and found themselves convinced by the counterinsurgency doctrine, high on the
adventure of war, skilled in combat and not much else, longing for the automatic provision of
265 Ex-combatant (Bloque Catabumbo), interview by author, Comuna 3, Cicuta, 30 May 2008. Author also
interviewed ex-combatants who served as mechanics and cooks. Further confirnation was provided by Will Fredo
(Director Fundaci6n Progresar), interview by author, Cnicuta, 9 June 2008.266 Ex-combatant (Bloque Catatumbo), interview by author, Comuna 3, Cicuta, 28 May 2008.
267 Ex-paramilitary Leader in Aguaclara, interview by author, Aguaclara, Norte de Santander, 10 June 2008.
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food, clothing, and shelter that the army provided, and missing the routinized life of the military.
Accordingly, veterans, having completed their tours of duty, sought to rejoin the Colombian
armed forces. Some of these were refused. They deemed the paramilitaries their next best option.
At the same time, the paramilitaries needed to increase their manpower rapidly in order to
patrol the vast border region of Norte de Santander and they ideally sought people with
"expertise in arms and combat."268 Thus they used "the social webs of the ex-militares to recruit
and to recruit trustworthy people." 269 Many of the paras in Norte de Santander were ex-military
personnel who were linked to the combatants from their time together in the army. One ex-
combatant told me that as many as 50% of the soldiers of his unit were veterans.270 Former BC
militant, Tomis, explained, "Local people joined the paramilitaries only through friendship links
because in order for a local to enter, he had to have a friend that would respond for him, be
completely accountable for him. He had to be someone trustworthy who had friends in the
organization. You couldn't enter if you didn't know people in the group." 271
Many of my respondents confirmed the veteran path to BC recruitment. One recalled, "I
was unemployed and tried to join the army three times, but they would not receive me... My
friends convinced me, 'lets go to the paracos [paramilitaries].' Another, Jose Luis, was in the
army for four years in Norte de Santander as a counter-guerrilla. "I liked it. I got used to it. After
serving, I didn't find a permanent job, only seasonal, unreliable work. During this period, I
always went to visit my friend from the army in prison. My friend said, "I have a friend from my
army battalion who is working with the paramilitaries in Puerto Santander... So I went to Puerto
Santander to visit his friend and eight days later, he called me and offered me work with the
268 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Comuna 8, Cicuta, May 2008.
269 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Puerto Santander, May 2008.
270 Ex-combatant (Bloque Catatumbo), interview by author, Comuna 6, 3 June 2008.
271 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Cicuta, 9 June 2008.
272 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Comuna 3, Cficuta, 25 May 2008.
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paras. Most of the members of the battalion were from other parts of the country, but I was able
to join because I was reliable." 273 Another of my interviewees completed his military service and
then returned home to the south of Cesar and could not find a job. "They train you in all military
matters, but then leave you with nothing to do after. You have all the military skills and have
become accustomed to the military way of life." He tried to join the army as a professional
soldier, but there "was not room for me." His former lieutenant from the army offered to
introduce him to the paras. "I was accepted into the paramilitaries only because of the
recommendation of my lieutenant." 274
Logic of Post- War Migration
Thirty-four percent of the BC soldiers remained in Norte de Santander after
demobilizing. The rest returned to Cordoba, Urabi, and other coastal areas. Most importantly,
nearly all the commanders returned home, leaving a vacuum in the power structure.m2 7 5 The
commanders who stayed were killed.276 I interviewed several members of the Bloque Catatumbo
in C6rdoba and Urabi and they unanimously told me, "After the demobilization, all of my
companeros and I from Urabi returned home to Urabi 2 77 Those who stayed in Norte de
Santander confirmed this, "Almost all of my battalion companeros were from C6rdoba or the
coast or were paisas. They all left Norte de Santander to go home after disarming." 278
Those who remained in Norte de Santander who were not from there did so because a)
they were scared to return to their lands because armed groups still operated there; b) they did
not have a family that would take them in or forgive them; c) they feared that they would create
273 Ex-combatant (Bloque Catatumbo), interview by author, Comuna 6, 15 May 2008.
274 Ex-combatant #1, interview by author, Comuna 8, Cficuta, 3 June 2008.
275 Ex-combatant (Bloque Catatumbo), interview by author, Comuna 3, Cdcuta, 28 May 2008.
276 Ex-combatant (Bloque Catatumbo), interview by author, Cficuta, May 2008. Newspaper articles from La Opinidn
2004-2006 confirmed this.
277 Ex-combatant (Bloque Catatumbo), interview by author, Apartad6, 26 June 2008.
278 Ex-combatant (Bloque Catabumbo), interview by author, Comuna 3, Cicuta, 28 May 2008.
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security problems for their families and friends were they to return home; d) they perceived
better economic opportunities in the border cities through contraband; e) they believed that they
would be safer on the Venezuelan frontier because, were anyone to chase them, they could easily
cross the border and find sanctuary; and f) they had found wives and/or built families in Norte de
Santander while operating in the department. 279 Most of these ex-paramilitaries who had
operated in Catatumbo in the north of Norte de Santander displaced to the department's capital
city of Cnhcuta to reintegrate. There, they were able to disappear in anonymity into the urban,
social fabric of migrants, displaced victims, and impoverished vagrants, and maintain no links
with their ex-BC employer. One told me, "I couldn't stay in La Gabarra [in Catatumbo] because
the barrio recognized me for all I had done. I couldn't return home to Cordoba because the
guerrillas were there and knew that I was a paraco. Here in Cnicuta, I could start anew. I didn't
know anyone in Cd'cuta so it seemed a city I could vanish in."280 Another similarly told me, "I
could never go back to Catatumbo. I would be killed immediately as I would be identified as a
paramilitary. In C'cuta, no one knows I am a demobilized." 2 81 While some of these ex-
combatants had strong incentives to go home, "I haven't seen my land in 12 years.. .my family
wants to see me... I have many nieces I have never met," they nonetheless remained displaced
out of fear, fear in some ways of the unknown.2 82 How would they be accepted back? Would it
be safe? Somehow life on the run seemed preferable for these already uprooted individuals.
279 Coronel Paez (Policia Nacional), interview by author, Cicuta, 30 May 2008; ACR Regional Director, interview
by author, 28 May 2008; Ex-combatants, interviews by author, Norte de Santander, May 2008.280 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Comuna 3, Cficuta, 28 May 2008.
281 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Comuna 8, Cicuta, 3 June 2008.
282 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Comuna 8, Cf'cuta, 20 May 2008.
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Table 1. Bloque Catatumbo's Recruitment, Deployment &
Post-War Migration Patterns
Department % of BC Combatants % of BC Combatants % of BC Combatants
from Department who Operated in who Live in
Department Department
Post-war
Antioguia 11% 11%
Atlintico 1% 3%
Bogoti 0% 2%
Bolivar 6% 2%
Cesar 4% 6%
C6rdoba 31% 27%
Magdalena 2% 2%
Norte de Santander 29% 100% 34%
Santander 2% 2%
Sucre 8% 8%
Note: These data derive from the ex-combatant surveys described in Appendix C.
Organizational Outcome In Zone of Displacement (Ciicuta)
All of the ex-combatants I interviewed in Cd'cuta explained that there exist no social
networks between the demobilized Bloque Catatumbo fighters and no associations comprising
ex-BC fighters. These ex-paramilitaries maintain low profiles, move continuously, and try to
recede into the city's passageways. One former combatant told me, "We all concentrated in
Campo Dos for the disarmament ceremony and then all of my compafneros went their own ways.
Nothing remained. I don't know what happened to them." 283 Another told me, "There are many
demobilized paramilitaries in the capital city of Norte de Santander, but it is not safe to be seen
with other demobilized. I only have friends from my barrio. I have no demobilized friends. I
only go out till 9pm if I go out at all." Nearly all of my interviewees confirmed, "I have no
contact with the other demobilized.... I have nothing to do with them. I only see them when I go
to pick up my reintegration stipend or when I go to a DDR workshop." 284 "I live in the city
283 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Comuna 3, Cicuta, 28 May 2008.284 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Cicuta, 28 May 2008. Reiterated by Ex-Bloque Catatumbo, interview by
author, Comuna 6, Cdcuta, 3 June 2008.
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where I can disappear because you never know how many enemies you have. I never leave the
house and have moved six times since I demobilized," 285 another confided in me. "There is no
corporation of demobilized, there are no leaders of the demobilized... they are no social
networks between the demobilized," were other words repeated in my interviews.28 A former
foot soldier added, "There is extreme lack of trust between us former comrades... no one asks
questions and no one would answer. I don't even know where the other ex-combatants live."
Another summed it up, "nothing remains of my Bloque Catatumbo. It has no social influence, no
military influence, nothing." 287 "There is no longer a hierarchy, the structure of the paras of
Norte de Santander has disappeared. There are no rural structures, no commanders or leaders...
there are just illegal businesses and hitmen," a think tank analyst and human rights activist
confirmed.288
There were two BC battalions that diverged from this dominant trajectory - those that
operated in Puerto Santander and Ocafia. I return to these in Chapter 7.
Organizational Outcome In the Zone of Return
The mechanisms that sustained Urabi's Bloque Elmer Cardenas and Medellin's Bloque
Cacique Nutibara's organizational collective action, namely multifaceted networks and physical
clustering, were largely absent in the case of Norte de Santander's Bloque Catatumbo. Since the
fighters' origins were more geographically dispersed, at least 66% left Bloque Catatumbo's zone
of operation and many scattered. With low expectations of future interactions, these ex-
paramilitaries faced few incentives to cooperate with the organization; defection escalated.
285 Ex-combatant (Bloque Catatumbo), interview by author, Comuna 6, Cncuta, 4 June 2008.
286 Ex-combatant (Bloque Catatumbo), interview by author, Comuna 6, Cicuta, 3 June 2008.
287 Ex-combatant, interview by author, interview by author, Comuna 8, Cnicuta, 3 June 2008.
288 Fundaci6n Progresar analyst, interview by author, Cnicuta, 30 May 2008.
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The case of the large numbers of concentrated BC returnees to the zone of Urabai
provides an interesting case to explore. Whereas the local Bloque Elmer Cirdenas and Frente
Bananero fighters remained strongly linked to their former organizations and part of the ex-
combatant civic associations, businesses, and security forces (Superban, Constupaz, Special
Services), the paramilitary returnees to Urabi, who had been deployed to Norte de Santander and
elsewhere, but returned home to reintegrate, interestingly did not belong to any organization
comprising former paramilitaries. A civilian community leader in Carepa explained to me, "The
Bloque Elmer Cirdenas and Frente Bananero [local groups] are more organized than the
members of any of the other [non-local] brigades. They have associations. Other brigades need to
be brought into the process and need to become organized."289 Similarly, a former combatant
from the Frente Bananero, now a member of Superban offered, "I would like to see the other
muchachos not from Frente Bananero having projects as well." 290 These returnees to the zone
retained only thin relationships with their leaders. According to the Urabi reintegration program
director, "The difference between those who arrive having operated elsewhere [such as those of
the BC] and those who operated here is that those arriving from elsewhere come and ask, 'Who
is commanding here?' They arrive without their leaders and don't have authority figures or a
hierarchical structure. This is very different from those that fought here... Those that operated
elsewhere also tend to maintain a lower profile." 291
Frente Calima/Turbo. Another interesting counterfactual case is that of Frente
Calima/Turbo under the command of Ever Veloza Garcia, alias 'HH, who wished to remilitarize
in his home area as a returnee, but lacked the organizational collective capacity to do so because
his structure had been deployed elsewhere and thus went bankrupt.
289 'Taller de Formaci6n de Liderazgo,' Participant Observation by author, Carepa, 26 June 2008.
290 Ex-combatant (Frente Bananero), interview by author, Caurallo, Urabi, 3 July 2008.
291 ACR Regional Director, interview by author, Apartad6, July 2008.
116
During the nineties, Ever Veloza commanded the Frente Turbo in the northern and
eastern zones of the banana axis of Urabi. In 1996, he was elected to be part of the expansion of
the self-defense movement and was deployed to the Pacific state of Valle de Cauca292 where he
met with narco-traffickers and business elite to strategize how they might replicate the successful
'self-defense' model of Urab.2 93 HH's Bloque Calima was the result. In 2004, having operated
'non-locally' for eight years, HH demobilized his brigade in Valle de Cauca and returned home
to Urabi.294 While HH 'reintegrated into civilian life' in Urabi, his absence from the zone in the
eight years prior meant that he did not enjoy territorial control. He wished to reclaim it;295 it was
his home, the region he formerly commanded, and a zone of riches. However, he lacked an
organization with which to do so because his brigade had been deployed 'non-locally.' It was an
'expeditionary' force, which left Urabi in the mid-nineties with a small core of combatants and
continued to recruit as it expanded. Its ranks thus included soldiers from 88 different
municipalities. Whereas 75% of the ex-combatants from Frente Bananero, upon demobilizing,
reported that they intended to live in one of five municipalities concentrated in Urabit, those of
Bloque Calima chose 97 different municipalities, with no one municipality exceeding 20% of the
292 Comisi6n Colombiana de Juristas 2006.
293 Deployment was relatively random and involuntary. HH, for example, went unwillingly to the pacific coast. He
wished to remain in Urabi. "He went to Vicente [his mentor and commander] and said, 'It is different trying to work
in the territory of the narcos. It so much harder because I don't have the EPL and armed forces as my allies who are
reliable; rather I have the narcos who not only work with me, but also with the guerrillas and so I can easily be
crossed by them.' He asked Vicente to let him leave Valle and return to Urabi and Vicente said, 'No, you can't
leave.' So HH had to remain in Valle for the rest of the war." (Gersen Arias (Fundaci6n Ideas para La Paz),
interview by author, BogotA, 17 July 2008).
294 HH demobilized as the 'commander' of the Frente Bananero even though he had not operated in the region for
years. He was ordered to do so to protect the FB's real commander, Rail Hazbin's reputation as an upstanding
bananero with no judicial processes against him. Rail demobilized as a foot soldier to avoid enrolling in the Justice
and Peace process (Faber (Director of Superban), interview by author, Apartad6, June 2008). The Castaflos decided
to protect Raul because he had developed the model of using the legal Convivir to fight the guerrillas and gain
extortion monies (Convivir Popayan). Rail also brought in lots of money through the extortion of the bananeros
(Conflict analyst, interview by author, Bogoti, July 2008).
295 Ex-combatants (Frente Bananero), interview by author, Turbo and Apartad6, June 2008.
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fighters.296 Thus, after relinquishing their arms, the Calima paramilitaries, including the second
and third-level commanders, dispersed. In HH's notoriously honest testimonies under the Justice
and Peace law, he reported, "not knowing the whereabouts" of five of his top commanders ('el
Rolo,' 'el Colocho,' 'Gallo,' 'Ronald' and 'Perro Mocho'). Of his remaining leaders, two were
in Medellin ('Julian' and 'Alex'), three were in prison ('Maturo,' 'Pata de Palo' and 'Pescadito')
and the rest were dead ('Julian,' 'Gregorio,' 'Juan Onorte,' 'Martin,' 'Daniel,' and 'Bola de
Cacao). Only one of his commanders, his brother, Giovanni, was with him in Urabi. In total,
only 35 of 555 ex-Calima members migrated to Urabai. As a result, HH lacked a structure to
'retake' Urabi. Interesting, co-opting or "borrow[ing] a structure" 297 proved unfeasible. HH
sought to chop off or seduce the local, urabefto Frente Bananero's leadership and then
"appropriate the structure, use it, implant himself in it."2 98 Given the security and coercive
motivations for rejoining an armed group, it would seem HH could have quite easily achieved his
objective, equipping himself with an organization through arm-twisting and forced
recruitment.299 It was therefore "impressive that HH was not able to co-opt the former Frente
Bananero." 300 My respondents gave me clues as to why. "He was not a leader of the zone, didn't
have support there," conflict analyst, Gersen Arias told me. Carolina Rodriguez of the High
Commission of Reintegration similarly explained, "HH had only recently arrived to the zone ...
HH was not really a commander in Urabi. He was the commander over there, of Calima."301
When I asked the director of Superban if HH was able to recruit his men, he responded, "He took
296 Organization of International Migration 2004a; Organization of International Migration 2004b.
297 Conflict analyst, interview by author, Bogoti, July 2008.
298 Director of Superban, interview by author, Apartad6, June 2008.
299 It should be noted that HH did pursue coercive means of recruitment. Many of those not in favor of the Bloque
Bananero's structure being used for HH purposes and goals, he had killed by hitmen. Demobilized leaders in the
banana axis confirmed this. HH was implicated in "social cleansing" of demobilized who would not reenter his
armed group.
300 Academic, interview by author, Bogota, January 2008.
301 ACR Urabi Regional Director, interview by author, Apartad6, July 2008.
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his men from Calima... He didn't take anyone from Superban because HH wasn't of the Bloque
Bananero."302 The social network mechanism seemed to trump the coercive one and the ex-
soldiers of Frente Bananero remained loyal to their formerly armed organization.
Unable to 'borrow' the Superban structure or recruit combatants who had operated in
Urabi, HH faced three sources of soldiers to staff an organization: 1) ex-Calima combatants (of
which there were few); 2) new recruits; and 3) returnee fighters. HH recruited some new youth.
However, they lacked war and criminal training and indoctrination. He also recruited former
paramilitaries that were recruited in Urabai, deployed elsewhere and then returned to their
families in Urabit post-demobilization; their structures had disintegrated. These were thus
individual recruits, rather than collective ones. Several of these returnee ex-combatants, lacking
orientation and looking for someone to command them, became a puddle of recruits for HH.
Thus HH was able to mobilize a small force in San Pedro de Uraba.303 However, it was quickly
defeated. With the state after him, HH fled the flat, open banana axis and journeyed to the vast,
state-less, eastern plains of Meta. In April 2007, he was captured. The cases of Bloque
Catatumbo's displaced fighters in Cnicuta and Bloque Catatumbo and Bloque Calima's small
fraction of returnee fighters in Urabi' suggest that low levels of geographic concentration and
thin bonds prompt post-war bankruptcy or, at best, weak collective action capacity.
VI. Quantitative Analysis
Accordingly, if my argument is correct, organizations' recruitment, deployment, and
post-war migration patterns should affect the likelihood that they disappear. I predict that pre-
war networks and post-war physical clustering should be negatively correlated with bankruptcy.
302 Emphasis added. While it may seem unlikely that the Director spoke honestly with me about his men rearming,
he openly admitted that some of his muchachos had joined the ranks of Don Mario.
303 This was his mentor, Vicente Castaflo's former stronghold.
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Specifically, organizations characterized by low recruitment dispersion and high post-war
clustering should preserve a strong capacity for collective action while we should observe armed
groups with weak pre-war networks and low levels of post-war geographic concentration going
bankrupt. Armed groups which recruited in a concentrated fashion, but whose combatants
dispersed after demobilizing will retain an initially intermediate capacity for collective action,
but this capacity will erode very quickly. Finally, we should expect thinly tied, highly clustered
armed groups to constitute an intermediate case of post-war organizational survival. To test this
hypothesis formally, I estimate the following model:
Survival = a + P,3Clustering / Networks +2 Loot + [3Lead + P4 Defeat + P5Ideol +e
The dependent variable - organizational Survival - captures the degree to which
organization o retained its capacity for collective action and averted bankruptcy. I first estimate
the model using a survey-based index version of Survival and employing ordinary least squares
analysis. I then use a dummy measure of Survival based on qualitative evidence and employ logit
analysis. For both estimation techniques, I cluster the standard errors on the organization. To
allow for sufficient power, I specify the model without fixed effects. The formal test of the
impact of clustered recruitment and post-war migration is HO : B > 0. The model further
controls for several other factors, which are predicted to correlate with organizational
bankruptcy. Specifically, I include measures of resource-richness, leadership, military defeat,
and ideological cohesion. For models employing the bloc-municipality dyad as the unit of
analysis, I control for organization fixed effects and municipality fixed effects, indexed by the
variables I. By incorporating these fixed effects, I account for all location-specific, time-invariant
organization-level unobservables that may affect the likelihood that an organization-municipality
dyad will disappear. I also test the logic on the individual level of analysis (n=30,935 ex-
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combatants).
Measuring Bankruptcy. To determine if a group has disappeared, I create an index of the
ex-fighters, their families, and psychologists'3 0 4 responses to eight related survey questions. (See
Appendix C for the survey methodologies). The questions ask about the horizontal and vertical
components of the former armed structures. I derive weights to create a single measure: the
Survival index.305 I then take averages at the brigade and brigade-community dyad levels. I also
evaluate the argument on the individual ex-combatant unit of analysis. Survival at the individual
level can be thought of as a continuous spectrum ranging from complete defection from the
former armed organization (a value of '0') to highly sustained membership in the entity (value of
'1').
The measures used to construct the index employ three types of questions. First, I ask
about ex-combatants' ties with their former comrades in arms. Specifically, the interviewees are
asked about the former fighters' social networks, face-to-face interactions, norms of reciprocity,
and mutual dependence. Second, respondents are questioned about the ex-combatants'
relationships with and reliance on their ex-commanders and the extent to which the chain of
command has been dismantled. Finally, I include responses to questions that explicitly ask about
the survival of the organizational structure (see below for question wording).
Recruitment Dispersion and Multifaceted Networks. To measure pre-war networks, I
evaluate two proxies. The first takes data on ex-combatants' self-reported department,
municipality, and neighborhood of origin and municipality-level data on their former armed
304 Each ex-combatant is assigned to a psychologist, called a 'tutor,' with no more than 120 ex-paramilitaries per
tutor. The tutors give the ex-combatants their monthly stipends, run the required social-psychological workshops,
which the ex-combatants must attend twice a week, and conduct house visits to every ex-combatant.
305 Future iterations of this quantitative analysis will evaluate the findings based on this conceptualization of the
bankruptcy/survival index against results using an index based on factor analysis. Additionally, more comprehensive
corrections will be incorporated to deal with potential biases resulting from the survey design and enumeration,
including sampling and non-response biases.
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groups' zones of operation. The latter is based on triangulated data from three different classified
sources: the Colombian High Commissioner for Peace; the Organization of American States'
Peace Mission; and the Attorney General's Justice and Peace Division;306 and from one open
source: VerdadAbierta.307 Combining these data, I extract a measure of whether each of 22,605
combatants operated where s/he was from (Operated Where From). I then take the average at the
brigade level. At the brigade level, this variable ranges from 4% of the unit being local to their
war theater to 80% being local with a mean of 35%. For the second measure, for each ex-
combatant, I take the percentage of their former armed groups' recruits who shared their town of
origin. This measure ranges from .05% to 71.35% with a mean of 9.03%. Again, I take the
average at the brigade level.
Post- War Migration and Physical Clustering. To measure post-war physical clustering, I
employ a similar strategy. First, I obtain a measure of if each ex-combatant remained in the zone
in which his/her former armed group operated - In Zone - as this constitutes the dominant means
by which the ex-combatants remained geographically concentrated.308 Based on data on 30,935
ex-combatants, I obtain an aggregated measure of the percentage of each armed group's
members that remained in the group's 'war theater' post-demobilization. This variable ranges
from 1% to 98% with an average of 53%. Comparing these results with the geographic
dispersion of the combatants to different Colombian departments supports the use of this
measure as a proxy for physical clustering; armed groups with low levels of ex-combatants In
Zone witnessed their members spreading out throughout Colombia to as many as 24 departments
306 This source incorporates data derived from the confidential testimonies of 2,700 ex-paramilitary top and mid-
ranking commanders.
307 See www.verdadabierta.com.
308I constructed a municipality-level database (n=1065) and entered the armed groups that operated in each
municipality. Some municipalities had no paramilitary groups while others had a maximum of five groups. I then
merged this data with the individual level survey data on each ex-combatant's former paramilitary faction, town of
origin and place of current residence.
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whereas those with high levels of former fighters 'In Zone' had combatants living in only one or
two departments. Second, I calculate the percentage of each combatant's former militarized
comrades who live in his/her current municipality of residence. Some ex-combatants live in a
community in which no other ex-paramilitaries from their armed group reside while other former
fighters share their towns of residence with 90% of the combatants from their ex-bloque. The
mean is 15%. I also derive a brigade-level average of this measure. In future stages of analysis, I
will employ GIS to extract geographically-based dispersion measures of recruitment and post-
war migration that will take into account the distance between localities. This will mirror
techniques used by population and public health studies.
Alternative Explanations
Resource-Richness. According to Weinstein 2002, loot-based groups attract opportunistic
joiners and suffer greater principal agent problems and vulnerability to organizational
fragmentation. We should thus expect access to resources to be negatively correlated with group
survival: Hi : B2 <0. To test this hypothesis, I create a measure of Drugs that estimates the
hectares of coca and poppy crops in the armed group's zone of operation prior to demobilization.
I derive this data from satellite imagery, taken by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime &
Colombian Government's Integrated System to Monitor Illicit Crops (SIMCI) in 2000. I also
evaluate a more nuanced measure, Loot, which includes data on the presence of oil fields,
pipelines and refineries, emerald and gold mines, and drug crops, laboratories, and smuggling
routes.309 For the individual level equation, I look at if there is 'loot' in the ex-combatant's
municipality of current residence.
309 Gems indicates emerald, sapphire, and aquamarine locations identified in The Oxford Economic Atlas of the
World, 1972 and gold and emerald mine locations from CEDE data; Oil is coded "1" for municipalities with oil
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Map 4. Density of Coca Crops, Colombia, 2000
Source: UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2000
Leadership The presence or absence of leaders at the high rungs of the command chain
may also determine post-war organizational endurance. Post-peace agreement, many leaders are
subject to imprisonment, assassination, or extradition. I thus include a dummy Decapitated
Leadership (Lead), which takes a value of 1 if the top leaders are isolated from their subordinates
and 0 otherwise. We should expect a negative correlation between Lead and organizational
Survival: H2 :1B3 <0. I further test a measure of the fates of the mid-ranking commanders,
which derives from the psychologists' responses to the question, "Do the mid-tier leaders
maintain a leadership role in the community in which you work?"
Group's Military Defeat. The war outcome literature proposes that negotiated settlements
yield less stable peace than do military victories (Fortna 2004; Toft forthcoming) and implicitly
predict that militarily defeated groups should be more likely to disappear. The individual-level
logic is that no one likes to be on a losing team and thus defection escalates. The formal test of
the impact of war outcome on organizational bankruptcy is: H3 : B4 <0. To measure military
fields, pipelines, or refineries. US Department of Energy maps provide this data; Landvalue measures the average
value of each municipality's land.
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defeat, I construct a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if, in the year prior to demobilization,
a large share of the armed faction's combatants defected to another armed group or if the armed
faction suffered a large number of battle-related deaths.3 1 0 This measure, Defeat, relies on ex-
combatant interviews and violent event data.
Group Ideology. It is predicted that armed groups characterized by stronger ideologies
are more likely to retain the loyalty of their former fighters and avert bankruptcy. The formal test
is H 4 : B5 >0. For this variable, I use expert's coding of the nature of the organization - pure
autodefensa or pure narco to approximate the paramilitary group's allegiance to a rallying
political platform.
Results
Analysis of the data presents strong and consistent support for the proposed model.
Multifaceted networks and post-war physical clustering are significantly correlated with
organizational survival across all specifications of the model, measures of the variables, and
units of analysis. The data offers little support for resource, military outcome, ideology, and
leadership-focused arguments. In fact, loot in the armed group's zone of operation and
decapitated top leadership had the opposite effects predicted: they produced cohesion rather than
division. I first discuss the results at the meso units of analysis and then disaggregate to the micro
ones.
Armed Organization and Armed Group-Community Dyad Results
A critical issue in evaluating armed groups' post-war outcomes is determining the
appropriate unit of analysis. Most qualitative analyses use the macro organizational level (FARC,
310 In future iterations of the project, I plan to use an approximation of military strength: the number of the
paramilitary bloc's fighters in the municipality relative to the estimated total number of troops in the zone. In the
absence of municipal level troop levels, I use the dummy described above.
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AUC, UNITA, Afghan militias). However, many of the important and exciting causal processes
occur at either the level of the sub-faction or that of the sub-faction - community dyad. The 36
paramilitary brigades in Colombia, called bloques, broke into 128 battalions and operated in
1040 municipalities, generating 1040 bloque-municipality dyads. Table 2 reports the armed
brigade-level results. Then, Table 3 undertakes a preliminary analysis at the battalion unit of
analysis. Table 4 explores the sub-faction-community dyads.
Table 2. OLS Analyses of Determinants of Organizational Bankruptcy versus Survival
(1) (2)
Variables Organizational Survivalb Organizational Survivalb
Networks +Clusteringa 0.334** 0.333*
(0.161) (0.165)
Loot 0.220
(0.344)
Decapitated Leadership 0.313*
(0.176)
Military Defeat -0.246
(0.251)
Constant 1.013*** 0.715***
(0.159) (0.235)
Observations 36 36
R-squared 0.112 0.219
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%
a At the organizational level, Networks is measured as the percentage of the brigade's combatants who operated in
their towns of origin (Operated Where From); Clustering is measured as the percentage of the armed group's
fighters living in their combat zone after demobilizing (In Zone).
b Organizational Survival is measured as the average of the brigade's combatants' organizational
survival/bankruptcy indexes.
I code the sub-faction (battalion) level outcomes by triangulating diverse sources of data.
These sources include seven years of press reports, over 200 interviews of ex-combatants,
participant observation in the former zones of operation of 21 of the 36 paramilitary blocs, 100
interviews of experts on the conflict, Organization of American States (OAS) Peace Monitors'
reports, intelligence data, paramilitary commanders' testimonies under the Justice and Peace
Law, and municipal-level violent event data. I create a dummy variable, Bankruptcy, which takes
a value of '0' if the organization retains a collective capacity; '1' if it has largely gone bankrupt.
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A more nuanced coding will be undertaken in future iterations of the analysis. I present the
results below.
Table 3. Logit Analysis of Determinants of Battalion Bankruptcy versus
Survival
(1)
Variables Bankruptcy
Networks & Clustering -1.991***
(0.403)
Constant 0.721**
(0.287)
Observations 128
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
For the organization-community analyses, I run the regressions averaging the bankruptcy
indexes of the ex-combatants in each municipality-armed group dyad. This level of analysis
measures the extent to which armed organization o in municipality m has survived or gone
bankrupt. The prediction is: the greater the proportion of local fighters that remain clustered in
the zone, the higher the likelihood that the organization in that locale will remain collective-
action capable.
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Table 4. OLS Analyses of Survival of Armed Brigade - Municipality Dyads
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Survival of Survival of Survival of
Armed Brigade- Armed Brigade- Armed Brigade-
Municipality Dyad Municipality Dyad Municipality Dyad
Pre-War Networksa 0.0484***
(0.00461)
Post-War Clustering 0.0407***
(0.00338)
Networks & Clustering 0.0231***
(0.00199)
Loot 0.0778* 0.0822* 0.0793*
(0.0466) (0.0459) (0.0461)
Decapitated Leadership 0.223*** 0.214*** 0.219***
(0.0567) (0.0559) (0.0561)
Military Defeat -0.148* -0.146* -0.147*
(0.0859) (0.0847) (0.0850)
Strong Ideology 0.0882* 0.100** 0.0925*
(0.0487) (0.0479) (0.0481)
Constant 0.107** 0.111** 0.106**
(0.0505) (0.0497) (0.0499)
Observations 1040 1040 1040
R-squared 0.124 0.150 0.143
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
aPre- War Networks is proxied by the percentage of the brigade o from municipality m
b Post-War Clustering is measured as the percentage of brigade o currently residing in municipality m. I test these
independently and then sum them (Networks & Clustering).
Consistent with the predictions, paramilitary factions characterized by more concentrated
recruitment and post-war migration faced a higher likelihood of successfully navigating the
organizational challenges of war to peace transitions, averting chronic defection, and maintaining
collective action to potentially form socio-political entities or redeploy for war. These results are
robust in the bivariate and multivariate models and across the three levels of analysis. The effects
are substantively and statistically significant. A one percent increase in the combined percentage
of In Zone and Operated Where From corresponds with a 33% increase in the 0.75 to 2.5
survival index at the brigade level; being a clustered and densely networked organization
decreases the chances of bankruptcy by 87% at the battalion level. The substantive effects at the
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organization-community dyad unit of analysis are much smaller, but they remain statistically
significant.
Leadership. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, decapitating the top leadership of an
organization does not seem to contribute to its collective bankruptcy (Tables 2 and 4). This
finding is consistent with this project's case-based findings and focus on middle management.
Appealing to Selznick again: the 'cadre' is "a highly manipulatable skeleton organization ... [It]
is the permanent staff of leaders who train recruits and around whom new units may be built.
More broadly, the term may refer to a corps of professional soldiers preserved in peacetime as a
basis for the wartime army."311 These were the mandos medios (middle commanders) of the
paramilitaries who possessed highly specialized knowledge and the direct contact with and
loyalty of the foot soldiers.3 12 When I measure the effect of intact mid-level leadership,313 I find a
positive, significant relationship with organizational survival across specifications of the model.
Moreover, the explanatory weight of recruitment and post-war dispersion remains.
Loot. At the organizational level of analysis, Loot proved an insignificant predictor of
organizational bankruptcy as demonstrated in Table 2. However, at the organization-community
dyad level (Table 4), resource-richness enhanced the likelihood of survival at the 10%
significance level. I discuss this result below.
Defeat. Consistent with the war outcome literature's prediction, military defeat or
weakness dooms an organization to bankruptcy (See Table 2 and 4). However, as Table 5 shows,
this result does not hold at the micro level.
3" Selznick, 1952, p. 18. Emphasis added.
312 Miller 1992. Gustavo Duncan confirmed the very specialized nature of the training and knowledge of the mandos
medios. "It is knowledge that one cannot just gain from one day to the next ... so rearmed units will be built around
these leaders," (Gustavo Duncan, interview by author, BogotA, 29 October 2007).
313 For this measure, I take the psychologists' responses to the question, "Do the mid-ranking commanders maintain
leadership roles in the community in which you work?" I then average their responses at the municipality level,
merge this data with that on ex-combatants' location of residence, collapse it by their former ex-bloque.
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Individual Ex-Combatant Level Results
I next evaluate the proposed logic on the individual level of analysis. Strongly networked
and geographically concentrated combatants should have a lower likelihood of defection.
Consistent with this hypothesis, ex-combatants who remain physically clustered and who share
pre-war networks with a large fraction of their former militarized comrades prove more likely to
sustain their membership in their ex-armed group while ex-fighters who lack pre-war bonds and
who find themselves physically isolated from their paramilitary colleagues demonstrate a greater
tendency towards defection. Specifically, a 20% increase in the percentage of one's former
comrades living where one lives (the proxy for clustering) corresponds with a 30% increase in
the sustained membership index. These effects hold in the fully specified model. As predicted,
the clustering effect seems to trump the pre-war network effect in explanatory value.314 This
implies that a group strong in networks, but highly dispersed may face a greater likelihood of
bankruptcy than a group weak in networks, but densely concentrated; the decay function for the
former is steeper than that for the latter. The proposed logic of post-war migration also seems to
hold. Those that operate where they are from prove significantly more likely to 'be home' after
disarming than those that operate far from their towns of origin.
Model 1 in Table 5 presents the fully specified model. The significance of the networks
and clustering mechanisms holds as does the counterintuitive finding about leadership
decapitation. Against resource determinism, I find that ex-combatants residing in zones of Loot
proved more likely to retain their membership in their former armed organizations. Additionally,
individuals belonging to armed groups characterized by stronger political ideologies were more
314 This may, however, reflect variation in the precision of the proxies with post-war clustering more accurately
captured than pre-war networks for two reasons. Town of origin does not indicate how long an individual has
resided there. Additionally, individuals who come from the same place do not necessarily know each other while,
given their history of combat together in the same group, individuals living in the same place post-war do likely
know each other.
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likely to defect than those participating in more 'materially-motivated' or greedy groups.
Together, these findings undermine the resources' thesis and point to the capacity-enhancing
rather than capacity-degrading effects of resources. These results ironically return us to a key
finding in the collective action literature: selective incentives prove effective at sustaining
organizations irrespective of ideology. Economically-endowed groups may be more likely to
remain cohesive than "politically" or "socially" endowed ones.31 5
The findings also suggest that individual ex-combatants who belong to losing teams,
characterized by military defeat, are no more likely to defect. However, this effect is inconsistent
with the organization level analysis presented above.
The final models (2-4) present more fully specified models in order to speak to the
individual reintegration literature. This literature is highly developed in the policy arena with
several recent contributions from academia, most notably Humphreys and Weinstein's 2007
piece. 3 16 These studies equate effective DDR with organizational bankruptcy. Humphreys and
Weinstein state, "Successful reintegration requires that combatants break their ties with the
warring factions, so that previous command and control structures no longer operate in the post-
war period." One of their dependent variables measuring effective reintegration is thus "broken
ties tofaction, that captures the extent to which combatants still turn to faction leaders for
assistance" (p. 18). While I do not find such a conceptual equivalence between bankruptcy and
reintegration success, I nonetheless use this opportunity to compare my results against theirs and
to test the effects of gender, education, and abuse on ex-combatants' likelihood of sustained or
broken ties to their former armed faction. The policy implications of this project for reintegration
theory and program design are elaborated upon in the Conclusion.
315 Popkin 1979 and Olson 1965. These selective incentives include salaries, food, clothing, support to one's family,
work, land, and drugs.
316 See also Pugel 2006; Mvukiyehe, Samii, and Taylor 2010.
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Table 5. OLS Analyses of Determinants of
Individual Defection versus Sustained Membership
(1) (2) (3)b (4)c
Variables Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained
Membership in Membership in Membership in Membership in
Organization Organization Organization Organization
Networks + 0.0105*** 0.0103*** 0.00915*** 0.0105***
Clustering a (0.000212) (0.000223) (0.000317) (0.000322)
Loot 0.0788*** 0.0946*** 0.155*** 0.0903***
(0.0180) (0.0184) (0.0204) (0.0197)
Decapitated 0.305*** 0.312*** 0.292*** 0.316***
Leadership (0.0350) (0.0356) (0.0367) (0.0368)
Military Defeat 0.0512 0.0427 0.0459 0.0465
(0.0516) (0.0522) (0.0583) (0.0585)
Strong Ideology -0.232*** -0.222*** -0.153*** -0.205***
(0.0179) (0.0182) (0.0203) (0.0205)
Abuse 0.000125*** 2.41e-05***
(1.1 8e-05) (8.90e-06)
Female -0.108*** -0.0751** -0.0885***
(0.0329) (0.0338) (0.0339)
Education 0.0566*** 0.0497*** 0.0585***
(0.0113) (0.0126) (0.0126)
Age -9.Ole-06 -1.29e-05
(1.81e-05) (1.82e-05)
Constant 0.992*** 0.836*** 0.803*** 0.810***
(0.0339) (0.0455) (0.0541) (0.0550)
Observations 16706 16038 14316 14316
R-squared 0.154 0.149 0.132 0.126
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
a Pre-War Networks is proxied by the percentage of ex-combatants from individual i's armed group who share i's
town of origin. Post-War Clustering is measured as the percentage of the ex-combatants from individual i's armed
group who share i's post-demobilization town of residence. Networks & Clustering is the sum of the two
percentages.
b Model 3 estimates the model with Abuse measured as civilian casualties committed by the paramilitaries in the
zone in which the ex-combatant resides.
' Model 4 estimates the model with Abuse measured as the paramilitary-inflicted civilian casualties in the ex-
combatant's former zone of military combat (committed by his/her faction).
Humphreys and Weinstein find the prospect of defection to depend largely on the
abusiveness of the units to which the ex-combatants belonged. They find age and gender to be
unimportant predictors of organizational survival. In contrast to their findings, I find the effect of
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group abusiveness to be substantively negligible. I test abusiveness of the individuals' former
armed factions (Model 4) and also that of the factions that operated in the regions in which they
currently reside (Model 3). Neither has a substantive impact. Instead, I find that individual ex-
combatants are more likely to break their bonds with their armed group if they are
geographically isolated and have thin pre-war ties to their colleague combatants. They are also
more likely to do so if they live in a resource-poor region with few opportunities for loot and if
they belonged to a group characterized by 'political' rather than 'criminal' creed.
Last, contrary to Humphreys and Weinstein 2007's findings, I find gender and education
to have significant impacts. Specifically, females proved less likely to remain connected to their
former armed employers and more highly educated individuals proved more likely to do so.
While reintegration models focus on these two variables, 317 we have little theory to explain why
they might matter. I propose two reasons why gender might link with defection. First, many
female combatants are not directly part of the armed organizations. Rather, they hang around the
fighters, sleep with the fighters, feed the fighters, hide the weapons of the fighters, and are
related to the fighters 3 18 and, thus, when the call to demobilize comes, they are invited to accrue
benefits from the DDR process as well (See Appendix C). Second, if alternative networks 'pull'
ex-combatants away from the formerly militarized web, the pull of family and children operates
more strongly on females than males. While both demobilized men and women I interviewed
claimed to desire a return to and the development of their family lives, the women's actions in
this respect spoke louder than the men's words. These differential trajectories of male versus
317 United Nations 2006; Pugel 2006.
318 There were few women in the military ranks of the paramilitaries. However, women were deemed "critical for
intelligence as they were less noticeable and were good at gossiping and finding out stuff' (Ex-combatant Woman,
interview by author, Comuna 2, Medellin, 6 March 2008). They played these support roles or were merely linked to
the paramilitary combatants.
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female ex-combatants merit greater theoretical attention. With respect to the relationship
between education and individual defection, the mechanism is likely one centered on status.
More educated recruits often climb the ranks to leadership roles within the armed groups. They
therefore resist the status reversal that comes with demobilization and hold tighter to their ties
with the organization in which they enjoyed respect and power.
VII. Conclusion
This chapter looked at the interior of armed organizations. Bankruptcy versus survival
was its object of inquiry. It revealed vast differences in the ability of former paramilitary
structures to endure and carry out collective action. Data drawn from nine surveys and over 300
in-depth interviews point to divergent patterns of recruitment, stationing, and migration and their
strong links with organizational endurance.
The chapter put to test theories that aim to make sense of divergence in organizational
capacity and cohesion. Arguments that locate the causes of fragmentation in the fates of top
leadership perform less well. Theories that predict that resource endowments determine
organizational outcomes find disconfirming evidence in the cases of Urabi, Catatumbo, and
Medellin. Explanations that suggest that strength of group ideology predicts post-war
organizational survival are also challenged by the data. The existing models cannot account for
the observed variation across the paramilitary brigades or former combatants. Instead,
organizations' social and human geography proves better able to account for empirical realities
on the ground in Colombia.
The enduring organizations explored in this chapter act as receptacles of collective action
and embody influence - social, political, economic, and coercive - that can remilitarize or 'be
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diverted' to non-violent politics. The next chapter explores this latter outcome: when and why
former paramilitary structures maintain social and political influence over civilian affairs without
the manifest use of force. The chapter turns outward from the organization to look at the
dynamics between former militarized groups and civilian communities.
Component Survey Questions: Index of Organizational Survival
[Surveys of Ex-Combatants]
* Currently, who makes up a majority ofyour friends?
Former comrades from your armed group / People who did not belong to your armed group / A mix of
former comrades and people who did not belong to your armed group
* Ifyou had economic problems, to whom would you turn?
To your family / To friends who were not part of your armed group / To former comrades from your
armed group / To your ex-commander / To government entities / No one / Other
* Ifyou had security problems, to whom would you turn?
To your family / To friends who were not part of your armed group / To former comrades from your
armed group / To your ex-commander / To government entities / No one / Other
* Who helped you get yourjob?
Family members / Government Officials / Friends or Ex-commanders from your armed group / Friends
that did not belong to your armed group / Classified Ads / No one / Other
* Who did you ask for help in finding ajob?
Family members / Government Officials / Friends or Ex-commanders from your armed group / Friends
that did not belong to your armed group / Local politicians / Classified Ads / No one / Other
*Are a majority ofyour friends at work former combatants from your armed group?
Yes / No
* How often are you in touch with your ex-commander?
Frequently / Sometimes / Rarely / Never
* How do you view your relationship with your former commanders?
Friendship / Respect / Support / Dependence / Submission / Gratitude / Non-existent / Distant
[Survey of Ex-Combatants' Families]
*Currently, who makes up a majority of the ex-combatant's group offriends?
Former comrades from the armed group / People who did not belong to the armed group / A mix of
former comrades and people who did not belong to an armed group
*Does the ex-combatant remain in contact with his/her comrades from his/her former armed group?
Yes / No
[Survey of Ex-Combatants' Psychologists]
* Do the mid-ranking commanders maintain a leadership role among the ex-combatants?
Yes / No
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* Did the paramilitary structure that operated in the municipality remain intact post-demobilization?
Completely intact / More or less intact / Not very intact / Not at all intact / The paramilitaries never had a
structure in the municipality
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Chapter 6
Campaigns
I. Introduction
The battalions in Medellin maintained a capacity for collective action, but why were they
able to become socio-political organizations with extensive influence over civilian affairs? An
Organization of International Migration survey conducted of 2,827 civilians in Medellin and
Norte de Santander found that 88% of civilians in Medellin evaluated the presence of the ex-
combatants in their neighborhoods as positive whereas only 48% of those in Norte de Santander
expressed these sentiments. Similarly, 41% of the civilians surveyed in Medellin viewed the ex-
combatants as protectors whereas only 6% of those in Norte de Santander did. Why, given the
massacres, kidnappings, homicides, and extortion that the paramilitary battalions carried out in
Medellin, does the population have this positive view and what explains the variation between
the two regions?
I propose five mechanisms that account for variation in ex-combatants' embeddedness.
First, local combatants who operated where they are from tend to be tied to the civilian
population through familial, friendship, neighborhood, and other networks, creating a web of
direct contacts that are linked to the rest of the population through similar bonds. Second, given
the high cost of displacement, the community members recognize that the combatants will
continue to reside in their neighborhoods for at least the medium term, thereby extending the
shadow of the future. Third, evidence suggests that, surprisingly, anger levels are reduced when
the perpetrators are deemed part of in-community and when the violence is perceived to be
justified by the motive of protecting that community. Fourth, civilians engage in simple
retrospective voting; they endogenously develop support for the armed groups based on the
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groups' past governance record rather than on deep-rooted partisan (armed group) preferences.
Good performance facilitates embeddedness. And fifth, institutions of authority are slow to
change and thus ex-combatants' ability to exercise influence endures in the short-run even in the
absence of civilian tolerance.
Highly local battalions are embedded in their communities through these five
mechanisms. This provides them the authority and endorsement to successfully form socio-
political organizations. In contrast, non-locally deployed combatants are divorced from the
communities in which they operate and, as a result, cannot form civic or political associations
after disarming.
This chapter elaborates on this proposed model to explain variation in transitions from
guns to campaigns. It introduces alternative explanations for 'rebel-to-party' transformations. It
then motivates this project's broader definition of socio-political influence, which extends
beyond electoral politics. The third section introduces the five mechanisms linking the human
geography of armed organizations with their governance of civilians post-war. I then turn to the
paramilitary cases and explore the persistence of wartime social, economic, and political
leverage over non-combatants in practice. Their divergent levels of leverage clarify the causal
processes that connect variation in soldiers' deployment with patterns of socio-political influence
in the aftermath of violence. The subsequent section outlines the quantitative strategy for
evaluating the proposed framework and presents the empirical results. The chapter concludes by
developing preliminary insights into varying repertoires of socio-political influence.
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II. Alternative Explanations
Hearts and Minds
The most obvious and intuitive argument in the literature is that the groups best able to
appeal to the social groups they claim to represent prove the most effective at transitioning into
legal, political entities; they have popular support. This is the conventional wisdom of the
growing, rebel-to-party transition literature. Essentially, if an armed organization has a
'following,' it will become a successful political party. 3 19
This theory proves non-falsifiable. It essentially states that if a political party receives
many votes, it will win. The question of course is why does it receive so many votes? This is the
question I seek to answer below, focusing not only on the highest bar of endorsement (voting),
but also on a lower bar: tolerance (not resisting former armed groups' socio-political influence).
A defense of this focus can be found below.
Resources & Abuse
The resource endowment theory provides an additional explanation for divergence in
'popular support.' It posits that resource-rich groups' behavior is characterized by a "total
disregard for the interests of the civilian population and includes looting, destruction, and the use
of indiscriminate force." 320 As a result, it predicts that resource-rich groups should face rejection
by the non-combatant populations after they demobilize and should be less likely to muster the
civilian backing necessary to be able to form legitimate political organizations.3 2 1 The opposite
should hold for resource-poor, socially-endowed groups. Extracting just the abuse aspect from
this hypothesis without explaining its variance, the hypothesis would be: armed groups, which
319 See Manning 2004, 2007; de Zeeuw 2008; S6derberg 2007.
320 Weinstein 2006; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008.
321 Weinstein 2006; De Zeeuw 2008
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engaged in greater and more arbitrary violence against the non-combatant population should
prove less likely to form socio-political entities after relinquishing their arms.
While I find that armed groups vary in their ability to form socio-political groups, I do
not find this ability to be determined either by resources or by abuse. There are cases of 'loot-
based,' abusive militarized groups that became successful political parties. Similarly, there are
cases where resource-starved, relatively non-abusive groups formed peaceful socio-political
organizations. Resources do not yield determinate outcomes.
The resource endowment approach makes a further claim that resource-rich groups are
driven by material rather than ideological motivations and are thus unlikely to want to form
socio-political organizations. Against this motivation claim of the 'greed' theory, evidence
indicates that even purely criminal, rebel or paramilitary groups face strong incentives to seek
political office. Access to political power enables demilitarized groups to corrupt, consume state
revenues, control resource-rich territories, limit prison sentences, enjoy veto power, and
guarantee that gains promised in the peace deal are not reversed once the group demobilizes.32 2
Again, loot's effect is indeterminate.
Leadership
This chapter also challenges strictly agent-based explanations for post-war outcomes. The
most important rebel and paramilitary leaders assume a central role in many accounts of
divergent armed group outcomes. Indeed, the role of leadership - Colombian President Uribe
and paramilitary commanders Macaco, Don Berna, Don Mario - was frequently cited during my
field interviews as explaining variation. Military groups often have singular, authoritarian leaders
who control all aspects of the organization and thus, in military organizations, leadership is likely
m Many governments are highly predatory and criminal. Thus, being greedy more than ideological does not
preclude a group from seeking political power and control of the government. See the literature on 'rentier states:'
Mahdavy 1970; Beblawi and Giacomi 1987; Yates 1996; and Karl 1997.
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to matter a great deal. Specifically, the scholarly literature and anecdotal evidence highlight that
leaders' preferences determine what happens to their organization; it enters politics because its
leadership wants it to.323 While leaders' preferences, ideologies, and personalities no doubt have
explanatory utility, I find that leaders' decisions and preferences are constrained by their
relationships with their subordinates and the non-combatant population. The leadership literature
further suffers from serious research design issues. The ex ante coding of leaders' preferences
and ideological beliefs is often enormously difficult and preferences change over time, are
inconsistent, and thus provide unreliable predictors of individual behavior and outcomes.
Institutions
A fourth set of explanations derives from the power-sharing and political party
scholarship. While this literature introduces an important part of the story, it focuses "more on
the design and enforcement of the game than on the players themselves" (Manning 2004, 55);
this literature lacks agency. Instead, it is necessary to map institutional arrangements on top of
rebel and paramilitary armies' zones of embeddedness to yield meaningful hypotheses. Before
explaining why and when armed groups' retain governance powers post-war, I must first broaden
the discussion of political influence to go beyond only formal structures to also include informal,
but equally powerful, manifestations or social, political and economic leverage.
323 A sub-set of this literature argues that leaders' preferences act in conjunction with the structure of power within
the organization (whose preferences matter) to influence post-war group outcomes. Leadership is viewed not as
singular, but as a small group of elites, often conceived of as hawks and doves, criminals and ideologues,
reconcilables and irreconcilables (Petreus 2009; Stedman 1997; Kydd and Walter 2002; Bueno de Mesquita 2005,
2008). It follows that, if an organization's distribution of power favors the doves, it is more likely to become a
political party.
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III. Defining Socio-Political Organization
The dominant power-sharing paradigm over-emphasizes formal forms of political
leverage, namely political party formation, at the expense of informal forms of political influence
(co-opting existing parties, bribery, corruption, and civic association formation).
I define a post-war socio-political organization more broadly as an association
comprising ex-combatants, which engages in the following activities: runs for political office,
exercises social control, administers local justice, provides social services (jobs, patronage,
pork), regulates economic activities, dictates norms and even sexual behavior, taxes income,
realizes community development, resolves disputes, and behaves as a proto state. This
organization may be a political party, local government, community development group, NGO,
or cooperative. Electorally, it may field candidates, campaign on behalf of or against an existing
party, intimidate voters, threaten or bribe public officials, and receive money or favors from
politicians and civil servants.
IV. A Model to Explain Variation in Socio-Political Influence
To explain variation in ex-combatants' post-war socio-political leverage, I examine rebel
and paramilitary groups' deployment strategies. I argue that local militarized groups, which drew
a majority of their recruits from the communities in which they fought, are embedded in the
communities. There are two components of embeddedness. One, that the civilian population
tolerates or endorses the armed organization and does not reject or resist it. And two, that non-
combatants look to the militarized unit as the local power. If these conditions hold, once the
armed group demobilizes, it will be able to maintain influence over civilian affairs without the
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manifest use of arms. It thus faces a high probability of forming a legitimate socio-political
entity.3 24
It merits mention that 'embeddedness' likely co-varies with popular support, but is
distinct in several ways. Endorsement is a very high standard to look at. It is partially imposed by
existing studies' exclusive focus on electoral politics in which civilians vote for former armed
groups. By relaxing the threshold that armed organizations need to cross to have influence (i.e.
no electoral ones), I also relax the civilians' support requirements. The former armed group does
not have to win the civilian population's hearts and minds; the population must merely tolerate
and not reject the group's influence. 325 This is a more empirically useful form of the concept and
allows us to understand one of the fundamental paradoxes of post-war politics: how demobilized
illegal armed groups, despite often very high prior use of violence and abusiveness, can still
enjoy community 'support.' It is usually not support, but something weaker: tolerance. I turn to
the theory's mechanisms, but before doing so, I briefly specify the different configurations of ex-
combatants (Figure 6).
Ex-Combatant Types
I define former fighters as Local if they operated where they were recruited, deployed in
their home region and remained there after disarming. Returnees are ex-combatants who were
deployed to another region, but returned to their hometowns post-war. I code Squatters as former
paramilitaries who were stationed away from homes and remained in their combat zones after
demobilizing. Last, Displaced fighters are those that either deployed locally, but then left the
324 I do not examine remilitarized units' socio-political influence as this influence is achieved through coercion and
is therefore not puzzling and is over-determined.
325 Why citizens vote for a former armed group is likely best studied not in the context of war-to-peace transitions,
but rather in that of new political parties entering the electoral arena.
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zone post-war or those that were stationed far from their towns of origin and neither returned
home nor squatted in their war theaters.
Figure 6. Configurations of Ex-Combatants
Deployment & Migration Patterns
Operated in Currently Currently
Town of Origin Residing at Residing in
Home Combat Zone
Ex-Combatant Local 4
Types Returnee X X
Squatter X X 4
Displaced (Local) X X
Displaced (Non-Local) X X X
The Mechanisms
The theory's five mechanisms linking these 'ex-combatant types' to socio-political
leverage relate disproportionately to either the 'tolerance' or 'authority' components of
embeddedness. I look first at the mechanisms generating endorsement and tolerance versus
resistance.
Figure 7. Civilians' Attitudes Towards Ex-Combatants
Resistance Tolerance Endorsement
1. Networks -> Tolerance
Combatants deployed in their towns of origin enjoy multidimensional networks with
members of the community; military and civil life remain coupled. This means that, for civilians,
former fighter Juan Carlos is not only an ex-paramilitary and perpetrator of violence, but also the
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son of Maria, the school buddy of Francisco, the former employee of mechanic Luis, the
neighbor of Manuel and Alejandra, the soccer mate of Esteban, the former moto-taxi of Carolina,
the childhood crush of Juliana, the cousin of Jaime, Jose, and Mario, the father to Daniela's
children, the longtime buyer of arepas from Camila, the passenger on Pablo's bus, and the
frequenter of Luis Antonio's bar. An example in Meta speaks to this logic: "[Edison Cifuentes]
was the son of a well-known farmer and rancher from El Castillo, Meta ... [His] teenage
neighbors remember him as an excellent football player and sancochos [stew] and riding
companion." One community member recalled, "My grandmother gave him candy, he came to
lunch at my house, my family spoiled him." Another added, "Edison studied with one of my
sisters, we invited them to eat ice cream; he came home for meals." 326
These relations create cognitive dissonance, "It was a shock to think that the same person
we had known all our lives was involved in the disappearance of my brother."327 This
multidimensional network does not usually fully reject the soldiers and the rest of the community
cannot reject this group either both because it is sizeable and because it is not an isolated web;
rather, it is linked to the rest of the community through marriage, business, and friendship. This
generates relative collaboration with the combatants (both while at war and after). Non-local
combatants, in contrast, do not enjoy multifaceted ties with the civilian population.
2. Lower levels ofAnger 4 Tolerance
The second mechanism posits that pre-war membership in the local community reduces
levels of anger and thereby enhances civilian tolerance of former combatants' socio-political
influence. It does not, however, reduce levels of pain, sadness or loss. Perpetrators who patrolled
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326 Verdad Abierta 2010.
327 Verdad Abierta 2010.
their home communities never lost ties to their communities. According to Colombian journalist,
Juanita Le6n, this facilitates reintegration and reconciliation. 328 The emotional logic underlying
this assertion is that anger is reduced when the perpetrator is deemed part of the in-group - the
community - and when the violence is justified by the motive of protecting that community. This
mechanism is surprising as one might rationally anticipate the opposite to hold: anger
intensifying when victimized by a social contact.329
Being part of the community exerts a similar effect on levels of anger as a truth
commission. 330 Knowledge of the offender's identity and motivations, as revealed through
multifaceted local ties, mitigates anger not via the ability to know whom to punish,3 3 1 but
through a different mechanism: by altering the information available to the victim. Learning the
perpetrators' motives and circumstances can un-do the distorting effects of anger on information
and beliefs; that is, by individualizing the perpetrator and showing his/her humanity, shared
community bonds can enable victims to overcome stereotypes brought on by anger. If anger
lowers victims' threshold for attributing prejudices and assigning blame and causes them to
remember selectively and desire revenge, then acquaintance with the perpetrator, by providing
information,3 32 can alter the victims' cognition that the perpetrators have committed 'bad'
actions against them and can offset the "action tendency" to seek punishment. 333 Knowing one's
victimizer can de-demonize him/her despite the heinousness of the crime. It thereby enables the
victim to understand, forgive, and let go of the past. It is through these mechanisms that ex-
combatants' membership in the local community reduces levels of anger at an accelerated rate
328 Juanita Leon (Colombian Journalist), interview by author, Cambridge, MA, April 2007.
329 Kimberly Theidon expresses that anger is elevated when people are victimized by armed actors from their own
towns (Kimberly Theidon, interview by author, Cambridge, MA, March 2007). I do not find support of this.
330 See Petersen and Zukerman Daly 2010.
331 Goldberg, Lerner, and Tetlock 1999.
332 Keltner, Ellsworth and Edwards 1993; Bodenhausen, Sheperd and Kramer 1994; Lerner and Keltner 2000.
33 Petersen 2006.
34 See Gibson 2004.
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and facilitates reconciliation. Two civilians verify the relationship between deployment and
emotions:
Here, unlike in other places where the self-defense forces arrived from other areas
to kill people, the boys who formed the self-defense forces here were from the
communities (children of my neighbors, children of my friends). For this reason,
here ... they are well received when they return from war. For this reason, there
hasn't been massive rejection of these boys ... Many of the boys were children of
the violence. Each one had his story and, in some way, the community saw them
as justified. For this reason, the issue of forgiveness is not so difficult as they are
boys from our same communities. We watched them grow up. There is a
continuous interrelationship between victims and perpetrators. 335
To a certain degree, not to be overestimated, victims understand that, for the paramilitaries and
guerrillas, violence is their job in an economic environment that offers few alternatives and in a
war in which nearly everyone has been touched by atrocity. Therefore, in some respects, the line
between victim and perpetrator is blurred - both are deemed victims of an incessant conflict in
which children grow up believing violence to be natural.336
3. Shadow of Future 4 Tolerance
A third mechanism linking deployment strategies and levels of civilian tolerance of ex-
combatants' social leverage derives from the cooperation literature. Local former soldiers enjoy
a history of iterated interactions, an expectation of a long 'shadow of the future,' and
interpersonal trust with the civilian communities, rendering cooperation and mutual tolerance
between the civilians and former fighters more feasible (Axelrod 1984; Fearon 1998). Given the
hypotheses laid out in the previous chapter - that local combatants prove unlikely to displace -
the communities recognize that locally deployed ex-combatants will continue to reside in their
3 Interview by La Comisi6n Departamental de Seguimiento y Acompai'iamiento al Proceso de Desmovilizaci6n,
Desarme y Reintegraci6n, Antioquia, 14 February 2007.
336 An ICTJ survey, for instance, found Colombian victims from smaller towns (likely characterized by more
frequent interactions and stronger social ties between victims and victimizers) much more likely to consider the
guerrillas and paramilitaries also "victims" of the conflict (International Center for Transitional Justice 2006, p. 29).
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neighborhoods for the long term. Accordingly, they resign themselves to this fact and accept the
former fighters in their mix.
Figure 9. Civilians' Views of Ex-Combatants
No Authority Power Power and
or Power Authority
4. Retrospective Voters 4 Tolerance and Authority
Non-combatants do not simply identify with one armed actor over another based on their
prospective ideological platforms (left or right in the case of Colombia); rather evaluations of the
incumbent armed group's past performance influences citizens' likelihood of rejecting or
endorsing the group in the next period. This evaluation is relative to an estimate of how well the
other armed actors (state and non-state) would have performed had they been in power, weighted
according to some level of uncertainty about this estimate. Citizens then predict which 'ruler' is
more likely to serve their interests in the future. These evaluations are reflected in the civilians'
allegiance. The civilian population either approves the status quo and supports the incumbent -
the former armed group - or endorses change. Tolerance of different actors may evolve over
time as the alternatives shift.m Initially, the incumbent, former rebel or paramilitary faction may
represent the only viable option, but as demobilization takes hold, non-formerly militarized
options may strengthen, political parties may break their ties to ex-armed groups, and the state
may engage in state-building, affording a substitute source of authority. This framework enables
m Evidence from the highlands of Peru offers support for this mechanism. The population viewed the incumbent -
the state - as corrupt and abusive. Accordingly, when the rebel group, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), provided
better governance, schools, etc. the population voted the state out of power and afforded the SL their endorsement.
When Sendero later began engaging in re-education programs and restricting fiestas and liberties, their support
began to erode. This points to the potential, temporal and performance-based aspect of combatant-civilian relations.
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us to understand civilian support for highly abusive armed entities; there may be no viable or
preferred alternative. Support is relative to alternatives; it is not absolute.338
Additionally, communities are often fearful to 'vote out' or reject the only authority they
have because they do not know when the vacuum will be filled again and by whom.339 They
prefer the known, calculable risk to the unknown. Highly abusive powers can also do 'good' and
thereby win endorsement. History is littered with popular dictators and polls suggest that citizens
often prefer order and jobs to democracy and liberty. In the aftermath of long struggles, civilians
are often tired of violence and want to get on with their lives. They therefore, at times, desire
peace at the cost of justice and revenge.340 Thus, any entity able to establish negative peace
(absence of manifest violence) and economic growth may be able to reign.34 1 In sum, we should
expect communities, which perceive the ex-combatants' rule to have brought positive changes to
their neighborhoods to be more likely to look to them as accepted, and even endorsed, authority
figures.
5. Stickiness of Social Institutions - Authority
Social relations and hierarchies are not quickly dismantled. Ex-combatants are known in
the communities they patrol. They are accustomed to ruling the civilians and the civilians are
accustomed to being ruled by the illegal armed structures. Because local former fighters do not
change contexts after demobilizing, it proves more challenging for them to defect from their old
habits and modes of operating vis-d-vis their communities. The path from prince to pauper is not
338 Former rebel groups' success as political parties is often a vote against other parties rather than a votefor the
rebel-to-party. The Nepalese Maoists, Hamas, and M19 are examples of this (Interviews by author, West Bank, 20
May 2009; ICG 2008.
339 Fundaci6n Progresar analyst, interview by author, C(icuta, 30 May 2008.
340 Patrick Barron (World Bank, Aceh), interview by author, Cartagena, 6 May 2009. See also Pham et al. 2009.
341 In Colombia, for example, as the means of reparation, Colombians favor monuments to honor victims, money,
and official apologies much less than they do education, creation of jobs, and medical attention. See ICTJ 2006.
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one taken overnight. Social institutions are sticky in the short to medium term for several
reasons: silent coercion, psychological power and fear, but also because of standard operating
procedures; obedience becomes habit. These institutions may also lock-in further if the ex-
combatants can institutionalize their influence in legitimate, legal terms. As one of my subjects
explained, there is not resistance to the former militants because "they are just accepted, they are
the norm, they were the law, they imposed the rules of daily life, they resolved everything in
these municipalities. Nobody in these areas can imagine being obedient to another group because
this one was everything. "342 It follows that ex-combatants are more likely to remain powerful
figures in communities in their former zones of operation, those in which they established the
social institutions and authority hierarchies over non-combatants. In contrast, we should expect
returnee and displaced former paramilitaries to be treated as 'normal civilians' by their
communities, non-endowed with authority.
It may be the case that the longer the rule, the stickier ex-combatants' power. For
example, where an armed group has reigned for 30-40 years, whole generations grow up only
knowing illegal armed actors as authority figures. When these generations were born, there were
only militants around. When they reached forty years old, there were still only militants around
and the army and police had never set foot in their towns. Accordingly, these institutions of
authority are likely to endure even without arms.343
342 Defensoria del Pueblo analyst, interview by author, Cdcuta, May 2008.
343 Ex-combatant #2, interview by author, Comuna 3, Cicuta, 28 May 2008.
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V. Observable Implications
Local combatants who fought and sought to reintegrate in their towns of origin should
enjoy dense networks, longer shadows of the future and sticky institutions with their neighbors
who view them with mitigated levels of anger.
Returnees should operate with more muted versions of these networks and shadows of
the future - they are from the communities and thus enjoy their childhood friends and family, but
they have spent usually years fighting elsewhere. Accordingly, these bonds may have eroded.
Additionally, their deployment elsewhere renders their permanence in the community more
questionable, shrinking the expected duration of future interactions. Returnees also do not enjoy
the institutions of authority in the neighborhood in which they reside, having exercised their
coercive leverage elsewhere in the country.
Meanwhile, Squatter and Displaced combatants share thin if any ties to the communities;
uprooted, they are more transient; and, strangers to the inhabitants around them, they are
stereotyped and blamed for all paramilitary violence. These two 'types' differ in authority -
displaced combatants, as returnees, do not settle in their theater of combat and thus their
interactions with the communities are between equals, between 'normal civilians.' It should be
noted that displaced combatants are not generally 'rejected' as most civilians do not even know
they are ex-combatants; instead, communities' reactions to them are usually characterized as
indifference. If community members learn that a displaced individual is an ex-combatant, they
may stigmatize him/her, but are unlikely to resist him/her.
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Figure 10. Mechanisms of Embeddedness
Recruitment, Deployment & Migration Patterns
Local Returnee Squatter Displaced
Dense Social Networks T X X
Mechanisms Lower Anger Levels X X
Longer Shadow of Future X X
Sticky Institutions X 4 X
Retrospective Voting ? ? ?
Based on these mechanisms, I predict the following relationship between deployment and
migration decisions and post-war embeddedness (Figure 11).
H: Local and Returnee ex-combatants should experience greater levels of acceptance
and tolerance from their communities while Squatters or Displaced former fighters
should be subject to higher levels of rejection by the civilian population.
H2: Local and Squatter ex-combatants should prove more likely than their Returnee and
Displaced counterparts to enjoy power and authority roles within their communities.
Figure 11. Variation in Embeddedness
Component #1 of Embeddedness
Resistance Tolerance
Component #2 Low Levels ofAuthority Displaced Returnees
Of Embeddedness High Levels ofAuthority Squatters Locals
I further predict that:
H3 : Local ex-combatants should be strongly embedded in their communities and thus
enjoy high levels of socio-political influence, enabling them to form legitimate political
entities (civil associations or political parties) after disarming.
H4: Returnees and Squatters, meanwhile, should experience intermediate levels of
embeddedness and socio-political leverage with the latter subject to steeper decay in their
influence.
Hs: Last, Displaced should face low levels of embeddedness and influence over civilian
affairs (Figure 12).
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Figure 12. Variation in Socio-Political Influence
How do these propositions hold up against the empirical record? In this section, I present
evidence that the character of the relations between civilians and ex-combatants co-varies with
stationing and migration patterns. I draw on two types of evidence: qualitative case studies of
the three paramilitary regions and quantitative survey data that capture variation in the character
of embeddedness and socio-political mobilization across space.
VI. Embeddedness and Socio-Political Influence in Post-Conflict Contexts
Medellin's Bloque Cacique Nutibara: Deeply Embedded
The Bloque Cacique Nutibara (BCN) comprised local fighters, which never broke their
ties with their communities. I argue that these social origins and deployment patterns embedded
the BCN in the non-combatant populations of Medellin and afforded them the authority,
legitimacy, and endorsement of their communities. Figure 13 contrasts the local BCN
combatants with the non-local displaced and returnee combatants from other paramilitary
factions.
3 Returnee armed groups may join a socio-political organization comprised mostly of local combatants in their
home regions or may form their own, endogamous entities such as 'productive projects' and businesses to employ
their ex-combatants.
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Figure 13. Embeddedness
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The BCN soldiers operated and sought to reintegrate into civilian life in the
neighborhoods where their mothers, aunts, brothers, and childhood friends lived. It follows that,
if 536 demobilized resided in a neighborhood,34 s each with an average social network of six
family members and ten unique civilian friends, there existed a web of 32,160 community
members directly linked to the former fighters. This network did not reject the demobilized and
the rest of the community could not reject this group either because it was not an isolated web.
Social relations in the barrios were not quickly altered. The ex-combatants were well
known by the community - they had hung out and protected its street corners all their lives.
Therefore, their authority tended to persist without the use of manifest weaponry; the civilian
citizenry continued to obey and fear them. This enabled them to translate their power in
'illegality' to power in 'legality.' The locals knew what they were capable of and knew that they
still had the backing of a giant organization. 346 One coordinator boasted to me, "I will never lose
345 This constitutes the ex-combatant population of Comuna 1, Medellin.
346 Gersen Arias (Fundaci6n Ideas para la Paz), interview by author, Bogotd, July 2008.
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my fame in my neighborhood."3 47 With their milieus unchanged, their standard operating
procedures vis-a'-vis their communities were similarly constant.
Evidence suggests that the BCN's embeddedness further worked against the
stigmatizations and stereotypes that would have existed absent these personal social links, and
surprisingly facilitated reconciliation. The victims in Medellin's neighborhoods often knew their
perpetrators and were "friends with their perpetrators' mothers," a fact repeated to me during
several interviews. These social ties worked to mitigate emotions of anger, but left those of pain
and sadness intense.
Additionally, the communities comprised retrospective voters. Despite its use of
assassination, extortion, kidnapping, and massacres, the BCN improved the lives of a majority of
the shantytown dwellers. The BCN 'ran on a platform' of doing so and made good on this
promise. Thus, the community members offered it their support.
Prior to the BCN's reign, Medellin was characterized by well-defined neighborhoods that
survived long periods of violence during which one could not cross from one neighborhood to
the next due to the presence of powerful, community-based, armed actors.34 8 Those who crossed
the road marking the neighborhood boundaries would be killed. Turf wars between gangs were a
daily and bloody affair. For example, in Popular, "combats occurred day and night between two
gangs - La Galera and La 38 - irreconcilable enemies because one was allied with the guerrillas
and the other contracted by the paramilitaries ... Many students didn't go to class ... the gangs
were waiting and would kill based on mere suspicion." The gang Los Triana wanted to control
the blocks between the streets 124 and 125 and the avenues 49 and 50. "If one is from Avenue 49
(and thus the zone of Canada Negra) and one crosses Avenue 50, death is automatic ... We can't
347 Coordinator of Comuna 6, interview by author, Medellin, March 2008.
348 See Defensoria del Pueblo, ACNUR and EUROPEAID 2004.
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even cross to take our sick and injured to the Hospital because it would mean crossing the sector
of Los Triana."349 This one feud caused more than 70 families to abandon their homes and
displace, especially those living on the second and third floors, which the explosives tended to
hit.350
The BCN promised to end this inter-gang fighting. It also promised to end the guerrilla
militias' abuses and violence. Exploiting its powerful coercive structure, the BCN co-opted all of
the armed factions into a single umbrella organization and defeated those who refused to join.
From the marginal neighborhoods in the northern part of Medellin to those in the south, one
could observe the graffiti on the walls announcing the BCN's hegemony. "Self-Defense Groups:
You either put on camouflage or you die a civilian," read one message. Those who would not
join died.3si Thus, the Bloque Cacique Nutibara came to control 70% of Medellin, 2 a figure that
increased following several joint military/paramilitary security operations. 353 Medellin and
eastern Antioquefto came to be under the influence of a single paramilitary group - the Bloque
Cacique Nutibara.
This hegemonic control of the territory meant that violence levels dropped
significantly 35 4 (with the exception of the Comuna 13 which serves as an illuminating micro
counter-case explored below). The number of reported killings in the city fell by 47 percent in
2003 (See Figure 14).
34939Yarce 2003a.
350 Yarce 2003b.
351 Yarce 2003a.
352 This figure comes from a Colombian Intelligence Report cited in Yarce 2002a.
3 Security force operations - Operacion Mariscal and Operacidn Oridn - launched in Comunas 7 and 13 in the
centre-west of the city in 2002 ended guerrilla control in these areas and allowed the BCN paramilitaries to partially
fill the void.
35 Kalyvas 2006.
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Figure 14. Homicide Rates, Medellin 1986 - 2006
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Source: Programa Paz y Reconciliaci6n, Medellin. Homicide rate is per 1,000 inhabitants.
Residents of Popular and Santa Cruz described how this statistic was felt on the ground, "Now
the gangs are not killing each other block by block. Now, all of them work for the same 'sefor:'
the Bloque Cacique Nutibara.... You can now go all the way to Zamora because the
paramilitaries have already co-opted all of the communities [on the way] ... Now you hear
fighting only far away.355 Thus communities began to feel that they were living in peace.
In everyday terms, this 'peace' in the barrios translated into inhabitants venturing out
into the streets again, opening bakeries and markets, engaging in community service, and
attending social gatherings. It meant that development, investment, and participatory politics
returned to these areas, long-abandoned and silenced by over 20 years of violence. An older
woman in Popular described how, as the conflict diminished, her dance club and group of
female friends became her principal concerns; she could return to the worries of daily, civilian
life.356 In Manrique, a young man told me with relief how he was finally able to complete high
school; before he could not leave his house.357 "Our neighborhood has changed completely
" Yarce 2003a.
356 Civilian Woman, interview by author, Meeting of Proyecto Encuentro, Comuna 3, Medellin, 4 March 2008.
"5 Young Civilian Man, interview by author, Meeting of Proyecto Encuentro, Comuna 3, Medellin, 7 March 2008.
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because now the people are free, you can have a party in your house tranquilo," commented a
civil society leader in the neighborhood Villa Hermosa.358 A resident of Robledo added, "I see it
this way ... before it was impossible for children to go outside to play ... These parks were filled
with drug-dealers and at any hour there could be an exchange of gunfire ... Further up the hill,
narrow passages wind between the houses. Each nook guards a story of death and evokes
memories of victims. Here fell so-and-so and further down, so-and-so." 359 This changed.
As a result of the reduction in violence, the members of the Medellin shantytown
communities were happy that they could return to normal life again. Moreover, they associated
this 'peace' and contentment with the paramilitaries and, later, with their reintegration process.
Several confessed to me that the "tranquility and peace that Medellin has today is thanks to the
autodefensas"360 In a word association exercise carried out in Medellin on a random sample of
1,000 civilians with the question, "What do you think of when they hear the word
'reintegration?,"' the most frequent responses were 'peace,' 'opportunity' and 'tranquility.'
Eight-eight percent of Medellin's community members evaluated the presence of ex-combatants
in their neighborhoods as 'positive.' 361 Eighty-seven percent responded that, since the
demobilization process, their neighborhood had more peace and 84% said their neighborhood
had more security. The association of peace and happiness with the paramilitaries' presence and
reintegration, in turn, conferred to the BCN a degree of legitimacy and credibility, which led to
the relative acceptance rather than rejection of the combatants. A civil society leader admitted:
"In general the community accepts the ex-combatants because they are happy that they don't
358 Civilian Man, interview by author, Comuna 1, Medellin, 4 March 2008.
359 Castrill6n 2005.
360 Civil Society Leader, interview by author, Comuna 8, Medellin, 9 March 2008.
361 These figures are based on Organization of International Migration surveys conducted annually since 2004 on a
random sample of civilian respondents across the comunas of Medellin. In 2004, respondents totaled 451, in 2005
(n=501), 2006 (n=812), 2007 (n=1 123). See Appendix C.
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have to live in war and fear anymore."362 The BCN was known as the "great pacifier of the city."
Graffiti in one of the northeast neighborhoods announced: "Adolfo Peace [BCN's commander] is
peace in Medellin."363
This embeddedness allowed the demobilized to continue their involvement with
community activities,364 which afforded them greater acceptance and deeper social control (even
a monopoly over social activities and organization). Additionally, the civilian population
preferred the incumbent (now the BCN) to a return to armed competition: "More than the terror
due to the presence of the remains of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara structure ... is the
community's terror that another armed actor could come in."365 The BCN was conscious of this
fear. One former mid-tier commander explained to me:
If we, the demobilized, are good to the community and work with/for the
community, if a new group enters, the community is not going to support the new
group as they are not going to be looking for a way to get rid of us. If there is
harmony and we are providing the necessary social services, fiestas, and security,
the community will reject any new group that comes, but will never reject us, the
ex-autodefensas.366
Thus, as long as the reduction in violence continued, the support continued; retrospective voting
remained in effect.
Finally, given the extreme costliness of displacement, the community members and
former BCN combatants recognized that they would continue to reside in the neighborhoods for
at least the medium term, thereby extending the shadow of the future. 367 Maria, a resident of
Popular explained: "They are our neighbors, our family, if we don't give them a second chance,
362 Community member, interview by author, Barrio Carpinello, Comuna 1, Medellin, 5 March 2008.
363 Revista Semana 2005.364 Revista Semana 2004a.
365 Yarce 2003c.
366 Coordinator of the Ex-BCN Combatants, interview by author, Medellin, 2008.
367 This is based on a series of interviews conducted by the author of women in the barrios. This includes the woman
in charge of the chapel built by the paramilitaries in Comuna 1, the woman who is the cook for an ex-commander in
Comuna 6, and several female civil-society leaders and members of the JACs.
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they will return to violence. We cannot turn out backs on them." 368 Meanwhile, the ex-BCN
soldiers, conscious of their permanence in the neighborhoods, were concerned about changing
the negative stigmas they may have had in the eyes of their communities and convincing their
neighbors that they were heroes and that the violence was not for nothing. Ex-combatant Jesus,
for example, told me, "I consider myself a martyr because I sacrificed myself and saved my
country." 369 His comrade, Juan Manuel, offered, "My and other ex-autodefensas' motivations for
seeking political power are to obtain legitimacy, to show everyone that we can be normal
civilians and still important in the legality, and to change the paradigms and stereotypes that
everyone has of us as bad." 370 According to the former director of Medellin's reintegration
program, Gustavo Villegas, "The Democracy Corporation engages in community work so that
the communities will accept the ex-combatants and no longer view them as criminals." 371 Given
that most of the BCN combatants were local, they also loved their neighborhoods and wanted to
contribute to them. One ex-combatant expressed, "Even if I had the opportunity to live in El
Poblado (the wealthiest neighborhood of Medellin), I would never leave my barrio."372
While in Medellin, I visited the ex-combatants' command center of socio-political
operations in La Sierra. They showed me a model they had designed indicating how they wanted
their neighborhood to look. It included an ecological park, a community center for youth and life,
and a local government building. They could construct these models because they maintained
influence over all of these facets of civilian affairs. They gained votes, regulated economic
activities, dictated social norms, and administered local justice without community resistance. I
propose that the BCN's embeddedness in the local communities allowed them to do so. The
368 Castrill6n 2005.
369 Jesis (Ex-combatant), interview by author, Comuna 2, Medellin, February 2008.
37 Juan Manuel (Ex-combatant), interview by author, Comuna 2, Medellin, March 2008.
371 Interview by author, Medellin, February 2008.
372 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Comuna 6, Medellin, March 2008.
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community members continued to tolerate their enduring control over civilian affairs and to see
them as the authority, able and willing to take care of the neighborhoods. 373
Two measures shown in Figure 15 look at whether the ex-combatants promoted
community activities and resolved disputes. We can see that 84% of non-local combatants
considered that the best way to support the community was by being an anonymous person and a
legal individual, whereas local, ex-BCN combatants tended to instead promote community
activities and assume an active, visible, and influential role in the social and political life of the
neighborhoods in which they resided.
Figure 15. Socio-Political Influence
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Democracy Corporation: A Socio-Political Organization
The Bloque Cacique Nutibara (BCN)'s NGO reincarnation - the Democracy Corporation
- thus enjoyed hegemony of 'social work' in many of the poor neighborhoods of Medellin, and
m Herrera, interview by author, Medellin, February 2008; Male and Female Civilians, interviews by author,
Comuna 1, Medellin, 4 March 2008.
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won several local government positions (in the Community Action Committees (JAC) and the
Local Administration Boards (JAL)).
According to the president of the Democracy Corporation, Fabio Acevedo, the BCN
became "a legitimate, legal, social organization to accompany the reintegration process,
coordinate the demobilized, regain the social trust lost during the conflict, and generate social,
human, political, and economic development of the demobilized and their surroundings."374 He
went on to outline how the 78 former mid-ranking commanders, now called 'coordinators,' were
charged with a territorial zone and group of 15-37 ex-combatants in order to direct the
Corporation's franchise social organizations in the neighborhoods under their command. One of
these coordinators, Jorge Mario, specified, "My position as the social leader of the neighborhood
came directly from the military structure of the BCN in which I was the leader of the zone."375
Not surprisingly, the Corporation also enjoyed the greatest influence in the zones of the city in
which the BCN's presence during the war had been strongest and thus the institutions sticky.
"This came from the work we were doing before the demobilization, the ties we had from
before," clarified the Corporation's director.376 According to journalist Gloria Castrill6n, the
paramilitaries "fabricated the image of a Robin Hood to extend their political project."377
The Bloque Cacique Nutibara (BCN) continued to exercise its social leverage in several
ways. First, the ex-combatants resolved problems between members of the community. One
mid-ranking commander described, "Whenever there is a death in the community or a robbery,
the community members call us to deal with it or to help resolve the problem." 378 Another
34 Acevedo, interview by author, Medellin, March 2008.
375 Ex-commander of Comuna 3 and President of the Community Action Board (JAC), interview by author,
Medellin, 19 February 2008.
376 Acevedo, interview by author, Medellin, March 2008.
37 Castrill6n 2005.
378 Ex-commander of Comuna 4, interview by author, Medellin, March 2008.
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coordinator claimed, "I receive 10-15 visits from people everyday because someone is not
paying his debt, someone's husband hit her, someone's wife is cheating on him, someone is
taking over his land." 379 Civil society leaders corroborated this, "Many people continue to go to
the former combatants instead of to the police. The police does not even exist in these
neighborhoods and the citizens view it with mistrust."380 The former BCN combatants responded
to the community's complaints and imposed 'justice.' 38 1 "When there is a problem in the barrio,
the [ex-paras] arrive and help, sometimes they threaten the implicated or even beat him or put
him in the sewage holes for hours as punishment." 382 For example, a man who refused to pay his
neighbor the 300,000 pesos that he owed him was assassinated to set an example. And several
drugged boys who kidnapped a mentally disabled child were exiled from the neighborhood and
sent death threats. 383
Second, the former combatants eliminated or punished people whom they deemed
socially 'undesirable.' They established themselves as 'moral guardians.' For example, the local
ombudsman reported that the demobilized applied punishments to women they found unfaithful.
In a tragic event, they killed "a homosexual couple whom the community affirmed had been
living together for over three years." They also disciplined students who were 'behaving badly.'
Local police agents testified that parents used the ex-combatants to punish their children
physically and psychologically. 384 For instance, the police found a 12-year-old child in the sewer.
Triangulating the evidence, it became clear that his parents had asked the demobilized to put him
there as punishment for using drugs and stealing. According to civil society leaders, prostitutes
379 Ex-commander of Comuna 8, elected to the local government (JAL), then imprisoned on charges of criminal
violence in May 2008, interview by author, Medellin, 25 February 2008.
380 Community Leaders and Presidents of the local community boards (JAC), interviews by author, Sector Aures 2,
Comuna 7, March 2008.
381 Intergovernmental organization officials, interviews by author, Medellin, May 2008.
382 Young Civilian Man, interview with author, Comuna 1, Medellin, February 2008.
383 Restrepo 2005.
384 Local Police Agents, interviews by author, Medellin, March 2008.
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received similar treatment. An interview with an imprisoned former combatant revealed the
following story:
After I demobilized, there was an elderly woman with cancer living in my
neighborhood and a guy stood outside her house smoking marijuana all the time.
The woman went to the 'coordinator' and asked him to do something about it. I
was called to 'resolve the problem.' I went to the guy smoking marijuana and told
him he had to stop doing drugs there. He responded, "You can't tell me what to
do, you're not a paramilitary anymore, you're not anyone." I shot the guy. He was
with two other guys, but since they hadn't done anything, I left them alone. I was
just.385
Third, the former combatants hosted community fiestas. They threw huge, well-funded
parties in the poorest neighborhoods of Medellin in celebration of Christmas, New Year's,
Easter, Mother's Day, Halloween, and a host of other holidays. For these fiestas, they bought
presents for all the children of the neighborhood. During my visits to the shantytowns, the
members of the community showed me pictures of these parties and recounted them in detail -
the music, food, games, decorations, and costumes. For neighborhoods plagued by violence for
decades, the importance of these celebrations cannot be underestimated.
Fourth, the ex-combatants, through the Democracy Corporation's foundations, organized
and funded social clubs for the elderly and children and sponsored sports teams. They also
contributed to the marginal neighborhoods by mobilizing people to clean up the trash, plant trees
in the parks, create tourist destinations, and construct chapels. They even formed health brigades,
which linked up with the official state services to provide coverage in the marginal
neighborhoods. Additionally, the ex-BCN structure funded micro-businesses from agricultural
projects to enterprises that produced sweets, soft drinks, fast food, and shoes. Through these
businesses, they became a large, local employer.
385 Recidivist Ex-combatant (Bloque Cacique Nutibara), interview by author, Bellavista Prison, Medellin, 18 April
2008.
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Finally, with respect to formal politics, 24 ex-BCN combatants ran for the Local
Administrative Boards (JAL) in the 2007 election. Three were elected. Meanwhile, many other
former paramilitaries gained positions in their neighborhood Community Action Committees
(JAC). 386 In these political pursuits, the ex-combatants were backed by the Democracy
Corporation and ran on the paramilitary-allied Movimiento Colombia Viva party ticket. It was no
longer "sufficient [for the paramilitaries] to have political power through co-opted people, now
they want[ed] to assume it directly." 387 According to BCN commander, Giovanni Marin: "We
[the BCN] continue seeking our ideals in legality. Now we are on our way to creating a political
movement." 388
Urabai: Social and Political Leverage Preserved
I will only very briefly discuss the case of Urabi as it largely mirrors that of Medellin in
the first two to three years following demobilization. Thereafter, as discussed in Chapter 7, the
former urabefio armed organizations remilitarized and their social and political influence re-
assumed a coercive nature.
Embedded It is widely accepted that the paramilitaries were deeply embedded in the
communities of Uraba and, despite extreme levels of violence and atrocity, enjoyed tolerance by
the population that enabled them to retain leverage following the peace accords. The
autodefensas of Uraba were native to the region and highly connected to elite classes.389 Frente
386 It should be noted that the JACs have control over the neighborhood budgets.
387 Conflict analyst, interview by author, Medellin, 2008.
388 Niera 2003.
389 The paramilitaries of Urabi were implanted in the network of the state's coercive apparatus through the
commander of Colombia's 17th Army Brigade, General Rito Alejo del Rio. Frente Turbo commander, HH, testified,
"I maintained a close relationship [with the military]; between us, we frequently offered each other collaboration.
The army gave us information about the guerrillas and their members and other times, turned a blind eye before the
actions that we committed. The commander, 'Rodrigo Doble Cero' coordinated with the armed forces, he called
them by telephone and spoke with them directly." (Ever Veloza Garcia, Testimony under the Justice and Peace Law,
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Bananero commander, Raul Hazbd'n, one of the most prominent banana plantation owners in the
region, "had all the links with the bananeros, the mayors, the armed forces, etc. He managed all
the 'contacts' of the Bloque Bananero, held all the meetings with the wealthy of the area,
convincing them to come onboard." 390 Similarly, BEC commander, Alemiln, confessed during
his Justice and Peace hearings, "I knew all of the local authorities and met with all of them. I also
knew all the mayors of Urabit and participated in meetings about their 'political project."' 391
The Urabi paramilitaries were also densely linked to the campesino communities who,
according to the social architecture of the Colombian coast, followed the will and preferences of
their patrons. 392 When the Esperanzados (ex-EPL guerrillas) joined the paramilitaries, they
further conferred to the paras their broad and deep social web of banana unionists, palm, cattle
and wood workers, leftist sympathizers of the Hope, Peace, and Liberty (EPL) political party, 393
and ex-rebels and their families. 394 "The autodefensas [thus] enjoyed support from both the right
and the left of the political spectrum [rich and poor].... The autodefensas were made up of
everyone: the bananeros, the unions, the police, the army, the businesses, everyone." 395
It follows that the combatants were tied to the non-combatant population through
neighborhood, unionist, political, former guerrilla, patronage, and other networks. 85% of the
rural community members surveyed confirmed that they had no difficulties accepting the
demobilized "because they were native to those communities and/or some had belonged to the
Medellin, 26-27 November 2007). See also Human Rights Watch 2008, p. 45-47; Human Rights Watch 2004, 2007.
390 OAS-MAPP Peace Monitor, interview by author, Apartad6, July 2008.
391 Fredy Rend6n Herrera, alias 'El Alemin,' Testimony under the Justice and Peace Law, Medellin, 5 June 2007.
392 OAS-MAPP, Analysis Unit, interview by author, Bogotd, February 2008. See also Duncan 2007. The alliances
with the regional leaders (patrons) brought with them the support of the patrons' laborers, especially in the cattle
region on northern Urab6. In the southern region of the banana axis, the workers were less dependent on their
patrons as they were organized in strong unions.
39 Carolina (ACR), interview by author, Bogotd, January 2008. The EPL's political party, Esperanza Paz y Libertad
was successful politically and very popular.
394 Corporaci6n Neuvo Arco Iris 2007.
395 Beatrice, interview by author, Apartad6, July 2008.
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self-defense forces that had operated right there." 396 According to ACR director of Riosucio,
"The community members, such as professors, civil society leaders, priests, etc. have opened the
doors to the demobilized, in part because they have some familiar link with the demobilized
given that the demobilized arefrom here."397 Social relations positively correlated with
embeddedness.
Second, life, for some, improved under the paramilitaries' reign. The FARC and EPL's
intra-guerrilla bloodbath had left the social bases of both groups relatively anti-guerrilla (that of
the EPL became anti-FARC and that of the FARC anti-EPL). Additionally, the FARC and EPL's
abuses (extortion and kidnappings) against the banana owners caused much of the capital and
jobs to flee the zone, leaving the laborers without work. As a result, unemployment and
economic depression were viewed as the direct consequence of the guerrillas and the
paramilitaries became preferred to the rebel incumbents. 398 After the autodefensas gained control
of the region, it began to recover, pacify and grow. People in exile returned to the zone and the
businesses began to operate again.399 People spoke of the rebirth of Urabai and Urabi became
"the model of pacification for the rest of the country."4 00 In his confessions, paramilitary
founder, Carlos Castau-o wrote:
It was worth it to kill in Urabi some 200 civilian guerrillas and some hundred guerrillas
in uniform. Come and see! This region is awaking from a lethargy. There is [now]
employment, education, health, harmony between the employers and employees. The
unions work to save the businesses not to ruin them as happened in the past when the
guerrillas operated here. 401
And after disarmament, the non-combatant populations, fearing the guerrillas' return, continued
396 Organization of International Migration 2006c.
397 Interview by author, Riosucio, 3 July 2008.
398 Civilian, interview by author, Apartad6, 26 June 2008.
399Ex-combatants (Frente Bananero), interview by author, Caurallo, 3 July 2008. For example, in the regions of
Choc6 in which the BEC had a presence, the wood companies began to operate again and even expanded.
400 ICG Report 2003.
401 Aranguren Molina 2001.
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to look to the ex-paramilitaries for governance. Known abuses, but order, were preferred to the
unknown ones, and potential disorder. 402
Third, "the magnitude of the violence has made it so that in many communities, they
have learned to live victims and executioners in a complex process in which the status of one and
the other have not always been easy to determine because many inhabitants of the region have
been one or the other thing at the same time." 403 Despite high levels of atrocity, the victim and
victimizer lines blurred and perpetrators' membership in the communities facilitated
reconciliation. The director of the ACR in Riosucio confirms, "All the [demobilized] are in their
communities so there haven't been problems with the victims." 404
Construpaz, Superban, and the Special Services. The BEC's embeddedness permitted the
powers of paramilitarism in Urabi to survive after demobilization. 405 The ex-Bloque Elmer
Cirdenas' non-violent socio-political organization, Construpaz,406 constituted part of a 'social
plan' for Urabir to "arrive at reconciliation, to improve quality of life in the communities and to
prevent repetition, a return to war. This is our platform with the peace process." 407 Through its
programs, the demobilized combatants continued to intervene in the problems of the
communities and the protection of civilians. 408 "If someone stole something, a chicken, some
land, if someone's woman cheated on him, everyone would turn to us.... It was hard to avoid a
paternalistic relationship with the civilian population... [We were] used not just by politicians,
402 These preferences were expressed to me in several interviews with civilians in Chigorod6 and San Pedro de
Urabi, July 2008.
403 Walker 2008.
4 04 ACR Regional Director, interview by author, Riosucio, 3 July 2008.
405 Duncan 2006. See also Observatorio del Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos 2006.
406 Construpaz was also designed to form 'productive projects for peace,' projects with the paramilitaries' money
that would enable them to self-run the reintegration process. Gersen Arias (Fundaci6n Ideas para La Paz), interview
by author, Bogota, 17 July 2008.
407 See also Revista Semana 2006. In 2006, 'El Alemin' designed, in collaboration with the government, the Project
Social Alternative (PASO). Paso, meaning step, was symbolic of the transition the organization was making from
illegality to legality (Alejandro Toro, interview by author, Necocli, June 2008).
408 Organization of International Migration 2006.
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but also by the very communities to fix the school, build a road, plant seeds." 409 The BEC also
operated a series of non-governmental organizations, cooperatives, media outlets, and businesses
that survived and provided it public license to control the territory and population. The ex-
combatants of the Frente Bananero, meanwhile, formed the Association of Demobilized of Urabi.
(ASEDSUR), which had two associations: Superban and the Special Services.4 10 Superban
monitored and controlled the safety of the domestic distribution of bananas from Urabi.41
Operating on eight hour patrol shifts with 25 stations on the roads, mobile units on motorcycles,
radios and a command center to keep track of intelligence, they continued "to keep tabs on what
[was] moving" and to exercise "extensive social influence" of the banana axis.412 The local
population assured that the autodefensas' power remained "firmly intact."413 Finally, several ex-
combatants ran for office and won political positions. For example, in Necocli, Chigorod6, and
Rivalino, demobilized won the posts of council and, elsewhere, they continued to influence the
JACs and JALs, exerting a leadership role in the community governance system. I turn now to
cases populated not with local ex-combatants, but instead with displaced or squatter ones.
Comuna 13
Comuna 13 provides a fascinating, micro, counter-case within Medellin while
maximizing controls. Because of the non-local nature of the BCN fighters in Comuna 13, they
were not embedded in its communities. Because the guerrillas had such deep connections in the
409 Ex-BEC commander, interview by author, Necocli, June 2008.
4 10 ACR Regional Director, Urab6, interview by author, Apartad6, June 2008.
411 Director of Superban, interview by author, Apartad6, June 2008. Essentially, Carlos Vasquez and Raul Hasbdn
enjoyed extremely strong relations with the banana plantation owners and knew about all their "skeletons in the
closet." Accordingly, under blackmail, the bananeros agreed to a post-demobilization project that would employ the
ex-combatants (Interview by author, Aguachica, April 2008).
412 Observatorio del Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos 2006
413 Duncan 2006.
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neighborhoods, the paramilitaries' reprisals against the local population were indiscriminate.4 14
Victims were found shot with the letters AUC (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia)
inscribed on their stomachs, having been accused of being a girlfriend, friend, or family member
of an insurgent militia member.4 " Moreover, the survivors had no links with the perpetrators to
offset their anger. Conditions also never improved in these neighborhoods of Comuna 13 to the
extent they did in the rest of Medellin because the BCN was unable to achieve hegemony. As a
result, those that stayed in the zone tended to be rejected by the civilian population. "There is a
lot of resentment towards the former self-defense [paramilitary] groups here," commented the
psychologist assigned to the ex-combatants in Comuna 13.416 While the Democracy Corporation
sought to maintain social and political influence in the zone, it recognized "that its work in the
Comuna 13 has been much more difficult because of the resistance of the traditional leaders that
enjoy the support of and represent the communities and are openly against the ideas of the
paramilitary forces."417
The ex-combatants who remained in Comuna 13 kept a very low profile and tried to
disappear.4 18 Whereas in other sectors of the city, being demobilized raised one's status, in
Comuna 13, it created security problems. "In the community's minds, there is still war," 419
explained a woman in Independencia I. "I feel like I am in danger because people know I am an
ex-combatant... it would be better if no one knew," a former BCN fighter in Comuna 13
complained.42
414 Member of the Group of High Risk Youth, interview by author, Comuna 13, Medellin, 5 March 2008.
415 Yarce 2002b.
416 Programa Paz y Reconciliaci6n Psychologist, interview by author, Medellin, March 2008.
41 Conflict Analyst, interview by author, Medellin, May 2008. This was also verified by a Former Mid-Ranking
BCN Commander, interview by author, Medellin, February 2008.
418 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Barrio 20 de Julio, Comuna 13, Medellin, 5 March 2008.
419 Civilian, interview by author, Comuna 13, Medellin, March 2008.
420 Ex-BCN combatant, interview by author, El Salado, Comuna 13, Medellin, February 2008.
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The ex-combatants residing in La 13 chose to attend the required ex-combatant
psychological reintegration workshops elsewhere in the city.421 Whereas associations of
demobilized proliferated in the neighborhoods of the other Comunas, in those of Comuna 13,
there was not a single ex-combatant organization. The ex-BCN fighters did not campaign,
engage in social work, or exercise leverage over civilian affairs in their neighborhoods of
Comuna 13. Those that engaged in social activities did so only elsewhere in the city, in the
communities in which the paramilitaries were embedded.
Bloque Catatumbo
We observe a similar pattern in Norte de Santander to that of Comuna 13. The Bloque
Catatumbo (BC) fighters, for the most part, did not share social networks with the non-combatant
population. According to Will Fredo, "They did not recruit here. Only 2% of the armed group
was from Norte Santander."422 While the survey data suggests a higher estimate of local
combatants, no account puts the fraction of native soldiers at more than one-fifth. To establish
ties to the civilian population, the Bloque Catatumbo paramilitaries sought to displace the
civilian communities and then repopulate them with people from their hometowns in C6rdoba,
Uraba and other parts of the coast. However, the paras were unable to make the plantations
sufficiently productive and linked to principal markets to draw 'their people' to the zone. Thus
these repopulation efforts failed.423 The non-integrated nature of the BC combatants was
reflected in their racial character. Due to its twisted topography, Colombia is such a highly
regionalized country that different regions, even if separated by only small distances boast
421 Reintegration Psychologist for Comuna 13, interview by author, Medellin, 29 February 2008. Ex-BCN
combatants, interview by author, Comuna 13, Medellin, 6 March 2008.
422 Interview by author, Cicuta, May 2008.
423 Defensoria del Pueblo, interview by author, Cficuta, 2008.
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different accents, slang, skin color, and cultures that, to any average Colombia, make 'locals' and
non-locals' easily distinguishable. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the BC combatants were, for the
most part, tall afro-descendents from the coast. "The arrival of the paramilitaries was a shock of
cultures." 424 One ex-combatant from Norte de Santander explained, "All of the members of my
group ... were black.. .The local population had so much fear of them because they were dark
and large and intimidating." 425 The majority of the BC's members were from "outside of Norte
de Santander." 426 In 1999, the population kept repeating, "The paracos arrived" They say this
because the men were "big men and were black. They were tall, costenos [from the coast]; they
played dominos; they didn't wear shirts." This became the stereotype of the paramilitaries in
Norte de Santander and the populations retained fear of anyone who fit this description even
after the demobilization. To them, all afro-descendents were paramilitaries. An Organization of
International Migration report described the ex-combatants in Cdcuta as isolated and alone
becuase "of their cultural diversity, given that many of them are from other regions of the
country. 4 27
In addition to a lack of social ties to the civilian population, the violence perpetrated by
the Bloque Catatumbo (BC) was not viewed as justified in the eyes of the civilian population.
The communities tended to reject the ex-combatants because "they rejected the armed group to
which the ex-combatants belonged" and because "members of the community were victims of
the demobilized fighters." 428 Without social bonds to provide informational short-cuts about the
perpetrating combatants' motivations and human characters, desires for punishment remained
high. Without reliable data on the victimizers, anger clouded and distorted the victims' beliefs
424 Director, Fundaci6n Progresar, interview by author, Cicuta, 9 June 2008.
425 Security guard of BC commander, interview by author, Cflcuta Prison, May 2008.
426 Ex-BC combatant, interview by author, Comuna 6, Cficuta, 3 June 2008.
427 Organization of International Migration 2005.
428 Comprehensive Survey of Ex-combatants' Psychologists. See Appendix C.
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about the past. The victims thus stereotyped and engaged in punitive behavior against the entire
population of ex-combatants not just their individual perpetrators, blaming not the situations that
led to the acts of violence, but the entire group of executioners. 429 They became "intuitive
prosecutors." 430 As a result, Norte de Santander witnessed the deaths of several ex-combatants,
murdered in revenge by victims' families. Other former fighters were assassinated by hired
hitmen.43 1 Any act of violence was immediately blamed on the former combatants irrespective of
their involvement. These emotions and resultant actions obstructed reconciliation and generated
the relative rejection of the ex-combatants. The psychologists, who possessed an intimate
window into the ex-combatants' reintegration, explained that the communities felt anger and
then indifference. They stigmatized and discriminated against the ex-combatants.
Furthermore, the BC excombatants were less likely to remain in the Venezuelan border
zone for the long term, a fact recognized by the civilian communities. According to Will Fredo,
director of Fundaci6n Progresar, "The paras never came with the intention of staying here in
Norte de Santander so they didn't create social bases and didn't really infiltrate the
institutions." 432 Many I interviewed had already moved six times because "we know we have
enemies." 433 The Organization of International Migration found that ex-combatants in Norte de
Santander change residences "constantly." 434 These migration patterns reduced the shadow of the
future and thus levels of tolerance between the non-combatant population and demobilized BC
militants. It also produced incentives for the population to try to drive the ex-fighters from the
429 For studies of these emotional mechanisms, see Keltner, Ellsworth and Edwards 1993; Bodenhausen, Sheperd
and Kramer 1994. Lemer and Keltner 2000.
430 Goldberg, Lerner and Tetlock 1999.
41 Fundaci6n Progresar analyst, interview by author, Cicuta, 30 May 2008.
432 Director, Fundaci6n Progresar, interview by author, Cdicuta, 9 June 2008.
433 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Cficuta, 2008.
434 Organization of International Migration 2005.
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zone; already uprooted by their deployments, these ex-fighters' displacement thresholds were
significantly lower than those of combatants native to their war theaters.
Despite the relative rejection of the former combatants, a residual part of their power
nonetheless remained. This enabled them to continue to exercise control through the "stickiness"
of social institutions. This type of control, however, unbolstered by endorsement, was quick to
erode. In the short term, immediately after demobilization, civilians obeyed the former fighters
as they would conquerers or occupiers. The population was the "social base of the paramilitaries
only due to fear and pressure." 435 In the medium run, these social relations mutated. One BC ex-
combatant described, "When we first demobilized, I would keep threatening people, saying you
should give me food, respect me because do you know who I am? But slowly, I have stopped
doing that." 436 The communities in Norte de Santander began to come forward and to point
fingers about who did what during the war. The civilian population became the best source of
information on any illegal activity. They mobilized against the presence of the demobilized.
According to the reintegration psychologists, they did not collaborate with or support the ex-
combatants; they "very often" did not allow the ex-combatants to participate in organizations or
associations and "very often" did not permit them to engage in economic activities (establishing
businesses or buying land or cattle).43 7 "The populations did not view the ex-paras as counsel for
advice, leadership, or dispute resolution though individuals did, at times, use them to resolve
their personal vendettas." 438
Not embedded, the ex-BC fighters did not congregate in public, did not run for office,
did not participate in community work or political activities and did not maintain influence over
43 Defensoria del Pueblo, interview by author, Caicuta, 2008.
436 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Puerto Santander, May 2009.
437 Comprehensive Survey of Ex-combatants' Psychologists. See Appendix C.
438 Fundaci6n Progresar analyst, interview by author, Cdcuta, 30 May 2008.
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civilian affairs in their communities. 439 The communities resisted such influence and denounced
it to the police. In contrast to Medellin, in Norte de Santander, there was not a single ex-
combatant, socio-political entity. The former paramilitaries sought to avoid engaging with their
neighborhoods. "They feared social rejection." "They feared the public exposure of community
activities... and being recognized" and "showing their identities." 440 Divorced from their
communities, ex-combatants in Norte de Santander remained hidden to protect themselves. 44 1 As
a result, "there [were] no organizations of the demobilized ... nothing." The Bloque Catatumbo
(BC) lost its social, economic, political, and military influence.442
Quantitative Analysis
If the framework is correct, we should observe deployment patterns significantly
impacting ex-combatants' relationships with and leverage over civilian communities. I engage in
several quantitative tests of the logic proposed in this chapter. I seek to test both the relationships
between deployment patterns and embeddedness and between embeddedness and socio-political
influence. To recall the model's hypotheses:
HI: We should expect Local and Returnee ex-combatants to experience greater levels of
acceptance and tolerance from their communities while Squatters or Displaced former fighters
should be subject to higher levels of rejection by the civilian population.
H2 : Local and Squatter ex-militants should prove more likely than their Returnee and
Displaced counterparts to enjoy power and authority roles in their communities.
439 They did not form political groups or parties, groups of community development or community action boards.
They were not part of NGOs that engaged in political activities, did not engage in any electoral political activities -
campaigns, threats, running of candidates, joining political parties, intimidating voters, nothing (Comprehensive
Survey of Ex-Combatants' Psychologists. See Appendix C).
440 Fundaci6n Progresar analyst, interview by author, Cicuta, 30 May 2008.
441 Defensoria del Pueblo, Early Alert System, interview by author, Cncuta, May 2008.
442 Fundaci6n Progresar analysts, Cn~cuta, 29 and 30 May 2008.
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In order to evaluate the effect of soldiers' stationing on embeddedness, I assess the following
model:
Embedded = a + f3Deployment + P2Loot + P3Abuse + 3Leader +Eo
Measuring Deployment. For over 22,500 ex-combatants, I determine a) if they operated
in their town of origin (Operated Where From); b) if they resided in the zone in which they
fought after disarming (In Zone) and c) if, post-demobilization, they lived in their hometown (At
Home). Combining this information, I code the ex-combatants as described above: Local if they
were recruited, deployed, and remained in their town of origin (Operated Where From=1 and In
Zone=1 and At Home= 1); Returnee if they deployed to another region, but returned to their
hometown post-war (Operated Where From=O and In Zone=O and At Home= 1); Squatter if they
were stationed away from home and remained in their combat zone after demobilizing (Operated
Where From=0 and In Zone=1 and At Home=O); and finally Displaced if either they deployed
locally, but then left the zone post-war (Operated Where From=1 and In Zone=0 and At
Home=O) or were stationed far from home and neither returned to their town of origin nor
squatted in their war theaters (i.e. they moved to a third zone) (Operated Where From=0 and In
Zone=O and At Home=O).
Measuring Embeddedness To capture the tolerance versus resistance aspect of
embeddedness, I generate indices of several measures of civilian communities' perceptions of
the combatants. Respondents (civilians, psychologists, and ex-paramilitaries) were asked if and
how the non-combatant communities accept, tolerate and endorse or reject and resist the fighters
(see below for exact question wording). To assess if non-combatants look to the militarized unit
as the local power, I use responses to survey questions about the leadership role and authority of
former fighters in their communities.
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Socio-Political Influence and Organization I predict that H: Local ex-combatants should
be deeply entrenched in their communities, enabling them to form legitimate political entities
post-war. H4: Returnees and Squatters, meanwhile, should experience intermediate levels of
embeddedness and socio-political leverage with the latter subject to a steeper erosion in their
influence. Last, H5 : Displaced fighters should face low levels of embeddedness and influence
over civilian affairs. These hypotheses should also apply at the armed organization-community
dyad unit of analysis. To evaluate the effect of embeddedness on social and political leverage, I
estimate a model in which the dependent variable, SocPol Orgn, captures the degree to which
organization o in municipality m has retained influence over civilian affairs.
SocioPol = a + PfEmbedded + P2Loot + f3Abuse + f, Leader + E,
If my theory is correct, embeddedness should associate with higher levels of socio-
political influence. The formal test of the impact of embeddedness is: H0 : #1 >0.
Measuring 'Socio-Political Entity. 'To assess if an armed structure has transformed into a
socio-political entity, I create a weighted index of ten measures of ex-combatants' influence over
civilian affairs: if they run for office, regulate economic activities, dictate social norms,
administer local justice, participate in community development, and form socio-political
associations (see Appendix). I then take the averages of the index SocPol Orgn at the bloc-
municipality level. I also measure socio-political influence as a dummy variable based on the
diverse sources of data outlined in Chapter 3. I evaluate the theory's key variable - deployment -
against the strongest alternatives: resources, abuse, and leadership.
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Alternative Theories
Resources and Abuse. Resource richness and high levels of abusiveness should correlate
with lower levels of embeddedness and socio-political influence: H1 : #2 4O and H2 : j3 < 0. In
the models, I include measures of paramilitaries' access to economic endowments (Loot) and
violence against civilians during the war (Abuse) and check for multicollinearity between the two
variables. I use Loot proxies described in Chapter 5 and employ violent event data to measure
Abuse as the number of civilian casualties committed by paramilitaries per municipality from
1990-2003.443
Leaders. We should expect organizations led by politically-motivated commanders to
face a greater likelihood of sustaining socio-political influence post-war. I thus control for
leaders' preferences and ideological beliefs. To capture these, I rely on the coding of experts
from the OAS Peace Mission, Colombian High Commission for Peace, and Organization of
International Migration who were present at the peace negotiations and have an intimate
understanding of the paramilitary commanders' personalities and goals. They code the
paramilitary leadership in a trichotomous fashion: pure narco (economically driven), pure self-
defense (politically driven), or a mix of the two. I crosscheck this information with the leaders'
former membership in the Medellin and Cali drug cartels in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Results
Civilian-Combatant relations are complex and to capture them requires a triangulation of
different lenses and perspectives. I assess the explanatory weight of the model using data from
ex-combatants, civilian communities, and third-party observers. Combined, the tests offer
443 I am grateful to Fabio Sinchez of CEDE, Universidad de los Andes for sharing this data with me.
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validity to the theory as they rely on viewpoints that are all biased, but biased in different ways.
We should expect ex-combatants' responses about how they are viewed by their communities to
be subject to 'social desirability' bias; everyone wishes to be well-regarded and respected by
those around them. This bias should be uniformly distributed across the sample and, if subjects
respond to the contrary - expressing negative images of themselves in the eyes of their neighbors
- these responses should be taken seriously.
Meanwhile, community members' answers may be subject to fear of disclosure effects.
Despite the OIM enumerators' great efforts to protect the respondents' identities, the community
members nonetheless may have feared repercussions for expressing negative opinions of the
former armed persons. Fear may have been more intense in places in which the ex-combatants
still enjoyed power, thus conflating the concepts of authority and acceptance and potentially
inflating the measures of the latter form of embeddedness. The results may therefore suggest that
civilians tolerate ex-combatant rule where they, in fact, only fear it. Analyzing the two indexes
(power and acceptance) separately partially resolves this problem, but these biases should be
kept in mind as we review the results. Another type of bias in the community survey derives
from the timing of its enumeration. In some cases, it was executed months or a year after the
demobilization of the paramilitaries. Remilitarization and wars that ensued in the aftermath of
the peace process in certain regions very likely damaged the communities' view of the
paramilitaries irrespective of their sentiments at the moment of the peace accords.
The third source of data on combatant-civilian relations is the tutores, the psychologists
charged with providing the ex-combatants, their families, and communities the reintegration
benefits. They met weekly with the demobilized paramilitaries, visited their homes, observed
them at community events, met with their associations, and lived in their towns. They therefore
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provided a valuable view of the dynamics between former militants and civilian populations. As
outlined in more detail in Appendix C, the tutores' responses to the survey were anonymous in
order to address potential sources of bias: namely employment desirability bias and fear of
retribution bias. Their anonymous responses were deemed significantly more open and honest
than those elicited through interviews in which their identities were revealed. I turn now to the
results.
Ex-Combatants' Perceptions of their Relations with Civilians
I evaluate the model first by using data on ex-combatants' own perceptions of their
relationships with the civilian communities and involvement in socio-political affairs. This
section thus uses the individual ex-combatant as the unit of analysis (n=22,500).
Consistent with the hypotheses, I find Local and Squatter ex-combatants 40% more
likely than Returnees and Squatters to be viewed in their communities as protectors. This result
holds when I control for Abuse, Loot, and Leadership (Table 6).
Table 6. Logit Analyses of Determinants of Embeddedness: Authority
(Ex-Combatants' Perspective)
(1) (1)
Variables Authority Model Authority Model
Locals & Squatters 0.304*** 0.363***
(0.0893) (0.0993)
Loot -0.634***
(0.0987)
Leadership 0.157
(0.0973)
Abuse -0.000196*
(0.000113)
Constant 1.710*** 1.914***
(0.0579) (0.0790)
Observations 4381 4146
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Loot has a negative impact on embeddedness in this model. Presence of loot makes ex-
combatants half as likely to be perceived as authority figures in their communities. Abuse is
marginally significant, but not substantively so.
Consistent with the theory's predictions, I found Displaced ex-combatants to be
significantly more likely to believe that they are viewed in their communities as "normal,
ordinary civilians" (See Table 7). These uprooted former fighters, living neither in their home
towns nor combat zones, are 42% more likely to disappear into civilian life than Local, Returnee,
and Squatter former fighters, a result robust when controlling for armed group characteristics. In
contrast, local paramilitaries prove especially willing to have their ex-combatant status be
recognized by their communities.
Table 7. Logit Analyses of Determinants of Disappearing into Civilian Life
Variables "Normal Civilian" Model
Displaced Combatants 0.0207***
(0.00577)
Constant 0.933***
(0.00309)
Observations 8369
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The data further offers support to the hypothesis that Local and Returnee ex-combatants
should be more likely than their Squatter and Displaced counterparts to believe that their
communities endorse or accept them and do not reject them (Table 8, Models 1-3). Model 4
compares Squatters, the most likely to face rejection, with the other ex-combatants (grouping
together Local, Returnees, and Displaced).
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Table 8. OLS Analyses of Determinants of Embeddedness: Tolerance
(Ex-Combatants' Perspective)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Tolerance Tolerance Tolerance Tolerance
Model Model Model Model
Locals & Returnees 0.0823*** 0. 116***
(0.0151) (0.0148)
Squatters -0.261*** -0.273***
(0.0197) (0.0191)
Loot -0.245*** -0.218***
(0.0164) (0.0164)
Abuse -0.000430*** -0.000424***
(7.79e-06) (7.76e-06)
Leadership -0.353*** -0.335***
(0.0155) (0.0154)
Constant 0.925*** 1.372*** 1.018*** 1.469***
(0.0115) (0.0162) (0.00819) (0.0140)
Observations 22414 21189 22414 21189
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
According to the theory, embeddedness should also be associated with lower levels of
anger among victims of paramilitary violence and higher levels of reconciliation between victims
and perpetrators. The surveys of ex-combatants and non-combatant communities enable me to
evaluate this micro-dynamic. Consistent with the prediction, I find embedded ex-combatants
significantly more likely to believe in transitional justice, recognition of the harm done to
victims, and symbolic and material reparations. 444
Socio-Political Influence
Embeddedness also proves highly and significantly correlated with socio-political
influence and organization in both statistical and substantive ways (Table 9). A one unit increase
in ex-combatants' (0 to 3) embeddedness index renders the former fighters three times more
likely to be part of community associations (political groups, local governments, or community
444 See Zukerman Daly 2009 for a discussion of perpetrators' transitional justice.
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development entities) and four times more likely to belong to ex-combatant socio-political
organizations.
Table 9. Logit Analysis of Determinants of Socio-Political Organizations
(Ex-Combatants' Responses)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Socio-Pol Orgn. Socio-Pol Orgn. Socio-Pol Orgn. Orgn. Membership
Embeddedness Index 1.266*** 1.334*** 1.366*** 1.033***
(0.0265) (0.0315) (0.0321) (0.0378)
Abuse -0.000749*** -0.000699*** 0.000964***
(8.52e-05) (8.26e-05) (2.36e-05)
Political -0.320*** -0.292*** -0.338***
Leadership/Ideology
(0.0466) (0.0467) (0.0432)
Loot 0.130*** -0.354***
(0.0478) (0.0492)
Drugs -0.000112*
(6.33e-05)
Oil 0.614***
(0.0595)
Constant -3.410*** -3.339*** -3.438*** -2.126***
(0.0338) (0.0570) (0.0552) (0.0613)
Observations 36692 29154 29154 13935
Pseudo R-Squared 0.1164 0.1620 0.1678 0.1446
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Abuse's effect is in the expected direction. Ex-combatants living in regions in which the
paramilitaries carried out greater levels of violence prove less likely to seek membership in
socio-political and community associations, though the substantive effect is not large. Loot's
effect, meanwhile, points in opposite directions. The presence of drugs is negatively, though not
highly, correlated with socio-political organizing while that of oil is positively associated, nearly
doubling the probability of association membership. This finding underscores the need to
disaggregate 'resources' and their varying impacts on armed organizations' relationships with
non-combatants. If an armed organization extracts its wealth by extorting petroleum resources
(oil fields, pipelines, refineries), then its business model is parasitic on multinational
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corporations and on the wealthy. Under this financing scheme, the group targets the upper-class
with violence and avoids alienating the lower classes. If the armed group instead depends
principally on high-value illicit goods such as cocaine, heroine, and gems, it enters into a
different relationship with the local citizenry. But this relationship depends on what point in the
production chain the armed group exploits. If operating in the drug-growing or mineral-rich
areas, the armed group must employ the civilian population. Accordingly, in these regions armed
organizations form symbiotic bonds with the local populace. In exchange for protecting and
enhancing the local communities' source of livelihood, the armed groups gain legitimacy and
political capital (Felbab-Brown 2005). In contrast, in areas with laboratories to transform coca
leaves into the drug, cocaine, armed groups require little labor, protect only limited geographic
areas and put a premium on non-denunciation to the government. Therefore, they may employ
rings of security and informants within the civilian population, but their work forces and thus
presumably their support bases will be relatively small. A similar analysis could be performed
for each type of resource and each point in the production chain of said resource and would
likely yield interesting hypotheses. The effect of loot on post-war socio-political leverage
requires more nuanced theorizing.
Interesting, and in stark contrast to Weinstein 2006, I find a negative and significant
correlation between resources and abuse; specifically, organizations with access to drug and oil
endowments were likely to inflict lower levels of violence upon civilians than resource-poor
armed groups. Resource endowments do not seem to generate a "total disregard for the interests
of the civilian population ... looting, destruction, and the use of indiscriminate force."445 The
separation of the two hypotheses of abuse and loot is thus merited.
445 Weinstein 2006; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008.
184
Last, the data indicates that belonging to more political or ideological paramilitary
factions decreases by 25% ex-combatants' odds of participating in social and political
organizations after disarming. Criminality and politics often complement each other more than
they clash.
Armed Organization - Community Dyads
I next evaluate the proposed logic using the organization-community dyad as the unit of
analysis. To do so, I average the embeddedness index to this level and calculate the fraction of
each paramilitary-municipality dyad's combatants that are local, returnee, squatter, or
displaced.446 The data, as shown in Table 10, suggests that organizations comprising ex-
combatants native to the communities are more likely to be tolerated and endorsed by those
communities than are ones with a majority of non-local members. Armed groups composed of
mostly local fighters are also more likely to form socio-political associations in their
communities after disarming. These models do not, however, account for a large share of the
variation, as demonstrated by the low R-squared values. Again, the negative and significant
finding of Abuse's impact holds. Loot (cocaine) has no significant effect.
446 The paramilitary-municipality dyads constitute each municipality m in which paramilitary organization o
operated. Thus, if the Bloque Cundinamarca operated in Yacopi, Pacho, and Utica among other places, its
paramilitary-municipalities would include 1) Bloque Cundinamarca - Yacopi; 2) Bloque Cundinamarca - Pacho; 3)
Bloque Cundinamarca - Utica. I then calculate the fraction of the ex-Bloque Cundinamarca fighters living in
Yacopi, for instance, that were from there, operated there, and returned there, etc.
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Table 10. OLS Analysis of Armed Organization-Community Dyads
(Ex-Combatants' Responses)
(1) (2)
Variables Tolerance Index Ex-Combatant Socio-Political
Association
Fraction of Local & 0.325** 0.0522***
Returnee Ex-Combatants (0.126) (0.0182)
Coca -5.88e-05 -3.39e-06
(3.65e-05) (5.25e-06)
Poppy -0.00248* -0.000150
(0.00143) (0.000205)
Gems -0.981 -0.0755
(0.914) (0.131)
Abuse -0.000376** -3.19e-05
(0.000190) (2.74e-05)
Constant 0.762*** 0.0372***
(0.0755) (0.0109)
Observations 524 524
R-squared 0.035 0.022
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Communities' Perceptions of Ex-Combatants
For the final set of analyses of embeddedness and socio-political mobilization, I use the
community as the unit of analysis and exploit the psychologist and civilian surveys. The civilians
and tutores were asked about the ex-combatants in their communities in general without
specifying to which former paramilitary faction they belonged. The responses therefore do not,
for example, differentiate the communities' sentiments towards displaced versus local former
fighters.447 It follows that, in order to assess communities' views towards differently deployed
ex-combatants, I must compare communities in which local combatants make up a majority of
the ex-combatant population with communities populated with non-local fighters. As a proxy for
this, I use the proportion of the ex-combatant population that is local - from, fought, and
demobilized in the community.
4 For example, in the aftermath of war, Turbo was home to ex-members of 23 different paramilitary brigades.
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The results suggest that communities populated with local former militarized persons are
more likely to tolerate the ex-combatants than those in which the majority of the demobilized
population is non-local (displaced or squatters). Specifically, communities faced with an
indigenous ex-fighter population are 2.16 times more likely to view the presence of this
population as positive whereas civilians living in neighborhoods containing substantial numbers
of squatter ex-combatants are eight times more likely to have difficulty accepting the
demobilized paramilitaries.
When I include in the model a proxy for the mechanism, retrospective voting, the data
further confirms that respondents who perceive improvement in their communities since
demobilization (more security, order, peace, and community activities) are nearly three times
more likely to accept the ex-combatants (Table 11).
Table 11. Logit Analysis of Community's Acceptance of Ex-Combatants
(Civilian Responses)
Variables Acceptance Model
Retrospective Voting 1.098***
(0.0795)
Fraction of Local & Returnee 0.693**
Ex-Combatants (0.295)
Abuse -4.04e-05
(2.55e-05)
Constant -0.554***
(0.185)
Observations 4381
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Affirming the social networks mechanism, civilians who reside in communities with
large proportions of local and returnee ex-combatants prove eight times more likely to interact
with the former fighters than communities with lower proportions of local demobilized fighters.
Additionally, and unsurprisingly, the individual, ex-combatant survey data in Table 12 indicates
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that returnees and locals have a 73% higher odds of feeling part of their communities than do
their counterparts who are either 'displaced' or remain living in their combat zones.
Table 12. Logit Analysis of Ex-Combatants' Sense of Community Belonging
(Ex-Combatant Responses)
(1)
Variables Community Belonging
Locals & Returnees 0.546***
(0.0762)
Constant 2.071***
(0.0524)
Observations 8818
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%
Given the survey's over-representation of respondents from Medellin (see Appendix C)
and the difficulty of distinguishing between the communities' views of different 'types' of
former combatants (local, returnee, etc), these results are only suggestive, rather than conclusive.
Future analysis will disaggregate the Medellin survey results in order to compare across
neighborhoods populated with different configurations of demobilized paramilitaries.
Psychologists' Perceptions of Combatant-Civilian Relations
The psychologists or tutores' survey provides better coverage. All of the former
combatants in the program were assigned to a tutor and all of the psychologists responded to the
survey. The psychologists' responses are, however, also at the level of the community rather than
at that of the deployment and migration configuration (local or not). I average the psychologists'
responses to the municipality level and then examine the effect of different stationing strategies
on combatants' embeddedness and socio-political influence.
Consistent with the results reported above, I find that communities populated with local
and returnee combatants were significantly more likely, in both a substantive and statistical
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sense, to tolerate the former fighters (Table 13). This result is robust to different specifications of
the index and when I control for loot, leadership and abuse. The alternative explanations do not
hold up to scrutiny. Contrary to these theories' predictions, loot has no effect and abuse
marginally increases tolerance, but the impact is not significant across models.
As predicted by the theory, we observe communities in which the ex-combatants are
highly embedded 2.23 times more likely to witness the successful creation of ex-combatant
socio-political associations than those populated by non-embedded, demobilized populations
(Table 14).
Table 13. OLS Determinants of Embeddedness: Tolerance
(Psychologists' Perspectives)
(1) (2)
Variables Tolerance Index Tolerance Index
Fraction of Local & Returnee 2.561*** 3.083***
Ex-Combatants (0.706) (0.801)
Coca -0.000162
(0.000378)
Poppy -0.0151
(0.0129)
Gems 0
(0)
Oil -0.116
(0.367)
Abuse 0.000743*
(0.000416)
Constant 1.022** 0.676
(0.426) (0.492)
Observations 89 81
R-squared 0.131 0.209
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 14. Logit Analyses of Determinants of Socio-Political Organizations
(Psychologists' Perspective)
(1) (2)
Variables Socio-Political Socio-Political Organization
Organization
Embeddedness 0.801** 0.802**
(0.323) (0.378)
Coca -0.000753
(0.00267)
Oil -0.829
(1.187)
Abuse 0.000971
(0.000957)
Constant -4.493*** -4.511***
(1.177) (1.354)
Observations 89 81
R-squared 0.1305 0.1898
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
VII. Conclusion
This chapter took on the Campaigns post-war trajectory of demilitarizing paramilitary
groups. To do so, it opened up the 'black-box' of combatant-civilian relations and proposed a
theory of when, why and how former illegal armies are able to retain organized influence over
their communities without the manifest use of arms. A subsequent analytic step will be to
determine what form this influence assumes; when will former rebel and paramilitary groups
become political parties versus informal socio-political entities? 448 To explain this variation, I
believe it necessary to map political institutions (proportional representation, district size,
viability threshold, and decentralization) atop geographic variation in deployment strategies and
thus embeddedness.449 The exercise will likely generate meaningful and exciting predictions
about post-war politics.
448 While practitioners recognize the prevalence of corruption, bribery, and informal politics during wars, the post-
war literature ignores these perverse forces or expects them to end with the ceasefire. It thus focuses exclusively on
power-sharing arrangements.
449 Supporters cast their votes. However, the political institutions (the voting system; district structure; electoral
formula; and degree of decentralization) determine how the votes are counted and thus the rebel-turned political
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The next chapter explores the Guns outcome. It asks, when and why do demobilized
organizations reactivate in a coercive fashion in the aftermath of peace processes and return to
violence?
Variables and Survey Questions
Variables Component Survey Questions
Index of Socio-Political [Survey of Ex-combatants]
Organization and Influence * Have you participated in community activities?
Yes / No
* Are you a member of any of the following associations or
organizations?
Legal political group or party / Union / Local government /
Community development group / Sports group / Cultural association /
Other
* Who makes up a majority of the members of the organization(s) to
which you belong?
Former comrades from my armed group / People who didn't belong
to an armed group / A mix of former comrades and people who didn't
belong to an armed group
* How do you contribute to the wellbeing ofyour community?
Remain in legality / Promote community activities / Resolve
problems in my neighborhood / Other
* When there is a problem in your neighborhood, what do you do?
Try to resolve the problem / Seek the help of the authorities / Resolve
it in an authoritarian fashion / Become violent / Do not intervene
[Comprehensive Survey of Psychologists]:
* Has the paramilitary structure continued to exist after the
demobilization as a social organization or political group?
Yes / No
party's probability of achieving a certain share of seats. It may also be relevant to evaluate if the former armed
group's interests are represented by an existing party on the ideological spectrum. If so, the group may prove less
likely to create a political party and more likely to form a civic association. Guiqueta 2007 predicts that status-quo
actors will be less likely to successfully form political parties. Gisselquist 2006 posits that new parties emerge if
there exists a salient cleavage unexploited by existing parties. And Downes 1957 argues that new political entrants
prove likely if a shift occurs in the distribution of the population's ideological preferences and established parties
cannot adjust quickly enough.
191
*In what type ofpolitical activities do the ex-combatants participate?
They are members of a political party / They vote / They are
candidates in political elections / They participate in campaigns for a
party or candidate / They participate in campaigns against a party or
candidate / They intimidate the population so that it supports a party
or candidate / They are part of an NGO that engages in political
activities / They threaten or bribe public officials / They receive
money or favors from public officials
Index of Embeddedness - [Survey of Ex-Combatants]
Acceptance Index * Have you received any demonstration of acceptance by the
community?
Community members greet you on the street / Community members
have extended you some kind of invitation / Community members
have offered you help / You are part of a community group
* In general, how do the members ofyour community or
neighborhood feel about you?
Appreciation / Contempt / Trust / Fear / Mistrust / Gratitude /
Resentment / Acceptance / Rejection / Indifference
[Comprehensive Survey of Psychologists]
* Were the paramilitary groups accepted or rejected by the
community before the demobilization process?
Everyone supported them / A majority supported them / Few
supported them / No one supported them
* How does the community feel about the former combatants who live
in the community or municipality?
Respect / Appreciation / Fear / Gratitude / Anger / Hatred /
Indifference
*In general, do the members of the community collaborate or support
the ex-combatants?
Yes / No
* How does the community support or collaborate with the ex-
combatants
Provides food / Provides housing / Provides money / Participates in
activities with the ex-combatants / Gives jobs to the ex-combatants
* In general do the members of the community reject the ex-
combatants?
Yes / No
* What are the more common expressions ofrejection?
Insults / Public demonstrations / Graffiti / Threats from the
community / They do not speak with the ex-combatants
/ They do not give work to the ex-combatants
*With what frequency does the community not allow the ex-
combatants to participate in organizations or associations?
Frequently / Sometimes / Rarely / Never
* With what frequency does the community not allow the demobilized
to undertake economic activities (establish businesses, buy land, buy
cattle, etc)
Frequently / Sometimes / Rarely / Never
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[Survey of Civilian Community Members]
* In general, how do you evaluate the presence of the ex-combatants
in your neighborhood or municipality?
Positive / Negative / Everything has remained the same
* Do you or others in the community have difficulties accepting the
demobilized?
Yes / No
Index of Embeddedness - [Survey of Ex-Combatants]
Authority Index *How do you think you are seen in your neighborhood?
a. As a protector / As an aggressor / Neither
b. As a positive leader / As a negative leader/ Neither
[Survey of Civilian Community Members]
* How does the community perceive the ex-combatants?
a. As a protector / As an aggressor / Neither
b. With trust / With fear / Neither
c. As a positive leader / As a negative leader / Neither
d. With gratitude / With resentment / Neither
e. Other
[Comprehensive Survey of Psychologists]:
* If someone wanted to make a public investment in the community,
whom would s/he contact?
Local Authorities (mayor, council, other) / Priest / Ex-Commander of
the armed group / Demobilized combatants / A guerrilla group / a
dissident paramilitary group / An emerging criminal gang / A local
gang / Other
* If someone needed help finding ajob, to whom would s/he turn
Local Authorities (mayor, council, other) / Priest / Ex-Commander of
the armed group / Demobilized combatants / A guerrilla group / a
dissident paramilitary group / An emerging criminal gang / A local
gang / Other
* If someone had a problem of intra-familial violence, to whom would
s/he present the complaint?
Local Authorities (mayor, council, other) / Priest / Ex-Commander of
the armed group / Demobilized combatants / A guerrilla group / a
dissident paramilitary group / An emerging criminal gang / A local
gang / Other
* If someone were a victim of a robbery, to whom would s/he turn?
Local Authorities (mayor, council, other) / Priest / Ex-Commander of
the armed group / Demobilized combatants / A guerrilla group / a
dissident paramilitary group / An emerging criminal gang / A local
gang / Other
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Community-Combatant Ties [Survey of Ex-combatants]
* Do you feel a sense of belonging to your community?
Yes / No
[Survey of Civilian Community Members]
* How often do you interact with the ex-combatants
Once or more per week / Once or more per month / Once or more
every six months
Retrospective Voting [Survey of Civilian Community Members]
*Since the demobilization, in your neighborhood, is there
a. Peace: Yes / No / Remains the same
b. Order: Yes / No / Remains the same
c. Security: Yes / No / Remains the same
d. Community Activities: Yes / No / Remains the same
e. Other
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Chapter 7
Guns
I. Introduction
49% of civil wars, which ended between 1945-1999, erupted in subsequent war; 51%
consolidated peace.4 5 0 This variation is reflected at the organizational level as countries do not
transition to peace or re-wage war; organizations do. The Bloque Cacique Nutibara retained a
latent facility for violence for several years, but over time fully demilitarized, contributing to
state capacity. In contrast, Urabi's paramilitaries remilitarized full-scale armies a year and a half
after they signed peace accords with the government. This chapter explores war recurrence,
investigating whether variation in remilitarization can be explained by examining differences in
armed organizations' recruitment, deployment, and post-war migration patterns. I find that, as
result of these patterns, demobilization either preserves demilitarizing groups' relative strength
and thus cements the peace regime or it exerts differential effects on ex-armed groups' collective
capabilities. In this latter case, it changes the distribution of power within the system and
generates high levels of uncertainty as to the extent to which it has done so. In so doing,
demobilization alters the parameters underpinning the peace bargains between the state and each
former armed group and between each former armed group dyad. It creates noise and mutual
optimism around the new estimates of relative power, rendering bargaining difficult and war
likely.
The chapter divides into four sections. In the first, I generate a theory that links
recruitment, deployment, and migration patterns with variation in remilitarization. I then contrast
the observable implications of this model with hypotheses that derive from several other theories,
which focus on natural resources, commitment problems, and war onset variables. In the third
450 41 of the 83 wars that ended between 1945-1999.
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section, I present evidence on the processes of remilitarization and demilitarization 'in practice'
in the three paramilitary case studies. I show how my model focusing on changes in relative
power has greater leverage on the observed variation in war recurrence across time and space
than do existing approaches. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of a forthcoming quantitative
test of the theory. The subsequent chapter - Chapter 8 - uses violent event data on the emergence
of rebellion in Colombia 1964-1984 to evaluate the project's remilitarization logic against the
dominant accounts of civil war recurrence.
II. Explaining Patterns of Remilitarization
In the demobilization agreement, the state offers the illegal armed organization a package
of benefits that renders the peace bargain preferable to remaining militarized and potentially
revising the status quo. By signing the accords, the rebel or paramilitary actors demonstrate that
they favor their assured, current power to the gains achievable through war. Given that the
benefits conferred to the armed group exceed the probability of winning greater power minus the
costs of fighting, the peace will hold unless one of the parameters changes (the probability of
'winning the war' increases or the costs of fighting decrease). Parallel to the formal bargaining
process between each illegal armed unit and the government is an informal process between each
pair of illegal non-state entities. War involves a multitude of actors; it is rarely a two-party game
as commonly conceived in the Political Science literature.
In my model, demobilization at time t=1 constitutes an exogenous and differential shock
to the distribution of power, weakening some groups' relative power while strengthening others.
The shock's effect depends on where the armed groups recruited and deployed their members
and where these members went after relinquishing their arms. Simplifying the argument
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presented in Chapter 5, non-local organizations, characterized by thin networks and post-war
physical dispersion, erode while local ones, comprised of fighters with multifaceted ties and
strong geographical concentration, preserve their power.45 1 As demonstrated in Chapter 4, groups
do not foresee the power shifts and therefore cannot avert them by fighting a preventive war (i.e.
not demobilizing). The process takes unanticipated turns once the commanders are locked in. So
the organizations are zapped to t=2 at which point they have demobilized and there is a new
distribution of power. In absolute terms, some groups' power, measured as capacity for
collective action, remains constant while others' power is destroyed. This shock brings the game
suddenly to the future, to the second stage of the commitment problem model, when the
relatively strengthened group cannot commit not to take advantage of its stronger position and
renege on the agreement. It has no reason not to. Thus, the strengthened group wants to revise
the bargain, to get a piece of the pie equivalent to its new power position. But why can it not
negotiate a new bargain with the relatively weakened group to avert the use of violence?
'Information problems' have not been applied to the intrastate context as information is
assumed complete.452 However, demobilization creates a highly uncertain environment replete
with asymmetries. Prior to demobilization, paramilitary organizations have complete knowledge
of each other's capabilities and commanders know their own organizations' endowments. The
paramilitary groups are, for the most part, allied and militarized, with their capabilities manifest.
They are involved in combats with the insurgents that merit information sharing. Moreover, their
strength, demonstrated on the battlefield, is public even to their enemies. Demobilization alters
this strength and creates proprietary knowledge about the extent to which it has done so. Since
451 The existing approaches assume that demobilization freezes the status quo or, if anything, diminishes the
capabilities of the ex-armed group relative to the state through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and
does so equally. I find strong disconfirming evidence of these assumptions.
452 Fearon 2004 writes, "After a few years of war, fighters on both sides of an insurgency typically develop accurate
understandings of the other side's capabilities, tactics, and resolve."
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the armed groups demobilize, their resolve to return to fighting also becomes private
information; how much do they value remaining at peace?
For there to be a plausible bargaining range, there must be a certain p - the probability
that army A would defeat army B were they to confront each other - that the parties agree on and
then bargain around. The civil war literature's explanations for divergent estimates ofp ignore
noise and mutual optimism.4 53 I argue that ex-armed groups are subject to organizational
pathologies. In other words, private information and incentives to misrepresent exist within
organizations. This can generate misperceptions of the organization's relative power. Mid-level
commanders have an incentive to overstate their control over their subordinates and foot soldiers
have an incentive to feign loyalty, especially in organizations in which defection is punishable by
death. Thus, former armed commanders can quite easily end up with inaccurate or noisy
estimates of their organizations' relative might. While I may know how I would individually fare
in a fistfight with a colleague, it is difficult to assess how my organization of say MIT Political
Scientists would fare against an organization of MIT Engineers. Organizational outcomes on the
battlefield are difficult to predict especially where information asymmetries within the structures
run high.
At the same time, commanders seek to demonstrate resolve to each other and signal that
they still have completely re-deployable troops while at the same time indicating to the
government that they have fully disbanded their troops, are committed to disarmament, and are
playing by the rules of the peace accord. These mixed signals generate greater divergence and
45 For mutual optimism theory in the interstate context, see Blainey 1988; Wittman 1979; Wittman 2001; Morrow
1985;Wagner 2000;Werner 1998; Slantchev and Tarar 2009. See also Fey and Ramsay 2009 for a critique of mutual
optimism theory.
454 Information asymmetries are larger in organizations with weaker networks and greater geographic dispersion.
Thus, non-local former armed groups should face greater difficulties assessing their relative power (relative decline)
and should be more likely to generate overly optimistic accounts of their power.
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noise in the estimates of relative resolve. Demobilization-induced changes in the distribution of
power combined with this inaccuracy in the measures ofp reduce the bargaining domain. As a
result, now relatively bolstered and relatively deflated groups may be unable to agree on a deal to
avert remilitarization. They redeploy.
The same equation holds for the state except that it is rarely weakened by the illegal
armed groups' demobilization.4 5 5 The peace accord may, however, boost its capacity relative to
the former non-state armed units. 'Local groups' do not deteriorate in capacity and thus, the
bargain with the state holds. In contrast, non-local groups weaken, changing the terms of the
peace accord with the state and requiring an adjustment of the arrangement. Given the variance
around this erosion in capacity, the state often feels emboldened to enter the territory of the
weakening former armed group to reassert its authority. In this process, however, it will be
subject to a resource constraint and state-building priorities: it cannot enter all regions equally at
once. Decaying armed groups in the depths of the jungle will be unlikely to experience the
state's incursion into their zones of former control. The state will also be constrained by the
international community, which may pressure it to purge its ties to certain former armed groups
and reclaim sovereignty over those groups' territories while respecting power-sharing
arrangements with other groups. These third party effects on the state's strategy are currently
relegated to the model's error term. The project's conclusion discusses how they may be
incorporated into the main analytic framework.
At time t=2, some groups remilitarize due to the process just described. The bargains,
however, are intimately interdependent and thus if the parameters change that glue together one
bargain in t=2, the other accords threaten to falter as collateral damage in t=3. The outcome of
the first war between actors whose relative power shifted during demobilization alters the
4 Security sector reform and demobilization of state forces would present different scenarios.
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distribution of power further. The victor is now potentially strengthened relative to its other
contiguous (ex-)armies. At the same time, the victor faces reduced costs to fighting as it has
already paid the sunk costs of remilitarization.456 These costs include a public relations blunder:
by defecting on the peace deal, the rearmed actor loses credibility and the population comes to
believe that it is not interested in peace. It also foregoes the benefits the peace process afforded it
in the current round and the prospects of a renewed peace and similar benefits shrink to near
zero. Additionally, while fighting expends more resources than remaining demilitarized, once the
start-up costs of remilitarization have been paid, the marginal cost of fighting is insufficient to
open up a bargaining range with the rearmed group or to underwrite its economies of scale.457
Thus, it is both the reduced costs of fighting and the shifting distribution of power, and thus
benefits of militarization, that produce a second series of wars between the victors of the first
war and their neighbors.458 It follows from this analysis that, for demilitarization to hold, the
status quo distribution of power has to hold in every dyadic relationship.
III. Observable Implications
Across Space & Time
According to this model, we should expect armed organizations, whose capacity is
preserved during the transition from war to peace and whose region is populated with similarly
intact, formerly coercive groups, to retain silent guns initially and to, over time, fully disarm. In
456 The interstate war literature assumes the costs to war are the reductions in the pie due to damages during war.
The intrastate peace literature assumes that remilitarization is costless. Both are inaccurate.
4" When at peace, from a pure resource maximizing perspective, there exist bargains such that demilitarized groups
will avoid redeploying.
458 Fearon 1995 and Powell 2006 would both argue that this scenario would produce a preventive war, initiated by
the neighboring power not involved in the first war in order to grab more resources while it still has the chance
before the window of opportunity closes and the victor of the first war is significantly stronger. However, I have not
found evidence of this dynamic. Nonetheless, the 'second wave' of remilitarization need not happen sequentially; it
can occur simultaneously to the first.
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these cases, we should observe the state respecting the organizations' sovereignty and seeking to
collaborate with them in its state-building efforts. In the medium to long term, however, as the
former paramilitary groups' redeployment potential erodes, we should witness the state assuming
more confrontational tactics and more confidently establishing its presence in the groups'
territories.
In contrast, where demobilization disperses a 'non-local' organization's weakly
networked ex-combatants and diminishes its capacity for collective action, we should observe
the remilitarization of its contiguous non-state armies. This wilting organization should also
redeploy defensively. Aftershock waves from this initial remilitarization may reverberate
through the system. Specifically, redeployment may occur in concentric circles running out from
these initial sites of demobilization-induced power disparities. If these sites are strategically
important, we should witness the state deploying its forces and institutions in an effort to take
advantage of the power vacuum.
Before testing these observable implications against the empirical record, I present the
strongest alternative models that seek to explain variation in remilitarization and war recurrence.
IV. Alternative Explanations
Commitment Problems
The most prominent explanation of divergence in post-conflict outcomes asserts that the
post-civil war landscape resembles the international system; there exists no overarching
government able to enforce agreements. Rebel and paramilitaries, it argues, cannot disarm
because the government cannot credibly commit not to renege (Walter 1997; Fearon 2004).4'
These armed actors therefore lack guarantees that, once the state has strengthened, it will
459 See Fearon 1995; Posen 1993; Snyder and Jervis 1999 for the civil war onset corollary of this thesis.
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nonetheless keep its word rather "than exploit[ing] its better bargaining position" 460 and acting as
a "crafty opponent ... wait[ing] until full disengagement to strike." 461 In contrast, with security
sector reform, power-sharing arrangements, and third-party guarantees, 462 this theory predicts
that the group will instead disarm as it receives credible commitments from the international
community/state. It thus does not need to continue to fight now in order to "lock in a higher
payoff while it still has a chance," before it weakens in the future.463
I argue that commitment problems cannot explain variation in post-war remilitarization
for the following reasons. Demobilization is a shock and then it is over so the future distribution
of power (at t=3) looks the same as the current one at t=2. There is no expectation of afuture
shift in power so the parties should be able to reach a bargain (Fearon 1995; Powell 2006).
Second, the effect of demobilization on relative power is notforeseen. Non-local groups
would not have demobilized had they foreseen they would become bankrupt or weakened. They
would have preferred to grab more territory and continue to initiate war preventively while they
were still in a position of power because the organizations that would be strengthened by
demobilization could not commit not to exploit their new relative power. This, however, applies
to every period (the prospectively weakened powers by demobilization will always prefer
fighting to peace because of the commitment problem). However, contrary to these predictions,
these groups do demobilize and do so absent guarantees. 464 Thus, unable to foresee the power
shifts, the prospectively bankrupt groups cannot and thus do not act to prevent them. These
460 Powell 2006.
461 Walter 1997.
462 On external guarantees, see Walter 1997, 1999; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004. On security sector
reform, see Toft forthcoming; Call 2007; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Licklider 2009. For key works on power-
sharing, see Lijphart 1977; Horowitz 1991; Roeder and Rothchild 2005. Kaufmann 1996 champions the partition
solution.
463 Powell 2006.
464The small guarantees given to the paramilitaries, for example, were uniformly applied and therefore unable to re-
balance the power shifts that demobilization caused.
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groups then find themselves in the second stage of the commitment problem trajectory when the
relatively strengthened actors renege on their agreements. It follows that, in the aftermath of
demobilization, the intact, relatively bolstered groups will grab the territories of the relatively
bankrupted ones.
Another form of the commitment problem hypothesis centers on bargaining
indivisibilities. The logic is the following: if I give up territory to my adversary today, then my
adversary will be stronger tomorrow and cannot commit not to exploit this advantage to take
465
even more territory. Thus, I prefer not to give up territory today and instead remilitarize.
Undividable stakes may also directly induce a breakdown in bargaining and subsequent
remilitarization. There are arguably some issues that we are not willing to negotiate over such as
giving up our entire country and being ruled by another nation. Similarly, a former armed group
may prove unwilling to have the area where its combatants' mothers and sisters live be ruled by
another army. Thus, the armed group may always prefer to fight than to bargain. At the micro
level, where the individuals engaging in bargaining have a personal stake in the territory, it is
conceivable that the negotiation chips become inseparable. However, while these indivisibility-
focused explanations are plausible, the fact that bargains were made in the past in which
paramilitary factions transferred expanses of territory to each other renders this explanation
empirically inconsistent.
Greedy Spoilers
A second alternative explanation centers on loot-hungry spoilers of the peace. It is
predicted that leaders, because of their specific goals, backgrounds and reasons for entering the
armed group, form preferences that determine if the organization remains demilitarized or
remilitarizes. Colombians espouse this approach, arguing that the paramilitaries who have
465 Walter 2003. Powell 2006 also makes this argument.
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rearmed are those that were motivated to do so: the greedy and opportunistic ones. This
hypothesis suffers from several weaknesses. One, it cannot explain longitudinal variation in
rearming; why, if motivated by greed, some former armed groups do not remobilize
immediately, but instead wait several years to do so. Two, it is very difficult to know
individuals' motivations. Discourses cannot be trusted as militarized actors have incentives to
justify their behavior with narratives. Many analysts solve this by employing the methodological
dictum of observing behavior and making inferences about motivations by the logic, "If someone
says, 'I don't like chocolates,' but keeps on eating them, we infer that she really likes them."466
However, regardless of whether the remilitarized combatants seek resources as a means to an end
or as an end in themselves,467 the observable behavior is the same: rent-seeking.468 In this case,
observed behavior cannot distinguish between the hypothesized motivations (greed or other).
Even if we accept that some paramilitary brigades are driven purely by greed while others
are not (thus explaining variation in redeployment), there remain weaknesses in the logic.
Controlling resources does not necessarily require the manifest use of arms: remilitarization;
profits are not available only to militarized actors; 'silent guns' may suffice. Keen highlights this
fact:
The art of facilitating a transition from war to peace may lie, to a considerable extent, in
ensuring that some of those benefiting from war are in a position to benefit to a greater
extent from peace. In practice, these benefits may (at least initially) be secured under
some kind of 'armed peace' in which a number of players remain in a position to use the
threat of force to underwrite control of economic activity... Groups that have been able to
use violence to secure control of production, trade and emergency aid in wartime may be
466 Collier 1999, p. 3.
467 Karl and LeBillon 2001 advocate the former position. This view, however, is becoming increasingly rare.
Ballentine and Sherman 2003 assume a balanced view and Grossman 1999; Collier 2000; de Soysa 2000; and Keen
2000 argue the latter; that combatants view as the end to the war, not victory, but the abuses and crimes promising
immediate rewards.
468 If the militants seek wealth in the long run, they must pursue resource accumulation in the short run. If they seek
lofty political goals in the long run, they must continue the struggle and thus amass finances in the short run. It,
therefore, proves exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to determine armed organizations' long term motives from
their short-term behavior.
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able to carve out for themselves a degree of control over production, trade and
development or reconstruction aid after a peace settlement.
Former armed groups often continue their licit and illicit dealings at peace through either explicit
or implicit agreements (that is why they demobilized). Thus, the puzzle becomes why do we see
latent arms in some cases and manifest ones in others? The greed argument cannot explain this
variation.
A second weakness of the 'revisionism' or spoiler logic, even accepting the premise that
the armed actors are greedy, is that they are not irrationally so; rather they demonstrate
vulnerability to prospect theory's endowment effect. Thus, the state is able to offer them a deal
that satiates their greed and transforms them from 'consumers' of the war economy to
'consumers' of an 'armed peace' economy and eventually a peace one. Especially at the
commander level, former combatants often prefer to get out while they are ahead, with amnesty,
their resources intact, and the ability to launder and legalize their resources, then to keep
increasing their pie.
It could be proposed that revisionist powers believe monitoring infeasible and thus engage
in "non-serious bargaining" and "commit to vague agreements for political [or reputational]
reasons" with no intention of actually enforcing the agreements (Fearon 1998). In this case, these
actors use the peace process to stall for time before returning to war rested and resupplied. I
argue that, were the organizations revisionist and greedy, they would not agree to disarm and
demobilize. DDR constitutes a costly signal and behavior to indicate commitment to a peace
process (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003).469 According to Schweller 1996, cooperation, in this case
demobilization, only occurs with revisionist powers if they lack the power and capabilities to
469 Of course, groups usually retain arms caches. However, they surrender many weapons; the ratio is usually 1
weapon per 2 combatants. Moreover, these displays (disarmament, running for office, etc) are public and
thus may create standards to which their support bases and foot soldiers hold them accountable.
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threaten the status quo. If they have power, they defect from cooperation (do not demobilize) in
order to pursue their revisionist aims. That armed groups voluntarily disarm despite great
strength suggests that they prefer the status quo to the benefits possible through continued
militarized revision. They wish to legitimize their power and maintain control of their territories
through non-coercive means. The benefits of demobilizing exceed the probability of winning
more goodies/territory minus the costs of war for all armed factions that sign a peace accord.
Explaining remilitarization puts the onus on the analyst to locate the factor that can account for
cooperation across all cases at t=1 (disarmament and demobilization of all factions) and its
breakdown in certain cases at t=2 (redeployment of some factions).
Given the issues with the greed-oriented approach, I assume uniform preferences across
time and across former militarized organizations and their leaders. Specifically, I assume that
demobilized units are status-quo powers that aim to maintain the control and influence they
enjoyed while at war. This does not preclude greedy motives, only that these motives have been
satiated. The armed group receives compensation in excess of that which it can grab (revise) by
returning to war (with a certain probability of winning).
War Onset
A final and dominant alternative explanation derives from the substantial war onset
literature and claims that motivations for remilitarization exist everywhere and yet we only
observe remilitarization in certain places 'favorable' to illegal armed activity. 470 These correlates
of war include poverty, rough terrain, large populations, and loot. Chapter Eight provides a
rigorous discussion and test of the model against this alternative 'feasibility' explanation - in the
case of Colombia's rebels in the 1960s-1 980s. It finds that, empirically, money, opportunity
470 Walter 2004 applies these theories to war recurrence. Fearon and Laitin 2003 does not do so explicitly, but it
relies on a database in which war onset and war recurrence are both coded '1' and are thus indistinguishable.
206
costs, and refuge are not the limiting factors; rather, organizational structure determines the
production-possibility frontier. War and demobilization change the impediments to collective
action and violence's organizational legacies render onset factors' causal effects inoperative. I
turn now to remilitarization in the case of the paramilitaries (2003-2008).
V. Demilitarization and Remilitarization in Practice
This section navigates the fragile architecture of the peace regimes and explores when
these regimes cement and when they fracture. In considering the three paramilitary case studies,
it assesses whether variation in their organizational bankruptcy can account for these varying
outcomes.
Urabai: Variation Across Time and Space
"The [OAS Peace] Mission has a positive assessment of the effective dismantling of the armed
structures of the self-defense forces [in Urabi] ... the security of the demobilized has been
satisfactory. There is no evidence of incursions of other illegal armed groups in the cleared zones
and the armed forces have increased their manpower. The reintegration of the demobilized group
has advanced positively and within the parameters hoped for."
- OAS Peace Mission Trimester Report, October 2005m
"Until a year ago, the victims were gaining trust and confidence and beginning to talk and
become more visible. The armed groups were invisible and not affecting the communities. Then
a year ago, the rearmed groups became manifest and now the victims have so much fear. The
communities say ... they are the same as before, establishing the law, resolving problems,
engaging in social cleansing and killing and exploiting the communities."
-Initiative of Colombian Women for Peace, interview by Author,
Apartad6, June 2008
"We, the demobilized, are rearming because the Paisas [another remilitarized paramilitary
faction] are going to kill us... we have to unite our demobilized to defend ourselves."
- Remilitarized Paramilitary Commander, 'Don Mario,' May 2008
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471 OAS 2005.
Despite enjoying a roughly constant ability to redeploy 472 and constant incentives to
continue extracting resources from and exercising influence over Uraba, the Bloque Elmer
Cardenas remained demilitarized from April 2006 till August 2007 and then remilitarized
thereafter. Accordingly, neither greed nor onset correlates of war can explain this longitudinal
variation. In fact, our theories are surprisingly weak at explaining the timing of violence. To
explain variation in remilitarization, I examine shifts in the distribution of power and these
shifts' effects on formal and informal peace bargains.
Bargaining in Urabd.
In Uraba and neighboring C6rdoba, the Bloque Elmer Cardenas, Bloque Heroes de
Tolova, and Bloque C6rdoba signed separate peace accords with the state. In exchange for
demobilization, they received benefits including amnesty, guarantees of no extradition,
reintegration stipends, and laundered assets. For each of these brigades, these benefits exceeded
the probability of the brigade winning a war against the state minus the cost of fighting. The state
continued to provide these compensation packages to each paramilitary brigade as long as it
remained demobilized. The brigades simultaneously (or previously) signed contracts amongst
themselves.
The exact content of these inter-paramilitary faction accords has not been revealed.
However, our glimpses into their arrangements suggest that division of territory and monetary
compensation were involved. According to a demobilized from Uraba:
There were problems between the commanders and so, after a joint operation in
Nueva Antioquia, everyone from different places went back to the brigades in
their areas. The Bloque C6rdoba took the region of southern C6rdoba, Elmer
Cardenas took northern Uraba and Uraba Chocoana and the Frente Bananero
under Cepillo, took the 'banana axis.' I was under Cepillo. We didn't operate in
Nueva Antioquia anymore because this was given to another commander. We had
permission to go up to El Tres, but we couldn't cross El Tres because that would
472 The organizational decay function seems to set in approximately two years after demobilizing.
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be invading another man's territory. And to the south, we also had our limit as
there was another sehor, El Alemin, there. So the whole zone was divided up into
separate areas of control of different senores de la guerra [warlords].4
The sister of former paramilitary commander, 'Doble Cero,' after several tumblers of whiskey,
confided in me that 'Don Mario' paid 'Don Berna' two million dollars not to enter the zone of
Urabi; this sum was the compensation required to offset 'Don Berna's' expected payoff from
invading minus the anticipated costs. This testimony was not independently verified and thus its
veracity remains questionable. Nonetheless, it points to the informal peace deals between
paramilitary commanders that facilitated their demobilization.
It follows that, until 2006, a cooperation regime was in effect and the paramilitary
brigades of Urabai and C6rdoba remained demilitarized. So what happened thereafter? Before
delving into the narrative, I will quickly touch on the distribution of power at the moment of
disarmament. As imperfect proxies, I use the brigades' number of soldiers and weapons and the
size of their territories. 474 All of the units had access to abundant resources. See Table 15.
Table 15. Relative Power of Paramilitary Organizations
# Combatants4 # Weapons Size of Territory
Bloque Elmer Cardenas (BEC) 1536 1,068 Large
Bloque C6rdoba (BC) 925 393 Medium
Bloque Heroes de Tolovi (BHT) 464 256 Small
On the basis of these blunt figures and qualitative evidence, it can be inferred that the power
ordering was as follows: BEC > BC > BHT at the moment of disarmament.476
473 Ex-combatant (Frente Bananero), interview by author, Caurallo, 3 July 2008. Another ex-combatant similarly
explained to me the top command's division of territory, "In Urab6, there were three brigades: the Bloque Elmer
Cirdenas; the one of Cepillo that controlled the municipalities of the banana axis towards the south; and the one of
Don Bema that had the east in C6rdoba. These all had separate zones of operation" (Ex-combatant, interview by
author, Apartad6, July 2008).
474 For parsimony, I do not include the Frente Bananero in the analysis. It was the weakest of the brigades with 451
combatants, a small territory and 351 weapons.
47 It should be noted that these combatant levels included the 'support networks' of the paramilitaries (family
members, cooks, informants, etc.) who demobilized with the combatants. Additionally, the ex-armed groups
maintained caches of weapons. I assume support networks and caches are relatively constant across the paramilitary
brigades.
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Prior to demobilization, these four organizations had complete information about each
other's capabilities and were thus able to avoid confrontation; they did not fight each other. The
organizations shared intelligence and were involved in combat, which rendered their capabilities
public information. I argue that demobilization significantly and disproportionately weakened
the Bloque C6rdoba, but created proprietary knowledge about the extent to which it had done so.
I should note that this project's theory cannot account for the Bloque C6rdoba's erosion; it was a
strongly local armed unit and thus, according to the theory's predictions, should have remained
intact. While the preponderance of evidence supports my argument, I relegate this idiosyncratic
fact to the error term; my theory explains more of the variation than existing accounts, but its R-
squared term does not equal one. 4 77
The Bloque Heroes de Tolovi, believing itself strengthened relative to the Bloque
C6rdoba, could not commit to maintain the current division of territory because, now more
powerful, it wanted to exploit its better position and renege on the promised division of goodies.
The Bloque C6rdoba did not initiate a preventive war, as predicted in the literature478 as the
power shift was a shock and was then over. Instead, the Bloque agreed to renegotiate the bargain
with the Heroes de Tolovi whereby, according to diverse sources, the Heroes de Tolovi was
given the right to the coca crops located on the side of the road leading to the reservoir of Urri,
an area that had previously been firmly under the control of Bloque C6rdoba. 479 However, this
concession did not meet the Heroes de Tolovi's growing belief that it would win the entire pie
476 Don Berna commanded both the Bloque Heroes de Tolovi and the Bloque Hdroes de Granada (in the Oriente
Antioquefio). The latter may have strengthened the former after the remilitarization began. However, these brigades
can be evaluated as separate entities given that any time someone from Medellin was sighted in C6rdoba, it was
reported; in small, highly regionalized towns, an outsider cannot pass for a local. These reports of Paisa sightings
were scarce until 2008.
477 I am grateful for Jorge Dominguez' insights into the equivalence of the error term in qualitative research.
478 See Fearon 1995, pp. 379-414; Powell 2006, pp. 169-203.
479 Sources confirming this include the police, army, religious organizations, journalists and community members.
An eradication campaign in Valencia, C6rdoba also may have had an effect.
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(C6rdoba's assets) were the two powers to confront. The Bloque C6rdoba, meanwhile, had a
divergent, also optimistic, estimate of its relative power. While C6rdoba's commander, Mancuso,
was playing by the rules of the peace accord and seemed committed to the process, 480 he and his
field officers were also committed to protecting the Bloque Cordoba's territory against
encroachment. It appears that his mid-ranking commanders convinced him that he would be able
to do so, that the previous balance of power still largely held. Given the difficulty of estimating
its own capacity for remilitarization and fighting capabilities post-demobilization, let alone the
Heroes de Tolovi's, the Bloque C6rdoba proved unwilling to make the transfers the Heroes de
Tolovi found necessary to avert war. Accordingly, in 2006, the Heroes de Tolovi remilitarized
in the form of Los Traquetos. 481 Its remilitarization sparked the Bloque C6rdoba's defensive
remilitarization in the form of the Vencedores de San Jorge.482
According to diverse sources, the Traquetos, highly local to the zone, had at their
disposal a large and complex organization, with excellent logistics, communication, and
command and control. It was very well equipped with rifles, radios, and detailed knowledge of
the terrain and communities in which it operated (the same as those that the Heroes de Tolovi
had patrolled). The Traquetos also enjoyed familial and other links with the non-combatant
population, making non-denunciation nearly ubiquitous. 483 "Given the extreme complexity of the
organization, the armed forces confirm[ed] the link between this group and the former structures
480 Mancuso, for example, engaged in manual eradication of coca with his men in order to show good faith and also
to employ his ex-combatants. In so doing, he sought to gain a good reputation for his commitment to the peace and
to reduce his chances of being extradited.
481 The command of the Traquetos included Eduardo Galiano, alias 'El Profe,' a representative of Don Berna, and
alias 'El Primo,' Don Berna's relative. Los Vencedores were similarly led and stacked wtih friends and relatives of
Salvatore Mancuso (Colombian Armed Forces, interview by author, Monteria and Tierralta, August 2007). It
became clear that there was a confrontation between the two ex-paramilitary commanders and their men
(International Organization Personnel, interview by author, Tierralta, August 2007).
482 El Tiempo 2006.
483 This points to a challenge of remilitarization research; rearming is reported where it is least dangerous to do so;
where the rearming phenomenon is weak or where the armed group is not embedded in the local communities. See
Appendix A.
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of the paramilitaries that [had] operated in the zone." 484 The Traquetos had a close relationship
with narcotrafficking, benefiting from a monopoly over the purchase and sale of the coca base
and processing inputs in western C6rdoba.
Meanwhile, the Vencedores de San Jorge descended from the Bloque C6rdoba's Frentes
Alto Sindi and San Jorge and operated in squads of 15 soldiers. Relatively little is known about
the Vencedores because, after becoming visible in February 2006, they quickly withdrew and
maintained a very low profile. Within a year and a half, the Vencedores were seemingly
disarticulated and the Traquetos had won the war. At this time, members of the Bloque Heroes
de Tolovi were observed patrolling the right banks of the Sind' River, "a change in the territorial
distribution that had historically maintained in the zone." The Traquetos gained access to the
Bloque C6rdoba's zones of control and sucked nourishment from them, strengthening in the
process.
The dynamic between the Bloque Heroes de Tolovi and Bloque C6rdoba did not remain
isolated to this dyad; rather it had significant externalities and affected all of the other bargains to
which the two armies had committed. Motivated by incentives independent of their peace
bargains with the state (namely the shift in power between them), both reneged on their
commitments to the state under those peace accords; they returned to violence. 4 85 Meanwhile, the
Bloque Heroes de Tolovi's strengthening due to its successful defeat of the Bloque C6rdoba
484 Conflict analyst, interview by author, Monteria, August 2007. The Hdroes de Tolov6 combatants were local to
the zone and thus the structure remained intact post-demobilization in the form of an NGO (Observatorio del
Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos 2005).
485 While, in theory, this should have prompted the state to actively combat the Traquetos and Vencedores de San
Jorge, in actuality, these groups, especially the Traquetos had successfully corrupted the local armed forces to such
an extent that the top police commanders denied their existence and called them common, petty crime despite their
highly sophisticated and extensive organizational structures. The state did, however, 'renege' on its corruptive ties in
2008 when it extradited Don Berna in part for his participation in these (re)armed groups. Whereas, in principal, pro-
state armed groups usually enjoy relative immunity from state 'counterinsurgent' operations, if remilitarized, the
state should become justified and pressured (by civilians and the international community) to combat the groups;
corruption should end.
212
upset the distribution of power on the Urab6/C6rdoba border and thus destabilized the bargains
brokered between the Bloque Heroes de Tolovi and Bloque Elmer C'rdenas.
Prior to the Heroes de Tolovi's successful campaign against the Bloque C6rdoba, its
power remained stable relative to the Urabi organizations. As a result, there emerged a "tense
calm," in the banana axis48 6 and, from 2004 to 2007, "there were no incursions by other armed
actors" into Urabi 487 All reports on the rearming phenomena that emerged in 2004-2006 did not
list any remilitarized groups in Urabi.488 This changed in 2007.
The Heroes de Tolovi faced reduced costs to fighting as it had already paid the sunk
costs of remilitarization. By redeploying, it had already foregone the benefits of the peace
process. Its members lost the lenient judicial benefits of maximum sentences of eight years for
crimes against humanity and the promise of no-extradition. Additionally, the Heroes de Tolovi
had to face not only its illegal armed rivals, but also the state, which was forced to at least appear
to be confronting the remilitarization. Accordingly, it was in the Heroes de Tolovi's interest to
strengthen as much as possible; its incentive structure was that of a group at war rather than one
at post-war peace. Thus, at this point, we observe it engaging in revisionist efforts and offensive
expansionary campaigns. Moreover, having defeated the Bloque C6rdoba, the Bloque Heroes de
Tolovi faced a significantly higher probability of winning a war in Urabi than at the moment of
disarmament. 4 89 It had consolidated power and territory while its contiguous, ex-armed
organization in Urabi, the Bloque Elmer Cirdenas, had remained demobilized, thereby not
making public its redeployment capacity. For the Heroes de Tolovil, this produced a perceived
486 Conflict analyst, interview by author, Bogoth, August 2006.
487 OAS 2005.
488 BACRIM classified intelligence reports.
489 According to the sister of paramilitary commander Doble Cero, Don Mario never paid the two million dollars
stipulated in the peace bargain because Don Berna decided to invade Urabi. Her testimony hints at the likely course
of events (Interview by author, Apartad6, 4 July 2008).
213
probability of winning high enough to incentivize its incursion into the zone; the compensation
package between it and the Bloque Elmer Cirdenas no longer sufficed as it was negotiated under
a different power differential.
Accordingly, in mid-2007, the Bloque Heroes de Tolovi, under the name los Paisas,
began encroaching on the region of Urabi, seeking to "increase [its] presence in the region" 490
and sparking a war with the Bloque Elmer Cardenas.491 The Paisas combined the Traquetos with
recruits sent from Medellin and Don Berna's Office of Envigado. They arrived first on
motorcycles, dressed like civilians with no camouflage, then began a selective assassination
campaign against ex-BEC combatants, and finally initiated more direct offensives on the BEC
structure.492 This structure redeployed. It shifted from an invisible strategy to a visible one; its
military influence went from latent to manifest as its men who, since April 2006, had been using
handguns and radios on motorcycles, dressed in civilian clothes and maintaining a very low
profile, now adopted a "military profile, patrolling in uniform in groups of 20, extending a
military structure into rural areas, using heavy weaponry, and returning 'to the same as
before."' 493 By August/September 2007, there was the first mention of an "emerging criminal
490 Observatorio del Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos 2007. See also Fundaci6n Seguridad y
Democracia 2004.
491 Gersen Arias, interview by author, Bogoti, July 2008; Conflict Analyst, interview by author, Apartad6, April
2008. It could be argued that 'Don Berna' and 'El AlemAn' were more direct adversaries than other dyads as they
fell on opposite sides of the rift over drug trafficking within the autodefensas. However, this explanation also cannot
account for the timing of the incursion into Urab6. Why did the war not break out between these two actors
immediately after demobilization? Additionally, why had they not fought each other prior to demobilization given
that this disaccord surfaced in 2000? Fearon 1995 and Powell 2006 would both argue that this scenario would
produce a preventive war, initiated by the BEC to grab more resources while it still had the chance before the
window of opportunity closed and the BHT was significantly stronger. However, I have not found evidence of this
dynamic.
4 9 2 Army Intelligence, Brigada 17, interview by author, Carepa, 4 July 2008; BACRIM (MEVEC), interview by
author, 30 January 2008; President, Indigenous Association, Camizba, interview by author, Riosucio, 2 July 2008.
This is consistent with Kalyvas 2006 predictions of selective violence.
493 International organization personnel, interview by author, Bogoti, April 2008. The communities claim that the
autodefensas did not demobilize, they just became less visible (Iniciativa de Mujeres Colombianas por la Paz,
interview by author, Apartad6, 2008). Superban, for example, had radios and delivered codes such as, "The green
tree is leaving farm La Macarena with the package." Green tree could have been code for the army, police, etc. For
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gang of Urabi" under Don Mario.494 In May 2008, Don Mario killed seven and kidnapped 25
members of the Bloque Heroes de Tolovai (Paisas), producing a highly publicized hostage
situation. In a video given to the OAS Peace Mission, Don Mario denounced the invasion of
Urabi, orchestrated by Don Berna, and explained, "We, the demobilized, are rearming ... to
defend ourselves." According to the OAS, "This demonstrated the territorial dispute in Uraba
between these two groups with links to the former paramilitaries; the Paisas were trying to enter
the territory of Don Mario and kill his men.A 95
By July 2008, the "conflict had died down a little." 496 "In 2007 till mid-2008, you would
hear that the Paisas were around ... but in recent months, they have been silent; they have not
made a peep," offered the head of the indigenous organization of Choc6, Camizba.497 The army
confirmed that the Paisas were largely destroyed in Uraba; "They have gone home ... They have
a few informants, but that is all." 498 By October 2008, Don Mario's Gaitanista Self-Defense
Forces of Colombia (AGC) had reclaimed hegemony in Uraba. With victory, however, came
externalities for the entire cooperative architecture buttressing the peace process; Don Mario's
army expanded into other regions of Colombia. By mid-2008, Don Mario's AGC was estimated
to number some 3,000 troops in Uraba with expeditionary forces being sent east and south into
the interior of Colombia. I turn now from Colombia's Panamanian border to its Venezuelan one.
several conflict analysts, the ex-combatants' radios and presence on all the roads constituted a form of social control
(Interview by author, Apartad6, June 2008).
494 It should be noted that the battles between AGC and the Paisas also occurred in Valencia, C6rdoba, where the
BHT had previously enjoyed absolute domination. Eventually, the AGC claimed these regions as their own (Army
Intelligence, Brigada 17, interview by author, Carepa, 4 July 2008.
495 OAS Peace Monitors, interview by author, Bogoti, 20 May 2008.
496 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Caurallo, 3 July 2008.
497 President, Indigenous Association, Camizba, Riosucio, 2 July 2008.
498 Army 17th Brigade, interview by author, Carepa, 4 July 2008.
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Map 5. Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces and Los Paisas' Zones of Influence
Source: Colombian Army, 17'h Brigada
Bloque Catatumbo: A Power Vacuum Attracts Violence
As illustrated in Chapter Five, demobilization largely bankrupted the Bloque Catatumbo
(BC). Its combatants were recruited in a dispersed fashion and thus lacked dense ties. After
disarming, most emigrated from Norte de Santander home to their families in the coastal regions
of the country. Those that remained in the war theater of Norte de Santander interacted
minimally. Thus, the BC paramilitary organization, for the most part, ceased to exist.
During the war, the BC had forged a set of agreements with its contiguous armed actors.
It controlled the state of Norte de Santander; the Mellizos had Arauca; the Frente Julio Peinado
patrolled the south of Cesar and the Bloque Central Bolivar had Magdalena Medio
Santandereafio and the south of Bolivar.499 These agreements held despite ambitions to the
499 The Frente Julio Peinado and Bloque Central Bolivar, however, had not been able to agree to a bargain on the
Cesar/Bolivar border prior to demobilizing. Thus, unsurprisingly, the dispute resurfaced immediately following
disarmament.
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contrary and there was little, if any, violence observed between the paramilitary units.
Interestingly, the BC even had "an implicit division of territory" with its enemies: the FARC,
ELN, and EPL rebels. "La Gabarra was the limit of where the paramilitaries were able to extend
their power. The Catatumbo River marked the limit between the guerrillas and paras. It was a
tacit agreement. The paras had secured the areas important to them: the flat regions, roads, urban
areas, and petroleum, gold, and copper resources." 00 The BC also had a tacit accord with the
state whereby the state turned a blind eye to its activities and respected its sovereignty in the
regions it controlled.
Demobilization shocked and downgraded the Bloque Catatumbo's capacity and, in so
doing, undermined these agreements. In most areas, demobilization left nothing of the BC
structure (in La Gabarra, Tibu, El Tarra, Pamplona, San Calixto, Convenci6n, Teorama and
Ragonvalia). The words 'void' and 'vacuum' were those observers used to describe these regions
after the BC's demobilization. In other zones, DDR instead left latent, but 'rump' cadres of ex-
combatants who were either from the locales and 'returned' home or were not local to Norte de
Santander, but remained there post-war. These regions included Puerto Santander and Ocaia.50'
Meanwhile, the collective action capacities of the neighboring, strongly local Frente Julio
Peinado and Bloque Central Bolivar's Frente Sur de Bolivar were left largely unaffected by
demobilization. Their combatants emigrated minimally from their combat zones and remained
highly clustered and loyal to their former armed employers. Thus the Bloque Catatumbo
weakened both in absolute terms but also relative to its territorially contiguous brigades. These
armed actors, both state and non-state, reneged on their commitments to the BC to respect its
500 Defensoria del Pueblo, interview by author, Cicuta, April 2008.
501 The Catatumbo brigade divided into seven battalions. Five of them were highly 'non-local.' These were the
Frentes La Gabarra, Movil Catatumbo, Rural Catatumbo, Choque Cazadores, and Las Mercedes. Two fronts
incorporated more local recruits: Frente Frontera and Frente Ocafia.
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territorial integrity. Emboldened by their enhanced relative power, they wanted bigger pieces of
the pie. So they descended like vultures on Norte de Santander to take their grab. There was no
structure to deter them and uncertainty was high. Ex-guerrilla and now conflict analyst observed,
"Before the demobilization, it all was very clear. It was very easy to understand what was
happening. Everyone knew who was in charge, but post-demobilization, it became very unclear.
Everything was in confusion."50 2 The invasion of these multiple actors prompted the BC rump
units to remilitarize defensively in the form of the Black Eagles, Blue Eagles and Golden
Eagles.50 3 However, with only a fraction of their manpower and materiel and facing a strong
invading miscellany of armed actors, they did not last long.504 These actors merit further
elaboration.
While conducting interviews in the prison of Cdcuta, I observed one of the inmates
opening his notebook. The inner cover was tattooed with a large drawing of Black Eagles, the
symbol of the remilitarized group. It was cult-like. He told me that he had been captured a month
after the demobilization because a war broke out between the demobilized from Bloque
Catatumbo and "those trying to enter the zone." Those trying to enter included the "Mid-ranking
commanders of the Bloque Central Bolivar (BCB) [aliases 'Vides' and 'Pablo' 50 5 who]
trespassed into the area with the goal of exercising total territorial control."50 6 Evidence of this
incursion included 22 selective killings of BC ex-combatants between the December 1 0 th 2004
and the end of September 2005.507 Colombia's most prominent narcotraffickers, Jab6n, Varela,
and the Mellizos, also wanted pieces of the border pie and drug smuggling routes into
502 Director, Fundaci6n Progresar, interview by author, Cicuta, April 2008.
503 It seems that the 'invading forces' also called themselves by these names to confuse authorities and to convince
them that the Bloque Catatumbo was the only one redeploying, thus meriting a state offensive against it.
504 The three ex-combatant leaders of the Black Eagles were all killed within months of the demobilization
ceremony.
505 Ex-combatant (BCB), interview by author, Sur del Bolivar, April 2008.
506 OAS 2005
511 OAS 2005
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Venezuela. 508 To make their grab, they allied with the local cartels (los Boyacos, Pepes, Pulpos,
Mechas, and Pamplonas) who, having been subjugated to the paramilitary command during the
war, now resurfaced.
Finally, the guerrillas also sought to 'fill the vacuums' left by the paramilitaries in La
Gabarra, Tibu and El Tarra. Eight days after the BC's demobilization, the FARC killed several
inhabitants of the paramilitary's side of the river. "Such an obstruction of the rules wouldn't have
occurred before when the territory was divided."5 09 "The areas left by the former paramilitaries
are becoming constant targets" for the EPL, ELN, and FARC "with the goal of procuring those
territories."510
Meanwhile, the state also reneged on its tacit agreement not to encroach on the
paramilitary territories and state-build. The remnants of the BC were insufficient to deter it and
the border area was strategically important to Colombia's economy and national integrity. As a
result, Norte de Santander witnessed a military and state buildup in the years following
demobilization. In 2005, the military activated the 3 0th Brigade in Ciicuta and, in 2006, assigned
the 15th Mobile Brigade to Catatumbo. It also created an effective, elite search team charged
with capturing Black Eagle members. The National Police, meanwhile, established new stations
in several townships (Petr6lera, Campo Dos and la Gabarra), areas that were previously
"strongly controlled by the Bloque Catatumbo." Thus the state, rather than collaborating with the
former BC structure and respecting its sovereignty in its prior zones of operation as in the cases
508 Policia Nacional, interview by author, Cficuta, 30 May 2008. A number of the top leaders of the Mellizos' and
Varela's narco-trafficking groups were captured in the area of Norte de Santander after the demobilization.
509 Defensoria del Pueblo, interview by author, Cficuta, April 2008.
510 Conflict analyst, interview by author, Bogoth, August 2006. Emphasis added
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of Medellin and Urabi, instead sought to circumvent the paramilitaries' authority and establish
consolidated state presence.5"
Where the Bloque Catatumbo was almost entirely non-local, such as in La Gabarra, El
Tarra, and Tibu, the 'invaders' met with little resistance from the BC as it had fully disappeared.
Consistent with the argument, in areas in which the BC had recruited some natives or its non-
local combatants remained in the zone, the BC retained rump structures, which engaged in
defensive remilitarization. This was the case in Puerto Santander and Ocafta where the Aguilas
were observed to have "a more organized structure."m'
Nonetheless, because of their relative bankruptcy, these rump units proved
unsustainable. An conflict analyst noted, "The Bloque Catatumbo did not incorporate any
natives. For this reason, it wasn't able to 'rearm' because it did not have a consolidated structure.
[The rearming] is more a mishmash of disparate, disunited actors including members of the local
drug cartels."513 "If the Catatumbo paramilitaries had been local, we would be seeing a huge
rearmed bloc," commented an ombudsman.5 14 Instead, the BC's Eagles "do not have a
hierarchy... They are not linked to a military apparatus in rural areas. Now it is just illegal
businesses and hitmen. There are no commanders."m A Police Coronel similarly observed, "The
differences between before and now are that, before the demobilization, the autodefensas were in
charge, we knew that all the paramilitary commanders were running everything, now with the
new narcos, there is no clear command."
511 Army General, interview by author, Tibu, April 2008.5 12 Policia Nacional, interview by author, Cdicuta, May 2008.
51 Director, Fundaci6n Progresar, interview by author, Cnicuta, 9 June 2008.514 Defensorfa del Pueblo, interview by author, Cficuta, May 2008. This was confirmed in another interviewee (Ex-
combatant (Bloque Catatumbo), interview by author, Comuna 6, Cicuta, 3 June 2008.
515 Analyst, Fundaci6n Progresar, interview by author, Cacuta, 30 May 2008.
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The lack of a residue hierarchical structure following the BC's demobilization suggests
that recruits' decisions to join the Black Eagles were largely taken on individual bases. Ex-
combatants entered as 'common criminals' rather than as a collective rejoining their former
structure.516 Each year, the number of demobilized involved with the armed groups decreased
implying that the 'rump units' disappeared, replaced by the diverse militarized factions disputing
the zone in the absence of a strongman. 517
I turn now to the Bloque Cacique Nutibara, which retained silent guns initially and, over
time, fully demobilized.
Medellin: Differential Power Preserved
Prior to demobilization, the Bloque Cacique Nutibara enjoyed territorial alliances with its
neighboring paramilitary factions. Together with these factions, it had pushed the FARC and
ELN guerrillas out and exterminated its only paramilitary enemy in the region - the Bloque
Metro - and co-opted its structure.
The BCN's contiguous armed units were all strongly local and survived demobilization.
Accordingly, the regional power differential maintained and the territorial arrangements between
the former armies held. Additionally, until 2007, the local government adopted a strategy of
collaboration with the BCN rather than challenging it. As a result, the BCN structure persisted in
the form of a passively coercive, socio-political organization. Ultimately, the networks and
physical clustering of the Bloque began to erode such that the organization lost its ability to
516 Interestingly, group weakening facilitates further bankruptcy through the following mechanism: if the
organizational structure decays, other armed groups seek to enter the territory. If illegal, their means of encroaching
on the territory is through selective killings of the incumbents (ex-combatants). This creates disincentives for the
former combatants to associate or to have a manifest presence. Thus, fear makes them hide and the structure ends up
weakening further. According to a conflict analyst, "The demobilized don't want to form any sort of a group
because it is very dangerous as they do not want to be recognized as demobilized" (Interview by author, Tibu, April
2008).
517 National Police, interview by author, Tibu, May 2008.
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remilitarize. Given this weakened organizational capacity, the state gradually enhanced its
presence and authority in the marginal neighborhoods long under illegal armed control and co-
opted the BCN's ex-combatants back into civilian life.
Silent Guns
After demobilizing, the BCN's civilian reincarnation, the Democracy Corporation,
existed with what I call 'silent guns.' The BCN had disarmed, but remained in an unstable state
of latent coercive capacity from which it could easily remobilize. According to a Medellin
ombudsman, the ex-combatants patrolled the streets, but now did so without uniforms or guns.
They maintained their social, political, and economic influence, but without camouflage. 518 The
demobilized "radically changed their means of operating and their manner of being. Now they do
not use direct violence, do not displace. They use latent power."5 19 Eduardo Pizarro added:
"[Today the paramilitaries' control is] more subtle; there are no hooded patrols armed with
assault weaponry. It is an invisible control, with threats and camouflaged guns... and an iron
fist."520
While the demobilized no longer had an overt military presence, they did operate
informant networks, using mobile telephones to communicate with their leaders about what was
happening in their neighborhoods. For example, if the political left was seeking to establish a
presence in the communities, the former combatants reported, "We would have to speak to the
commanders... to see what should be done about it."5 21 The former fighters performed their
vigilante jobs, but did so without the use of arms. "We speak with any strangers who enter the
neighborhood, we ask them where they are from, what they are doing. Now, we start with
518 International Crisis Group 2007, p. 21.
519 Analyst, Sistema de Alertas Tempranas, Defensoria del Pueblo, interview by author, Medellin, 29 February 2008.
520 Pizarro Leong6mez 2004.
521 Revista Semana 2004a.
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dialogue, not like before when we went straight for our guns," explained a former BCN
paramilitary.522 "Before we would have just sent them to the funeral parlor."523 "Even though the
ex-combatants for now do not commit crimes in the sense established by the Penal code, they
have not lost their capacity for coercion," confirmed a local civil society organization.5 2 4
The term 'silent guns,' however, does not preclude the former combatants' involvement
in illicit endeavors. 52 5 There were reports, some verified, others not, of ex-BCN fighters using
threats, extorting, charging residents protection money, 526 abusing drugs, charging monies from
prostitution rings and lotteries, running credit scams, and operating private security businesses. 527
The demobilized were also accused of controlling the population's access to electricity and
water, regulating cocaine and marijuana markets, illegally appropriating land,528 pressuring
politicians, and taxing transporters for the right of passage. Testimonies of former paramilitaries
under the Justice and Peace Law further reveal that the ex-BCN combatants maintained caches of
weapons to facilitate rapid redeployment of their troops for combat. The caches included rifles,
ammunition, uniforms, and canned goods.529
During the first several years after demobilizing (2003-2006), had the BCN's power
relative to its counterparts been upset, it would have remilitarized. One mid-ranking commander
522 Restrepo 2005.
523 Revista Semana 2004a.
52 Franco 2005. See also Human Rights Watch 2005.
525 'Silent guns' also does not preclude manifest armed activity by other non-demobilized actors. There are many
unemployed minors and young men, who never had anything to do with the paramilitaries or guerrillas, but have
since joined neighborhood combos and gangs. The Mayor's Program for High Risk Youth, which demobilizes gang
youth is a testament to this problem. Additionally, the culture of violence in Medellin, while showing some signs of
changing, endures and thus reproduces many of the primary elements of the conflict (micro-gangs). The corrupt and
ineffective judicial system also means that deterrence of criminal activity is lacking and thus the incentive structure
remains perverse. Finally, while the paramilitaries demobilized, the narco industry did not. And this industry
requires private armies and often relies on violence. Thus, mafioso elements endure.
526 Human Rights Watch 2005.
527 Civilians, interview by author, Comuna 13, Medellin, April 2008.
52 For example, the president of La Honda's Community Action Board, a former combatant, illegally appropriated
and sold off land to displaced persons (International Organization official, interview by author, Medellin, May
2008).
529 Parmenio Usme, Testimony under Justice and Peace Law, Medellin, 2008). See also Castrill6n 2005.
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admitted to me, "We will be willing to retake up arms. If someone wants to enter the city -
guerrilla or other - we will be there to combat them."53 0 "If new-armed groups try to come to
Medellin, we won't let them come in," confessed another mid-ranking commander.53 1 A group
of ex-combatants in the neighborhood La Sierra similarly expressed, "Returning to arms is not
an alternative, but neither is it a myth." They described how there is a great deal of fear that other
groups will try to enter and dispute their territory. If this happens, "we will return to arms." 32 It
did not happen because the power differentials between the BCN and the Bloques Central
Bolivar, Mineros, and Noroccidente Antioquefno held.533 The BCN thus deterred other actors
from encroaching on its territory and did not collectively remobilize.
State-Build or Co-Opt
The local government in Medellin, as those everywhere in Colombia, wished to extend its
power into the neighborhoods under paramilitary control and to regain the Weberian goal of
hegemony over violence. As Colombia's High Commissioner for Peace asserted: the
demobilization of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara "will be the first step and the beginning of a long
journey to regain the state's monopoly over the means of coercion."53 4 However, it could only
engage in state-building where demobilization had weakened the paramilitary structures.
Accordingly, during the period 2003-2007, the Medellin government opted for a strategy of
minimal "articulated military contention" of the BCN's prerogatives; it did not contest the
BCN's control. 5 In 2008, it changed its policy and increased its levels of contention. It did so
530 Ex-commander, interview by author, Comuna 1, Medellin, March 2008.
531 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Comuna 6, Medellin, February 2008.
532 Ex-combatant, interview by author, Comuna 8, Medellin, March 2008.
533 Fearon 1995; Fearon 2004.
534 El Colombiano 2003.
5" See Stepan 1988.
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only after the BCN structure had begun to erode and thus, contesting its power no longer
threatened a return to fighting. This next section outlines these longitudinal dynamics.
Sergio Fajardo's Administration in Medellin (2003-2007): A Strategy of Co-optation
A state strategy of co-optation dominated for the first years after the BCN's disarmament.
Its intact organizational capacity produced a deterrent effect. Had the Medellin administration
confronted the BCN's prerogatives in these years, it would have sparked a return to war with the
victor unclear. The peace terms held; the government's probability of successfully state-
building - winning a war against the BCN - was unimproved. It was therefore in the state's
interest to cooperate with the BCN; "compromised peace [was] better than war."5 36
The Democracy Corporation implicitly promised to keep levels of violence to a minimum
if Mayor Fajardo allowed it to continue exercising control over the barrios' social and political
life (and narco-trafficking). In other words, the Fajardo administration settled for a sort of
'ceasefire' as opposed to demanding a full dismantling of the organization and its criminal and
governing functions. Accordingly, during these years, the Democracy Corporation continued to
operate as a quasi-state in large expanses of Medellin and eastern Antioquia. The Fajardo
government recognized that DDR processes are, by definition, gradual and long-term, and that
co-optation may become possible only over time. The Medellin government's strategy mirrors
that of the Colombian state everywhere the paramilitary organizations were strongly networked
and clustered and thus firmly intact post-war.
Thus, in the short and medium terms, the Medellin administration collaborated with the
BCN structure. It engaged in joint policing with former combatants and thereby facilitated the
entry of police forces into the neighborhoods to which they had had no access in the past.
Demobilized fighters were given radios so that the leaders could be in permanent contact with
536 Gersen Arias, interview by author, BogotA, 2008.
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their 'boys' and receive detailed, local intelligence on public order in the neighborhoods. Some
of this information the ex-commanders then passed on to the police with whom they had direct
phone access. Testimonies from San Javier, Popular, and Villa Hermosa about this collaborative
relationship abound. During my interviews in 2007-8, ex-BCN commanders complained that the
police acted through them because they were the ones the population turned to when there was a
problem. When a new police chief was assigned to a neighborhood, the first thing s/he did was
go to the ex-combatant 'coordinator' of the barrio, introduce him/herself and seek the
coordinator's collaboration. 537 For example, when there were several violent deaths in Villa
Hermosa on Easter in 2007, the police went directly to the former BCN commanders to clarify
the situation. The police chiefs claimed that this produced effective operations without civilian
deaths. One ex-combatant boasted, "The police forces are too weak... They can't do anything
without us [the demobilized]. The police depend on us."5 38 A Reintegration Program officer,
when asked if the people in the barrios really called the authorities, replied, "If it is a small
threat, yes. If it is a big threat, no, they just kill the person, often calling on the ex-combatant
structures to help."5 39
Decay in Organizational Capacity
Over time, however, the mechanisms that sustained the BCN (Democracy Corporation)'s
organizational collective action - dense bonds and physical concentration - began to erode.
Reintegration requires a psychological transformation from a military mentality to a civilian one.
This transformation is slow and gradual. The Colombian government's High Commission for
Reintegration (ACR) recognized this and decided to extend the reintegration program to
m Ex-commander (Elected to Comuna 8's Community Action Board (JAG)), interview by author, Medellin, 25
February 2008.
538 Ex-commander, interview by author, Comuna 6, Medellin, 28 February 2008.
539 Ex-militia Member, Scholar of the Conflict, and Director of the Security Branch of the Reintegration Program,
interview by author, Medellin, 27 February 2008.
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demobilized combatants indefinitely. Doing so enabled the program to draw 80% of the former
fighters in Medellin into 'legality' by 2008 and to erode the Democracy Corporation's cohesion
and its commanders' power.540
The former combatants now had something to lose by returning to fighting. They were five
years older than when they demobilized. "They had tested the benefits of civilian life, education,
job training, legal earnings, and constructing familial and social links as non-combatants." 541
These links began to pose a counterforce to remobilization. Sergio Mauricio, a former BCN
combatant explained, "Now I worry about my homework, now I worry about working for the
community... now I dedicate time to my children ... For me it is a luxury to sleep all night... go
to bed at six at night and wake up at six in the morning having slept calmly, without having
stayed up all night [patrolling]... now I think more about my family, my future."s42 According to
an ex-militia, "It is now easier to recruit new people to fight rather than demobilized ones.. .The
demobilized now have a different culture among them that isn't useful to armed groups. They
have attended too many psychological workshops!" 543 In addition, internal divisions and
splintering began to emerge within the Democracy Corporation and the "glue" that had kept it
cohesive corroded.
Evidence of this organizational decay becomes clear when one compares the responses to
two government actions: 1) the issuing of an arrest warrant for BCN commander 'Don Berna' in
2005 for the murder of Congressman Benitez; and 2) the extradition of 'Don Berna' to the US in
2008 on drug trafficking charges. In response to the former event, the ex-BCN combatants
paralyzed Medellin for a day by shutting down all buses and public transportation in the entire
540 Fundaci6n Ideas para la Paz 2009.
541 Fundaci6n Ideas para la Paz 2009.
542 Ex-combatant, interview by Programa Paz y Reconciliaci6n, Medellin, 2006.
543 Ex-militia member and Director of the Security Branch of the Reintegration Program, interview by author,
Medellin, 27 February 2008.
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Metropolitan area in protest. In response to the latter event, there was no disturbance or protest of
any kind by the former combatants. After several years of the state's co-opting strategy and
reintegration's decaying effects, the BCN's command and control had been damaged. Its
remilitarization became costly and unlikely.
As the BCN weakened, it lost its deterrent potential and its implicit and explicit bargains
with other illegal armed factions and with the state broke down. In 2008, criminal, armed actors
from Cali and Urabi tried to gain a foothold in Medellin. "Demobilized paramilitaries passed to
second in importance in the coercive world... Currently, all the names of those disputing the
illegal power in the city ... are of individuals which did not come from the ranks of the
paramilitaries." 544 Don Berna's BCN had lost its supremacy in the city. While the BCN's
capacity to return to war diminished, it still retained the Democracy Corporation structure and
extensive social and political activities and influence. 545
Alonso Salazar's Administration (2008-2009546): A Strategy of State-Building
Responding to the BCN's organizational decay, the Medellin government shifted its
strategy. In January 2008, Alonso Salazar took office as Medellin's mayor and continued a
policy of gradual erosion of the former paramilitary structure through co-optation. However, he
coupled this strategy with policies aimed at directly dismantling the BCN.547 Doing so was now
possible without risking the BCN's remilitarization. After six years, the BCN's former
combatants were brought into the state's legal and political framework passing from 'silent guns'
to no guns. The group's prerogatives decreased and the likelihood of conflict between the state
and the BCN organization diminished. The BCN passed the baton to the local government to
5 Fundaci6n Ideas para la Paz 2009.
5 Its success at maintaining and extending this influence, however, is yet to be seen.
546 This analysis concludes in early 2009 when I concluded my fieldwork. I therefore analyze Salazar's
administration only up to that date.
m Think-tank Analyst, interview by author, Bogoti, July 2008.
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assume the lead in fighting the new forces of violence and illegality. The police's capacity was
not yet sufficient to eradicate these groups and illegality remained too culturally and
economically embedded to quickly evaporate. Nonetheless, the Medellin government
substantially enhanced its power. Its sovereignty was no longer restricted to a small radius in the
center of Medellin; rather, by co-opting the BCN units, its reach extended into the city's
marginal neighborhoods and into the 30 municipalities to the east of Medellin. There, it began to
construct a slew of new libraries, metro-cables, parks, schools, and urban and rural development
projects. It began to state-build.548
VI. Quantitative Analysis
This chapter has laid out a theory of variation in remilitarization. It predicts that armed
organizations, whose capacity is preserved during the war to peace transition and whose region is
populated with similarly intact, formerly militarized groups, will retain passive guns initially
and, over time, fully demilitarize and reintegrate. In contrast, where demobilization disperses a
'non-local' organization's thinly linked ex-combatants and downgrades its capacity for collective
action, we should observe the remilitarization of its contiguous non-state armies and the
deployment of state institutions. This fragile organization should also redeploy defensively. To
test these hypotheses, I plan to estimate the following model of remilitarization.
Re militarize, = d+ PfPowerDiff + f 2 Loot + P3OnsetX +e,
5I should note that the inter-neighborhood dynamics of Medellin provide support to the model. Because the BCN
structures dissolved in Independencia I, II, III, El Salado, and 20 de Julio, as shown in Chapter 5, they left a vacuum
that the state's forces and other armed actors (namely the Cali drug cartel and Don Mario's forces) sought to fill. As
a result, Comuna 13 did not witness the same improvement in public order and enhancement of state capacity
experienced elsewhere in the city 2003-2008.
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The analysis is still in progress and thus I outline the empirical strategy, but do not report
the results. The dependent variable Remilitarize captures the degree to which organization o in
municipality m remilitarized. If my theory is correct, shocks in the distribution of power should
have a positive effect on the likelihood of remilitarization. In formal language: HO : #1 > 0. As
with the other models, I measure the dependent variable both as a dummy and then, relying on
survey data, measure it as a continuous variable, in this case: the percentage of organization o's
combatants in municipality m that have remilitarized. For the first measure, I use logit analysis;
for the second, I employ OLS. I control for resource-richness and a range of factors, denoted X,
which have been found to associate with civil war onset (militarization). This set of factors
includes geographic, economic, and demographic variables. I turn now to how I operationalize
these factors.
Generating the Dyads
To generate the dyads, I exploit data on the paramilitary battalions' zones of operation as
outlined in Chapter 5. I then create a database of all contiguous dyads, which operated either in
the same or in neighboring municipalities.
Measuring Remilitarization. In an ideal world, I would know exactly which individuals
had returned to violence and the groups to which they belonged. I would then link these post-
demobilization armed factions with the pre-demobilization ones to determine which groups had
remilitarized and which had not. For the reasons discussed in Appendix A, I am unable to
generate this optimal measure. However, I am able to approximate remilitarization in the
following two ways: first, I gained access to intelligence briefing sessions and confidential
BACRIM 549 data on the geographic locations of armed groups active after the demobilization
549 This is an inter-institutional agency charged with fighting the 'emerging criminal gangs' which is the
government's term for all armed groups including remilitarized paramilitaries, non-demobilized factions, historic
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process. I cross-check this data with qualitative information from interviews, newspaper articles,
OAS Peace monitors, and violent event reports to confirm that these remilitarized units are
neither new armed groups nor factions that never demobilized. I also use this qualitative data to
link these rearmed factions to the former ones and to ensure that the demobilized combatants
joined in a collective fashion and not as individuals (i.e. the organization remilitarized). I create
a dummy variable Remilitarize that assumes a value of 1 if the group remilitarized and 0
otherwise.
My second means of measuring remilitarization is to calculate the percentage of former
combatants from X faction in municipality Y who have returned to violence. To estimate this
percentage, I examine two populations.550 One, the imprisoned population of former fighters who
rearmed, were captured, and are now imprisoned (1,797 ex-combatants).551 This includes
individuals who have been convicted and those awaiting trial.55 2 Two, the ex-combatant
population in the state's reintegration program (28,500). This latter population is either
demilitarized or may be simultaneously committing acts of violence and participating in the
reintegration program. To estimate the first population, I collected data on the captured and
imprisoned ex-combatants: what armed factions they belonged to, what crimes they were
accused of committing, and where they were captured. I then realized a random survey of 120 of
these imprisoned former fighters (See Appendix C). For the second population of former
narco-trafficking cartels, small-scale criminal entities, and new armed groups. The agency consists of
representatives from the army, navy, air force, police, intelligence agencies, attorney general's office, and OAS
Peace Mission. Information is shared between these separate institutions to estimate the location and evolution of
these armed actors.
550 I also estimate the population of 'non-located' ex-combatants with whom the Reintegration Program lost contact.
To do so, I use survey data from the moment of their demobilization to see if they are systematically different than
those that remained in the program. Excluding them does not seem to bias the sample (See Appendix C).
"5 3,437 demobilized have been captured since 2003, but only 1,797 are currently imprisoned.
552 Those that have been convicted can be judged to have remilitarized (assuming confidence in the Colombian
judicial apparatus). Those who are still facing trial may have remilitarized or may be innocent. I also include the
1,032 ex-combatants that died while engaging in illegal activities. This data derives from the Instituto Nacional de
Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses.
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paramilitaries in the government's reintegration program, I use two measures to capture the
likelihood that these individuals have remilitarized. The first is an index, created using factor
analysis of a series of questions about the ex-combatants' proclivity to return to violence.5 5 The
second, provided by the psychologists, estimates the number of former fighters in each
municipality who the psychologists know or suspect to be involved with violent activities. I then
combine these data on the two populations to generate the percentage of each brigade-
municipality dyad's combatants that definitely or possibly have remilitarized.
Shocks to the Distribution of Power.
To capture shocks to the power differential between the units in each paramilitary dyad, I
adopt three strategies. First, I calculate the difference in the bankruptcy/survival indices of the
two paramilitary factions. I also test the difference in the combined network and clustering
indexes. Third, I engage in qualitative coding of the changes in the relative power of the two
brigade-municipality entities.
Resources. It is predicted that units endowed with natural resource wealth, criminal
opportunities or external support lack incentives to commit to peace because they accrue supra-
profits from war. We should thus expect a positive relationship between resource-richness and
remilitarization H2 : P3 > 0. To test this hypothesis, I use the measure of Loot described in
Chapter 5. I also test the 'greediness' of the leadership. To try to overcome the challenges of
measuring motivations ex-ante, I exploit the coding of experts from the Organization of
American States' Peace Mission, Colombian High Commission for Peace, and Organization of
International Migration who were present at the peace negotiations. I had these experts code each
paramilitary leader in a trichotomous fashion: pure narco (economically driven), pure self-
m This approach may suffer high attenuation bias or high non-response rate.
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defense (politically driven), or a mix of the two. The correlation between these ex-ante codings
and remilitarization is insignificant. When asked who they believed, based on motivations and
preferences, would redeploy, the experts' predictions proved highly incongruent with reality.
International Assurances. A prominent explanation of divergence in post-conflict
outcomes asserts that, given that no government exists post-war, armed groups require third-
party security guarantees to facilitate their demobilization. Thus, we should expect international
assurances to negatively correlate with the likelihood of remilitarization. To capture international
assurances, I count the number of international peace monitors per municipality at the moment of
disarmament.
Militarization Onset Variables. I also include a host of variables that have been found to
be correlated with civil war onset in the first place and thus may associate with war recurrence
(remilitarization). Chapter 8 outlines these 'feasibility' variables - poverty, rough terrain, and
demography - their predicted impacts, and their proxies in great detail and provides a rigorous
test of their impacts.
While the quantitative analysis is still underway, preliminary results offer support to the
model's predictions.
VII. Conclusion
This chapter explores variation in the return to violence across time and space. It finds
that organizations which recruit and deploy in a geographically concentrated fashion preserve a
high capacity for remobilization after disarming. When demobilization protects the distribution
of power between contiguous paramilitary factions, the peace bargains hold and the former
armed groups remain demilitarized, able to reign over their territories without visible violence. In
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contrast, downgrades in organizational capacity due to the post-war migration of a demobilizing
group's combatants destabilize the equilibriums. In these cases, war becomes preferable to peace
and violence ensues.
Taken together, Chapters 5-7 have explored and theorized about divergent post-war
trajectories: bankruptcy, campaigns, and guns. They have argued that armed organizations'
recruitment, deployment, and post-war migration patterns are powerful predictors of the paths
that these groups will take upon relinquishing their arms. The next chapter provides a rigorous
test of this theory against the dominant account of militarization and war: that of "feasibility
conditions." It also assesses whether my theory should remain quarantined to the study of pro-
state paramilitaries or if it also has analytic leverage in accounting for variation in anti-state rebel
organizations.
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Component Survey Questions: Index ofRemilitarization
[Survey of Ex-Combatants]
* Under what conditions is itjustified to return to violence?
Lack of money or poverty / Threats to one's life or that of a family member / Lack of employment
opportunities / Having being a victim / Orders of a commander / Pressure from family members /
Pressure from friends / In order to rapidly obtain economic benefits or power / No reason
* If someone is not respecting your rights, what is the best way to make them respect your rights?
Join an armed group / Support an armed group / Try to peacefully organize with other comrades from
your former armed group / Appeal to the state through peaceful means / Seek a political party to defend
your rights
* Have you been invited to return to be part of an armed group?
Yes / No
[Comprehensive Survey of Psychologists]
* How many ofyour ex-combatants do you suspect or know have been involved with illegal activities
since demobilizing?
*Does the individual ex-combatant reject the use of violence in the community?
Scale 1-5
* Has the paramilitary structure continued to exist after the demobilization as a new-armed group?
Yes / No
[Survey of Ex-Combatants' Families]
* Does the ex-combatant have friends that belong to armed groups?
Yes / No
Chapter 8
Colombia's Insurgencies, 1964-1984
This chapter evaluates the project's theory against the dominant account of variation in
militarization -'feasibility conditions.' The findings both motivate the preceding chapters and
are a logical extension of them. The analysis that follows begs for a more rigorous theory of why
legacies of violence are redeployed in certain cases and remain dormant and unexploited in
others - the principal goal of the prior sections of the dissertation. At the same time, the analysis
provides a further test of the theory at a different unit of analysis - that of the municipality - on a
different militarized actor - that of anti-state rebels - and in a different peace process - that of
the National Front of 1958. The chapter thus establishes the generalizability of the theory and
links it to the broader literature on the causes of war.
The chapter proceeds as follows: it presents the now conventional wisdom of
(re)militarization - feasibility conditions - and my strategy for measuring these conditions.5 54 It
then describes the proxies for legacies of war - specifically the dense social capital and clustered
ex-combatants which can be mobilized for insurgency. After introducing the coding criteria for
militarization, I present the empirical results based on a dataset of 274,428 municipality-month
observations. I conclude by contextualizing the statistically significant correlations and
evaluating if my theory's causal mechanisms operate as predicted in the cases of Colombia's
1960s rebel movements.
ss4 See Zukerman Daly 2010 for an exhaustive explanation of the relevant literatures, data and measures.
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I. Feasibility of Insurgency: Financial Resources, Recruits, and Refuge
The conventional view of militarization and remilitarization groups the two together and
codes them as '1's. 'Peace incidents' obtain a value of '0.' Scholars make no effort to separate
out the causes of war recurrence from those of initial war onset.5 55 Accordingly, while this
project speaks about the remilitarization phenomenon, it must evaluate its logic against theories
of militarization as the closest, existing, conceptual equivalents. In so doing, it links this project
on 'peace and return to violence' with the overwhelming body of literature on war onset.
Set against the traditional view of armed mobilization that argues that where socio-
economic,556 'personal integrity,' 55 7 or political558 grievances are high, organized violence is
likely, Collier and Hoeffler 2001559 and Fearon and Laitin 2003 set forth their feasibility
approach. Motivations for militarization, they argue, exist everywhere and yet insurgency only
breaks out in some places. They conclude that "what is critical is not whether people actually
have reason to commit violence, but what enables them to carry it out in particular circumstances
sss Empirically, 49 percent of civil wars that ended between 1945 and 1999 led to renewed war. Walter 2004 finds
that countries which have experienced one civil war are significantly more likely to experience a subsequent war
than are countries with no prior history of civil conflict. Collier 1999 similarly finds that, during the first five years
of peace following a civil war, countries face a 50% risk of renewed conflict. Walter explains war recurrence using
the onset variables capturing 'grievances' and Collier ignores the war recurrence finding as uninteresting.
556 Scholars of this school focus on relative deprivation, inequality, poverty, and land distribution as driving
violence. Representative of this school are Gurr 1970; Huntington 1968; Paige 1975; Muller and Seligson 1987; and
Russett 1964. It should be noted that these categories are my own. The scholars may not identify themselves in these
groupings.
557 Poe and Tate 1994, 854 coined this term. It refers to the grievances, which result from the denial of freedoms
from arbitrary arrest, torture, and death. Also emphasizing personal integrity grievances are Goodwin 2001;
Lichbach 1987; Gurr and Moore 1997; Mason 2004; Davenport 2007.
558 These include grievances arising from the denial of political participation and cultural self determination. See
Linz and Stepan 1996 and Rothschild 1981 who emphasize ethno-nationalist policies as engendering armed
movements; and Burton 1990 who highlights the denial of basic human needs (identity, recognition,
role/participation, and psychological security) as the propeller of violence.
559 Collier and Hoeffler have published a series of articles on the 'feasibility of' or 'opportunity for' rebellion. See
Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 1999, 2001.
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... feasibility is a rare phenomenon."1 60 Combined, these circumstances confer rebels access to
recruits, a sanctuary, and materiel and financial resources: the requisites of rebel viability. 561
Loot
First, 'feasibility scholars' posit that rebel groups require substantial financial revenues to
purchase armaments and materiel. They can derive funding from high value, low-weight goods
such as cocaine, opium, and gems, from extortion/'protection' of primary commodity extraction,
or from voluntary donations from the civilian population.562
H: Armed mobilization, seeking to capture and control lucrative resources should
be more likely to emerge in regions of coca and poppy cultivation, sites of gem
extraction, 563 and areas of higher land value, which afford elevated tax revenues.564
Additionally, the presence of oil fields, pipelines and refineries should associate
with a higher probability of rebellion.
To capture the 'availability of financial resources' and test H1, I evaluate several
variables: 1) Gems, indicating emerald, sapphire, and aquamarine locations identified in The
Oxford Economic Atlas of the World, 1972 and the location of gold and emerald mines from
CEDE data; 2) Oil - coded "1" for municipalities with oil fields, pipelines, or refineries. US
Department of Energy maps provide this data; 3) Coca2000 & Poppy1994, capturing peak coca
560 Sherman 2001, p. 28. Sherman summarizes the remarks of Paul Collier.
561 These circumstances confer rebels power relative to the government. The 'relative power' models are based on
the contest models of Gates 2002, which builds on the contest success functions of Hirshleifer 1989, 2000;
Skaperdas 1996. It should be noted that these 'correlates of war' in the cross-country literature are now well-
established. Hegre and Sambanis 2006 test the sensitivity of estimates of these correlates to changes in the
conditioning set and find these factors to be robust causes of civil war onset.
562 Le Billon 2001 provides a comprehensive analysis of different resources and their links with violent conflict. See
also Ross 2004; Auty 2004; de Soysa 2000.
563 Insurgencies in Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC, Burma, and Cambodia support this hypothesis. The
presence of diamonds/precious stones is not found to significantly contribute to civil war onset in studies by Ross
2004 and Humphreys 2003. However, the results have proven sensitive to the data. As more accurate data has been
compiled (Humphreys 2005; Lujala 2003; Ross 2006), the relationship between natural resources and conflict has
strengthened. A sub-national study of Sierra Leone by Bellows and Miguel 2008 also confirms the natural resource-
conflict correlation.
564 Ross 2004 concludes that some of the most widely-cited causal mechanisms involving oil, non fuel minerals and
drugs, appear to be validly related to civil conflict onset but that legal agricultural commodities are not.
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and poppy cultivation and thus the regions able to grow drugs;565 and 4) Landvalue, measuring
the average value of each municipality's land.
Recruits
Second, the 'feasibility conditions' theory proposes that, to achieve fighting capacity, a
rebel group requires a dependable source of recruits joining at a rate in excess of the death,
desertion, and retirement rates. Walter 2004 articulates this fact: "Civil wars will have little
chance to get off the ground unless individual farmers, shopkeepers, and workers voluntarily
choose to man the rebel armies." 66 Empirical studies of civil war use per capita income as a
proxy for recruitment. The rationale is twofold: 567 one, a prospective insurgent will weigh the
benefits of 'rebel life' - the income offered by the rebel organization through theft, looting,
access to land, and appropriation of taxing powers - against his/her best economic alternative. In
the case of low per capita income, the economic alternatives present low opportunity costs to
rebel enlistment and thus generate an abundant pool of recruits; and, two, only such an
economically opportunistic account of guerrilla enlistment avoids collective action, free-rider
and time-consistency problems.568
565 Coca Survey 2004, pp. 10, 44. It should be noted that coca was not grown in Colombia until the late 1970s and
Poppy not until the late 1980s. Coca and poppy data are available only for the period 1994 - 2005. This measure
thus captures regions with potential for illicit financial gain. Qualitative accounts provide approximations of the
'actual' zones of coca and marijuana plantings in 1960s and 1970s cultivation (Drugs) to enable me to test if the
rebellions emerged in regions already cultivating illicit crops.
566 Walter 2004, p. 4.
567 These studies assume a rational choice logic of recruitment whereby rational decision-makers assess their
predictions of opportunities and consequences of alternative actions and maximize their net benefits. Leites and
Wolf 1970 were the first to lay out this methodology, which has become commonplace in the contemporary civil
war literature. The translation of this income-war correlation to the sub-national level is not straightforward, as
Ostby, Hegre, and Raighleigh 2008 point out. Examining the spatial distribution of conflict events in the Liberian
civil war, they find that relatively richer areas experienced more conflict. A similar study of conflict events in
Indonesia (Barron, Kaiser and Pradhan 2004) finds no effect of income levels on violence.
568 Economically opportunistic rebel groups can overcome these problems because they do not seek victory and thus
do not require mass movements; the rebels need only control certain resources. This enables them to overcome the
coordination problem. Furthermore, these movements encounter no free rider or time-consistency hindrances
because only those who participate reap the rewards and such rewards can be used to immediately pay off other
rebels (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Grossman 1999) See also Oyefusi 2008 for a test of this theory in Nigeria using
individual-level survey data.
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H2: The lower the economic opportunities available in the local economy, the
higher the likelihood of the insurgency's emergence. 569
I use per capita income and also a poverty measure - "Unsatisfied Basic Needs (NBI)57 0
- to gauge the size of the population with a low threshold for joining a militarized movement.57 1
Refuge
Up until now, the project has not considered the role of physical geography which
features prominently in the existing literatures. The 'feasibility' approach states that nascent
insurgencies are numerically weak relative to the government. This implies that, to survive,
militants must be able to hide and avoid denunciation. Dense forests and jungles and
mountainous terrain provide insurgents camouflage against detection and aerial attack and
facilitate free movement of their combatants and arms.572 Rough terrain also confers rebels local
knowledge superior to that of the government, enabling them to credibly threaten inhabitants
retaliation for denunciation.573 Cross-border sanctuaries provide an additional source of refuge
from government troops.574 It follows that:
H3: Insurgencies should be more likely to establish battalions and engage in
offensive activity in dense forests and jungles. Mountainous terrain should
associate with a higher risk of militarization. And the presence of international
borders should favor rebellion by providing cross-border sanctuaries and access to
international arms and illicit drug trades. 5
Large populations, low population density, and low road density further provide
insurgents refuge by inhibiting state policing. Large municipal populations make "keep[ing] tabs
569 These approaches ignore the multiplicity of motives for joining armed groups - social networks, revenge,
resentment, and security.
570 Calculated with information from the 1985 Colombian Census.
571 Ex-combatants, interviews by author, Colombia, June-August 2006.
572 According to Colombian military analyst, Roman Ortiz, the jungle's heat interferes with the army's radar system,
rendering the techniques to locate insurgents inoperative (Roman Ortiz (Military Analyst), interview by author, July
2006).
53 Fearon and Laitin 2003, p. 80; See also DeRouen and Sobek 2004.
54 Byman et al. 2001 explore the aid neighboring states (and their populations) offer insurgencies. This aid includes
safe havens, arms, money, materiel, intelligence, training, and organizational guidance.
s7s See Englebert, Tarango and Carter 2002.
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on who is doing what at the local level"5 76 more difficult and the pool of potential recruits
deeper."7 Geographic dispersion of the population further complicates policing.578 Additionally,
in the absence of adequate road systems, the police and government cannot penetrate rural areas.
H4: Holding all else constant, larger population size and lower population density
should be correlated with higher likelihood of rebellion onset.
Hs: Low road density should favor guerrilla presence.
For H3 , I use an Instituto Geografico Agustin Codazzi (IGAC) map series of each
department's vegetation and forests. For mountainous terrain, I exploit an elevation measure
from IGAC maps 1971, which reports the average altitude of each municipality. I also construct
a more detailed measure of topography, which measures if the municipality's terrain is 'strongly
inclined' or 'very steep.' 579 This ensures that high elevation plateaus are not coded as
mountainous terrain and that low altitude rough terrain is not coded as flat. I also include a
dummy variable for municipalities which adjoin an international border (DANE's Marco
Geoestadistico Nacional). For H4 , I use Colombian Census Data from 1951, 1964, and 1973 .580 I
also consider a measure of municipal population dispersion: residents per squared kilometer
using the Census data and municipal land area from Law 1999.581 For H5 , I rely on Instituto
Geogrdfico Agustin Codazzi political-geographic maps from 1949, 1970, and 1980.582 I consider
576 Fearon and Laitin 2003, p. 81.
57 Fearon and Laitin 2003 and Collier and Hoeffler 2001 find population size statistically significant at the cross-
national level, but treat it as marginal analytically. See also Raleigh and Hegre 2009 for population findings using
ACLED data.
578 Herbst 2000 provides a seminal discussion of this demographic variable in Africa. He models state strength as
proportionate to the distance from the government's capital and dependent on infrastructure, geography and
population. Collier and Hoeffler include a measure of population dispersion in their analysis, but find it only slightly
significant.
579 I am grateful to Fabio Sinchez and CEDE for this data.
580 To avoid endogeneity, I use lagged population data to capture population levels prior to the emergence of a
viable insurgency in the municipality
581 Law provides the size (km squared) of Colombia's departments and municipalities. For missing data, I use the
department population density calculated as follows: (Department A 's population - Sum of all known municipal
populations in department A) / (Department A's land area - Sum of all know municipal land areas in department A).
This measure takes advantage of all known data.
582 The Mapa Vialy Artesanal 1976 proved the most informative.
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the total kilometers of primarily or secondary roads (both paved and unpaved) and railroads in
the municipality. Given the importance of river transport in Colombia, I also consider the
kilometers of navigable rivers in the municipality.
II. Organizational Legacies of War
La Violencia
This project predicts that remilitarization differs from militarization in the first place; it
flourishes in locations of past violence. These locations confer organizational residue of war
resulting from recruitment, deployment, and migration patterns. Where there are changes in the
distribution of power as a result of demobilization, we should witness the reactivation of this
residue.
H6 : Areas affected by La Violencia and its guerrilla movements should be more
likely to experience insurgency than those municipalities untouched by the
internecine political strife of 1946-1958.
I use two measures of 'legacies of violence.' The first captures where violence occurred
1946-1958. For this, I use a dummy, which assumes a value of '1' if violent deaths occurred in
the municipality, '0' otherwise. The second measure records the presence of liberal and
communist guerrillas 1948-1958. These data derive from the 'truth commission' of Guzmin el
al. 1962. Through the Office of Rehabilitation, these violentologists narrated what happened
during La Violencia.583 I also rely on the ethnographies of Ortiz 1985; Casas 1987; Roldin 2002;
and Henderson 1985; Marulanda V6lez 1973; the National Police's Revista de Criminalidad; and
Sanchez and Meertens 2001's more macro data on la Violencia.
5 I am grateful to Fabio Sdnchez and Mario Chac6n for providing me access to their digitalized version of this data.
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State-Building Priorities
This project further posits that, in the aftermath of a peace process, the state seeks to
regain a Weberian monopoly over the means of violence and to establish its presence and
authority in areas formerly under armed group control. In this pursuit, it finds itself subject to a
budget constraint; it cannot do so everywhere at once and must therefore prioritize. We should
expect the state to deploy its forces and institutions to regions in which its capacity is weak and
in which the populations pose a threat to 'national security.' Given the Cold War context in
which the Colombian rebellions emerged, we should anticipate communism to constitute such a
threat. Where state-building challenges the prerogatives of latent, coercive organizational
structures, remilitarization should result.
H7: Insurgency should be more likely to emerge in areas dominated by the political
left (Marxist-Leninism, Maoism, etc.).
Hs: Zones with weak state presence should correlate with a higher probability of
rebellion.
I use a dummy measure to test H7. It captures if a majority of the municipal population
voted for leftist candidates during all elections 1930-1982.584 Pinzon de Lewin 1989 compiles
this data from the Colombian Electoral Statistics. For H8 , I use two measures of state presence.5 85
First, I code the municipality's distance to the department's capital and then calculate a variable
- State Presence - which measures if this distance exceeds 100 kilometers. 586 Second, I consider
a measure of the distance between the municipality and the principal economic markets.587
584 Leftist candidates ran as registered Liberals until 1972, in accordance with the National Front rules. Thereafter,
they ran as third parties. There was likely abstention by candidates as well. Pinz6n de Lewin 1989 describes loyalty
to the Left as often commensurate to that for traditional parties (29).
585 Herbst 2000.
586 Distance to the capital may also proxy for what Gates 2002 refers to as ethnic distance in the ethnic civil war
literature. The same concept may apply to non-ethnic wars in that distance from the government may facilitate rebel
enlistment, solidarity and retention, and civilian non-denunciation.
587 This derives from SAnchez' data.
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I also include a final measure of Liberal political preferences. All violence and seven
major wars between Colombia's independence and 1958 occurred along the lines of these
"hereditary [partisan] hatreds"588 between Liberals and Conservatives.589 We should therefore
expect this pattern of conflict to continue with the rebellions a reincarnation of past
insurgencies. 590
H: Insurgent activity should be greater, on average, in Liberal Party strongholds.
For H9, I use two measures of Liberal party affiliation: a dummy variable indicating if the
municipality population consistently voted for the Liberal Party between 1931 and 198259' and a
measure of whether over 60% of the county's citizens voted for the Liberal Party in the 1946
presidential elections.592
III. Modeling Insurgency in Colombia
To evaluate my theory of remilitarization against the dominant account, I analyze an
original, longitudinal, municipality-level dataset. Before presenting the empirical analysis, I will
introduce the sub-national method and data and define the coding criteria for the dependent
variable.
588 Dix 1987, p. 92.
589 Political parties in Colombia resembled ethnic groups; party allegiance was inherited; one's political identity was
commonly known. See Schmidt 1974, p. 105. Party carnets (membership cards), first issued in the 1920s, resembled
ethnic passports. Each neighborhood was politically homogenous. According to Fals Borda 1962, localities were
either homogenously Conservatives or Liberals, with mixed communities rare. When families migrated, they tended
to move to neighborhoods of the same political affiliation (p. 43). Dix 1987 describes Liberals and Conservatives as
"two races which live side by side and hate each other eternally."
590 Schmidt 1974 writes of the post- Violencia era: "People still perceive of violence in terms of political parties; still
conserve a large amount of partisan consciousness, continue to hate the opposition for what they believe it did and to
a great degree still trust and rely upon their own party as a source of security" (p. 109).
591 The variable is coded "1" - 'traditionally' Liberal - if in all elections 1931-1982 (with a maximum of one
deviation) the Liberal party won a majority in the municipality. It is coded "0" if, 1931-1982, the Conservative Party
won a majority in all elections (save one), if the municipality changed majority party (between Liberal and
Conservative) more than once, or if the population supported a non-traditional party in more than one election.
592 I aggregate the number of votes for all lists with Liberal Party affiliation and divide by the total vote minus the
null vote.
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Sub-National Methodology. The scores of empirical studies of civil war that followed
Fearon and Laitin and Collier and Hoeffler's seminal pieces primarily analyze cross-national
variation. 593 These works aggregate to the national level variables which generally vary
substantially at the sub-national level. Additionally, especially at their outset, armed mobilization
rarely spans the state's entire territory; rather, it concentrates in very specific geographic
locations. Thus, there arises an ecological inference problem: catalysts of violence are captured
at the country level while the violence and hypothesized logic is 'intensely localized.' It follows
that there is a mismatch; to correctly identify the conditions favoring militarization, we must
look at the conditions in the areas where the militarization began. If the rebels were active only
in the flat plains, the country's rough terrain may have little to do with facilitating insurgency.
National aggregates or averages do not capture the proposed micro-level mechanisms and logics
of violence and thus, our now conventional wisdoms of the correlates of war have yet to be
tested with the appropriate research design. Geographically-disaggregated data is required on
both the incidence of militarization and the factors predicted to cause it.
This dissertation project's model, methodology, and data offer and advocate for such a
sub-national analysis. Colombia, as mentioned above, is one of the 'feasibility' theories' stated
prototypes and thus offers a critical case. For these theories to hold, it must be the case that
armed organizations arose in the regions of Colombia where feasibility conditions were
strongest. 594
593 Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Collier et al. 2003; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2001, 2002;
Hegre et al. 2001; Reynal-Querol 2002; Gleditsch et al. 2002. Murdoch and Sandler 2002; Reynal-Querol 2002; Ron
2005; Sambanis 2002; Fearon 2004.
594 The Colombian scholarship makes this claim with respect to the 1990s system of violence between the guerrillas,
paramilitaries, and narcotraffickers. Rare is a contemporary study of Colombia that does not focus exclusively on
the drug, profit, greed and terrain aspects of the conflict. See, for example Sanchez, Diaz and Formisano 2003;
Bottia 2003; Diaz and Sanchez 2004; Richani 1997, 2002; Rabasa and Chalk 2001; SAnchez 2001; International
Crisis Group 2002; and Angrist and Kugler 2008 who all focus on the nexus between drugs and political violence.
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The chapter quantitatively analyzes an original dataset of 274,428 municipality-month
observations to determine the correlates of (re)militarization. These data include detailed, geo-
referenced information on the victims and perpetrators (state, rebel, paramilitary, criminal) and
on the kind and intensity of the 7,729 violent events. By exploiting this data, the analysis seeks to
overcome the measurement errors in the existing cross-national and sub-national datasets, which
are rarely addressed. Specifically, it introduces new, fine-grained measures which better proxy
our theoretical concepts and enable causal identification to parse out divergent causal stories.595
It takes great effort to collect new data in order to measure the variables in an ex-ante and
longitudinal fashion to avoid the endogeneity that currently plagues much of the civil war
literature. 596 Cross-sectional correlations with variables measured after fighting has (re)begun
cannot help us disentangle the theoretically complex interpretations of the causes of war. In
contrast to other existing databases on civil conflict and violence, the analysis relies not on
Western, English-language news sources, but on Colombian, Spanish-language ones to avoid
selection bias. 597 Rather than exploiting data at the country or first-order administrative level
(state), this chapter, as the rest of the dissertation, uses data at a disaggregated level, in this case,
the smallest administrative unit of analysis - the municipality - in order to gain precise locations
of violence, but also to obtain accurate measures of the independent variables, which are usually
collected by administrative units.598 In addition, the data defines militarization not narrowly as
However, correlation between the geographic distribution of the feasibility conditions and that of the insurgencies'
onset has never been proven.
595 For example, with cross-sectional data, conflict could contribute to poverty directly, as well as being driven by
poverty itself.
596 Most studies, for instance, rely on forest data collected in 1999 and population data for the 1990s for all data
points back to 1945 (FAO 1999; CIESIN 2000).
597 ACLED data are based on a number of information sources, primarily press accounts from Keesings, Africa
Confidential, Africa Research Notes, African Contemporary Reports, books written on particular conflicts, and in
later years, IRIN and other humanitarian agencies. This reliance on Western, English-language news reports
introduces concerns of selection bias.
598 Studies relying on the 100 km2 grid cell format admittedly do not have sub-national data on income levels,
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battles, but instead as the entire repertoire of violence that suggests the presence of a militarized
organization. These include not only confrontations with government troops, but also captures of
towns, rapes, kidnappings, highway piracy, extortion, guerrilla summits, electoral interferences,
massacres of civilians, graffiti, attacks on infrastructure and pipelines, and displacement. Finally,
nearly all studies of civil war measure militarization onset according to a threshold of either 25
or 1,000 battle related deaths. 599 Relying only on English-language sources, these thresholds and
thus the war onsets are often erroneously determined. In the Colombian case, the rebellions were
underway for 20 years before Colombia became coded '1' - presence of an insurgency - in these
datasets.600 Measuring violence only once it has already become high intensity increases
endogeneity problems.601 Finally, this chapter employs the mixed-method approach of the
broader project, embedding the microeconomic statistical study of violence in a detailed
historical narrative that relies on guerrilla autobiographies, diaries, social histories and over 60
interviews of ex-rebels and experts on their organizations.
(Re)Militarization
For the analyses, I measure the dependent variable, militarization, in two ways: first, as
the incidence of guerrilla activity in municipality m in month t. The database includes 7,729
insurgent violent events based on daily reports, which collapse into 3,899 municipality-month
observations. This outcome variable captures the ability of an insurgency to be active and carry
inequality, public services, elections and other variables, which are measured by administrative units. These studies
use roads to proxy for wealth. See, for example, Buhaug and Gates. 2002. However, roads capture the state
capacity causal story attributed to Fearon and Laitin 2003, but not the opportunity cost one of Collier and Hoeffler
2004.
599 The literature defines civil war onset as 1,000 combat-related deaths per year with both the government forces
and rebels suffering 5% of the casualties. See Singer and Small 1982; Collier and Hoeffler 2001. Most empirical
civil war scholars use this definition or a slight variation thereof.
600 In fact, Colombia was only coded a '1' for civil war in 1984, the year when a cease fire was signed with the
rebels.
601 The ACLED data, for example, code Burundi's war from 2003-2009 when the war endured from 1993-2005 and
code the Liberian war from 2002 when the fighting began in 1989.
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out violence in a specific, geographic space. Second, I seek to capture where militarization was
successful. For this analysis, I collapse the data and measure the dependent variable
dichotomously as '1' if a rebellion was viable in municipality m, '0' otherwise. I measure
viability by combining two sources of information: 1) the ability to carry out enduring violence.
Thus, an insurgency is deemed viable if it was able to carry out three acts in the municipality; 2)
I triangulate this violent event data with qualitative data on the insurgencies' fronts
(battalions).602 To form a front, the militarization must have achieved a level of success in the
area. Thus, front formation proxies for a viable insurgent presence. Combining these two sources
of information, I code the municipalities in which the rebels established a 'viable' presence '1.'
Cross-referencing the two sources of information enables me to overcome the problem of 'if a
tree falls in the forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?" because violence is
not a perfect indicator of successful militarization as insurgents in the forest do not need to carry
out violence if they have no competition. In these cases, they thus retain only 'latent' structures.
This study examines the period from the insurgencies' inceptions in 1964 to the civil war
literature's coding of Colombia as 'civil war positive' in 1984.603 This time period (1964-1984)
enables the project to speak to the empirical violence literature. 604 The data derives from
newspaper articles from the Colombian newspaper, El Tiempo, taken from the archives of
Colombia's national library, La Biblioteca Luis Angel Arrango. The articles were photographed
602 A 'front,' according to the guerrillas' military structure (and similar to that of the paramilitaries), consists of at
least 110 guerrillas operating in a geographic jurisdiction. "The front organization is determined not by the quantity
of men, but by the physical area occupied, that is the 'area of operations.'" (Estatuto de las FARC-EP, Chapter 2,
Article 3). See Rabasa and Chalk 2001 and Ferro Medina and Uribe Ram6n 2002 for a description of FARC's
organizational structure.
603 Extensive interviews with experts on the rebel organizations in Colombia confirm the appropriateness of these
dates (See Appendix B).
604 If I restrict the analysis to the pre-1983 period, I risk explaining a phenomenon distinct from that explored in this
literature. If I instead restrict the analysis to the post-1984 period, I ignore the over 7,000 violent events carried out
by rebels in the two decades prior.
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and then coded. They amount to 7,665 newspaper-days. 60 5 The guerrilla front data derives from
military intelligence reports and from the former Vice Presidency's Human Rights official,
Camilo Echandia Castilla.
IV. Empirical Analysis
Why does (re)militarization occur in some regions of a country and not in others? This
analysis focuses on variation across space rather than across organizations. Table 18 shows the
results of the logit multivariate analyses using Insurgent Activity as the outcome variable and the
conceptually optimal measures of the explanatory factors.606 Again, this dependent variable
captures the ability of an insurgency to be active and carry out violence in geographic space m in
month t. This table presents the feasibility model, organizational legacies of war model and the
combined model. Table 20 presents the same analyses, but instead using Insurgent Success as the
dependent variable. 607 This outcome is insurgent viability - the ability to carry out enduring
violence and establish rebel fronts in municipality m. Table 19 & 21 show several robustness
checks. Model 1 in both Tables 19 & 21 estimates the equation using an alternative set of proxies
for the concepts and Model 2 in these tables uses rare events analysis (King and Zeng 2001).
Finally, I collapse the events into cross-sectional data to see if the theory holds (Model 3 in Table
19). For greater controls, I also include measures of ethnicity and inequality in several of the
models.608
605 Of these, approximately 240 days had newspaper pages either missing or damaged.
606 The Tables present estimated coefficients. I convert these into odds ratios in the text to give a more intuitive
understanding of the variables' substantive effects.
607 I also test clustering observations by department to account for the possible lack of independence of observations
within the same department. Results do not change.
608 For Ethnicity, I derive data on afro-descendent and indigenous population sizes from the Colombian census.
Unfortunately, the census did not collect ethnic identity data prior to 1993. However, these populations have
remained concentrated in certain regions for decades. For Inequality, I use land gini coefficients calculated by the
Instituto Geografico Agustin Codazzi in 1985.
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The data show that 'feasibility' conditions cannot postdict (re)militarization onset.
Measures of the organizational legacies of war, specifically past violence, guerrilla movements,
and regions identified as 'state-building' priorities, perform better.
Lootable Resources
The descriptive statistics support the "financial feasibility" thesis; insurgency episodes,
on average, had higher levels of poppy and coca cultivation than did non-insurgency episodes.
However, when I control for demographic and socio-political-historical variables, these effects
disappear across most specifications of the model and measurements of the variables. There is no
significant correlation between the presence of gemstones and gold and the rebellions'
emergence and offensives.609 The effect is similarly insignificant for the measure of emerald
mines, the more lootable and historically smuggled good in Colombia. 610 Last, as demonstrated
in Tables 18 and 20, the presence of oil fields, refineries and pipelines are not associated with
systematically higher risks of insurgency onset. Only in the rare events analysis of insurgent
violence (Model 5) was the effect significant, suggesting a potential, underlying effect clouded
by the structure of the data in which observations positive for rebellion are relatively scarce.
Only poppy growing remains significant in several specifications. However, it is highly
improbable that the insurgents attacked and sought control of regions with poppy growing
potential in 1964-1984 as poppy emerged in Colombia only in 1986-87.611
609 This effect is surprising given Colombia's long history of emerald smuggling. However, the emerald mines are
concentrated in the Magdalena Medio region, which saw guerrilla presence for reasons independent of the mines and
related to past violence (Expert on the guerrilla organizations, interview by author, BogotA, January 2008). See
Richani 2003, pp. 22-25.
610 Gold mines reach significance in certain model specifications. However, qualitative evidence does not offer
credence to this relationship
611 Thoumi 2001, p. 91. I should note that the coefficients on the other variables do not change when Poppy is
omitted from the analysis. Coca was not cultivated in Colombia in any sizeable amount until the late 1970s and 80s.
I therefore also code qualitative sources of data on marijuana and cocaine plantings in the 1960s and 70s. The
marginal significance of Drugs remains.
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The insignificance of Coca, Poppy, and Oil undermines the profit-maximizing "drug
baronies" 12 thesis, both derivative of and applied to the case of Colombia. It follows that
finances are not the binding constraint on insurgency; 'soldiers never go hungry.' The
insignificance of loot even in Colombia points to a misconception about rebel financing. During
my time in the field, I observed the diversity of armed organizations' financing. Nearly
everything can be taxed from bananas to cows to buses (that is how governments run!). Thus
even small-scale business owners and peasants can provide sufficient extortion fees or 'voluntary
donations' to support an incipient armed group. Add to these finances the resources derived from
theft and kidnapping and, in the absence of high-value, lootable goods such as drugs and gems,
there is still sufficient funding for insurgency. Thus, unsurprisingly, Land Value also proved
insignificant. 613
Refuge
Scholars of civil war conceive of Colombia as the natural habitat for insurgency - high
mountains, poor infrastructure, and unmonitored borders. Contrary to the 'feasibility'
predictions, insurgent groups were less likely to establish a presence and perform operations in
mountainous terrain, 6 14 though the effect is not substantively meaningful or significant across all
models. Meanwhile, municipalities aligning an international border were not correlated with the
risk of rebellion.6 15 The armed groups were marginally more likely to operate in densely forested
612 Collier and Hoeffler 1999, p. 1. See also Collier 2000; Grossman 1999.
613 In the rare events analysis, higher land value was associated with a lower risk of insurgency, further calling into
question the 'greed' thesis.
614 Colombian's mountainous regions are, on average, more densely populated (r =. 15) and, as is to be expected,
road and population density are positively correlated (r =. 16). By omitting the population density variable, Fearon
and Laitin 2003 bias their terrain variables.
615 Border proves entirely statistically insignificant in all specifications of the model. This may be the case because
insurgencies need not establish themselves directly on the border to enjoy cross-border sanctuaries. The guerrillas,
specifically the FARC, controlled the frontier of 'civilization' with little except rainforest lying between its fronts
and the Venezuelan, Brazilian, and Ecuadorian borders (though notably, FARC established fronts not only on the
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municipalities, though the effect is again not significant.616 While the sign and significance of the
coefficient on road density is consistent with the stated hypothesis, the variable is not
substantively meaningful. These counterintuitive results suggest that terrain, geography, and
infrastructure have been given undue emphasis in the civil war literature.
Holding the other measures constant, population level and density prove highly
significant in a statistical, but not substantive sense. A one unit increase in population size
multiplies the odds of experiencing an insurgency by 1; in other words it leaves the odds
unchanged. Similar results hold for population density. A one percent increase in population
density reduces the odds of rebellion by 10%. Theoretically, the direction of these coefficients
makes sense. To keep tabs on a larger number of people spread over a larger area, counter-
insurgency forces must literally spread themselves thin. However, on the basis of the
coefficients' magnitudes, it is fair to conclude that these effects are unimportant.
Poverty
Militarization should be higher, on average, in impoverished areas. Contrary to H2, the
rebel organizations were less likely to gain a foothold in areas of high poverty, as demonstrated
by the negative, statistically significant coefficient for NBI - the % of the municipal population
with unsatisfied basic needs. GDP per capita measures, meanwhile, proved statistically
insignificant across all specifications.
In sum, the feasibility model has very low explanatory power with a pseudo R2 ranging
from 0.043 to 0.059. To further evaluate the explanatory value of the 'feasibility conditions,' I
employ a Wald Test which assesses the joint hypothesis that the coefficients on the feasibility
frontier). Border's insignificance does, however, suggest that proximity to population centers matters more to
insurgents than cross-border refuge and control of international arms and drug smuggling routes.
616 The forest data is only available for a fraction of the municipalities. I therefore do not include Forest in most of
the models as it would restrict the sample significantly.
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conditions are zero; that they have no effect. I cannot reject this hypothesis even at the 10% level
(p= 0.14).
Organizational Legacies of War
Consistent with this project's framework, the measures for both past violence and past
guerrilla organization were positive and highly significantly correlated with (re)militarization.
The odds of rebels successfully establishing a presence are six times greater in areas affected by
La Violencia than in areas which had not experienced past strife.617 This result is significant
across all specifications of the model, measurements of the concepts, levels of aggregations of
the data, and units of analysis.
Combining these significant effects, we get a very different story of the onset of
insurgency than that offered by contemporary civil war scholars. Militarization did not begin in
the municipalities which conferred rough (mountainous, forested, inaccessible) terrain, cross-
border sanctuaries, exploitable natural resources, and abundant impoverished recruits. Instead,
insurgency proved most successful in municipalities affected by La Violencia, which were
targeted as state-building priorities. These findings reorient the analysis away from physical
geography and loot and back to the population that picks up arms and fights and the
organizations that structure their collective action.
Past war and former guerrilla armies capture and proxy for the organizational legacies of
violence. As Selznick indicates and this project confirms, organizations act as receptacles of
collective action that can be appropriated for any future forms of cooperation: renewed
insurgency, criminal activity or political mobilization (Popkin 1979; Coleman 1988; Tarrow
1998). To mount an insurgency, militants often co-opt existing collective action and networks in
617 When I measure insurgency as 'viability' (fronts combined with armed activity), this effect drops to a three times
greater odds of successful militarization.
252
order to overcome collective action, commitment, and monitoring problems (Granovetter 1973).
They may co-opt non-violent protest movements, tribes or political parties or, very efficiently,
they may co-opt a previous armed structure and its social web.
Where 'strong' and sustained post-conflict, the militant ties constrain each ex-combatant.
They apply social pressure to follow those to whom s/he is strongly connected and they link
his/her self-identity and status to that of the network (Petersen 2001; Calhoun 1991). If preserved
post-demobilization, the network will pull its former members down the path of the armed
organization: back to rebellion, towards violent crime, or into peaceful (political) activities. In
this way, the network serves as a latent structure, which can be redeployed.
While the literature often treats the FARC, ELN, EPL, MOEC, M19, PCC-ML, FUAR
and the other guerrilla armies of Colombia as new groups which emerged in the 1960s as a result
of urban, radical intellectuals' instigations, in fact, they built strongly upon the organizational
legacies of the guerrilla armies of La Violencia. It could be argued that they would not have
succeeded absent these legacies, which produced the "conditions favoring insurgency" in
Colombia. This previous civil war created durable rebel networks and organizations that
revolutionaries in the 1960s exploited. An estimated 20,000 men bore arms in the Liberal
guerrilla formations between 1949 and 1953. The peace agreement - which ended La Violencia -
did not provide these combatants adequate demobilization, disarmament and rehabilitation
programs. General Pinilla Rojas offered amnesties in 1953-4 and in 1958,618 and created a
618 Rojas issued three presidential decrees offering amnesties and pardons. These proved initially successful with
7,000 guerrillas surrendering in the first ten months of Rojas' regime. Thereafter, the programs' numbers declined
though the exactly number of ex-combatants demobilizing vary across sources. See Guzman et al. 1962 and Molano
1980.
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program for the "reincorporation of political criminals back into social [civilian] life." 619
However, the initiatives came to be underfinanced and eventually abandoned.620
The revolutionaries of the 1960s co-opted the liberal guerrillas' structures with their
contacts, social capital, war training, territory, command and control, mid-level commanders,
recruits, knowledge of the terrain, and non-denunciation by civilian communities. It was on the
basis of these demobilized structures that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),
National Liberation Army (ELN), People's Liberation Army (EPL), Peasant Student Workers
Movement (MOEC), etc. were able to construct rebel armies.
The National Liberation Army (ELN) in Magdalena Medio emerged out of the remains of
the strong guerrilla army of Rafael Rangel, which had operated throughout La Violencia.62 1 it
also drew on the Chispas army of Eriberto Espitia.622 Similarly, Julio Guerra was a well-known
Liberal politician in the south of C6rdoba who, as Rangel, raised an army after the death of Jorge
6231 iElidcer Gaitdn in 1948 in self defense. In 1967, his organization reactivated to form the
insurgent group, the People's Liberation Army (EPL).624 According to Fabiola Calvo 1985, the
EPL was able to establish itself where the liberal guerrillas had operated and where the
populations were familiar with the presence of the armed groups. The Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) also constituted a remilitarized rebel army of the 'independent
republics.' 625 Most of the top FARC leaders had fought in the liberal and communist armies of
6 1 9 El Siglo 1958.
620 Guzman et al. 1961, p. 102; Additionally, Conservatives used their veto power to oppose the rehabilitation
programs, claiming such programs were payoffs to former (Liberal) criminals (Dix 1967, p. 377).
621 Alvaro Villarraga Sarmiento (CNRR), interview by author, Santa Marta, 9 May 2009 and Bogot6, 11 May 2009.
The ELN's first power bases were the jungle and frontier zones of southern Santander, Bolivar and northeast
Antioquia. For histories of the ELN, see Caycedo 1980; Pulido 1995; Gutidrrez et al. 2006.
622 Pizarro 1996. See also de la Torre 1980.
623 See Zuluaga 1993; Pizarro 1996.
6 2 4 Alvaro Villarraga, interview by author, Bogoti, May 2009; Hernando Corral, interview by author, Bogota,
August 2006.
625 FernAn Gonzalez, interview by author, BogotA, July 2006.
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the 1950S.626 In a parallel fashion, MOEC drew on former guerrilla leaders to fill its ranks. It
attracted Cauca guerrilla commander 'El Aguililla,' and former liberal guerrillas of the eastern
plains, Rosendo Colmenares, Eduardo Franco Isaza, and Roberto Gonzilez Prieto, among others.
Finally, the indigenous rebel group, Quintin Lame, formed on the foundation of an organization
created years earlier by the indigenous leader Manuel Quintin Lame.
Reactivation, however, was not inevitable and not all guerrilla groups remobilized. The
guerrillas retained arms in caches after the demobilization. However, they did not continue in
violence. To understand why and when some armed organizations were redeployed while others
fully demobilized, we must look at their recruitment and deployment strategies and changes in
the distribution of power as a result of the National Front. I propose that the armed groups which
were comprised of combatants local to the communities in which they operated formed latent
socio-political organizations after demobilizing. Only when threatened by contentious 'state-
building' did they reactivate. In contrast, organizations comprised of fighters, which operated far
from their communities of origin, drifted into banditry and went bankrupt. This was the
trajectory of the coffee-rich Cauca Valley's guerrilla armies, which splintered post-
demobilization into between 90 and 150 bandit gangs totaling over 2,000 men. These gangs
eventually disappeared.
Due to their highly localized flavor - they were from the communities in which they had
fought and returned to these communities after demobilizing - the armies of Rangel, Guerra, and
Marulanda enjoyed dense social networks and remained physically concentrated after the
creation of the National Front. These guerrilla units were also embedded in the civilian
communities because "they stayed in the same area where they recruited." 627 As a result, they
626 Arenas 1985.
627 Ferndn Gonzilez, interview by author, Bogotd, August 2006.
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were able to preserve their collective structures and capacity for collective action as local
strongmen and political entities.628 Guerra, for example, formed social/political organizations:
the Juntas Patri6ticas. Meanwhile, in the south of the country, in Agriari, Viota, Tequendama,
Sumapaz, El Pato, Guayabero, Rio Chiquito, 26 de Septiembre and Marquetalia, the former
guerrillas formed well-organized, 'independent republics.' 629 These were essentially proto-states
or shadow governments in which the former guerrillas (approximately 6,500 men) exercised
extensive influence over the social, political, and economic lives of the civilian population.
Bogoti enjoyed little if any control.630
These regions were part of the widespread phenomenon of armed colonization where
rural neighborhoods (veredas)631 forcefully displaced by the conservative army and paramilitary
factions (pdjaros) reestablished themselves around 'colonized' frontier lands in areas in which
the state had little presence.6 32 According to Fernin Gonzalez, "neighbors, families, friends,
towns all moved together, they transplanted themselves. They had very, very strong ties and so
they reproduced their original campesino societies and norms in their new zones." 63 3 These
republics proved "unresponsive to government actions to improve social and economic
conditions in their areas unless it was coordinated through former guerrilla leaders." 634 The
leaders fiercely guarded their prerogatives and influence. These communities did not look to the
state for authority, security, justice, or conflict resolution; rather, they looked to the former
628 Alvaro Villarraga Sarmiento (CNRR), interview by author, Santa Marta, 9 May 2009 and Bogotd, 11 May 2009.
629 Villarraga, interview by author, Bogotd, July 2006; Pefiate, interview by author, Bogoti, July 2006.
630 See Rempe 1995. Also Osterling 1989, p. 97.
631 See Borda 1962's ethnographic accounts of the vereda in Colombia, which he describes as a "distinct locality
group," "an extended family."
632 Ramirez Tob6n 1990.
633 Fernin Gonzilez, interview by author, BogotA July 2006.
634 Rempe 1995; See also Ferro Medina and Uribe Ram6n 2002.
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guerrillas to fill this void.63s The former guerrillas engaged in formal politics, maintaining
"subrosa political relationships with major figures of the legitimate government and opposition
involving the trade of votes, hatchet jobs, and influence." 636 They "maintained intelligence nets
throughout rural communities." "The guerrillas were everything. They were the law, they
imposed the rules regulating daily life, they resolved everything in these municipalities from
marital problems to the cantina's operating hours ... everything. They were the authority and
were just accepted." 637
These were latently coercive structures: "largely inactive... relatively passive. [They]
caused little interference in government affairs." However, they were latent and could therefore
be reactivated. In this sense "they remained a potential threat to the government." 638 But why did
they reactivate in a manifest form some years after demobilization? I argue that these regions'
turn to the political left and their relative evasiveness from state control rendered them a state-
building priority. Moreover, US military aid shifted the distribution of power between these
'independent republics' and the Colombian government. It thereby changed the parameters
buttressing the implicit peace bargains and rendered the bargains obsolete.
The Left. Consistent with H 7, the data indicates that municipalities which consistently
supported the Left proved at higher risk of militarization. Voting majority Left multiplied the
odds of experiencing an insurgency by four and of having an insurgent front by six. Driven by
resentment, the Liberal Party's fiercely loyal followers defected on their party. The National
Front, an exclusive, nonpartisan pact between Conservative and Liberal politicians, engendered a
635 Andrds Pedfate (Director of DAS), interview by author, BogotA, July 2006; This situation was compared to the US
settlers and rangers in the West; Ferndn Gonzdlez, interview by author, BogotA, July 2006; Francisco Gutierrez,
interview by author, Bogoth, July 2006.
636 Maullin 1973, p. 8. See Bailey 1967, p. 561-75.
637 Defensoria del Pueblo, interview by author, Cicuta, 29 May 2008.
638 Rempe 1995, 2002.
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sense of horizontal identification among elites. Having signed the Front pact and forged these
horizontal ties, the traditional parties turned against their former armed masses. For centuries,
these party rank and file had proven essential to the party's success and were thus endowed with
a sense of patriotism and legitimacy. Now, under the Front, the spoils of political office were
divided equally between the parties, reducing politicians' need to appeal to and mobilize their
constituents; electoral victory was guaranteed. 639 Now, rather than thanking their soldiers for
their service in the heinously bloody war fought on the elite's behalf, these commanders instead
called them 'bandits' and targeted them with state repression.640 In a public letter, Eduard Santos
announced, "We didn't authorize them ... now the guerrillas constitute an obstacle to the re-
establishment of peace." 641 The liberal fighters' status was reversed; they transitioned from the
pedestal of 'party soldiers' to an unwarranted subordinate position of 'common criminals.' These
'abandoned' Liberals, disillusioned with system politics, began casting votes for anti-system
Leftist candidates.
Critically, this rendered their regions top state-building priorities. The Colombian state
sought to consolidate its authority in the territories it had lost during the war. In this pursuit, it
found its resources limited and prioritizing necessary. It also found itself subject to deterrence: it
would respect former armed groups' territorial sovereignty and would not seek to circumvent
their authority if it could not be guaranteed victory in a battle. In other words, an implicit bargain
held whereby the former armed groups maintained their 'independent republics' in exchange for
not engaging in violent actions against the state.
639 Dix 1987, pp. 42-5. Additionally, by granting both parties veto power on government expenditures, the Front
reduced patronage, further spawning feelings of abandonment among traditional party supporters.
640 Traditional party elites realized that the internecine violence was not in their political interest; it risked revolution
and anarchy. They thus united and sought to eliminate the guerrillas which they had mobilized. See SAnchez and
Meertens 2001, p. 19. Labeled subversive or bandits, repression of these armed groups carried less political risk and
received bipartisan support (Maullin 1973, p. 67).
641 PdCaut 1987.
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The influx of US military aid in 1962-5 shocked the government's power relative to the
former guerrillas and thereby increased its chances of defeating the guerrillas were they to
fight.642 This destabilized the bargains whereby the former guerrillas enjoyed autonomy in
exchange for peace. The military therefore began a 'state-building' offensive. Given the Cold
War context, it targeted this offensive at "communist enclaves and the bandit gangs" in areas out
of the state's reach. Zones peripheral to the state proved twice as likely to experience
militarization. Thus, the former guerrilla republics' shift to the left and their elusiveness from
state control rendered them key targets in this military campaign. In response to the operations
launched against them, the organizational legacies of the previous war became reactivated
defensively. Once remobilized, they became the leftist insurgencies of the 1960s.
Thus, as becomes clear in the biographies of the insurgent commanders and foot soldiers,
violence was reborn in the 1960s in the same communities that had experienced La Violencia
and the previous civil war's protagonists were cast again in leading roles in the new era of
insurgency. The 'enclaves of violence' proved a decisive factor in the onset of the FARC, EPL,
ELN, and MOEC. These insurgents exploited the social capital of the former guerrilla armies. La
Violencia, according to Maullin, had "spawned a class of men who lived by the gun, thus
offering a reservoir of recruits for future political efforts requiring violence."643 Areas affected
by La Violencia thus swarmed with ex-combatants and adolescents who grew up during the civil
war.644 The former commanders remained densely connected to these foot soldiers and were thus
able to call them back to arms; they retained the normative authority and respect to exercise
pressure on the demobilized soldiers. The pressures to join were also horizontal; the fighters
642 See Fearon 1995.
643 Maullin 1973, p. 23.
644 Adolescents who grew up during La Violencia proved especially likely to join the insurgency (Sinchez and
Meertens 2001, p. 22).
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entered the new rebel movements because of their friendships, familial ties, and social webs.
These armies thus capitalized on "multiple generations of guerrillas in the zones." 645 In one of
my interviews, an ex-EPL described how there were three to four generations of rebels in these
zones. He said, "When you ask combatants why they joined... they respond, 'My five brothers,
my uncles, my father, my grandmother, my great-grandfather ... were all in the guerrillas. It is a
family tradition."' 646 If you grew up in one of these areas that had been touched by La Violencia,
"there was something natural [even patriotic] about providing support to the guerrillas and
joining their ranks." 647 It was thus very common to find family and community ties among the
ranks of the insurgents.648 For example, the guerrillas in Tolima began under the command of
Gerardo Loaiza, his five sons, his relative, Pedro Antonio Marin, and his father. The guerrilla
armies thus arose in communities of chronic violence characterized by hereditary loyalty to
irregular armed groups, leftist political leanings, state absence, and state repression by
emboldened armed forces.64 9
V. Conclusion
The dissertation project's analytic framework provides leverage on the post-war
trajectories of armed organizations and, in so doing, helps account for war onset and recurrence.
645 Gonzilez, interview by author, BogotA, July 2006.
646 Luis Angel, interview by author, Cdcuta, April 2008.
647 Carlos Rosano (Editor, Voz) interview by author, BogotA, July 2006.
648 Fernn Gonzilez, interview by author, Bogoti, July 2006.
649 This theme ran through my interviews with Alvaro Villarraga, interview by author, Bogoti, May 2009; Eduardo
Pizarro, interview by author, BogotA, July 2006; Andres Pefnate, interview by author, Bogot, August 2006; and
Hernando Corral, interview by author, Bogot, July 2006. The importance of organizational residue in facilitating
subsequent violence (remilitarization) does not only apply to Colombia's leftist insurgencies, but also has causal
weight in accounting for the rise of the paramilitaries in Colombia. In an interview with paramilitary Bloque
Tolima's commander, Diego Jos6 Maria Goyeneche, I was told, "There is a strong relationship between the Bloque
Tolima of the paramilitaries [in 2005] and the former self-defense forces of Tolima in the 1950s... really the people
who were in the Bloque Tolima were the children, grandchildren, nephews, that is, the family members of these
people that began in the 1950s in the region of Rio Ata in southern Tolima" (Diego Jose Maria Goyeneche,
interview by author, 'La Picota' Prison, Bogotd, 15 September 2008).
260
It links not only with the study of peace, but also with the broader, extensive literature on the
causes of war. This project's insights into organizational bankruptcy, disarmament and
remilitarization provide a new lens into why wars occur in some geographic places and not in
others. It has explanatory value in understanding variation in pro-state paramilitary groups'
remilitarization and in that of anti-state rebel, insurgent, and guerrilla units. This chapter tested
the project's theory against the conventional wisdom. It stood up to scrutiny. The chapter also
reasserted several central claims of the project more generally. First, it pointed to the need to
reorient the study of conflict and peace away from physical geographical and economic variables
and back to social, political, and human factors. Second, the organizational residue of war
renders the causes of recurrent war divergent from those of initial war onset. Given that 50% of
civil war 'onset' wars have recurred, existing datasets are populated with cases of civil war
recurrence. We need to disaggregate these two types of war.
Table 16. Variables and Data Sources
Variable Name Variable Description Source
Insurgent Activity Dichotomous measure of FARC, ELN, EPL, El Tiempo 1964-1984M19, MOA, FALCO, ORP guerrilla activity
Measure of FARC, ELN, EPL, M19, MOA, El Tiempo 1964-1984; Echandia
Insurgent Success FALCO, ORP sustained guerrilla violence Castilla 1999; Military
and establishment of guerrilla fronts Intelligence Reports
State Presence] Distance to department capital CEDE dataset, 1960
State Presence2 Distance to principal markets CEDE dataset, 1960
State Presence3 Periphery (Distance to capital > 100 km) CEDE dataset, 1960
Liberal] % of population which voted for the Liberal Estadisticas Electorales CamaraParty in the 1949 congressional elections 1949
Liberal2 If municipality population voted for the Pinzon de Lewin 1989
Liberal Party 1931-1982
Left If municipality population voted for Leftist Pinzon de Lewin 1989
candidates 1931-1982
The Colombian Truth
Commission after La Violencia:
. If municipality affected by violence during Guzman el al 1962; Sinchez and
Violencial La Violencia conflict 1948-1958 Chac6n 2005; Ortiz 1985;
Casas 1987; Roldin 2002;
Henderson 1985;
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Sinchez and Meertens 2001.
Presence of Liberal and/or CommunistViolence2 Guerrillas during La Violencia
Colombian National Police Force,
Antinarcotics Division; UN Office
on Drugs and Crime & Colombian
Coca Hectares of coca cultivated Government, Sistema Integrado
de Monitoreo de Cultivos Ilicitos
(SIMCI) Data, Estadisticas
Municipales
Poppy Hectares of poppy cultivated ''
Oxford Economic Atlas of the
Gems If municipality has emerald, sapphire, gold, World, 1972; CEDE data on
and/or aquamarine mines mines
. . US Department of Energy;
Oil If municipality has oil fields, oil pipelines, Petrobank Energy and Resources
and/or oil refineries LTD: Latin American unit
Instituto Geogrifico Agustin
Mountains1 Average altitude of municipality Codazzi
Instituto Geogrifico Agustin
Mountains2 If terrain is 'steeply inclined' Codazzi
Instituto Geogrifico AgustinIf municipality was densely forested or was CodazziForest jungle, 1960
Border If municipality adjoins an international DANE, Marco Geoestadisticoborder (dummy) Nacional
Instituto Geogrifico Agustin
Kilometers of roads (paved or unpaved) and Codazzi
Roads and Rivers rivers, 1949, 1970, 1980 Mapa Vialy Artesanal, 1949,
1970, 1980
Pop1951 Population size, 1951 1951 Colombian Census
Pop1964 Population size, 1964 1964 Colombian Census
Pop]973 Population size, 1973 1973 Colombian Census
Law 1999; 1951, 1964 and 1973
Population Density Population density, 1951, 1964, 1973 Colombian Census
Poverty] Poverty: % of population with "Necesidades 1973 Colombian Census
Baisicas Insatisfechas" (NBI)
Poverty2 Per Capita Income, 1973 Colombian Census, 1973
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Combined afro-descendent and indigenous
proportions of municipal population
Based on 1993 Colombian Census
See Repnblica de Colombia,
Grupos Etnicos
Ethnic If ethnic majority constituted 45-90% of the
Domination* municipal population
Inequality Rural land gini coefficient, 1983 Colombia Land Survey, 1983
* Measured at the department level; municipality level data is unavailable.
Table 17. Descriptive Statistics for Insurgent Activity Models
Mean Mean
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max No Insurgency Insurgency
(n=) (n=3899)
Past Presence of
Guerrillas
(Violencial) 194796 0.1332471 0.3398425 0 1 0.1323012 0.2574728
Past Violence
(Violencia2) 194796 0.4631307 0.4986401 0 1 0.4611378 0.7248641
Liberal Party 1949
(Liberall) 193284 0.2385919 0.4262238 0 1 0.2386101 0.2362151
Liberal 1931-1982
(Liberal2) 262841 55.87757 10.92807 40.71 98.4 55.88383 55.03571
Left
(Left]) 262841 0.0124638 0.1109437 0 1 0.0118819 0.0907216
Left 1931-1982
(Left2) 262841 0.0393089 0.1943293 0 1 0.0382252 0.1850515
Periphery
(State Presence]) 194796 0.3492885 0.4767465 0 1 0.3493617 0.3396739
Distance to
Department Capital
(State Presence2) 194796 119.6675 96.67634 0 790 119.7657 106.7704
Distance to Markets
(State Presence3) 194796 314.9276 118.3233 168 763 314.8109 330.248
Road Density
(Roads]) 206834 30909.77 43705.34 33.3 963252.6 30709.36 53249.91
Dichotomous Road
Measure
(Roads2) 262841 .8226152 .3819948 0 1
Road + River
Density
(Roads3) 81554 97830.84 139350.2 612.9 1140529 97542.09 122329.9
Forest 91729 31975.98 99086.4 1.59 1307181 31539.45 79151.97
Average Altitude
(Mountains]) 194796 1327.177 878.0804 2 3087 1330.287 918.7385
Steeply Inclined
Terrain
(Mountains2) 187992 0.8632708 0.3435622 0 1 0.8628572 0.9279732
Altitude Exceeding 194796 0.0103493 0.1012039 0 1 0.0104229 0.0006793
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Ethnic *
3,000 meters
(Mountains3)
Border 262841 0.0517804 0.2215837 0 1 0.0519392 0.0304124
Oil 262841 0.1140918 0.3179233 0 1 0.1134185 0.2046392
Coca 262841 57.80013 499.2866 0 9081 57.62747 81.0201
Poppy 262841 19.47135 84.07346 0 667 19.35848 34.64948
Gold, Emerald,
Sapphire,
Aquamarine Mines
(Gems]) 274452 0.1248743 0.3305769 0 1 0.1241908 0.2133017
Gold Mines
(Gems2) 274452 0.1129378 0.3165173 0 1 0.1122942 0.1961995
Emerald Mines
(Gems3) 274452 0.0101001 0.0999908 0 1 0.010046 0.0171021
Land Value 187992 35.43023 61.36773 0 1690.909 35.44177 33.62553
% NBI
(Poverty1) 269151 64.45295 18.27601 13 100 64.52181 55.71207
Per Capital GDP
(Poverty2) 230580 10363.39 15277.19 97.89337 345256.3 10324.19 15242.18
Ethnic Dominance
(Ethnicity1) 262841 0.1591647 0.3658303 0 1 0.1596353 0.0958763
Ethnic
(Ethnicity2)
Population 236125 21858.62 90893 72 2571548 19747.72 278005.1
Population Density 189252 0.855825 2.689339 0.0045832 57.87412 0.8299118 4.401738
Inequality 260823 0.5021207 0.1521665 0.0071 0.9404 0.5022019 0.4920082
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Table 18. Logit Analyses of Determinants of Insurgent Activity, 1964-1984
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Feasibility Organizational Combined Model Combined Model
Model Legacies of with
Violence Ethnicitya &
Inequality
Violencia 1.542*** 1.155*** 1.144***
(0.233) (0.229) (0.227)
Left 1.497*** 1.313** 1.096*
(0.525) (0.579) (0.581)
Liberal 0.130 0.576*** 0.606***
(0.207) (0.217) (0.217)
State Presence 0.521*** 0.682*** 0.751***
(0.183) (0.194) (0.196)
Coca 0.000993 0.00170 0.00139
(0.00127) (0.00118) (0.00118)
Poppy 0.00249*** 0.00188** 0.00152*
(0.000914) (0.000867) (0.000879)
Gems 1.461 0.468 0.400
(0.898) (0.290) (0.290)
Oil 0.53 1* 0.354 0.385
(0.284) (0.270) (0.270)
Land Value -0.00784 -2.77e-05
(0.0102) (0.00968)
Poverty -0.0337*** -0.0318*** -0.0333***
(0.00600) (0.00576) (0.00585)
Population 1.36e-05*** 1.30e-05*** 1.33e-05***
(2.45e-06) (2.39e-06) (2.39e-06)
Population -0.101** -0.0825* -0.0876*
Density (0.0496) (0.0479) (0.0478)
Border 0.302 1.064 1.200
(0.843) (0.817) (0.814)
Mountains 0.430 0.332 0.311
(0.332) (0.321) (0.309)
Road Density 5.61e-06*** 5.65e-06*** 5.68e-06***
(1.37e-06) (1.36e-06) (1.37e-06)
Ethnic 0.752***
Dominance (0.288)
Inequality 0.441
(0.622)
Constant -5.150*** -7.129*** -6.030*** -6.275***
(0.537) (0.156) (0.523) (0.613)
Observations 118344 192024 116748 116748
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
a Ethnicity is measured at the department level with missing data. Violencia is measured as past guerrilla presence;
Mountains is measured as steeply inclined terrain; Poverty is measured as NBI; Periphery is measured as 100 km
from the department capital.
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Table 19. Logit Analyses of Determinants of Insurgent Activity, 1964-1984
Robustness Checks
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Alternative Modela Rare Events Model Cross-Sectional Model
Violencia 1.145*** 0.623*** 1.454***
(0.162) (0.0982) (0.265)
Left 1.266*** 1.402*** 0.904
(0.470) (0.164) (0.744)
Liberal 0.00776 0.192** 0.250
(0.0110) (0.0974) (0.211)
State Presence 0.00190** 0.461*** 0.00389***
(0.000784) (0.0844) (0.00104)
Coca 0.00197** 0.000910** 0.00265
(0.000916) (0.000354) (0.00269)
Poppy 0.00255*** 0.000367 0.00404***
(0.000729) (0.000396) (0.00120)
Gems 0.952 0.0732 1.222
(0.635) (0.122) (0.769)
Oil 0.112 0.484*** 0.0816
(0.241) (0.0956) (0.295)
Land Value -0.0111**
(0.00440)
Poverty 1.37e-05 -0.0234*** -5.96e-07
(9.21e-06) (0.00232) (1.11e-05)
Population 7.83e-06*** 1.13e-05*** 6.47e-05***
(6.06e-07) (6.95e-07) (9.65e-06)
Population Density -0.0549*** -0.0613
(0.0157) (0.0451)
Border 0.235 0.222 1.457**
(0.529) (0.453) (0.710)
Mountains -0.000356*** 1.465*** -0.000124
(0.000107) (0.279) (0.000116)
Road Density 1.085*** 5.39e-06*** 1.348***
(0.348) (5.67e-07) (0.399)
Constant -8.646*** -5.772*** -3.397***
(0.792) (0.301) (0.503)
Observations 184968 116748 725
Note: Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%0
a Model 1: Violencia is measured as past violence; Periphery is measured as distance to the department's capital;
Gems is measured just using data on emerald mines: the most lootable and subject to extortion; Poverty is measured
as per capita income; Mountains is measured as altitude; Roads is a dichotomous variable.
Model 2: Violencia is measured as past guerrilla presence; Liberal is measured as hegemony in the 1946 elections;
Periphery is measured as 100 kilometers to the department capital; Gems is measured using emerald and gold mine
data. Poverty is measured as NBI; Mountains is measured as steeply inclined terrain.
Model 3: Violencia is measured as past guerrilla presence; Liberal is measured as hegemony in the 1946 elections;
Periphery is measured as distance to the department's capital; Gems is measured using emerald mines. Poverty is
measured as per capita income; Mountains is measured as altitude; Roads is a dichotomous measure.
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Table 20. Logit Analyses of Determinants of Insurgent Success, 1964-1984
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Feasibility Organizational Combined Combined Combined Model
Model Legacies of Model Model with Ethnicitya &
Violence (More Obs.) b Inequality
Violencia 1.010*** 1.045** 0.881*** 1.014**
(0.295) (0.414) (0.331) (0.422)
Left 1.464** 0.747 1.519** 0.379
(0.570) (0.907) (0.612) (0.919)
Liberal 0.254 0.675 0.449 0.711*
(0.284) (0.416) (0.321) (0.428)
State Presence 0.508** 1.014*** 0.686** 1.274***
(0.257) (0.389) (0.286) (0.421)
Coca 0 0 -0.00302 0
(0.00282)
Poppy 0.00260** 0.00229 0.00175 0.00155
(0.00132) (0.00145) (0.00118) (0.00157)
Gems 1.229 -0.0776 0.673** -0.189
(1.165) (0.588) (0.339) (0.612)
Oil -0.272 -0.617 -0.0398 -0.350
(0.564) (0.602) (0.416) (0.583)
Land Value -0.0215 -0.0258
(0.0255) (0.0263)
Poverty 0.00981 0.0135 0.0105 0.0131
(0.0113) (0.0120) (0.00871) (0.0123)
Population 3.26e-05*** 3.95e-05*** 1.34e-05*** 3.83e-05***
(8.32e-06) (9.32e-06) (3.91 e-06) (9.20e-06)
Population Density -0.316* -0.335* -0.294
(0.176) (0.182) (0.180)
Border 0 0 -0.746 0
(1.279)
Mountains 0 0 -1.02e-06 0
(0.000182)
Roads 1.66e-05* 1.41e-05 1.87e-05*** 1.55e-05*
(8.55e-06) (8.99e-06) (5.5 8e-06) (9.25e-06)
Ethnic Dominance 1.550***
(0.508)
Inequality 0.273
(1.259)
Constant -3.306*** -2.789*** -4.323*** -4.616*** -5.729***
(1.168) (0.201) (1.259) (0.757) (1.123)
Observations 475 762 468 727 468
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%
a Ethnicity is measured at the department level.
b More observations are used by employing average altitude as the proxy for mountains and dropping population
density and land value.
*0's indicate variables that were dropped from the analysis as they perfectly predict the absence of insurgency.
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Table 21. Logit Analyses of Determinants of Insurgent Success, 1964-1984
Robustness Checks
Variables (1) (2)
Alternative Model Rare Events Model
Violence 0.571* 0.867**
(0.294) (0.343)
Left 1.743*** 1.481***
(0.649) (0.526)
Liberal -0.0191 0.437
(0.0209) (0.347)
State Presence 0.00278** 0.679**
(0.00129) (0.283)
Coca -0.000942 -0.000967
(0.00251) (0.00242)
Poppy 0.00184 0.00177*
(0.00113) (0.00105)
Gems 1.701** 0.670*
(0.798) (0.352)
Oil 0.180 0.0107
(0.407) (0.436)
Poverty -7.83e-06 0.0100
(2.16e-05) (0.0102)
Population 1.45e-05*** 1.29e-05
(3.87e-06) (8.57e-06)
Border -0.448 -0.246
(1.106) (0.826)
Mountains -0.000267 -4.81e-06
(0.000197) (0.000161)
Road Density 1.156 1.75e-05***
(0.771) (5.64e-06)
Constant -3.112** -4.467***
(1.460) (0.862)
Observations 734 727
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Model 1: Violencia is measured as past violence; Liberal is measured as liberal ever; Periphery is measured as
distance to the department's capital; Gems is measured using data on emerald mines; Poverty is measured as per
capita income; Mountains is measured as average altitude; Roads is a dichotomous measure.
Model 2: Violencia is measured as past guerrilla presence; Liberal is measured as hegemony in the 1946 elections;
Periphery is measured as distance to the department's capital; Gems is measured using emerald and gold mine data.
Poverty is measured as NBI; Mountains is measured as altitude.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
In its search for an explanation of varying post-conflict outcomes, this project has
focused on the primacy of armed organizations. Divergence in their human and social
geographies cause some armed groups to dissolve while others endure and remobilize for war or
peaceful politics. I have argued that variation in recruitment, deployment, and post-war
migration helps us account for these trajectories taken by rebel and paramilitary armies in the
aftermath of peace accords. The theory is simple, but it has explanatory range over important
outcomes and prescriptive richness. The applications of the model are potentially far reaching to
civil wars far beyond Colombia's borders and several mechanisms of the model may be
amenable to human action. The paths of the armed organizations studied in this project
fundamentally influence post-war patterns of human rights abuses and shape prospects for
consolidated peace, state-building, legalization of war economies, and democratization.
Policymakers concerned with these outcomes may therefore find these conclusions useful. The
theory also has implications for social scientists interested in micro and macro processes of war
to peace transitions, transitional justice, state formation, and path dependency. Specifying the
project's implications is the task of these concluding pages.
I. Beyond the Colombian Paramilitaries
The proposed model has strong explanatory power and should operate in contexts beyond
Colombia. Armed groups demobilize in the course of many other peace processes and then
disappear, remilitarize and reinvent themselves. The puzzle therefore recurs across many
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settings. Recruitment, deployment and post-war migration are also present in most conflict
settings. Moreover, the methodology and analytic framework of this project can be replicated
and applied elsewhere. There are two likely scope conditions to this project. The model should
be most clearly applicable to territorially-based, militarized units and to contexts of irregular
warfare characterized by military asymmetry between the armed actors. 650
The diversity of the Colombian paramilitaries both in type and name suggests that
organizational structure matters more than ideological creed or purpose for the model's
generalizability. Colombian paramilitaries have used a variety of labels over their five decades in
existence: self-defense forces, oligarch death squads, mercenaries, warlords, para-state armies,
bandits, village patrol forces, vigilantes, terrorists, narcotrafficking organizations, and criminal
gangs. My theory offers a rich explanation of these. Chapter Eight's thorough test of the model
on the Colombian rebels of the 1960s further indicates the relevance of the theory beyond cases
of pro-state paramilitaries. To realize a preliminary evaluation of the theory's external validity to
organizations beyond Colombia, I conducted interviews with ex-rebels and peace negotiators
from a diverse sample of wars around the world. They suggest, but by no means, prove the
model's generalizability. More than that, they inspire future research to rigorously find the limits
of the project's applicability.65 1 I mention several examples from this cursory survey.
The Indonesian government recruited most of its militia soldiers65 2 in Java and deployed
them to Aceh. In sharp contrast, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) rebels were local to the
650 Kalyvas 2005. Military asymmetry between armed actors contrasts with 'symmetric nonconventional warfare,'
which can be observed in civil wars that accompany processes of state collapse.
651 A rigorous survey of cases worldwide would also serve to identify potential, confounding variables such as
peacekeepers, peace terms, security sector reform, state's overall strength, ethnicity, and war duration, which vary
across cases. These cases would further enable me to understand how inter-state dynamics interact with my theory,
which, for parsimony purposes, focuses on the intra-state sphere. For my theory to be comprehensive and externally
valid, I need to incorporate the roles of the international community and external states.
652 The militias were called the Resistance Front Against GAM Separatists (Front Perlawanan Separatist GAM,
FPSG).
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communities of Aceh, having mobilized around family and veterans networks from the earlier
Darul Islam revolt of the 1950s.65 3 After the peace accord was signed, the non-local, government
militia members dispersed back to their homes and the organizations disintegrated. Meanwhile,
densely linked, physically concentrated, and deeply embedded, the GAM structure survived, the
command and control maintained, and GAM transformed into a highly successful political party,
victorious in the 2006 elections. An ex-GAM rebel told me, "We were from the communities
where we fought and so we didn't need to be 'reintegrated' or 'reinserted;' we were already
there." 654 A village head reported, "We have already accepted into the community those who
have returned. There's no hostility because they too are a part of the community. Their families
live here." 655 The project's mechanisms linking deployment and embeddedness appear to be
potentially operative in this Indonesian context.656
In Guatemala, we observe powerful, collective vigilantism derived from the
organizational residue of the local, wartime Civil Defense Forces.657 In Africa, the Kamajors
survived organizationally in Sierra Leone and thus the state respected their sovereignty in
expanses of the country and permitted them to govern civilian affairs. The army reports, "We
never go to this corner of the country and if we need to go there, we call on the Kamajors to
mobilize their large numbers of combatants." 658 Still capable of mass mobilization, but without a
653 Aspinall 2009.
6 54 Nur Djuli (Ex-GAM Rebel), interview by author, Santa Marta, 8 May 2009.
655 Barron, Kaiser and Pradhan 2004. Muslahuddin Daud and Kusumastuti Rahayu (Aceh Reintegration Program
Personnel), interviews by author, Santa Marta, 8 May 2009. 80% of Acehnese civilians reported that they would be
happy if an ex-GAM combatant married into their families (Patrick Barron (World Bank, Aceh), interview by
author, Santa Marta, 7 May 2009).
656 The Philippines offers further, possible evidence of the model's explanatory value. The New People's Army
(NPA) drew its cadres from organizational legacies of past war; specifically, it recruited former members from the
Hukbalahap rebellion. Meanwhile, the MNLF's was reactivated when challenged by contentious state-building
(Raymundo Ferrer (Lieutenant General of the Filipino Army), interview by author, Santa Marta, 6 May 2009;
Gaudencio Pangilinan Jr. (Brigade General of the Filipino Army), interview by author, Barranquilla, 7 May 2009).
657 Regina Bateson (Yale University), interview by author, Cambridge, MA, 1 May 2010.
658 Interview by author, Cambridge, MA, December 2008.
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manifest, active military structure, the Kamajors' social and human geography seemingly
determined its post-war path.
The model also has possible predictive power. The LRA abducted children from villages
in Northern Uganda, but then, defeated by the Ugandan military, deployed its fighters to the
Congo. Currently those that demobilize "operated away from their homes and all go back to their
villages. They can go anywhere, but all go back to their villages." 659 Accordingly, the theory
would predict the groups' bankruptcy upon demobilization. The fighters would be accepted into
their communities due to the mechanisms of social ties and mitigated anger stemming from
abduction's victimization and the ex-combatants' 'returnee' status. However, dispersed to
different towns of origin, these ex-fighters would not remain part of the LRA structure and
would be unlikely to exercise any influence over civilian affairs.
Finally, the lessons from this study may be relevant to Iraq. Specifically, the model may
provide analytic value in understanding the local, embedded Sons of Iraq - their organizational
endurance, deep leverage over their communities, and ability to be co-opted by US forces willing
to respect their sovereignty in the short run as a means to state build in the long term.
I turn now to the implications of the project for current and future social science.
11. Implications for the study of civil war and peace
As highlighted in the Introduction, the project's organizational approach to the study of
peace provides important analytic leverage at the micro and macro levels of analysis and
659 Peter Onega (Amnesty Commission, Uganda), interview by author, Santa Marta, 9 May 2009. This was further
confirmed by several other individuals involved with the peace and reconciliation processes in Uganda (Damali
Nakibuuka, Aporu Christine Hellen Amongin, Jacob L. Oulanyah, interviews by author, Cartagena and Santa Marta,
7-9 May 2009).
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contributes to how we think about reintegration, war prevention, state-building, path dependence,
reconciliation and organized crime. I briefly elaborate on each.
Micro Peace Agenda
First, the organizational approach contributes to our understanding of demobilization and
reintegration of former combatants. Specifically, it challenges the conventional approach of
micro-dynamics' scholars, which treats former fighters as independent agents, rather than as part
of a web of ex-combatants and armed institutions that structure their decisions to reintegrate. 660
The micro peace literature makes the assumption that no organization exists post-
disarmament. 61 This proves problematic for two reasons. One, it is empirically false and thus
misses a critical part of the causal story about individual-level reintegration. Belonging to
networks and organizations "makes an enormous difference in the behavior of individuals." 662
These institutions simultaneously determine the rules of the game and condition the incentives,
restrictions, and choices of former fighters under the rules (North 1990). Thus, to understand
individual-level reintegration outcomes, we need to understand when these institutional
constraints endure and how fighters live within them. Organizations must be incorporated into
models of reintegration.663
660 Humphreys and Weinstein 2007; Blattman and Annan 2009; Blattman 2009; Mvukiyehe, Samii, and Taylor
2010; Pugel 2006.
661 It should be noted that while the micro literature assumes organizational dissolution, the macro literature assumes
organizational persistence. Dialogue between the two levels of analysis has broken down and research on the
intermediate level is necessary to repair it.
662 Miller 1992; Wilson 1995; Williamson 1975.
663 I am currently undertaking this analysis to evaluate the implications of the organizational-level theory of
demilitarizing groups' trajectories on the individual-level analysis of ex-combatants' reintegration. Specifically, I
examine the entire range of demilitarization from successful reintegration to returning to arms and model an ex-
soldier's reintegration as a function of both individual-level variables and, critically, the outcome of his/her former
organization.
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Two, the micro scholarship makes an implicit normative claim that successful
demobilization requires the disintegration of ex-armed structures and the atomization of ex-
combatants. However, as this project demonstrates, atomization should not be a uniform
objective. Organization bankruptcy may impact reintegration success, but it is not determinate.
For example, if an organization survives and forms a non-violent political party, pulling its ex-
combatants along this trajectory, reintegration should be deemed effective even though the
organization endures and its members retain ties to it. Meanwhile, if an organization files for
bankruptcy, reintegration is not necessarily successful. Instead, the analysis shifts to the
individual ex-combatant level and, to repeat Bearman 1991's words, "each [ex-]soldier is
theoretically freed from constraint and may pursue individual rather than group ends." This
means that ex-combatants' transformations depend not on their organizations' trajectories, but on
their individual traits and objectives. They may individually join a criminal or political armed
group, commit solo acts of violence, transition into 'normal' civilians, or become highly
politically-active citizens, but organizations' bankruptcy does not determine these outcomes.
The project's analytic framework proposes moving the variables currently on the left
hand side of the reintegration equation to the right hand side664 and defining reintegration success
not as individual defection from one's former armed unit or 'ex-combatants' relations with
family and community members,' 665 but instead as not returning to commit acts of violence.
Recidivism is individual reintegration failure. Scholars of the micro-dynamics of peace might
consider relaxing their assumption that ex-combatants remain demobilized and instead seek to
explain a non-truncated dependent variable that includes the extreme of reintegration failure: ex-
combatants that engage in violence.
664 These studies place all variables on the right hand side of the equation, leaving no information with which to
explain variation in DDR outcomes.
665 Humphreys and Weinstein 2007.
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Macro Research Agenda
Second, the organizational approach challenges the cross-country studies of war and
shows that, to understand why half of civil conflicts recur, requires a shift to the organizational
level analysis. This shift induces a causation rather than correlation approach to the study of
peace. Our literature is flooded with significant correlations, but our statistical models are only as
good as our theories and our theories lie in disrepair, in great need of mechanism, process
orientation and an accounting of the longitudinal dimensions of variation. We have models to
explain where violence breaks out, but none to explain when they do.
The popular claim that credible commitment problems dominate post-war landscapes
does not hold up to closer scrutiny. The effect of demobilization on organizational capacity is
sudden and not foreseeable and therefore not predictable as is necessary for credible commitment
problems to be operative and to drive remilitarization. There are other, important international
relations theories that have greater salience in the intrastate domain. These include theories about
information problems, the distribution of power, and variance around estimates of the probability
of winning a war. Needed is a model that combines unforeseen shocks to the distribution of
power with mutual optimism.
Path Dependency
Third, by proposing that changes in the distribution of power can be unforeseen, this
project confirms insights into rationality during processes. Despite the widespread use and
acceptance of the phrase "only hindsight is 20/20," when we theorize about individuals' actions,
we often assume that they have a window into the future. We say it is not rational to take an
action in which the costs outweigh the benefits. However, the expected value of an action at t=1
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may be positive, leading one to take a path that then, once taken, turns out, at t=2, to have a
negative expected value. At t=2, however, the choice set may have narrowed or the alternatives
may have changed in value such that, though the least worst path was taken, its costs surpass its
benefits. Leaders lose control of their destinies once the process assumes the reigns.
In some respects, the processes herein described mirror those of democratic transitions.
Dictators often have no intention of relinquishing power when they liberalize their political
systems moderately, but the decisions to do so can have a' lock-in' effect that brings the country
down a path generated by process rather than agency. Analysis of these outcomes helps us
understand the high levels of uncertainty about the future that decision-makers must face and
accept.
It should be noted that, while process plays an important role in my argument, it is not
deterministic; rather, organizations act strategically, but there is a strong lock-in effect to their
doing so. Recruitment, deployment and post-war migration patterns are not the product of
resources or structural conditions; rather, they are the product of decisions; they are endogenous
to the war, but have strong exogenous effects on what happens after they have been adopted.
These findings relate to the path dependency of social organizations and movements more
generally.
Reconciliation
Fourth, the project's window into community-combatant dynamics offers predictions
about reconciliation and transitional justice. In particular, the project proposes that reconciliation
should be most challenging in cases of intergroup violence, where perpetrators are not seen as
members of the in-community and where ties linking victimizers to victims run thin. It follows
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that transitional justice tools need to take into account variation in victim-perpetrator relations
and emotions. This project also advocates for integrated research on reintegration and
transitional justice rather than relegating these two outcomes to quarantined realms.666
State-Building
Fifth, this project offers interesting implications for state formation. It challenges the
conclusion that state-building in the developing world cannot occur absent an exogenous,
structural shock. Understanding armed organizations' interactions with the state provides
endogenous paths by which states strengthen through intrastate war and peace agreements.
Tilly's story of nation-states being built by war reaches its limits at the frontiers of the
developed world.667 In developing countries, as Herbst 2000 demonstrates, dispersed
populations, changing international norms, and the absence of 'highly disruptive forces'
generated enduring, weak states. The lack of pervasive interstate war, Migdal concludes, has
generated an equilibrium wherein the state does not challenge the prerogatives of its 'strongmen'
and the 'strongmen' do not challenge the state. Thus, models of state-building lead us to the
present regime of weak states in the developing world in which social control is fragmented and
often rests with warlords, guerrillas, militias, and other armed actors. 668 However, these models
provide few means by which the states can strengthen absent a further, structural shock (war,
economic depression, massive shift in political geography) that weakens the existing strategies of
survival and enables the state to challenge the prerogatives of armed actors within its borders.
666 Theidon 2007.
667 Tilly 1990.
668 Migdal 2001. All of these models assume a Hobbesian notion of the state in which populations, if left
unprotected by a weak state, turn to strongmen for survival.
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Countering these static models, I propose two paths by which states strengthen absent the
rare external and structural shocks. First, states dismantle weakly networked and clustered armed
forces through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and then fill the power
vacuums that result. Second, states sign peace accords with densely tied and concentrated forces,
allow them to stay intact with latent coercive capacity and then, over time, co-opt them, their
territories and the populations under their control. These means of exerting and consolidating
authority represents an alternative form of state-building prevalent in many incomplete states
such as Afghanistan, the Philippines, Iraq, India, and Brazil.669 In these cases, the Weberian goal
of a monopoly over legitimate violence is sacrificed in the short or medium term to facilitate it in
the long term.
This project's organizational approach specifies the conditions under which internal war
can enhance statehood. A subsequent, analytic step will be to gain leverage on when co-optation
of former armed groups enhances statehood and democracy and when it instead generates narco,
mafia states. When is the state the winner, consolidating the state formation project and when is
the 'co-opted,' non-state actor instead victorious, corrupting the state? 670
It is the state's Weberian agenda that renders interstate war theories, at times,
inappropriate for the intrastate domain. This project predicts that anarchy will end and the state
will reclaim its right to rule in cases in which demobilization bankrupts armed groups. In these
cases, the interstate logic of treating rebel and paramilitary groups as states reaches its limit; the
ex-armed groups relinquish their sovereignty to an overarching governing structure.
669 Gaudencio Pangilinan Jr. (General Brigadier of the Filipino Army), interview by author, 7 May 2009; Civilians,
interviews by authorfavelas, Rio de Janeiro, September 2006; Padre Apollinaire Malu Malu (President of the
AMANI Peace Process in the Democratic Republic of Congo), interview by Author, Santa Marta, 7-10 May 2009;
Petraeus 2009.
670 These bargains entail non-state actors operating with immunity and monopolistic control over their sovereign
territories. In exchange, the political elite gains bribes and electoral benefits.
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An interesting corollary to the discussion of state formation is to think of rebel and
paramilitary organizations as part of a larger spectrum of formal and informal organizations,
which fulfill collective needs and adopt state functions in incomplete states. Rather than
segregating insurgent and militia groups and their post-conflict reincarnations from other types
of entities operative during times of 'normal politics,' it might be useful to look at vacuums in
state power and ask, who fills them and how? I propose that my analytic framework, which maps
the inner workings of the organizations and their ties to the state, communities and each other,
may apply to these other structures: organized crime, party brokers, collective vigilante forces,
and election thugs. A potential future research agenda emerging from my project would consider
these "socio-political entities" more broadly in the context of state-building and the provision of
social services.
Resource Determinism, Crime, and War
Sixth, in the critical case of Colombia, in which drugs and rough terrain are at their
maximum value, I do not find resources to be determinative. In fact, I find them to have a
negligible effect on where insurgency and counterinsurgency first emerge and on armed groups'
relations with civilians, internal cohesion, and post-war outcomes. Given that Colombia provides
a valuable window into the effect of resources in civil war, it is worth reflecting on what causal
power resources do and do not have.
Resources do not cause war, do not determine group fragmentation, do not determine the
use of heinous crimes against humanity, and do not determine embeddedness in civilian
populations. What illicit resources do impact is the likelihood of endemic, pathological
corruption and non-state regulation of illicit economies (criminal groups). Resources also
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provide strength to illegal groups and enable them to threaten even well-established states.
Moreover, the production of illegal goods (drug crops, laboratories, trafficking routes, ports)
requires protection and thus, if left unguarded by a rebel or paramilitary group, cartels will use
other apparatuses of private security. 671 This points to a different research agenda for the political
economy of war. It suggests that analysis be conducted on the effects of resources on military
strength and effectiveness. The loot and war scholarship might also study armed groups' links
with domestic corruption, a topic that has gained surprisingly scant attention in the literature.
Additionally, as pointed out to in Chapter 6, the project highlights the diversity of resources used
to fund war and the need to disaggregate how the effect of different 'products' and points in the
production chain impact the structures of armed organizations. This study further suggests that,
rather than marvel at the novelty that rebel and paramilitary groups can be involved in criminal
activities, we should perhaps consider them again in a broader set of coercive, illegal non-state
actors that includes drug cartels, trafficking organizations, gangs, and other criminal entities.
Paramilitaries in Medellin and militants in Karachi look quite a lot like drug cartels in the favelas
of Rio de Janeiro or Ciudad Juirez.
Existing motivation-oriented studies of war and peace have produced insoluble debates.
Distinguishing between 'investors' and 'consumers,' 'the greedy' and 'the aggrieved' is, in
practice, impossible. These labels are easily biased by national narratives, and do not, in my
experience, constitute empirically accurate constructs. One man's freedom fighter (or self-
defense force) is another man's terrorist (or criminal). Additionally, in my interviews and
671 These often include criminal organizations that existed alongside or intersected with paramilitary and rebel
groups. They also include new armed structures. Thus, peace may have an insufficient impact on the shadow
economies or on levels of violence. However, the policy implications to address these criminal actors may be
distinct.
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surveys of former combatants, the evidence repeatedly pointed to the multiplicity of motives and
the resultant fruitlessness in arguing that one motivation matters at the exclusion of others.
Micro-Macro Linkages
A final research agenda derives from this project. The move away from macro, cross-
national research has been invaluable to gaining purchase on the causes, dynamics, and aftermath
of violence. 6 72 However, our meso- and micro- dynamics of civil war agenda risks generating a
plethora of theories with high levels of internal but not external validity, high levels of accuracy
in the climates in which they are developed, but low levels of applicability to other contexts,
great specificity of detailed mechanisms, but no broader sense of how the pieces all fit together.
Our research has slowly, but commendably, moved away from aggregate, country-level
observations. The next step, it would seem, is determining how we can combine our micro-level
data to move back to the macro level and generate conclusions at this important level of analysis.
From the perspective of this project, the question becomes, how do the trajectories of armed
organizations aggregate to determine patterns of violence, peace, and politics regionally or
globally?
672 This new, exciting literature disaggregates conflicts to the sub-national to understand the micro-dynamics of
violence. Studies employing the conflict zones (100 km2 grid cells) in Africa as the units of observation include
Buhaug and Gates. 2002; Gates 2002b; Buhaug and Lujala 2005; Buhaug and Rod 2006; Eriksson and Wallensteen
2004. Ostby, Nord~s, and Rod. 2006 use the administrative region as their unit of analysis. Three administrative unit
level studies in Indonesia include Tadjoeddin and Murshed 2007; Barron, Kaiser and Pradhan 2004; and Chen 2005.
For the Nepalese case, Murshed and Gates 2005; Do and Iyer 2007; and Macours 2008 use district-level data.
Beardsley and McQuinn 2009; Weinstein 2006 use the armed organization as the unit of analysis and Cunningham,
Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009 use the dyad. Studies employing the individual level analysis include Oyefusi 2008;
Annan, Blattman, Carlson, and Mazurana 2008; Mvukiyehe, Samii, and Taylor 2008.
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III. Policy Implications
The international community's ideology of reintegration is a non-context specific recipe
that views all intact structures and sustained command and control arrangements as threats to
peace.673 Bankruptcy is its chief objective. Thus, due to international community pressure,
financing, and intervention, in the overwhelming majority of cases, states choose DDR tools that
aim to break chains of command, undermine commanders' influence, atomize former
combatants, and transform ex-fighters back into civilians able to disappear into their former
social milieus.674 Most commonly, they adopt the policy of homeward 'relocation' to affect the
former armed commanders' and foot soldiers' incentives for non-cooperation. This relocation
aims to return former combatants back to their families in order to reproduce civilian networks,
which will compete with combatant camaraderie.
This project suggests revisions to not only reintegration theory as described above, but
also to reintegration policy. 'Homeward relocation' does not disband all structures equally. In the
case of local groups, a strategy to dismantle the local ex-armed group through 'relocation'
produces the unintended consequence of sustaining the organization at least in the medium run.
Thus, this policy ends up weakening certain groups while preserving others. Exacerbating this
tendency, the international community often plays favorites, preserving groups with international
legitimacy or those who can serve third party interests while undermining groups unpopular in
international circles. However, doing so upsets the status-quo distribution of power.
The findings indicate that former armed organizations will remain demilitarized only if
the power differentials maintain. Thus, it is critical that outside actors aim to preserve these. To
673 Sophie de Camera Santa Clara Gomes (UNDP), interview by author, Bogoti, 10 August 2007. For examples of
this ideology, see United Nations 2006; Colletta et al. 1996; World Bank 2009.
674 See Humphreys and Weinstein 2007, which concludes that "successful reintegration requires that combatants
break their ties with the warring factions, so that previous command and control structures no longer operate in the
post-war period" (p. 18).
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do so, third parties must recognize that usually wars are fought not between a singular rebel
group and state, but rather between a multiplicity of actors. Informal arrangements between these
actors are often critical to the architectural integrity of the peace structure. After the peace has
held for several years, outside powers may induce changes in the distribution of power without
risking a return to violence. However, in the early years post-war, this is often not possible.675
Where erosion in demobilizing groups' organizational capacity does occur, the state and
its international backers should aim to fill the resultant power vacuums quickly. According to the
model, we should expect armed units, characterized by dispersed recruitment and post-war
migration, to go bankrupt. If the state enjoys sufficient capacity, it should aim to immediately fill
these voids. If it is incapable of doing so, it should aim to instead bolster the weakening ex-
armed group and facilitate its survival. It can do so by incentivizing non-local ex-combatants to
remain in their combat zones (as 'squatters') to enhance physical clustering and organizational
endurance. 676
The international community's customary recipe also calls for the state reasserting its
presence through reconstruction - the creation of schools, clinics, roads, and police stations in
former armed groups' territories. Where groups survive the demobilization process, this state-
building will spark remilitarization. Thus, reconstruction programs need to collaborate with
rather than challenge intact, ex-armed structures.
There is one area in which the international community has its hands tied: that of
information problems and the noise surrounding relative power estimates. These are key
contributors to instability in the post-conflict period and yet, third parties do not have access to
675 Except if the ex-armed group goes completely bankrupt.
676 The DDR program can also recognize and reward the former rank and status of fighters. Treating mid-ranking
commanders as equal to foot soldiers represents a form of status reversal, which may generate resentment. The
action tendency of resentment is to seek to rectify the hierarchy. This may best be achieved through violence
(redeployment). See Frijda 1994; Elster 1999; Petersen 2002 on resentment.
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the private information necessary to resolve the data asymmetries. If information problems trump
commitment ones, third-party guarantees and power-sharing may not be the obvious solutions.
Finally, peace processes rarely bring an end to illicit political economies, even if they
seek to reduce the economic benefits of war through targeted sanctions, enhanced international
governance of extractable resources, and drug eradication. The persistent presence of illicit
resources means that continued criminality and violence is likely even if the former armed
organizations successfully demilitarize and exit the conflict.
IV. Conclusion
For populations that survive civil wars, peace accords bring hope for an end to terror's
reign. At times, this hope is brought to fruition and the process brings state-building,
democratization, and an end to massacres, torture and displacement. At other times, this hope
fades as peace brings only more death, state absence, and coercive politics. This study offers an
attempt to understand the complex processes that lead to these distinct outcomes. It exposes the
inner workings of demilitarizing organizations and their dynamics with each other, victimized
communities, and the state. It simplifies seemingly riotous variation and empirical chaos into a
model of when survivors should expect peace to end war. It has prescriptive richness and thus
hopes that human action may impact the outcomes it frames.
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Methods Appendices
Appendix A. Challenges of Conducting Research on Remilitarization
Research in war zones is challenging. Armed organizations are extremely opaque and
secretive; data is imperfect, sensitive, and subject to manipulation; protecting one's human
subjects is difficult. Research on remilitarization in Colombia, however, was subject to several
further challenges that merit mention here. One, the shadow of the transitional justice created
disincentives for those involved to confess to the truth. The peace treaties between each of the
paramilitary brigades and Colombian government stipulated that former fighters would enjoy
amnesty and a host of reintegration benefits (monthly salaries, occupational training, health care,
etc.) if they engaged in complete truth-telling and did not return to commit acts of violence. If
they reneged on their side of the agreement and either confessed to only partial truths or returned
to arms, the full force of the Colombian common law would be brought against them.677 Thus,
because a truth and reconciliation commission was underway while I was realizing interviews
and participation observation, many of my demobilized subjects were concerned about the
prospect of punitive action for their behavior. Additionally, they were unlikely to respond
honestly to questions about their comrades as 'tattle-taling' was normally met with harsh
reprisals (death). Given that former fighters were likely to censor their responses about
remilitarization, I chose not to ask direct questions about individuals' participation in illicit
activities; rather my inquiries focused on collectives and organizations. Learning about
individuals' criminal and violent endeavors would have also put my respondents and me at risk;
there is a danger in knowing too much.
Another challenge of remilitarization research derived from the highly dynamic nature of
677 See Law 975 (Justice and Peace Law) of July 2005 and decrees 4760 of 2005 and 690, 2898, and 3391 of 2006.
See also Kalmanovitz 2009.
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the phenomenon in Colombia. Rearmed groups tended to switch names often and mutate
quickly; they demonstrated high levels of flexibility and the ability to respond quickly to changes
in the state's counter-terrorism and counter-crime strategies. The Organization of American
States' Peace Mission called it a "game of names," intended to confuse. 678 The combatants also
intentionally sought to misguide the population and victims as to their affiliation - guerrilla, neo-
paramilitary, military.679 Armed personnel possessed many aliases and multiple legal names6 80
and commanders often demobilized as foot soldiers, further confusing the analysis.
Fear of reprisals for disclosing information also manifested itself in vague, indirect
statements. 68 ' My human subjects asserted that they "never know who is by their side." 682 While
my affiliations afforded me trust, my subjects nonetheless took precautions and, at times,
expressed overt remilitarization in the following ways: "The situation is worrisome;" "There are
inconveniences;" "Something is moving." Reading too much into these statements could be risky
as they were indirect. At the same time, explicit testimonies of remilitarization, while not entirely
absent, were more rare. "No one wants to denounce who is behind the acts nor do they wish to
speak about them," explained a peace monitor.683 Where paramilitarism ran especially deep, the
communities remained silent both because they were scared to speak and because they "want[ed]
678 For example, 'Don Mario's' group assumed the names Autodefensas Bolivarianas; Nuevas Autodefensas; Banda
de UrabA; Los Chengues; Aguilas Negras, Hdroes de Castaflo; and Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia. The
police call them "the ones from Urab6," while others call them the "Urabeflos."
679 In many cases, the remilitarized units explicitly copy the uniforms of the Colombian armed forces. Thus,
informants do not know if it was los paracos or the military operating in their villages. The guerrillas, meanwhile,
only diverge in dress by their boots and their armbands (which they sometimes remove in order to misguide
civilians).
680 For example, Dairon Mendoza Caraballo is known by the aliases 'Rogelio,' 'El Aguila,' 'Cocacolo' and 'John
Dairon Mosquera Palacio,' among others.
681 For a discussion about the authenticity of testimonies under conditions of fear, see Schmidt 2005.
682 Initiative of Colombian Women for Peace, Interview by author, Apartad6, May 2008.
683 Unpublished report, November 2006.
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to protect the paras."684 In addition to intentional falsehoods and vague testimonies, I also
received highly contradictory evidence due to 1) problems of recall despite the short lapse of
time since the events, often just days or months, and at most several years and 2) erroneous
hypotheses guided by the highly imperfect nature of information.
Another source of potential bias in the study of remilitarization derived from electoral
politics. The presence of armed groups was viewed as a report card on the demobilization and
reintegration process, one of Uribe's 'showpiece initiatives.' Accordingly, Uribe supporters
(including the Colombian military, police, and intelligence apparatus) called the armed groups:
'emerging, criminal gangs,' emphasizing that they were 'new forces,' unconnected to the
demobilized paramilitaries (i.e. reintegration had succeeded) and purely criminal (i.e. meriting
the US War on Drugs' funded operations).685 Reintegration program and military personnel
sought to understate the extent of rearming in order to bolster their performance ratings. The
'false positives' scandal speaks to the lengths to which the armed forces would go for these
ratings.686 In contrast, the opposition and the left called the armed groups 'rearmed units,'
'successor groups,' or a 'new generation of paramilitaries,' highlighting their continued elements
and links to the demobilization process.687 Making my way through the weeds of these
ideologically motivated labels and data proved extremely challenging.
A fourth source of information bias was corruption. Armed groups succeeded to varying
degrees at infiltrating state entities through bribery, marriages of convenience, and coercion. As a
result, government data could be unreliable or replete with intentional omissions; state officials'
684 Organization of International Migration, Interview by author, Bogotd, 30 January 2008. According to a conflict
analyst, in these areas, "it will be hard to get information as the paras had full control and infiltration" (Interview by
author, BogotA 24 January 2008).
685 See http://www.eiercito.mil.co
686 See El Tiempo 2009. Stories on the scandal ran in the press frequently from April 2009 through February 2010.
687 Fundaci6n Arco Iris; Indepaz; Human Rights Watch 2010.
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'coziness' with the armed groups created a chasm between them and their invaluable civilian
informants. A demobilized from Caurallo explained to me: "The police doesn't see. Nobody
comes forth to the police with information because Don Mario's [remilitarized] men go to it and
ask who testified, who 'told,' and the police tell them and then the informant get 'punished."' 688
Where narco dollars were involved, bribes reached a level at which nearly no one was immune to
corruption and even enemies could become friends. Thus, any of my human subjects could have
been simultaneously responding to my inquiries and reaping benefits on the rearmed groups'
payrolls.
Finally, the demobilized paramilitaries had one additional incentive to misrepresent
information: to gain compliance and further benefits from the state. As Urabi's reintegration
(ACR) director described: "The participants report to us that there are new groups that are
seeking them out and offering them money and coercing them to join, but I don't know if it is the
truth or not because the demobilized are always threatening that if the ACR doesn't give them
more benefits or comply with everything they will return to the mountains [i.e. to illegal armed
activity]." 689
In order to overcome these diverse data challenges, I exploited the following techniques.
One, I sought to triangulate all information and to never rely on a single source. Two, I engaged
in a multi-method research design; different methods suffer different biases. Three, I aimed to
develop relationships with my human subjects over time in order to increase their levels of trust.
I also relied on information principally from people who had their fingers on the pulse of the
communities and were deemed reliable confidantes of diverse members of those communities.
Along these lines, I wore several different hats while conducting my fieldwork in areas of
688 Demobilized foot soldier (Bloque Bananero), interview by author, Caurallo, 3 July 2008
689 High Council of Reintegration Urabd Director, interview by author, Apartad6, 26 June 2008.
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remilitarization. Each hat afforded me a different inroad into the world of the demobilized
combatants, remilitarized soldiers, victims, civil society and state's coercive apparatus. I spoke
with police commanders, mayors, army officers, representatives from indigenous and afro-
Colombian organizations, victim associations, reintegration program personnel, ombudsmen,
attorney generals, intelligence officials, journalists, ex-combatants (both commanders and foot
soldiers), remilitarized and imprisoned former paramilitaries, banana, palm, and wood plantation
owners, cattle ranchers, ex-guerrillas (EPL, FARC, ELN), community leaders, politicians of the
Community Action Committees (JAC) and the Local Administration Boards (JAL), Catholic
priests, families of former commanders, and international organization personnel. I also
consulted local and national media and NGO and government reports. Perhaps most importantly,
I was wary of the information I received and analyzed it cognizant of its potential shortcomings
and biases.
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Appendix B. Elite Interviews & Document Collection
Elite Interviews
During my time in the field, I conducted over 200 in-depth interviews with experts on the
Colombian civil conflict in general and the paramilitaries in particular. Every contact led to more
interviews and meetings. Thus, in many respects, my elite sampling technique acquired a
snowballing aspect. I interviewed professors at both national and regional universities in the
fields of Political Science, Economics, Sociology, History, and Anthropology. I made sure to
speak with academics at both public and private universities. I spoke with researchers at all of
Colombia's major think tanks: Fundaci6n Seguridad y Democracia, Fundacion Ideas para la Paz,
Corporaci6n Arco Iris, CINEP, CERAC, CEDE, IEPRI, Fedesarrollo, CODHES, and Fundaci6n
Progresar. I also spoke with analysts and practitioners at the International Organizations present
in Colombia: USAID, UNDP, OIM, MAPP/OEA, World Bank, International Crisis Group, and
ICTJ. I interviewed a wide range of Colombian government officials from the intelligence
branches (DAS, DIPOL, CTI, CIJIN), the security forces (Ministry of Defense, Police, Army,
and Navy), the justice and human rights sectors (Fiscalia, Personeria, Defensoria del Pueblo,
ICBF), and policy makers (ex-presidents, senators, governors, mayors). I met with journalists
from several of Colombia's national newspapers and magazines - El Espectador, El Tiempo,
Revista Semana and Voz - and regional newspapers - El Heraldo de Urabd, Urabd Hoy, and La
Opinidn. I also interviewed a large number of the people working with the Reintegration
Program for ex-combatants and the Reparations and Reconciliation Program for victims both at
the national and local levels. Finally, I interviewed members of the church involved with
conciliation and negotiation. These 'elite' interviews had very high response rates. The only non-
respondents were due to scheduling issues (generally they were out of town during the dates I
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was in the region). I conducted the interviews in the Colombian departments of Antioquia,
C6rdoba, Choc6, Bogota, Cesar, Norte de Santander, Valle de Cauca, Magdalena, Bolivar, la
Guajira, Atlintico, and Meta.
Document Collection
To complement the interviews, I engaged in content analysis of the armed organizations'
records and consulted newspapers, secondary literatures, and government documents. I was able to
access most of the academic, think tank, and government research and data conducted on my topic.
Additionally, with the help of a research assistant from the Universidad de los Andes, I collected
articles from 10 national and regional newspaper articles 2002 to the present that cover the peace
negotiations, demobilization process, reintegration, rearming phenomenon, and the so-called para-
politica. This work involved both searching the few newspapers, which had online search engines
and going to the national library and regional newspaper offices and reading the physical copies of
the newspapers page by page and photographing the relevant articles. Fortunately, the Alta
Consejeria para la Reintegraci6n also hired a media firm to collect relevant articles on a daily basis
beginning in January 2007 and the Fundaci6n Ideas para la Paz similarly collected articles on the
peace process. I gained access to these compilations of news reports. However, the former only
collects information on reintegration and the latter is incomplete. Thus, I chose to complement these
collections with my own. I also created a municipal-level violent event database of paramilitary,
guerrilla and state violence of 43 years of data (1964-2007). This database combines a dataset I
created by photographing and coding Colombian newspaper articles documenting violent events
1960-1984 and a dataset compiled by Fabio Sanchez (1984-2007).
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Appendix C. Survey Methodology
This dissertation project draws on data from nine surveys. This section presents their
survey designs, enumeration strategies, and potential sources of bias.
Table 22. Surveys
Survey Name Number Number
Total Usable
Respondents Surveys
Baseline Ex-Combatant Survey 31,472 31,472
SAMEl Ex-Combatant Survey 11,703 11,703
SAME2 Ex-Combatant Survey 28,235* 24,389
Comprehensive Ex-Combatant Survey 15,540 14,090
Survey of Ex-Combatants' Nuclear Families 2,247 2,245
Medellin Survey (OIM) 3,207 3,207
Comprehensive Survey of Ex-Combatants' Psychologists 226 226
Short Survey of Ex-Combatants' Psychologists 2,817 2,767
Civilian Community Survey 5,004 5,004
Prison Survey 120 120
*Includes guerrillas and individually demobilized paramilitaries
1. Organization of International Migration: Baseline Ex-Combatant Survey
Organization of International Migration personnel were present in the 'concentration
zones' of each of the paramilitary bloques prior to their demobilization. While there, they
surveyed nearly the entire population of paramilitaries that disarmed: 31,472 of 31,638. The
survey had three main objectives. The first was to obtain an assessment of the basic
characteristics of the population as well as their expectations for the future in order to design a
reintegration program that would meet its beneficiaries' needs. Second, the survey constituted
the baseline data for the Sistema de Acompafiamiento, Monitoreo, y Evaluaci6n (SAME), which
was created to 'accompany, monitor and evaluate' each individual ex-combatant's route back
into civilian life. Third, the survey aimed to extract information on demobilized combatants'
intended destination of post-war migration. This information was intended to help choose the
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locations of the government's reintegration program offices (Reference and Opportunity Centers
(CRO)).
Given that this survey interviewed nearly all the ex-paramilitaries, it provides me with
basic information on the entire population of ex-combatants and, using the identification
numbers, enables me to merge the other surveys with this database in order to understand their
potential sampling biases and coverage errors.
2. Organization of International Migration: SAME] Ex-Combatant Survey
Following the initial survey, the Organization of International Migration continued to
monitor and evaluate the reintegration program (through SAME), conducting monthly surveys
on the services provided. It also realized a more comprehensive ex-combatant survey. The
purpose of this latter questionnaire was to gain insights into ex-combatants' perceptions about
their reintegration processes. Specifically, it asked them to reflect on their integration into their
communities, forgiveness and reconciliation experiences, family relations, intra-family violence,
emotional control, consumption of psychoactive substances, and management of sexuality. The
survey was administered through the OIM 'supervisors' who conducted semi-structured
interviews with each member of their groups of ex-combatant beneficiaries (123 per supervisor).
Coverage was good, but better in some places (Medellin reached 90% of the ex-combatants) than
in others due to the OIM's reach; it did not have personnel in the entire country. The reasons for
individual non-response to the SAME survey included: 1) the individuals could not be located; 2)
they had security problems and thus preferred not to respond to the survey; 3) they were out of
town at the time of the survey's application; or 4) they were either deceased, detained, or in
psychiatric clinics.
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3. Organization of International Migration: SAME2 Ex-Combatant Survey
Given its incomplete coverage, the OIM, in collaboration with the government's
reintegration program, enumerated a third survey in 2007 (which I will call SAME2) to collect
all missing data on the population of ex-combatants with which the program had contact
(28,235). The missing data in this survey was almost perfectly proportionate to the ex-bloque
populations, suggesting that being 'missing' was not associated with membership in any
particular ex-faction.
The SAME2 survey collected information on ex-combatants' towns or origin and current
residences, basic demographics (age, gender, ethnicity, family structure), employment and
education histories and future trajectories, reintegration program services, health care, judicial
status, security threats, and offers to rejoin armed groups. Combined, the SAMEl and SAME2
ex-combatants surveys provide relatively detailed information on 82% of the paramilitary
population.
4. Comprehensive Ex-Combatant Survey
For a large-scale, individual-level survey of demobilized paramilitaries, I collaborated
with the Colombian High Commission for Reintegration. This survey's population of inference
was ex-combatants in post-conflict environments. The survey asked, among other things, about
the ex-combatants' experiences in the armed groups, social networks, participation in ex-
combatant NGOs, productive projects, political campaigns, businesses, and the conditions under
which they deemed remilitarization justifiable.
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Survey Instrument. The survey instrument, first developed in a graduate survey design
course at Harvard University, benefitted from the feedback of the course professor and fellow
students. It also was improved by suggestions from my dissertation committee, PRIO scholars,
academics employing similar surveys in Africa, and Colombian individuals involved with the
reintegration process. The Colombian Reintegration Program planned on conducting a survey
similar to my own, which facilitated our collaboration.
Sample Frame The ACR administered monthly stipends, schooling, training, and
psychological and social aid to nearly all of the demobilized individuals at 40 Centers of Service. 690
Each ex-combatant was assigned to a tutor (psychologist) with no more than 120 former fighters per
tutor. The tutores conducted house visits to every ex-combatant (and their families) once per month
in order to track their reintegration. Additionally, they carried out weekly workshops with the
program's beneficiaries. These tutores conducted the survey. They had established rapports with
and engendered the trust of the ex-paramilitaries. Additionally, the tutores were trained as social
workers and psychologists and were therefore well suited to interview this vulnerable population.
Finally, they enjoyed access to the entire population of demobilized ex-combatants. Thus, the
sample frame was all ex-combatants in the Reintegration Program.
Coverage Error. For this research design, there were several sources of coverage error. One,
844 demobilized individuals had been killed.69 1 Second, there were 3,171 'non-located' ex-
combatants with whom the Reintegration Program had lost contact (this included individually
demobilized guerrillas). To understand this population, I interviewed the 226 reintegration
psychologists. Many ex-fighters exited the reintegration program and then later returned to it. I thus
asked the psychologists why these ex-paramilitaries left the program, what they were doing while
690 25,318 or 82% of the total ex-paramilitary population regularly went to these centers.
691 As of May 2008.
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outside the program, why they returned, and if they differed from the rest of the demobilized
population in any systematic ways. I also explicitly tested if the 'non-locatable' ex-combatants were
different than those that remained in the program by comparing these two populations' profiles in
the OIM baseline survey. Excluding them does not seem to bias the sample. It should be noted that
"being located" by the Reintegration Program was oftentimes more a function of how long the ex-
combatant had been demobilized than if s/he had returned to arms or not. Additionally, the mobility
of ex-combatants rendered their whereabouts difficult to track.
Finally, there is an additional form of bias that plagues all the ex-combatant surveys in
this study and indeed other ex-combatant surveys conducted worldwide. Not all 'combatants'
who demobilize are part of the military structures of the armed groups, or even necessarily part
of the armed groups at all. When asked if they suspect or know if any of their beneficiaries were
not combatants in the guerrilla or paramilitary armies, 57% of the tutores responded 'yes.' Of
their participants (on average 109 per tutor), an average of 6.4% were deemed not to have been
combatants. This amounts to a total of 2,000 demobilized persons in the program. Ninety-three
percent of the tutores did, however, believe that these 'non-combatant' participants in the
reintegration process had had some link with the members of the armed groups. Of these, 41%
believed them to have been friends of the members of the armed groups; 37% believed them to
have been family members of the armed groups' fighters, 16% responded that they were likely
sympathizers of the armed groups, and 6% responded that they had had other functions within
the groups: cooks, mechanics, drivers, forced collaborators, doctors, and girlfriends.
Even the ex-paramilitary commanders confirmed the 'non-combatant' status of some of
the ex-combatants. For example, Ramon Isaza, in his testimony under the Justice and Peace Law,
admitted, "There were many people in the demobilization that were not part of the Autodefensas
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Campesinas de Magdalena Medio." 692 Prior to disarmament, the government and conflict
analysts estimated the paramilitaries to number 10,000 to 12,000 soldiers. Over 31,000
demobilized. The explanation given was that, for every military combatant, there were three
'supporters' providing intelligence, cooking food, sewing uniforms, fixing cars, etc. Thus, the
numbers swelled to 30,000.693 Another account held that the commanders "asked [civilians] to
give their names on the list of combatants so that they would get the benefits and services
(money, health, schooling) from the government. In this way the commanders enhanced their
support bases." 694
I elaborate on this source of bias because the research design assumes that the ex-combatants
were indeed former fighters or, at least formally belonged to the armed organizations in some way. If
common civilians, their likelihood of reintegration is distinct from that of the ex-combatants. If
common criminals, their likelihood of recidivism is similarly distinct from that of former
paramilitaries. While the survey asked, "What was your rank and job during the war?," the responses
proved to be edited. Respondents believed that if they responded that they were "ex-combatants,"
they might be tried for crimes against humanity, but if they instead said they were "supporters," their
role in the paramilitaries would be questioned and they would lose their reintegration benefits. Given
the government's official claim that all participants in the reintegration program belonged to the
armed organizations and the inability of the researcher to separate out the 'real' from the 'imposter'
ex-combatants in the data, I report this issue, but cannot resolve it.
Mode. This fourth ex-combatant survey, as the other surveys described above, used face-
to-face mode for contacting respondents and conducting the surveys. The majority of individuals
692 Ram6n Isaza, Testimony under the Justice and Peace Law, Bogot6, 30 April - 2 May 2007.
693 The number of arms represents a reasonable estimate of the number of people in the military structure (the
international standard is two arms for every person. 28,000 were turned in which puts the number of actual
combatants at 14,000).
694 Conflict analyst, interview by author, Bogoti, February 2008.
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in the sample frame did not have telephones or internet access and thus face-to-face remained the
only realistic mode. Additionally, the majority of ex-combatants had very low levels of
education (50% had less than primary school education) and 12% were illiterate. Therefore, self-
administered or highly technical tests would have been ineffective.
Pilot. The survey was piloted in four locations on 159 respondents across Colombia
(Tierralta, Monteria, Ibague, and Villavicencio) with the goals of clarifying the hypotheses, refining
the survey questions, and establishing the infrastructure for the full-scale survey. Focus groups were
then held with the enumerators of the pilot surveys in order to gain their feedback on the survey
instrument and administering procedures.
Full Survey. The survey was conducted on a total of 15,540 ex-combatants. The populations
of ex-combatants in the sample were proportionate to the number of ex-combatants in each ex-
paramilitary bloque.
S. Ex-Combatants' Nuclear Family Survey
A fifth survey was conducted of 2,247 randomly-selected nuclear families of ex-
combatants. This survey was enumerated in the ex-combatants' homes, but without the former
fighters present in order to create an environment of confidentiality. The idea of this survey was
to triangulate the information given by the ex-combatants and to gain insights into the
reintegration process from all different perspectives. Eighteen of those in the sample frame were
not surveyed either because the ex-combatants lived alone and had no family nearby (15 cases),
the family was deceased (2 cases), or the ex-combatants' family members were not aware that
the individuals were demobilized (1 case).
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The survey assessed six domains of the reintegration process: family type, family
dynamics, housing characteristics, emotional control, use of psychoactive substances, and
interactions with the community. The family members' answers spoke to their intimate
relationship with the demobilized fighters, but also to their status as members of the civilian
communities.
6. Comprehensive Survey of Ex-Combatants' Psychologists
The sixth survey was administered to the psychologists charged with providing the ex-
combatants, their families, and communities the reintegration benefits. As mentioned above, they
met weekly with the demobilized paramilitaries, observed them at community events, met with
their associations, and lived in their towns. The survey thus aimed to collect extensive
information on the situation of reintegration, reconciliation, and remilitarization in each
municipality in which the ex-combatants lived.
The instrument was piloted on a group of psychologists in Villavicencio, Apartad6, and
Pereira, and was then administered to the entire population of psychologists who had been
working in their municipalities for at least two months (n=226). The survey was anonymous in
order to address potential sources of bias, namely employment desirability bias and fear of
retribution bias. The psychologists sought positive employment reviews and thus, had the survey
not been anonymous, they would have exaggerated the reintegration and reconciliation success
in their regions. They also wished to uphold 'patient confidentiality' and not betray their human
subjects. Last, they would have feared retribution by the ex-combatants and new armed groups
for reporting on violence. The anonymous survey asked the psychologists if they felt that they
could tell the ACR of their participants' involvement in illegal activities. 51% responded, 'no.'
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While the majority explained this response in the following way - "I can't ensure that the
participants are involved with illegal activities, I only suspect it" - others confirmed their fear of
poor evaluations, of betraying their participants' trust, and of becoming a victim of aggression by
one of the participants or an armed group. Thus, the survey's anonymity proved critical. The
tutores received the survey by email and then returned a paper copy anonymously to the ACR's
central office in Bogota.
7. Short Survey of Ex-Combatants' Psychologists
The psychologists of 2,817 randomly-selected ex-combatants were also asked to assess
these ex-combatants' reintegration process in order to further triangulate the evidence. This
survey's unit of analysis was the individual ex-combatant while the one described above uses the
municipality as the unit of analysis.
8. Civilian Community Survey
The eighth survey was administered to civilian communities with a significant
demobilized presence. The survey's objective was to gain insights into community members'
assessments of the reintegration and reconciliation processes between the former fighters and the
civilian populations.
The target population was all stakeholders in the 450 neighborhoods identified for the
survey because of their large populations of ex-combatants. Stakeholders were defined as
"relevant people in the political, civic and religious realms," and "dynamics of the community,
such as community leaders, mothers, housewives, members of the JACs, teachers," 695 "mayors,
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695 Mitchell, Angle and Word 1997.
leaders of the taxi drivers, NGOs, priests, etc." These individuals were deemed to have "an
objective reading of the communities." 696
After mapping the stakeholders according to their power and influence, the survey was
administered by enumerators with previous knowledge of the neighborhoods that could identify
the selected respondents. The respondents were proportional to the number of total inhabitants
and number of ex-combatant inhabitants living in the neighborhoods.
The interviews were semi-structured, the conversations were open, but, during the
interviews, the enumerator touched on all the specific themes in the instrument. This strategy
was adopted in order to reduce mistrust and gain more accurate answers. 84% of the surveys
were enumerated in the respondents' homes, in an environment of confidentiality, which
improved the quality of the data collected. The remaining surveys were carried out in public
places: in churches, stores, schools, and clinics.
This survey offers a window into combatant-civilian relations. However, unfortunately, it
was administered not across Colombia, but only in certain communities concentrated in
Medellin, Urabi, C6rdoba, and Norte de Santander, which do not constitute a representative
sample of Colombian regions. Nonetheless, the survey provides reliable data in these cluster
sites.
9. Prison Survey
Finally, in collaboration with the OAS-MAPP, I conducted a survey of recidivist ex-
paramilitaries. The population of inference was former combatants who remilitarize: return to
commit acts of violence after disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating. The target population
696 OIM Personnel, interview by author, BogotA, 30 January 2008.
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was the imprisoned population of former paramilitaries who rearmed, were captured, and
imprisoned (1,797 ex-combatants).697
The project used cluster sampling. First, I established the numbers of 'reincidentes'
(recidivists) in each prison and then sampled randomly within the five prisons with the largest
imprisoned populations (to minimize cost, but ensure as unbiased a sample as possible). The list
of recidivists from which I selected the random sample was compiled using databases from the
Attorney General's Office, National Police, and High Commission for Reintegration (ACR).
The survey was then administered to a sample of 120 ex-paramilitary inmates in
Medellin's Bellavista Prison, Bogota's La Picota Prison, Cn'cuta's Prison, and Valledupar's
maximum security and medium security prisons. Procedures for the selection of subjects within
the prison were random and thus fair to all prisoners (each prisoner had an equal probability of
being selected) and immune from arbitrary intervention by prison authorities or prisoners. In
order to guarantee sufficient information on each of the variables of interest, I also used
information on the potential respondents' paramilitary blocs, where they operated during the war,
and what type of crime they committed post-demobilization.
Pilot. Before realizing the full-scale survey, we conducted a pilot of five prisoners and,
with this information, revised the questionnaire. We also gained a better sense of the prison
system and how we could minimize the risks to our human subjects.
It should be noted that, while the prison authorities notified the individuals on my list that
I wished to speak to them, they did not use the selection process to favor or punish prisoners. The
prisoner's participation in the research, moreover, had no consequences in terms of receiving
benefits or punishments from the prison officials. Additionally, the respondents were not asked
697 3,437 demobilized have been captured since 2003, but only 1,797 were imprisoned at the time of the survey in
April - December 2008.
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about any specifics of their or their comrades' crimes or activities during the war to ensure that
they did not get in trouble with their ex-combatant colleagues and to ensure that the study had no
effect on their judicial status.
Another potential concern was that prisoners who were not selected to be participants in
the study would view the participants with jealousy, suspicion, or hostility. I did not find this
concern to be applicable because, if prisoners wished to speak with us and express concerns
about the reintegration program or their legal rights, they were permitted to do so, irrespective of
their participation in the survey.
The benefits to the prison survey participants were emotional as there was no
compensation for participation. The interview broke up the prisoners' relatively mundane lives,
provided them the opportunity to tell their story, to explain their decisions, and to contribute to
reintegration success and consolidated peace.
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